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Why do rebel groups frequently fight each other rather than cooperating against their common enemy 
– the state? This dissertation presents a theory of inter-rebel war and tests it with a combination 
of case studies and statistical analysis.  
The theory conceives of inter-rebel war as a calculated response by rebel groups to 
opportunities for expansion and threats generated by the civil war environment in which they 
operate. Insurgent organizations attack weaker coethnic groups when government forces only 
pose a limited threat (i.e., when they face a window of opportunity), so as to eliminate potentially 
threatening rivals and acquire more resources to be used against the state. Additionally, rebel 
groups resort to force in desperate attempts to deal with a mounting threat posed by coethnic 
groups or a drastic deterioration of their power relative to other groups (i.e., when they face a 
window of vulnerability).        
Rebel groups’ cost-benefit calculus about infighting is powerfully influenced by whether 
they are facing coethnic insurgent organizations. Coethnic rebel groups’ overlapping 
mobilization bases make it possible for an organization to take over the resources (in particular, 
recruitment pools and tax bases) of defeated rivals and consequently improve their chances in the 
fight against the government. Thus coethnicity amplifies both defensive and aggressive motives 




  This dissertation adopts a mixed-method approach, combining case studies and statistical 
analysis. My three main case studies are the Kurdish rebellions against Iraq (1961-1988), the 
Eritrean war of national liberation (1961-1991) and the insurgencies in Ethiopia’s Tigray 
province (1975-1991). These case studies combine secondary literature with primary sources 
collected during fieldwork in Iraq, Ethiopia and several European countries – including fifty-four 
semi-structured interviews with forty former insurgent leaders, their memoirs, and archival 
materials. 
  In order to assess the generalizability of my argument across a variety of historical, 
geographical and political contexts, I also conducted shadow case studies of the civil wars in 
Lebanon (1975-89), Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and Syria (2011-), and analyzed an original panel 
dataset of all dyads of rebel groups pitted against the same government in multi-party civil wars 
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In early January 2014, the news media were abuzz with reports of large-scale clashes between 
Sunni rebel groups taking part in the Syrian civil war, which had started over two years earlier 
when the government cracked down on peaceful protestors. Pundits were quick to point out that 
the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Assad would be the ultimate beneficiary. Analysts 
Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, for example, noted that “rebel infighting is a boon to regime 
forces and clearly detrimental to the overall strength of the Syrian opposition.”
1
 This initial 
assessment was confirmed by subsequent developments, as the government made major gains in 
the following months as inter-rebel war dragged on.
2
  
Analyses of the causes of the infighting, however, were not as insightful as the 
predictions of its consequences. The initial narrative of “moderate” rebel groups fighting against 
the ruthless jihadi organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became 
untenable as evidence emerged that the anti-ISIS coalition included several Salafist organizations 
and even al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.
3
 Why would rebel groups sharing ethno-
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 See, for example, Sam Dagher and Maria Abi-Habib, “Fighting Among Rebels Boosts Syrian Regime,” Wall 
Street Journal, 13 January, 2014.   
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sectarian identities and religious ideology divert resources from their common struggle against a 
powerful foe to fight each other?   
Contemporary history is replete with instances of inter-rebel fighting. For example, 
during the Algerian war of national liberation against the French, the National Liberation Front 
(FLN) systematically targeted its local competitor, the Algerian National Movement (MNA). In 
more recent times, the Tamil Tigers wiped out rival Tamil groups waging guerrilla warfare 
against the Sri Lankan government, and Kashmir’s pro-Pakistan insurgents destroyed the pro-
independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) as they were all fighting against 
Indian security forces. The clashes between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Anbar’s local rebel groups in 
the mid-2000s are perhaps the episode of inter-rebel violence that has attracted the most attention 
in media and policy circles, due to the involvement of US forces in the war and the fact that it 




 This dissertation presents a theory of inter-rebel war – large-scale combat between 
organizations taking part in armed struggle against the state – and tests it with a combination of 
case studies (based on a variety of sources, including interviews with former insurgent leaders 
conducted by the author) and statistical analysis. In a nutshell, the theory conceives of inter-rebel 
war as a rational, calculated response by rebel groups to opportunities for expansion and threats 
generated by the civil war environment in which they operate. Insurgent organizations attack 
weaker coethnic groups when the incumbent only poses a limited threat, so as to eliminate 
potentially threatening rivals and acquire more resources to be used against the government. 
                                                          
4
 See, for example, Jon Lindsay and Austin Long, “Counterinsurgency Theory and Stabilization of Iraq’s Anbar,” 
working paper, 2009; and Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why did 
Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37 (1), 2012: 1-34. 
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Additionally, rebel groups resort to force in desperate attempts to deal with a mounting threat 
posed by coethnic groups or a drastic deterioration of their power relative to other groups.        
Rebel groups’ cost-benefit calculus about infighting is powerfully influenced by whether 
they are facing coethnic insurgent organizations. Coethnic rebel groups’ overlapping 
mobilization bases make it possible for an organization to take over the resources (in particular, 
recruitment pools and tax bases) of defeated rivals and consequently improve their chances in the 
fight against the government. Thus coethnicity amplifies both defensive and aggressive motives 
for inter-rebel war.  
 
1. The Puzzle and Limits of Existing Explanations 
The occurrence of inter-rebel war is puzzling from several theoretical points of view. Rational 
calculations based on power and interest should dissuade rebel groups from diverting scarce 
resources from the struggle against their common enemy. In particular, balance of power logic 
should push rebel groups to ally against the incumbent, as it is usually the strongest civil war 
belligerent. These strategic considerations should be reinforced by the enhanced social cohesion 
in the rebel camp brought about by the shared experience of violence at the hands of the 
government. This effect should be especially strong when the government and the rebels belong 
to different ethnic groups, as ethnic violence “hardens” identities and deepens inter-ethnic 
hostility and fears. 
Recent scholarship in International Relations and Comparative Politics has shed much 
light on a broad range of civil war dynamics, but we still lack compelling explanations of inter-
rebel war. In the only published large-N study specifically on the topic, Hanne Fjelde and 
Desirée Nilsson find that insurgent groups are more likely to be involved in inter-rebel war when 
4 
 
they are either strong or weak relative to other groups; they have exclusive control of a part of 
the country’s territory; they fight in areas with drug cultivation; and when the government’s 
political authority is weak.
5
 However, these are, in a sense, correlations in search for a theory, as 
the findings are not integrated in an overarching explanation of inter-rebel violence.  
Fotini Christia has advanced perhaps the most comprehensive and elegant theoretical 
explanation for civil war alliances, with clear implications for inter-rebel war.
6
 She argues that 
alliances follow a minimum winning coalition (MWC) logic, i.e., belligerents strive to be part of 
an alliance large enough to win the war but as small as possible given the requirement of being 
on the winning side. When the MWC threshold is passed, one or more belligerents will abandon 
the dominant coalition in search for an optimally-sized one. However, Christia’s work has some 
empirical limits. Most crucially for my purposes, the groups involved in all the episodes of inter-
rebel violence mentioned earlier faced an overwhelmingly powerful government. Because they 
did not constitute a MWC, the insurgents should have refrained from fighting each other. Thus 
MWC theory does not represent a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of inter-rebel war.  
Building on these important recent contributions, this dissertation aims to fill this gap in 
the literature.  
 
2. The Stakes for Policy  
Unraveling the puzzle of inter-rebel war is not only important for theoretical reasons; it also has 
crucial policy implications. Policymakers will typically want to have a sense of the probability of 
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 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Civil war 
alliances and inter-rebel war are related but distinct phenomena. Two rebel groups may not cooperate and thus not 
form an alliance but may also abstain from fighting each other. However, arguments that make predictions about 
rebel alliances typically imply predictions about inter-rebel fighting, as allies are expected not to fight each other. 
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inter-rebel fighting and of what policies could be adopted to induce cooperation or conflict 
between rebels when deciding about intervention in ongoing civil wars. Going back to the 
example with which this chapter opened, the linchpin of President’s Obama strategy against ISIS 
is the idea that US intervention could promote violent conflict between that organization and 
other Sunni Arab armed groups in Iraq and Syria.
7
 By contrast, in the early 1990s forging an 
alliance between Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats was a key element of the US intervention strategy 
in that civil war, ultimately aiming to put pressure on the Serbs to negotiate.
8
  
Moreover, inter-rebel violence may lead to insurgent side-switching, as the group being 
defeated turns to the government for help.
9
 Insurgent “defection” not only entails a shift of 
military resources between opposing sides, but also often provides the government with precious 
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 This point is well illustrated by insurgencies in Iraq and Sri Lanka. In the first case, the decision by Anbar 
province’s local rebels to side with US and Iraqi security forces against their erstwhile ally – al-Qaeda in Iraq – 
marked a key turning point in the counterinsurgency campaign, paving the road to a substantial reduction in 
insurgent activity in the province and in the rest of the country (Lindsay and Long 2009; Biddle, Friedman and 
Shapiro 2012). The Tamil Tigers’ eastern commander’s “flip” in 2004 facilitated the subsequent offensive by the Sri 
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22, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, CLAWS, 2010, New Delhi). 
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3.   Window Theory of Inter-rebel War and Contribution to the Literature 
My argument combines a power-driven, strategic logic of interaction in an anarchic environment 
with the idea that ethnic identities shape rebel groups’ calculations and threat perception. Inter-
rebel war occurs when groups face “windows of opportunity” or “windows of vulnerability.”
11
 
  Windows of opportunity emerge when a rebel group is in a position of clear military 
superiority over another group (or groups) directly competing for the same pool of resources – 
namely, the same ethno-national community – and the government does not pose an immediate 
and serious threat, even if it is much stronger in terms of aggregate military power. Under these 
circumstances, the stronger rebel organization will be tempted to launch a hegemonic bid – i.e., 
use overwhelming force to get rid of (or significantly weaken) coethnic rivals. The combination 
of favorable imbalance of power and limited government threat holds the prospect of achieving 
hegemony in the rebel camp at relatively low costs and risks. And getting rid of coethnic 
organizations entails significant benefits for rebel groups, which can be ultimately traced to 
ethnic parochialism, i.e., individuals’ tendency to cooperate with and favor members of one’s 
ethnic group. Given their overlapping popular bases and comparable ethno-national credentials, 
the victor can expect to be able to absorb a large chunk of the resources previously under the 
control of defeated rivals (including potential recruits and financial and logistical support 
networks), thus strengthening its position vis-à-vis the government. Moreover, as coethnic rebel 
groups aspire to control the same population and territories and may expect to do so with relative 
ease once they achieve a hegemonic position, they represent potential threats to each other. 
Success in inter-rebel war, therefore, can improve the threat environment of the group that 
emerges on top. By contrast, the victor of a fight between non-coethnic organizations would 
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 See Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999), pp. 73-104, for a discussion of “windows” as causes of interstate war.   
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likely be perceived as an alien presence by the base of support of a defeated rebel group and thus 
have a hard time with recruitment and extraction activities, forcing it to devote substantial 
resources to policing the population, to the point that rebel hegemony may result in a net drain on 
the organization’s resources.  
Windows of vulnerability arise when a rebel group faces the clear prospect of a dramatic 
deterioration of its power relative to other groups or a mounting threat posed by a coethnic rival. 
If no other option appears viable, the organization may be tempted to resort to force against the 
rival or start a course of action entailing a high risk of inter-rebel war, in a desperate attempt to 
turn the tables. I call this typology of inter-rebel war “gambling for resurrection,” which has been 
defined as “an attempt to maintain power by inducing massive change in the environment which 
has only a small chance of succeeding.”
12
  
  This dissertation situates itself in a growing body of works on civil war processes at the 
“meso-level”. By focusing on rebel organizations as central actors it contributes to bridging the 
gap between micro analyses of individuals and local communities affected by armed conflict and 
macro studies at the country- or ethnic-group level.
13
  
  The argument’s key moving parts – power and ethno-national identity – are common to 
many civil war studies, but they are conceptualized and combined in distinctive ways, with far 
reaching theoretical implications. Unlike most civil war studies that adopt some variant of 
balance of power logic, this dissertation conceptualizes belligerents’ power as both dynamic and 
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 Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity Without Groups,” European Journal of Sociology 43 (2), 2002: 163-89; Laia 
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Challenges, and the Way Forward,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (8), 2014: 1343-59. 
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contextual. Insurgents start operating from a position of weakness vis-à-vis the incumbent, but 
they expect to grow as they conduct political and military activities. As David Galula writes, 
“[t]he protracted nature of a revolutionary war does not result from a design by either side; it is 
imposed on the insurgent by his initial weakness.”
14
 My argument views infighting as one of the 
processes through which rebel groups can become stronger (in this case, by acquiring resources 
controlled by defeated coethnic rivals). Contrary to standard balance of power thinking, inter-
rebel war in a context in which the government is militarily much stronger than the insurgents 
may enable a rebel group’s growth without exposing it to an unacceptably higher risk of being 
wiped out. This is because the incumbent’s power is contextual: its superior aggregate military 
resources do not automatically translate into ability or willingness to project decisive force at 
short notice anywhere in the country’s territory. Political, military and logistical constraints may 
limit government power projection, so that the incumbent may not represent a serious and 
immediate threat to the rebels groups fighting each other. 
  The notion that coethnicity increases the risk of inter-rebel war by shaping rebel groups’ 
growth prospects and threat perception challenges two prevalent views of the effects of ethnic 
identity on civil war processes. The first one sees coethnicity as a source of inter-rebel solidarity 
and cooperation,
15
 while the second one considers identities as epiphenomenal – a façade for 
narrow material calculations, not an important causal force.
16
 By contrast, I argue that 
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coethnicity powerfully shapes rebel groups’ behavior, providing strong incentives for inter-group 
aggression rather than cooperation.     
      
4.   Empirical Approach 
This dissertation adopts a mixed-method approach, combining case studies and statistical 
analysis. The bulk of the evidentiary burden lies on in-depth case studies, because testing my 
argument requires fine-grained and contextual measures of relative power and threat, which are 
exceedingly hard to code for a large number of cases over time. My three main case studies are 
the Kurdish insurgencies against Iraq (1961-1988), the Eritrean war of national liberation (1961-
1991) and the rebellions in Ethiopia’s Tigray province (1975-1991). These case studies combine 
secondary literature with primary sources collected during fieldwork in Iraq, Ethiopia and 
several European countries – including fifty-four semi-structured interviews with forty former 
insurgent leaders, their memoirs and archival materials. I chose the Iraq case for theory 
development as it meets the deviant and diverse case criteria – it displays a pattern of inter-rebel 
fighting that extant theories cannot explain and full variation on the dependent variable (inter-
rebel war). I selected the Eritrea and Tigray cases for theory testing due to their substantial 
variation on the dependent variable and the fact that their combination offers a chance to test 
qualitatively the coethnicity part of my argument – the two neighboring provinces experienced 
multiparty ethnic rebellions, with insurgent groups having interactions, and thus opportunities for 
conflict, both within and across ethnic communities. 
  As a preliminary assessment of the generalizability of my argument across a variety of 
historical, geographical and political contexts, I also conducted shadow case studies based on 
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secondary literature of the civil wars in Lebanon (1975-89), Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and Syria 
(2011-). All three are multi-party civil wars fought along ethnic lines with multiple episodes of 
inter-rebel fighting, thus offering several opportunities for within-case controlled comparisons; 
each of them has also distinct benefits. Lebanon’s civil war is an especially useful case to test the 
coethnicity hypothesis, as it features both coethnic and non-coethnic armed groups operating in 
close proximity and thus with opportunities to fight each other; the Syrian civil war allows me to 
assess whether window theory sheds light on the behavior of jihadi groups, a relatively common 
presence in post-9-11 civil wars; and the Tamil insurgency offers an opportunity to the assess the 
performance of the argument beyond Africa and the Middle East broadly defined, where all of 
my other cases are located.  
  Finally, I use an original panel dataset of all dyads of rebel groups pitted against the same 
government in a multi-party civil war in the period 1989-2011 to further assess the external 
validity of window theory. In particular, I test the argument’s observable implication that, other 
things being equal, coethnic rebel dyads should be more likely to experience infighting.   
 
5.   Plan of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the window theory 
of inter-rebel war, elaborating on the constitutive elements of windows of opportunity and 
vulnerability. Particular attention is devoted to how coethnicity affects rebel groups’ cost-benefit 
calculus about infighting. This chapter also details my dissertation’s research design, discussing 
the argument’s scope conditions, case selection strategy and challenges involved in tracing 
insurgent decision-making by interviewing former rebel leaders. Chapter 3 presents the theory-
development case study of the Kurdish insurgencies against Iraq. Through detailed processes-
11 
 
tracing of insurgent leaders’ decision making, it shows how intra-Kurdish competition for 
overlapping bases of support and the opening of windows of opportunity and vulnerability 
caused multiple episodes of inter-rebel war. The following chapter – Chapter 4 – presents case 
studies of the insurgencies in the Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea and Tigray. It tests my argument 
about windows of opportunity and vulnerability by tracing rebel groups’ decision-making 
processes and shows that the mechanisms of intense competition for control of territory and 
populations that led to intra-ethnic rebel war were absent in interactions between non-coethnic 
rebel groups.  
The following two chapters assess the external validity of window theory with shadow 
case studies based on secondary literature and statistical analysis, respectively. Chapter 5 
contains case studies of the civil war in Lebanon, the Tamil insurgency against Sri Lanka and 
Syria’s ongoing civil war; collectively, their findings reveal how window theory can explain 
broad patterns of inter-rebel war in a variety of geopolitical contexts. Through an analysis of a 
panel dataset of all dyads of rebel groups in multi-party civil wars between 1989 and 2011, 
Chapter 6 demonstrates that coethnic rebels are more likely to clash. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarizing its main findings, discussing the 
argument’s relation with Realist theories of international politics and drawing policy 









Fighting the Wrong Enemy? Windows of Opportunity, Vulnerability, and Inter-rebel War  
 
 
We must not fight two-sided; it is better to fight one-sided. 




Why do rebel groups sometimes fight each other as they are also battling against the 
government? I argue that inter-rebel war occurs when groups face “windows of opportunity” or 
“windows of vulnerability.” Windows of opportunity are situations in which a rebel group is 
markedly more powerful than its coethnic rival(s) and the government (even if much stronger in 
terms of aggregate military power) does not pose an immediate and serious threat. Under these 
circumstances, the stronger rebel organization will be tempted to launch a hegemonic bid – i.e., 
use overwhelming force to get rid of or significantly weaken a coethnic rival (or rivals). 
Windows of vulnerability arise when a rebel group faces the clear prospect of a dramatic 
deterioration of its position in the inter-rebel balance of power or a mounting threat posed by a 
coethnic rival. If no other option appears viable, the organization may be tempted to resort to use 
force against the rival(s) or start a course of action entailing a high risk of inter-rebel war, in a 
desperate attempt to turn the tables. I call this typology of inter-rebel war “gambling for 
resurrection.” 
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets up the puzzle of inter-rebel 
war from various theoretical perspectives. Section 3 presents my argument, detailing the features 
of windows of opportunity and vulnerability that cause inter-rebel war. Section 4 discusses my 
13 
 
empirical approach, focusing in particular on the argument’s scope conditions, issues related to 
process-tracing based on interviews with former insurgent leaders, case selection strategy and 
operationalization of key variables. Section 5 concludes by summarizing my argument and 
laying out the road map for the following empirical chapters. 
 
2. The Puzzle of Inter-rebel War 
The fact of rebel groups fighting each other and thus diverting scarce resources from the struggle 
against a common (and usually stronger) enemy – the government – is puzzling from several 
theoretical points of view. A key insight from the sociology of conflict is that conflict with out-
groups tends to increase in-group cohesion. In as much as we can think of the rebel organizations 
as constituting an anti-government social group or movement, we should expect its members to 
abstain from fighting one another (and even cooperate).
17
 This should be especially the case 
when the government and the rebels belong to different ethnic groups, as the experience of 
violence at the hand of the ethnic-other is often seen as leading to “hardening” of identities and 
deepening of ethnic hostility and fear.
18
  
Rational calculations based on power and interest, epitomized by the adage “the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend,” point in the same direction. In particular, balance of power logic in 
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 The classic reference is Chaim D. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 
International Security 20 (4), 1996: 136-75; for a critique, see Stathis Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” 
Comparative Political Studies 41 (8), 2008: 1043-68). For micro-level evidence (on Rwanda), see Omar Shahbudin 
McDoom, “The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict:  Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the 
Rwandan Genocide,” International Security 37 (2), 2012: 119-55. 
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International Relations would lead us to expect rebel groups to ally against the government, as it 
is usually the strongest civil war belligerent: inter-rebel squabbling should be set aside until the 
government’s threat recedes.
19
 Strategic considerations are typically reinforced by the 
psychological need for consistency, which pushes individuals to develop positive attitudes 
towards people they cooperate with for material advantage (i.e., allies tend to become friends).
20
 
Finally, inter-rebel violence is puzzling because it may entail image costs for the insurgents 
before domestic and international audiences. Actual and potential supporters at home and abroad 
may be disheartened by the occurrence of incomprehensible internecine violence in the rebel 
camp, while the government may be better able to resist international pressure to address the 
grievances voiced by the rebels by pointing out that the insurgents are themselves divided and 
claiming that the government-rebels cleavage is not the main axis of violence.      
Scholars and practitioners familiar with the cases discussed in this dissertation may not 
find the occurrence of inter-rebel violence puzzling at all, as their expectations about “normal” 
patterns are shaped by knowledge of the corresponding fratricide-ridden histories rather than 
abstract theory.
21
 In any event, different priors about the normalcy and pervasiveness of inter-
rebel fighting do not eliminate the fact that phenomenon displays cross- and within-case 
variation: some rebel dyads experience large-scale inter-rebel fighting while others do not, and 
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 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 




 Paul Staniland refers to inter-rebel violence between coethnic insurgent groups as “fratricide” (“Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 56 (1), 2012a: 16-40). The term itself implies a deviation from “normal” behavior.   
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insurgent groups clash against each other in some phases of a civil war, but peacefully coexist in 
others. This variation begs for an explanation.  
Recent additions to the burgeoning literature on civil war processes have cast light on 
several aspects of inter-rebel dynamics, including the related phenomena of inter-rebel violence, 
civil war alliances and insurgent collaboration with the government.
22
 Yet, despite their 
important contributions, these studies do not provide entirely satisfactory answers to the question 
motivating this dissertation on theoretical or empirical grounds.
23
 In the only published large-N 
study explicitly on the topic, Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson present statistical correlations on 
inter-rebel fighting, finding that rebel groups are more likely to clash when they are either strong 
or weak relative to each other, they have exclusive control of a part of the country’s territory, 
they fight in areas with drug cultivation and when government political authority is weak.
24
 
However, these are, in a sense, correlations in search for a theory, as the findings are not 
integrated in an overarching explanation of inter-rebel violence.  
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 My project also contributes to an emerging literature that looks at the effects of the structure of insurgent 
movements – in particular the distribution of power within them and the presence of a “rebel hegemon” – on the 
probability of victory against the government (Peter Krause, “The Structure of Success: How the Internal 
Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness,” International Security 
38 (3), 2014: 72-116). By specifying the conditions under which hegemonic bids are likely to occur, my argument 
suggests an answer to questions about the causes of the emergence of different types of insurgent movement 




 Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 56 (4), 2012: 604-28. In an unpublished paper, Kristine Eck reports similar findings 
(“Fighting Our Friends Instead of Our Enemies,” working paper, 2010).  
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Other studies focus on rebel alliances, a dependent variable closely related to inter-rebel 
war, as insurgent groups that are expected to be in an alliance are also expected not to fight each 
other. Navin Bapat and Kanisha Bond develop a formal model according to which very weak 
rebel groups are shunned from rebel alliances, because they cannot commit not to defect to the 
government under intense military pressure; but third-party state supporters can mitigate these 
concerns by threatening to punish defectors, thus facilitating the inclusion of weak groups in 
rebel alliances.
25
 The implication for inter-rebel war is clear: rebel dyads including a weak 
organization should be less likely to experience infighting when they have an external sponsor 
compared to when they do not. The authors support their theoretical claims with a statistical 
analysis of rebel dyads in the post-World War II era, but the fact that they do not provide case 
study evidence reduces our confidence that the observed correlations reflect causal relations, in 




Fotini Christia has advanced perhaps the most comprehensive and elegant theoretical 
explanation for civil war alliances.
27
 She argues that alliances follow a minimum winning 
coalition (MWC) logic, i.e., belligerents strive to be part of an alliance large enough to win the 
war but as small as possible given the requirement of being on the winning side, both to 
maximize their shares of the spoils of victory and reduce their vulnerability to strong allies. 
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 The power variable is drawn from the non-state actor dataset and measures groups’ strength relative to the 
government (David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of 
Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (4), 2009: 570-97). The problem with this 
variable is that it is largely time-invariant in the dataset, but it is used to explain variation of alliance behavior over 




 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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When the MWC threshold is passed, one or more belligerents will abandon the dominant 
coalition in search for an optimally-sized one. The implication for inter-rebel war is that it should 
occur only when an insurgent group or coalition of a subset of groups is stronger than the 
government.  
However, Christia’s work has some empirical limits. Most crucially for my purposes, it is 
easy to come by well-known instances of rebel groups fighting each other while facing an 
unambiguously more powerful government.
28
 For example, at the beginning of the Algerian war 
of independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) wiped out its rival, the National Algerian 
Movement (MNA), despite the fact that it was facing an overwhelmingly more powerful foe – 
the French army.
29
  Similarly, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) fought each other from the beginning 
of the anti-Portuguese struggle rather than cooperating against the vastly superior incumbent.
30
 
This pattern is not limited to anti-colonial armed conflicts. For example, besides the cases 
analyzed in the following chapters, the massive military power of the Indian state did not deter 
Kashmir’s pro-Pakistan insurgent groups from targeting the pro-independence Jammu and 
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 The bulk of the fighting between FLN and MNA in Algeria occurred in the years 1955-1957. By 1956 the French 
had deployed 400,000 troops, while the FLN’s ranks included 15-20,000 regulars; the MNA was probably always 
weaker than the FLN (Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, London: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 
136 and 222; Rasmus Alenius Boserup, “Collective Violence and Counter-state Building”, in Bruce Kapferer and 





 John H. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1978), pp. 9-61.   
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Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
31
 Thus MWC theory does not represent a satisfactory solution 
to the puzzle motivating this project. 
 
3. Theory of Inter-rebel War: Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability 
Rebel groups exist in an anarchic environment. Much like states in a Realist world, insurgent 
organizations have to rely on themselves and cooperation with other self-regarding actors for 
survival and achievement of desired goals: there is no overarching authority to ensure order and 
enforce agreements. The anarchic characterization is even more fitting for civil war 
environments than for the international system: in civil wars, the balance of power game is 
played especially hard, with participants frequently getting “pushed by the wayside” in Kenneth 
Waltz’ parlance; by contrast, state death in the international system is a rare occurrence.
32
  
Standard balance of power logic would lead us to expect rebel groups to be natural allies 
given that they typically face a stronger common enemy.
33
 The incumbent’s overwhelming 
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 Others have noted that the effects of anarchy are especially pernicious in civil war settings (see Barbara F. Walter, 
“The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51 (3), 1997: 335–64, in particular pp. 
338-40; and Christia 2012, p. 51). Tanisha Fazal identifies nine instances of state death (defined as the formal loss of 
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Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research 46 (2), 2009: 269–
83). By contrast, rebel groups frequently experience violent death, which I define as a condition, induced by the 
government’s countermeasures and rivals’ attacks, in which a rebel organization is entirely destroyed or is no longer 
able to conduct significant military operations (Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin 
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power should represent a cogent incentive for rebels to put aside (at least for the time being) the 
quarrels they may have with each other and focus on their conflict with the government. So why 
does inter-rebel war occur? 
My answer stems from two basic observations. First, there typically are conflicts of 
interest between rebel groups, due to ideological differences, disagreements over military 
strategy, different priorities and overlapping ambitions. As Peter Krause pointed out, two groups 
with the same strategic goals (e.g., ending military occupation or altering the nature of the ruling 
government) will often have conflicting organizational goals (such as increasing their respective 
membership and funding).
34
 The existence of conflicts of interest implies that rebel groups could 
hinder the achievement of other rebel organizations’ goals and even represent existential threats 
for each other. Second, the incumbent’s aggregate military superiority does not automatically 
translate into ability or willingness to launch well-timed, decisive offensives against rebels 
weakened by infighting.  
Situations may thus arise in which an insurgent group can rationally seize an opportunity 
to destroy or seriously weaken a rival without exposing itself to an unacceptably higher risk of 
being defeated by the incumbent. In other words, windows of opportunity to launch a hegemonic 
bid may open up.
35
 Rebel groups may also resort to force in a desperate attempt to forestall the 
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 Strategic goals resemble public goods, while organizational objectives are more akin to private goods. Peter 
Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive 
Debate,” Security Studies 22 (2), 2013: 259-94. Similarly, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke, and 
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deterioration of their power position or to deal with a mounting threat posed by a rival, when no 
other solution appears possible – i.e., they may gamble for resurrection in the face of a window 
of vulnerability. Gambles for resurrection are not limited to direct attacks on rivals but include 
also remedial courses of action that risk provoking violent responses by rival groups. 
In either case, in deciding whether to use force, rebel groups weigh the benefits and costs 
of inter-rebel war. On the benefits side of the equation, using force may reduce the threat posed 
by another group and allow the absorption of the resources previously under its control. 
Coethnicity powerfully affects the benefits of inter-rebel war: coethnic rebel groups can 
represent both serious threats and opportunities for expansion for each other as they aspire to 
control the same population and territories and may expect to do so with relative ease once they 
achieve a hegemonic position in their ethnic community (i.e., after getting rid of their rivals).  
On the costs side, inter-rebel war might weaken the rebel group(s) and thus increase the 
probability of government victory. But the costs of inter-rebel war can be relatively low for a 
group enjoying a marked superiority over its rival(s) – which promises a quick and cheap fight – 
and facing a government unwilling or unable to rapidly intervene to take advantage of rebel 
infighting. Windows of opportunity are situations in which the benefits of inter-rebel war are 
likely to be high and the costs low, i.e., there is a stark imbalance of power between coethnic 
rebel groups and the government does not pose an immediate and serious threat.
36
 By contrast, 
windows of vulnerability are characterized by both high expected costs and benefits: the 
prospect, albeit remote, for a rebel group to overcome its predicament and avoid the associated 
steep costs by attacking a coethnic rival may warrant paying the costs and running the risks 
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involved in fighting in the absence of a favorable balance of power and/or in the face of a serious 
and immediate government threat – desperate times call for desperate measures.
37  
We should expect gambles for resurrection to be a “later resort” type of response, as rebel 
groups typically would go to considerable lengths in search for a less risky way out of their 
predicament. For example, insurgent organizations would engage in diplomatic initiatives to 
break hostile encirclements and gain new allies or experiment with different mobilization 
strategies in the face of dwindling popular support.
38
 Moreover, we should not see gambles for 
resurrection when the group’s vulnerability is due to its limited battlefield experience or 
problems of internal cohesion; in these situations, the group’s leadership would focus on internal 
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 Beleaguered rebel groups in principle have also the option of demobilizing or moving to remote areas to avoid 
confrontation with government forces and rivals. This may increase rebels’ chances of physical survival (depending 
on the willingness of other belligerents to leave them alone), but it also entails the significant cost of giving up 
(potentially forever) the pursuit of the goals for which they resorted to arms in the first place. As a consequence, I 
expect rebel groups to tend not to adopt “hiding” strategies, and to do so only when they conclude that there is no 
reasonable prospect for a resurrection gamble (on hiding in international politics, see Paul Schroeder, “Historical 
Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security 19 (1), 1994: 108-48.  
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reforms and efforts to enhance battlefield experience or to solidify its control of the organization 
rather than pick a fight with another group.
39 
It is important to point out that by hegemony I do not mean absolute monopoly on the 
insurgent struggle. A powerful rebel group may tolerate other coethnic organizations as long as 
they are extremely weak and thus do not pose a meaningful threat. Of course, even groups in this 
weak state may at some point grow stronger or circumstances may arise that make them 
threatening, but I expect the marginal benefits of getting rid of them when these developments 
are simply remote possibilities typically not to be worth the costs for the hegemon: domestic and 
international supporters may accuse the group of being power-hungry or not living up to 
professed ideals of democracy and pluralism; moreover, contingent factors (like the prospect of 
befriending the foreign supporter of a very weak rebel group) may prompt the hegemon to stop 
short of complete monopoly of the armed struggle. In other words, my argument envisions a 
non-linear relationship between the inter-rebel balance of power and the probability of 
hegemonic bids: when the capabilities of rebel groups are roughly equal, I do not expect 
hegemonic bids; when a clear imbalance emerges, I expect the stronger group to launch a 
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stronger rival. In addition, advocating a dangerous course of action (as a gamble for resurrection is) could weaken 
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 I code a group as below the threshold of extreme weakness if it has less than one-third of the fighters at the 
hegemon’s disposal (Krause 2014 adopts a similar criterion) and there is no immediate prospect of its rapid growth 
(which is the case when the weaker group operates in areas controlled by the stronger group or in sparsely populated 
regions, and is not receiving major external support). 
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Rebel groups’ motives and rational bargaining 
Before I proceed to a more thorough discussion of the benefits and costs of inter-rebel war, some 
clarifications of rebel groups’ motives and the relation between my argument and the bargaining 
model of war are in order. My theory is agnostic as to the deep motivations of the initiator of 
violence: security concerns, greed and “lust for power” may all be present in both situations, 
although the relative importance of each factor will vary from case to case. Thus in some 
instances the deep motivation of a hegemonic bid may be fear, as a group seizes an opportunity 
to get rid of a threat before it fully materializes. Conversely, the dire straits that may prompt a 
rebel group to gamble for resurrection may be the result of earlier aggressive actions by that 
group to which other actors reacted. In other cases rebel groups may find themselves entangled 
in spirals of tensions and mistrust as they respond to each other’s moves, which may be 
perceived as threatening even if not intended to be – an inter-rebel security dilemma.
41
  
What prevents rebel groups from reaching peaceful bargains that leave them at least as 
well-off as if they fought while permitting them to avoid the costs of combat?
42
 The answer, in a 
nutshell, is: the pervasiveness of fears of non-compliance with war-avoiding agreements, i.e., the 
commitment problem in anarchy.
43
 When considering the alternatives of inter-rebel war and 
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 This is the motivating puzzle of the rational choice study of war: given that fighting is costly (and assuming risk 
neutrality or aversion), rational actors should agree on a peaceful division of the prize that leaves all better off than if 
they had settled the dispute with force (James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International 




 Note that the commitment problem in anarchy combines elements of two rationalist explanations for war – 
information (about other actors’ present and future ambitions) and commitment problems (following Robert 
Powell’s analysis, I do not consider indivisibilities a distinct cause of war from commitment problems; “War as a 
Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (1), 2006: 169-203, esp. pp. 176-80). Typically rational 
choice models of war treat information and commitment problems separately for analytical simplicity. Scott 
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peaceful coexistence (including active cooperation), rebel groups will pay careful attention to 
their corresponding future implications. The possibility of shifts in the balance of power and of 
changes in the threat environment as well as uncertainty about the extent to which other rebel 
groups will try to take advantage of them (i.e., present and future intentions are hard to divine)
44
 
may lead a group to conclude that fighting today is preferable to reaching an agreement that may 
just be a scrap of paper tomorrow. Rebel groups may not only (or even primarily) be concerned 
about the risk of an attack down the road by a stronger or more aggressive rival, but also by the 
possibility of having to make unpalatable concessions to a rival in the future due to a 
deterioration of their bargaining position.
45
  
As noted, commitment problems are pervasive and thus their mere existence cannot 
explain variation in inter-rebel war. The expected costs and benefits of inter-rebel war and its 
alternatives, however, do vary; in other words, in some scenarios the costs of inter-rebel war are 
prohibitively high while in some situations commitment problems are especially acute (as their 
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 It is worth noting that that  my argument suggests that hegemonic bids should tend to be successful, as it does not 
assume a systematic bias in rebel leaders’ perceptions of the balance of power and threat environment (i.e., their 
sense that they have a good shot at hegemony is typically right). Conversely, gambles for resurrection should more 
often than not fail. This is not to say, of course, that all hegemonic bids will be successful, as not all safe bets pan 
out. Leaders may occasionally miscalculate or make mistakes in the execution of sensible plans, and information 
about important factors may not be available (for example, intangible elements of the balance of power like the 
actual force employment or cohesion of untested units); moreover, as Carl von Clausewitz famously observed about 
war in general, there may well be a pervasive element of inherent unpredictability in inter-rebel war outcomes.         
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consequences are likely to be dire). This variation, to which I now turn, sheds much light on our 
puzzle.  
 
Ties that Divide: Coethnicity and the benefits of inter-rebel war 
I posit that coethnic rebel groups, due to their overlapping social bases, will tend to have stronger 
incentives to fight each other than non-coethnic rebel groups, as under these circumstances inter-
rebel war promises significant benefits in terms of threat reduction and access to material 
resources.
46
 Coethnicity amplifies defensive and aggressive motives for inter-rebel war, as it 
affects groups’ threat perception (and thus the intensity of commitment problems) and their 
ability to expand their resources at their rivals’ expense. Therefore, I expect coethnicity to be 
associated with the occurrence of both hegemonic bids and gambles for resurrection.  
Overlapping ambitions, threat perception and coethnicity. Coethnic rebel groups tend to 
perceive each other as rivals or competitors for popular support and territorial control.
47
 Getting 
rid of rivals promises a group unhindered access to what it covets most – its base of support and 
a given territory – during the war and in its aftermath (in case of victory against the government 
or negotiated settlement). Even if a rebel group is in principle willing to forgo these benefits for 
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 This is consistent with the notion of “competitive exclusion” in population and organizational ecology, according 
to which competition is a function of the resources groups draw from, i.e., they only compete with other groups 
tapping into the same resource pool (David Lowery and Virginia Gray, “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or 
the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States,” American Journal of Political Science 
39 (1), 1995: 1-29;  for an application of competitive exclusion to interactions between terrorist groups, see Stephen 
Nemeth, “The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2): 336-
62). Similarly, Claire Metelits defines rivalry between rebel groups as a situation in which insurgent groups confront 
other organizations that extract from the same resource pool (Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and 
Revolutionary Group Behavior, New York: New York University Press, 2010, pp. 11-2).   
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the sake of inter-rebel peace, it cannot assume that its rivals will reciprocate down the road under 
changed circumstances and thus may decide to take advantage of an opportunity to launch a 
hegemonic bid. In other words, the intense conflict of interest implied by coethnicity affects 
rebel groups’ threat perception and the intensity of commitment problems.
48
 Moreover, as 
Krause points out, rival rebel groups may pose less direct threats to each other by engaging in 
outbidding and spoiling behavior, with potential detrimental effects on the rebel movement’s 
ability to reach its strategic goals.
49
 Rebel groups may also fear that their rivals might reach an 
agreement with the government, leaving them exposed to the incumbent’s superior strength. 
Thus, using force to get rid of or weaken rivals could ameliorate a group’s threat environment.  
Cumulativity and coethnicity. Coethnicity may also increase the probability of inter-rebel 
war through resource cumulativity, which in turn affects the net military benefits of achieving 
hegemony in the rebel camp. Resources controlled by coethnic rebel groups tend to be highly 
cumulative, i.e., they can be extracted at low cost and their possession allows a group to protect 
itself and expand its power.
50
 When a rebel organization wipes out a coethnic group, it can often 
coopt large segments of the latter’s membership thus increasing its manpower. The fact that the 
two organizations have similar ethnic credentials represents a powerful motive for members of 
the defeated group to join the other organization (where they are usually absorbed as individuals 
rather than separate military units, so as to minimize threats to its cohesion). More importantly, 
the group that has the upper hand in inter-rebel fighting is likely to be able to recruit and extract 
resources at a relatively low cost from the coethnic population previously under its rival’s 
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 Achieving rebel hegemony under these circumstances (in particular if it can be done 
through a quick and cheap fight) holds the prospect of strengthening the group that gets the upper 
hand.
52
 By contrast, a group perceived by the social base of support of a defeated rival as a 
foreign occupier is likely to have a hard time with recruitment and extraction activities and will 
have to devote substantial resources to policing the population, to the point that rebel hegemony 
may result in a net drain of the organization’s resources.
53
 For this reason, the existence of  
profound conflicts of interest between non-coethnic rebels groups (for example, about the 
distribution of power among a country’s ethnic groups) does not tend to provide incentives for 
inter-rebel war: the resolution of these conflicts of interest is better left to the post-war settings, 
as infighting would only benefit the government. The cumulativity of resources under the control 
of coethnic rebel groups thus amplifies both aggressive motives and security concerns: rebel 
groups may be tempted to use force to expand the resources at their disposal and at the same time 
may fear that their rivals at some point will be similarly tempted.  
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 Undisputed access to its ethnic support base is likely to be more important than the absorption of rivals’ fighters 
for a would-be insurgent hegemon. In fact, rebel groups do not typically field mass armies as relatively small forces 
are better suited for guerrilla warfare; a large, pliable support base can provide intelligence, safe havens, money and 
logistical support in addition to recruits. Moreover, some elements of a defeated rival group may be considered as 
irreconcilable and thus it may be preferable to replace them with less experienced but more reliable new recruits. 
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 Ethnic rebel hegemony resembles Daniel Corstange’s “ethnic monopsony” – the situation in which a political 
constituency defined along ethnic lines is dominated by a single vote-buying party/patron. The fact that inter-ethnic 
clientelistic transactions are too costly to be efficient creates a protected ethnic vote market with high barriers to 
entry for non-coethnic competitors; when there is no intra-ethnic competition, the patron can buy votes at a low 
price, which gives rise to the twin phenomena of ethnic favoritism and ethnic neglect – patronage is distributed to 
coethnics, but it is “closer to a trickle than a deluge” (Daniel Corstange, The Price of a Vote: Ethnicity and 
Clientelism in the Middle East, 2013, book manuscript, Columbia University, chapter 1). My argument is agnostic as 
to whether a rebel hegemon can extract more resources from its ethnic base on a per capita basis, while it expects the 





 As Stephen Van Evera (1999, p. 107) points out, “often resources empower their current owners but not a 
conqueror, or they empower the conqueror at a discount.” The point is not that foreign occupiers are typically unable 
to extract resources from occupied territories (they sometimes succeed) but that extraction costs are likely to be 
relatively high. The most thorough discussion of cumulativity in the context of foreign occupations (in particular of 
industrial resources in the 20th Century) remains Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of 
Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
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These fears are not only a function of abstract strategic calculations by rebel leaders, but 
they are also reinforced by two dynamics characterizing relations between coethnic rebel groups, 
which in turn enhance threat perception. First, coethnic rebel organizations have a relatively easy 
time infiltrating each other (by either “turning” members of a rival group or placing “agents” 
within it). This can pose serious threats to organizational cohesion as infiltrators may sow 
discord between a group’s factions and foment disgruntlement among its rank-and-file. Second, 
the fact that coethnic rebel groups tend to have overlapping recruitment pools and areas of 
operation generates opportunities for their members to interact with each other, which can 
sometimes lead to limited armed confrontations between them. These skirmishes may occur at 
the initiative of fighters and low-level commanders or they may be part of a larger plan 
envisioning the use of “salami tactics” to expand an organization’s influence at a rival’s expense 
while keeping the risk of all-out confrontation at acceptably low levels.
54
 The rebel leadership 
may be unable to discern whether these limited clashes reflect the rival organization’s policy or 
are isolated accidents, but it will typically react to their occurrence by revising upwards its 
assessment of threat posed by the rival.
55
   
It is important to note that, in practice, the existence of ethnically-mixed areas reduces the 
sharpness of the distinction between dyads of coethnic rebel groups (prone to war) and non-
coethnic groups (prone to peaceful coexistence). Non-coethnic rebel groups may violently vie for 
control of an area where their respective potential supporters live intermingled. Unchallenged 
control of this area would offer the benefit of mobilizing and extracting resources from 
                                                          
54




 See Robert Jervis’s (1976) discussion of the spiral model and related misperceptions (in particular pp. 62-76 and 
319-42). See also Philip E. Tetlock’s treatment of the fundamental attribution error (“Social Psychology and World 
Politics,” in Daniel Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 877-8.  
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coethnics, but may also entail the significant costs of policing a potentially hostile ethnic-other 
population or forcing it to leave (with the associated political and image negative consequences). 
Thus I expect inter-rebel war to be less likely between non-coethnic rebel groups whose distinct 
popular bases of support are partially intermingled than between coethnic rebel groups; I also 
expect inter-rebel war to be more likely between non-coethnic rebel groups whose potential 
supporters live in ethnically-mixed areas than between non-coethnic rebel groups whose 
supporters inhabit distinct geographical areas. 
Micro-foundations of the coethnicity argument. Having discussed why I expect 
coethnicity to affect the risk of inter-rebel war, some observations about the argument’s micro-
foundations are in order. First, my argument is fully consistent with two fundamental insights of 
the constructivist research agenda on nationalism and ethnic politics – the malleable (to varying 
degrees) and multidimensional nature of ethnic identities.
56
 Most existing identities are not 
“ancient” but rather the product of relatively recent historical processes; and even identity 
categories with a long history, today bear little resemblance to their original meaning or content. 
Typically, in both war and peace-time, there are a multitude of ethnic identities that leaders and 
individuals may emphasize. For example, in the context of the Kurdish insurgencies against the 
Iraqi state, tribal loyalties and linguistic differences between Kurdish Sorani and Kurmanji 
speakers complicated the picture of Kurdish rebels pitted against an Arab government. In the 
Angolan independence struggle, in addition to the Angolan-Portuguese cleavage, intra-Angolan 
divisions between Bakongo, Mbundu, Ovibundu and mestiços were clearly visible; similarly, in 
the Eritrean rebellion against Ethiopian rule, the Ethiopian-Eritrean divide coexisted with intra-
Eritrean tribal and religious distinctions.  
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 Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP 12 (1), 2001: 7-11; 
“Introduction”, in Kanchan Chandra, ed., Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).   
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The fluid and nested character of ethnic identities, however, does not imply that political 
entrepreneurs can credibly appeal to and successfully mobilize potential supporters along any 
conceivable identity dimension. Identities are not constructed out of thin air and the activation of 
existing identities does not take place in a vacuum, as history and shared culture at any time 
constrain the range of identity choices available to individuals and ethnic entrepreneurs. In 
particular, I posit that the recent experience of large-scale violence across ethnic lines 
dramatically affects the salience of the corresponding cleavage, thus drastically increasing the 
appeal of that identity dimension and reducing the prospects of mobilizing alternative identities 
in the short term.
57
 This is not to deny that ethnic identity shifts (the acquisition by an individual 
of a new ethnic identity that replaces an existing one) and ethnic defection (the process by which 
an individual joins an organization opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with 
which she identifies) occur in ethnic civil wars, as Stathis Kalyvas documented.
58
 My more 
modest contention is that those processes are powerfully constrained by highly salient ethnic 
identities in the context of ongoing ethnic civil wars.
59
 Recruiting and eliciting support across 
ethnic lines is not impossible, but it is difficult and expensive, requiring belligerents to devote 
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 Anecdotal evidence in support of the “violence hardens ethnic identities” hypothesis is ubiquitous in accounts of 
episodes of ethnic civil war (see, for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social 
Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (4), 2000: 845–77). Several studies relying on 
surveys in conflict and post-conflict settings provide more systematic supporting evidence (e.g., Moses Shayo and 
Asaf Zussman, “Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 2011: 
1447–84, which finds that Israeli Arab and Jewish judges’ in-group bias is positively associated with the intensity of 








 Following Kalyvas (2006 and 2008), I adopt a broad definition of civil war, which includes anti-colonial wars. 
Other studies distinguish the two types of war for empirical or theoretical reasons (see, for example, James D. 
Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (1), 
2003: 75-90, esp. pp. 76-7). By “ethnic civil wars” or “civil wars fought along ethnic lines” I mean “a subset of civil 
wars defined on the basis of their recruitment patterns and actors’ goals;” thus the Turkey-PKK conflict, for 
example, was an ethnic war because the PKK ranks did not include ethnic Turks (but Turkey managed to form pro-
state Kurdish militias) and because the PKK’s goals challenged the existing power relations between the state and 
the Kurds (Kalyvas 2008, pp. 1044 and 1050). 
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large amounts of military and economic resources to the task.
60
 By contrast, a shared, 




A second important point is that the idea that individuals are more likely to join and 
support a coethnic rebel group is consistent with the robust experimental finding of human 
parochialism – the tendency to cooperate with and favor members of one’s group – and with a 
vast amount of evidence from Comparative Politics in the developing world, where much 
political and economic competition occurs along ethnic lines.
62
 In ethnically heterogeneous 
clientelistic democracies and electoral autocracies, elections are often ethnic censuses, as ethnic 
identity provides a remarkably precise predictor of voting behavior.
63
 Relatedly, patronage tends 
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 Kalyvas presents several examples of governments capable of recruiting militias from rebellious ethnic groups 
and provides statistical evidence that the success of Nazi Germany’s recruitment efforts in occupied Greece varied 




 It should be noted that my argument is consistent with Paul Staniland’s insight that rebel groups are typically built 
on pre-existing social networks, such as political parties, religious organizations, kinship ties, and veteran 
associations (“Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia,” International Security 
37 (1), 2012b: 142–77; Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2014). These social networks sometimes have a “sub-ethnic” character (e.g., in Iraq the PUK 
historically recruited mostly from Kurdish Sorani speaking areas, while the KDP drew most of its support from 
Kurdish Kurmanji speaking territories). In as much as rebel groups’ claims to represent a broader ethno-national 
community pitted against an ethnic-other (the government and its support base) are plausible to their constituencies, 
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 See, for example, Robert H. Bates, “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa,” 
Comparative Political Studies 6 (4), 1974: 457-84; James D. Fearon, “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go 
Together,” presented at a MacArthur Foundation-sponsored conference on Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability, 
Chicago, May 1999; Nicolas van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (2), 2003: 297–321; Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: 
Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004);  Posner 2005; Karen 
F. Ferree, “Explaining South Africa Ratial Census,” The Journal of Politics 68 (4), 2006: 803–15, 2008; Leonardo 




to be distributed along ethnic lines.
64
 Moreover, developing countries’ rulers often resort to the 
practice of “ethnic stacking” (i.e., filling the most sensitive government positions, in particular in 
the security apparatus, with coethnics) for coup-proofing and ensuring the loyalty of the armed 
forces to their regime.
65
  
While these empirical patterns are widely acknowledged, there is much debate over the 
underlying causal mechanisms. The dominant view in political science holds that individuals 
support coethnic organizations (and more generally cooperate with coethnics) because they 
materially gain from it. In particular, voters are thought to find coethnic politicians’ promises to 
share the spoils of power credible, while heavily discounting patronage pledges from ethnic-
others.
66
 This instrumental calculus is in turn a function of better monitoring and enforcement of 
agreements between coethnics – due to denser social networks within, rather than between, 
ethnic groups, which facilitate information flows – and the existence of a self-fulfilling 
expectation (or norm) that coethnics will cooperate with each other, unlike non-coethnics. The 
literature provides important empirical evidence in support of the two mechanisms, but lacks 
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 Corstange 2013; Raphael Franck and Ilia Rainer, “Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter?  Ethnic Favoritism, 
Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa,” American Political Science Review 106 (2), 2012: 294-325. Kimuli 
Kasara finds that the taxation of agriculture in Africa represents an exception to the pattern of ethnic favoritism in 
patronage distribution observed by other scholars, as cash crop farmers of the same ethnicity as the head of the state 
face higher taxes (“Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa,” 
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Accounts of intra-ethnic cooperation emphasizing this narrow conception of self-interest 
are not necessarily incompatible with the existence of deeper group attachments. In some 
circumstances material and non-material considerations are likely to reinforce each other; for 
example, Kanchan Chandra posits that individuals expect to reap both material and psychic 
benefits from having coethnics in power (i.e., they “bask in the reflected status of the patron”).
68
 
In other circumstances, individuals may face a trade-off between material and psychic/emotional 
benefits. Psychological theories
69
 and theories of political socialization
70
 converge in explaining 
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 For experimental evidence, see James Habyariamana et al., “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods 
Provision?” American Political Science Review 101 (4), 2007: 709–25; Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of 
Collective Action (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009). These authors do not find support for explanations of 
lower levels of cooperation across ethnic lines stressing different ethnic preferences for public goods or high levels 









 The most influential psychological theory of identity is social identity theory, which explains group attachment as 
a function of individuals’ natural tendency to identify with groups and their need for self-esteem, making group 
identity a vehicle of self-esteem (Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). For overviews of experimental studies of intergroup bias inspired by social identity theory, 
see Toshio Yamagishi, Nobuhito Jin and Toko Kiyonari, “Bounded Generalized Reciprocity: Ingroup Boasting and 
Ingroup Favoritism,” Advances in Group Processes 17, 1999: 161-97; and John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, 
“Ingroup Bias,” in Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010). Experimental studies show that inter-group bias tends to be stronger when “real” 
groups rather than laboratory-created “minimal groups” are involved (Brian Mullen, Rupert Brown and Colleen 
Smith, “Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An Integration,” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 22, 1992: 103-22) and their relations are characterized by competition (Daan Scheepers et al., “The 
Social Functions of Ingroup Bias: Creating, Confirming, or Changing Social Reality,” European Review of Social 
Psychology 17 (1), 2006: 359-96) or threat (Blake M. Riek et al., “Does a Common Ingroup Identity Reduce 




 According to political socialization theories, long-term loyalty to an ethnic or national group develops through 
processes of socialization in the family, school and civic associations (see, for example, Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, 
Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Keith Darden’s argument about the 
durability of national loyalties after the introduction of mass schooling can be considered a type of political 
socialization theory (Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties, 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
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why individuals develop genuine and durable ethnic attachments, which in turn prompt them to 
support organizations seen as defending the interests of the group.
71
 These theoretical approaches 
may help account for the display of individuals’ strong, emotional commitment to an ethnic 
cause, the corresponding hostility towards ethnic opponents, and willingness to pay high costs 
(up to sacrificing one’s life), which are not easily reconcilable with narrow, material self-
interest.
72
 Relatedly, much of the literature conceives of ethnic mobilization as a collective action 
problem: the goals being pursued are public goods, from which non-participants cannot be easily 
excluded and whose probability of provision is not affected by individual participation. As the 
benefits of action are public but the costs are borne privately, rational individuals should free-
ride, in particular in contexts in which the costs are steep, such as social protests when the 
government is likely to violently repress and campaigns of antistate violence.
73
 Arguments 
emphasizing narrow, material rationality have a hard time making sense of individual 
participation under these circumstances.
74
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 Evolutionary biology can be seen as providing a foundation for both sets of theories. Jung-Kyoo Choi and Samuel 
Bowles present a theoretical model showing how parochial altruism (i.e., other-regardingness towards one’s fellow 
group members combined with hostility towards out-groups) could have survived a selection process driven by 
inter-group conflict (“The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War,” Science 318, 2007: 636-40; for supporting 
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Both sets of explanations of the effects of coethnicity have some theoretical and 
empirical plausibility and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an assessment of 
their relative importance. The key point is that, building on much empirical evidence on a wide 
range of socio-political phenomena, I expect coethnicity to powerfully shape individual behavior 
during ethnic civil war and thus operate as cause of inter-rebel war. This argument challenges 
two influential (albeit radically contrasting) views in the literature and public discourse about the 
effects of ethnic identity on civil war behavior.
75
 One view sees coethnicity as a powerful source 
of solidarity and cooperation. In particular, the ethnic security dilemma literature expects 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the collective action argument would emphasize the density of ethnic social networks, allowing the provision of 
selective incentives to participants and defectors (Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1979). While I certainly do not dispute the notion that selective rewards and coercion play an 
important role in ethno-national collective action, I contend that they are not the whole story. In-depth civil war case 
studies suggest that much individual participation depends on the strong norms of reciprocity and high levels of trust 
characterizing sub-ethnic networks (e.g., Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern 
Europe, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion: 
Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War,” American Political Science Review 107 (3), 2013: 
418-32). Moreover, selective violence cannot explain individual participation in other forms of risky collective 
action like ethnic riots, as rioters are typically not coerced into joining (Horowitz 2001; Alexandra Scacco, Anatomy 
of a Riot: Participation in Ethnic Violence in Nigeria, 2012, book manuscript, New York University). Stathis 
Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher offer a strong rationalist critique of the collective action logic of individual 
participation in civil war, arguing that indiscriminate and poorly targeted government violence may well provide 
individuals with incentives to join a rebel group, as a means of reducing their risk of being victimized (“How ‘Free’ 
is Free-Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics 59 (2), 
2007: 177-216). However, their critique does not necessarily undermine the idea that individual participation in 
ethnic collective action may require a different kind of explanation in some circumstances. As Kalyvas and Kocher 
note, their argument is more likely to apply to the phase of massive popular recruitment by a rebel group than to the 
earlier phase of the formation of the core of the organization (i.e., early movers in rebellion are peculiar individuals, 
“irrationally” willing to take major risks). Moreover, the documented fact that government violence in civil war is 
often indiscriminate or poorly targeted does not necessarily imply the absence of correlation between individual 
involvement with a rebel organization and risk of victimization (i.e., many individuals that are not involved are 
victimized, but the chance of victimization may be increased by involvement in some context); this is a largely open 
empirical question (Wood 2003, p. 13, suggests that protection from government indiscriminate attacks was not a 




 The hypothesis that coethnicity may provide incentives for inter-rebel violence is not entirely novel. For example, 
Jannie Lilja and Lisa Hultman argue that “[i]f a rebel group can become the single leader of the ethnic community in 
ethnically homogenous areas, the entire civilian population will subsequently fall into rebel hands. Rebels, therefore, 
will strive to establish dominance over the ethnic community by targeting rivals and thereby eliminating competition 
over social control” (“Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against CoEthnics in the Early Sri Lankan 
Civil War,” Security Studies 20 (2), 2011: 171–97, in particular p. 173). However, the authors do not test the 
hypothesis that coethnic rebel organizations are more likely to clash than non-coethnic ones. Similarly, Hanne Fjelde 
and Desirée Nilsson point out that coethnicity may increase the probability of inter-rebel violence, but they also 
provide arguments for why coethnicity could cause cooperation (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012, p. 608). 
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individuals to flock automatically to their ethnic side under conditions of state collapse or large-
scale ethnic violence, and tends to treat ethnic groups, rather than ethnic armed organizations, as 
the relevant units of analysis.
76
 The other view (emerged in part as a reaction to the first one) 
contends that coethnicity does not have an important independent effect on civil war behavior, 
but rather tends to be a façade for more mundane, often materialistic and survival-related, 
considerations.
77
 Most recently, Christia has argued that rebel leaders make alliance decisions 
following a power-driven logic but justify those choices to their followers using identity 
arguments.
78
 My hypothesis that coethnicity affects the risk of inter-rebel violence by increasing 
the net military benefits of fighting challenges the view of ethnicity as largely epiphenomenal. At 
the same time, it qualifies the earlier view emphasizing the causal role of ethnicity by pointing 
out that in some circumstances shared identity may increase the probability of violent conflict 
rather than decrease it.
79
 
Ideology vs. ethnicity. A final clarification about ethnicity is in order. Claiming that 
coethnicity affects the risk of inter-rebel war in the context of ongoing ethnic civil wars by 
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 Kalyvas (2006, 2008) has influentially argued that macro-cleavages and ethnic identities are much less important 





 The author is careful in pointing out that her claims about identity are limited to alliance decisions in multi-party 
civil wars and do not necessarily apply to other dimensions of civil war behavior (e.g., civilian targeting) (Christia 
2012, p. 48). Similarly, my claims about the divisive effects of shared ethnic identity apply to groups that are 
engaged in armed struggle against the state and have established a minimum level of organizational coherence; by 
contrast, I expect coethnicity to operate as a magnet and glue for small bands of individuals planning to launch a 




 This dissertation can be seen as contributing to an emerging literature advancing more specific claims about the 
causal effects of ethnicity on civil war behavior (e.g., Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective 
Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104 (1), 2010: 1-
20; Jason Lyall, Kosuke Imai and Yuki Shiraito, “Dropping a Dime: Coethnic Bias and Wartime Informing,” 
working paper, 2013; Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl and Shayo 2012). 
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increasing both defensive and aggressive motives for rebel-on-rebel violence does not imply that 
other types of shared identities may not be associated with similar dynamics. While much of the 
literature stresses the peculiar nature of ethnic identities,
80
 a substantial body of experimental 
evidence suggests that humans’ “groupness” may be activated along dimensions unrelated to 
ethnic identity.
81
 It is thus conceivable that other forms of identities (for example, ideology) may 
come to play a similar role in some civil wars.
82
 On this issue I take a theoretically agnostic 
position and test empirically the proposition that that a shared ideological outlook (as distinct 
from shared ethno-national identity) is associated with a higher risk of inter-rebel war in the case 
studies.    
 
Costs of inter-rebel war: government constraints and the rebel balance of power  
Having discussed the benefits of inter-rebel war and how they relate to coethnicity, I now turn to 
its costs. These are not limited to the blood and treasure spent in the infighting but include 
increased vulnerability to the incumbent and forgone opportunities to make gains against it. The 
government could take advantage of the situation and attack the squabbling rebels or it could let 
them bleed each other white and then take on the debilitated victor.
83
 Moreover, inter-rebel 
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 For a classic analysis of conflict between states sharing the same ideology due to competition for leadership of the 
communist movement, see Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New 




fighting could push the group that is losing to turn to the government for help, which in turn 
could significantly strengthen the government’s counterinsurgency effort.
84
 In addition, inter-
rebel war may divert resources from the anti-government struggle in moments in which a 
concerted insurgent effort could bring about important territorial gains or even decisive rebel 
victory and thus offer an opportunity for the incumbent’s forces to regroup.   
However, the costs of inter-rebel war may be low when there is an imbalance of power 
between rebel organizations, and the government does not represent a serious and immediate 
military threat. Under these conditions, a powerful group may be tempted to wipe out its rival(s) 
to become the rebel hegemon without an excessive increase in the risk of being defeated by the 
government.  
 The government is typically the strongest belligerent in civil war but this superiority does 
not mean constant willingness and ability to unrestrainedly bring to bear its military power.
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Political, military and logistical constraints may prevent or limit government power projection on 
short notice, so that the government may not represent a serious and immediate threat to the 
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 Geoffrey Blainey makes this point in the context of inter-state war in a metaphorical discussion of fighting 
waterbirds and the opportunistic fisherman (Causes of War, New York: Free Press, 1973, pp. 57-62). Richard 
Rosecrance labels the loss of relative power to a sideline-sitter as the “dilemma of the victor’s inheritance” (Rise of 




 Staniland 2012a. In the context of international relations, see Randall Schweller’s discussion of the tertius 
gaudens (the enjoying third), which can extract an exploitative price for its support to one of the two parties in 
conflict (Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia University 




 Paul Staniland makes a similar point noting that “[s]tates are often content not to devote their full resources to 
internal war. Deployed state capacity is endogenous to political relationships, which is why we see governments like 
India’s and Pakistan’s – which can rely on vast, ruthless security forces – willing to cut deals, bring insurgents into 
state governments, and look the other way at collusion between politicians, militants, and organized crime” (Paul 
Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (2), 2012c: 243-64, p. 
253). Staniland focuses on government’s resolve and interests, while I also emphasize that in some phases the 
incumbent may be simply unable to launch all-out offensives because its forces are in need of reorganization or 
committed elsewhere. Keren Fraiman and Austin Long (“When Failed States Succeed: Assessing Weak State 
Capacity and Choice to Confront Violent Non-state Actors,” working paper, 2014) make an analogous distinction.  
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rebels. For example, for a long time the prospect of high domestic political costs deterred the 
Indian government from launching large-scale offensives against the rebellions waged by United 
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Naxalite insurgents.
86
 Only after having repelled the 
Somali invasion in 1978 did the Ethiopian army vigorously focus on the growing Eritrean 
insurgency. In the fall of 1963, Iraqi army units redeployed from the Kurdish front to execute a 
coup in Baghdad; the purges that followed significantly weakened Iraq’s military machine, 
which was unable to take advantage of the subsequent Kurdish infighting.  
Rebel groups can gage whether the government poses a serious and immediate military 
threat based on recent and ongoing battlefield trends and troop deployments as well as 
intelligence on the incumbent’s calculus. The typical scenario of serious and immediate 
government threat occurs when the government is engaged in (or about to launch) a major 
offensive against the rebels. Even if the government forces are not making major territorial 
headways, an intense fight in which the insurgent forces are stretched thin to resist the 
government’s onslaught does not represent a permissive environment for inter-rebel fighting: 
diverting resources to inter-rebel war (even if short and decisive) may pave the way for a 
government’s “breakthrough”. By contrast, in a scenario characterized by sporadic and limited 
clashes, the insurgent leaders may see the diversion of resources to inter-rebel fighting as 
entailing an acceptable short-term increase of vulnerability vis-à-vis the incumbent.
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 The rebels’ 
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 In the context of guerrilla warfare, in this scenario insurgents would typically initiate contacts with security forces 
by launching hit-and-run attacks, which implies the rebels’ ability to pick and choose when and where to fight and 
thus pace their losses (trends in the portion of engagements initiated by government forces are typical metrics to 
assess progress in counterinsurgency campaigns; see, for example, David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: 
Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2006: 103-8, in particular p. 
106);  in conventional warfare, a permissive threat environment typically would be characterized by static battle 
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belief that the incumbent is unable or does not have the stomach at a specific time for an all-out 
offensive may be reinforced by (tacit or explicit) ceasefire offers by the government or by the 
observation of domestic or international political constraints to escalation.   
 In addition to the threat posed by the government, the balance of power between rebel 
groups affects the prospective costs of inter-rebel war. Attacking a weaker rebel group may offer 
the promise of a quick and cheap victory, and the low costs of fighting could be rapidly more 
than compensated by the inflow of resources previously under the control of the defeated rival. 
By contrast, groups of comparable strength are likely to put up a serious fight. The ensuing long 
war of attrition would likely weaken the rebel camp as a whole and thus create the military and 
political conditions for a successful government offensive; in fact, the prospect of significant 




Thus I expect rebel groups to launch hegemonic bids only when they see the rebel 
balance of power as clearly favorable
89
 and therefore anticipate that the fight would be relatively 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
lines, which, based on previous interactions, the insurgents know they can comfortably defend in the absence of 




 Following analogous reasoning, Dale Copeland argues that in international politics under multipolarity a great 
power will launch a hegemonic bid only when it has a marked superiority over all the other states, lest great powers 
sitting on the sidelines take advantage of its inevitable weakening in the lengthy and costly wars that it would have 
to wage against comparably powerful states. By contrast, in bipolar systems major war can occur even when the 





 This is consistent with the fundamental insight of classical and structural realisms that a balanced distribution of 
power in the international system is conducive to peace among great powers and with the finding that numerical 
superiority (i.e., a power advantage  implying a sufficiently high chance of victory) is an important determinant of 
coalitional aggression among humans and other primates (John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, “The Evolution of War 
and its Cognitive Foundations,” Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Report 88 (1), 1988; Michael L. 
Wilson, Marc D. Hauser and Richard W. Wrangham, “Does Participation in Intergroup Conflict Depend on 






 In cases with more than two coethnic rebel groups, the preponderant 
organization does not need to possess greater military power than all other groups combined; a 
large, unambiguous margin of superiority vis-à-vis the “second-ranked” group would typically 
be sufficient, as the other organizations are likely to experience serious collective action and 
coordination problems in mounting an effective joint defensive effort. Each of the weaker rebel 
groups has an incentive to sit on the sidelines or limit its contribution in the hope that someone 
else “catches the buck;” moreover, for any given level of contribution to the coalition, 
coordination problems at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are likely to arise, thus 
reducing its military effectiveness.
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 By contrast, rebel groups gamble for resurrection when facing an unfavorable distribution 
of power or a serious and imminent government threat (i.e., when the war is likely to be very 
costly). Windows of vulnerability, in fact, are situations in which the costs of inaction are also 
likely to be steep, such as when a rebel group faces the clear prospect of a major loss of power or 
a mounting threat posed by another group. In these cases, rebel groups are essentially weighing 
the costs and risks of inaction against those that a military gambit entails (i.e., a potentially costly 
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 While, to my knowledge, there are no studies on these topics in the context of civil wars, the literature on the 
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war that could leave the group more vulnerable to the government): an especially difficult 
situation may warrant an especially risky gamble.   
 Rebel groups pay attention not only to the actual costs of inter-rebel war but also to its 
opportunity costs. Inter-rebel war inevitably entails a diversion of resources away from the anti-
government struggle, but the significance of the opportunities forgone varies. When a rebel 
group is poised to capture important territory from the government forces (e.g., a major town or 
an area on an international border), it should be loath to engage in infighting so as not to 
jeopardize those prospective gains. Situations may also arise in which rebel victory appears 
within reach if the rebels sustain maximum pressure against the government. When “one final 
push” separates rebel groups from victory, they would be especially likely to refrain from 
infighting lest they spoil the opportunity. In fact, a breathing space provided by inter-rebel war 
could allow the government to reorganize its forces or offer an opportunity for an outside actor to 
prop up the beleaguered incumbent.  
 
Additional questions regarding the theory’s logic        
I now address three questions that the above discussion may have prompted. First, does a 
window of opportunity for a rebel group correspond to a window of vulnerability for another 
group? In short, this is possible, but it will not typically be the case. Windows of vulnerability 
may emerge in a context in which no rebel group is clearly stronger than the others, while 
windows of opportunity, by definition, entail a marked imbalance of power between rebel 
groups. For example, as discussed in detail in the following chapter, in 1983 the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) perceived a window of vulnerability as it faced an alliance of rival Kurdish 
organizations, and their foreign patron, Iran, was getting ready to invade Iraqi Kurdistan; 
43 
 
however, the PUK was not in a position of marked military inferiority vis-à-vis the other rebel 
groups. Moreover, while a temporary imbalance of power may tempt the stronger group to use 
force, the weaker group will typically refrain from attacking in the hope of not being targeted 
and thus ride out the storm (unless there is a major first-strike advantage that guarantees to the 
weaker group an acceptable chance of victory). Windows of vulnerability are not merely 
situations in which a weak group faces a serious existential threat; they entail a clear prospect of 
a deterioration of the balance of power or threat environment, which prompts “now or never” 
type of thinking. 
 A possible scenario in which a window of opportunity for a rebel group would 
correspond to a window of vulnerability for other groups is one in which an organization has 
sufficient power to sequentially take on its weaker rivals and would then gradually grow stronger 
by absorbing their resources: the powerful group would face a window of opportunity while the 
others would face a window of vulnerability as their relative strength would be deteriorating over 
time. However, in this scenario, a hegemonic bid is more likely than a gamble for resurrection as 
the weaker groups would be reluctant to act until less risky paths out of their predicament have 
been ruled out and would in any case experience collective action problems in mounting a joint 
attack, while the would-be hegemon would have an incentive to act swiftly.
92
               
 Second, can a rebel group face a window of opportunity and vulnerability at the same 
time? Stephen Van Evera’s observation in this regard travels from the context of international 
politics to civil war environments: “A single window can be a window of both opportunity and 
vulnerability, if the declining state expects to fall all the way from dominance to helpless 
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 The actions of a rebel group in this situation typically would be driven by a blend 
of window of opportunity and vulnerability logics: the group may reasonably hope to achieve a 
quick and cheap victory but it is also spurred into action by the dangers laying ahead, and thus 
may accept significantly more risks and costs in launching a hegemonic bid than would be 
warranted in the absence of a window of vulnerability.        
Third, would a weak rebel group perceive an imminent victory against the government by 
a strong rival as a window of vulnerability, given that, after the incumbent’s defeat, the latter 
could be in a favorable position to take on the other insurgents?  I expect the weak rebel group to 
see this development as threatening but to refrain from resorting to force in response, as the 
consequences would likely be worse than those of inaction. In fact, attacking a stronger rival on 
the brink of victory would be unlikely to radically alter the military balance, but it would have a 
very good chance of antagonizing the group. If the attack is not successful, the weak group may 
find itself “between a rock and a hard place” (the government and the strong rival) and may thus 
be forced to make the unpalatable decision to flip to the incumbent’s side in order to survive. By 
contrast, by avoiding open confrontation, the weak rebel group may hope to preserve its 
organizational autonomy, even if a position of subordination vis-à-vis the emerging hegemon. 
Moreover, the militarily weak rebel group may hope to be better at playing the electoral game 
and thus succeed as a political party if some form of democratic regime is established in the 
wake of the government’s defeat. In the unlikely scenario in which the weak rebel group did 
succeed in weakening the strong one by using force, it would run the risk of allowing the 
government to bounce back, thus forgoing victory for the rebel movement – a significant 
opportunity cost even for the weak rebel group. The weak group’s rank-and-file and base of 
support may be especially opposed to infighting when victory is within sight, as they probably 
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are less attuned to strategic considerations and more concerned about undermining the common 
anti-government cause than the leadership; this in turn may further discourage the leaders of the 




Summary of the argument and statement of hypotheses 
I expect inter-rebel war to occur when an insurgent organization faces a window of opportunity 
or vulnerability and inter-rebel peace to prevail in the absence of windows. Windows of 
opportunity emerge when there is an imbalance of power between coethnic rebel groups and the 
government does not pose a serious and immediate threat. In these situations, a relatively strong 
rebel group may be tempted to launch a violent hegemonic bid to get rid of or significantly 
weaken a direct competitor. Thus windows of opportunity are characterized by high expected 
benefits (absorbing a coethnic rival’s resource base and/or getting rid of the threat that it poses) 
and low expected costs of inter-rebel war (a short and cheap fight in which the government is 
unlikely to get involved) for the initiator. The center-south quadrant of the three-by-two matrix 
in Figure 2.1 below corresponds to the conditions under which we should see hegemonic bids.  
Windows of vulnerability arise when a group that is relatively weak or is facing a high 
government threat finds itself in a difficult predicament – characterized by a deteriorating power 
position or a mounting threat posed by a coethnic competitor – that cannot be addressed with 
peaceful means. Under these circumstances, the group may be tempted to gamble for 
resurrection – i.e., initiate a course of action likely to set it on a collision course with a rival or 
directly use force, in a desperate attempt to improve its difficult situation. Gambles for 
resurrection offer the initiator the prospect of significant benefits in terms of threat reduction (if 
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war or the remedial course of action are successful), but also entail steep costs of war (given the 
strength of the rival and/or the risk of government opportunistic intervention) (see the north-west 
quadrant). In the scenario depicted in the south-west quadrant, characterized by low costs of 
inter-rebel war but also a drastic deterioration of the strong group’s threat environment or power 
position, we should see a hegemonic bid prompted by both the benefit of immediate threat 
reduction and resources accumulation/long-term threat reduction.
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Figure 2.1: Theory of inter-rebel war 
 




No war No war 
Hegemonic bid* Hegemonic bid No war 
 
Note: The figure illustrates the combinations of benefits and costs that motivate rebel groups to launch hegemonic 
bids, gamble for resurrection or abstain from inter-rebel fighting.   
*This kind of hegemonic bid is driven by a mix of window of opportunity and vulnerability thinking.  
 
When the costs of inter-rebel war are high (i.e., the inter-rebel balance of power is not 
favorable, the government poses a serious and immediate threat, or the rebels are poised to make 
major battlefield gains and, in the extreme, rebel victory is within reach), and the only 
prospective benefit is the capture of the resources of a defeated coethnic rebel group and the 
corresponding long-term threat reduction, we should expect rebel groups to refrain from 
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Costs of inter-rebel war                                
(for initiator) 
Low 
              Benefits of inter-rebel war (for initiator) 
                                            Immediate threat          Resources accumulation/             None 
                                                 reduction               long-term threat reduction 
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    Low 
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infighting as the benefits are not worth the huge costs of a potential defeat at the government’s 
hands or of  wasting a clear opportunity of defeating the incumbent (center-north quadrant). A 
fortiori, if the costs are high and there are no expected benefits at all in case of victory (i.e., there 
is no prospect of resource accumulation or significant threat reduction, as the groups are not 
coethnic), we should not see inter-rebel war (north-east quadrant). Even if the costs of inter-rebel 
war are low, peace should prevail among non-coethnic rebel groups as the expected benefits of 
hegemony would be low; in this case scarce rebel resources would be better allocated to the anti-
government struggle (south-east quadrant).   
From the foregoing discussion I derive two testable hypotheses, corresponding to the two 
typologies of inter-rebel war: 
H1. Hegemonic bid. Inter-rebel war should occur when all of the following conditions hold: 
- A rebel group enjoys a marked military advantage over its coethnic rival(s) (but not all 
of them are below the threshold of extreme weakness); 
- The government does not represent a serious and immediate threat; 
- The rebels are not poised to make major territorial gains or just about to achieve 
outright victory against the government. 
H2. Gamble for resurrection. Inter-rebel war should occur when all the following conditions 
hold:  
- A group faces a major deterioration of its relative power or a mounting threat posed by 
a coethnic rival; 
- The inter-rebel balance of power is not favorable to the group and/or the government 
poses a serious and immediate threat;     
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- The group’s attempts at overcoming its predicament with peaceful measures have    
failed or alternative plans appear unworkable. 
 
4. Empirical Approach 
I adopt a mixed-method approach, combining case studies and large-N analysis. In-depth case 
studies of insurgencies in Iraq and Ethiopia’s provinces of Eritrea and Tigray carry most of the 
dissertation’s evidentiary burden, because testing window theory requires fine-grained and 
contextual measures of relative power and threat, which are exceedingly hard to code for a large 
number of cases over time. I also conduct three shadow case studies and statistical analysis for 
preliminary assessment of the external validity of my argument. The large-N part tests the 
coethnicity hypothesis with a dataset of all dyads of rebel groups in the post-Cold War era (for 
details on it, see Chapter 6). In this chapter I focus on the case study component of the 
dissertation, discussing in turn scope conditions and corresponding selection issues, research 
design, including my case selection criteria, causal inference strategy and interview method, and 
definitions and operationalization of key variables.   
 
Scope conditions and selection issues  
My argument is applicable to multi-party civil wars – situations in which at least two rebel 
groups
96
 are engaged in an armed struggle against the state that meets the key elements of the 
                                                          
96
 Pro-government militias are excluded from my analysis under the assumption that they have significantly less 
decision-making autonomy from the government than rebel groups have from each other, which is not to say that 
militias are mere “puppets” of the state; see Corinna Jentzsch, Stathis N. Kalyvas and Livia Isabella Schubiger, 





standard definitions of civil war.
97
 In contexts other than civil wars, political actors face partially 
different incentive structures and normative constraints and we should thus expect them to 
behave differently. Other sets of arguments (for example focusing on electoral competition and 
patronage politics) may be more important to explain political developments after the guns fall 
silent.
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 My focus on multi-party civil wars inevitably entails a “truncated” universe of cases, 
excluding civil wars that could have been characterized by a multitude of rebel organizations but 
were not. In other words, there is a process through which episodes of civil war are selected in 
and out of the universe of cases. This poses an inferential challenge to my analysis in as much as 
the selection process is related to inter-rebel war (as it is plausibly the case, for example, when 
the multi-party character of a civil war is caused by the splintering of an organization due to 
conflict between its different factions, which then continues to poison relations between the two 
separate groups). The seriousness of the problem, however, is limited, as my claims apply only 
to cases of multi-party civil wars, i.e., they do not extend to cases that were selected out. The 
selection issue here is inherently different from the one plaguing studies on the effectiveness of 
certain policies or strategies. Those studies advance counterfactual claims that an outcome of 
interest would have been different in the absence of a given treatment; but, as the treatment is not 
assigned randomly, it is hard to rule the possibility that unobservable (to the researcher) 
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characteristics of the units affect both the probability of the treatment and the outcome.
99
 By 
contrast, in my analysis I do not make claims about units that were selected out of the universe of 
multi-party civil wars. To put it differently, it may be the case that the selection process into my 
universe of cases leads to the inclusion of civil wars with characteristics that make the operation 
of my independent variables especially likely (or unlikely); this, however, does not undermine 
my findings, as they are scope-conditioned on cases that “survived” said selection process and 
thus have, on average, those distinctive features.  
 Even if this selection process does not introduce a bias in my scope-conditioned findings, 
it is nonetheless worth thinking about whether it leads to under-representation or over-
representation of cases in which my independent variables are likely to play an especially 
powerful role. The number of rebel groups taking part in a civil war at any given time (and 
therefore whether the war is multi-party) depends on the number of organizations that take up 
arms against the state in the first place, processes of organizational merge and fragmentation 
during the war, and violent selection at the hands of government forces or other rebel groups. For 
some of the determinants of the number of civil war belligerents, which I discuss below, there 
are no strong theoretical reasons to think that the observable universe of multi-party civil wars 
over-represents difficult or easy cases for my theory, while for others a plausible claim can be 
made that the selection process amplifies the effects of my independent variables.      
Rebel groups often emerge from pre-existing social networks.
100
 Thus the number of 
social networks present in a society may affect the number of rebel groups. Other things being 
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the same, countries and ethnic groups with large populations should have a large number of 
distinct social networks that would-be rebel leaders could try to “convert” into armed 
organizations. Cases with these characteristics are therefore likely to be common among multi-
party civil wars, but there are no theoretical grounds to expect them to enhance or inhibit the 
operation of my independent variables. The types of social networks may also affect the number 
of rebel organizations. As Paul Staniland points out, some types of networks are likely to give 
rise to groups with weak leadership and a tendency to fragment, which may lead to a 
proliferation of rebel organizations.
101
 These newly formed groups may be especially weak, 
either because they share the organizational pathologies of their “mother” organization or 
because of the limited resources initially at their disposal. The prevalence of weak groups in this 
kind of scenario may increase and decrease, respectively, the frequency of windows of 
vulnerability (as weak organizations are more likely to find themselves in situations in which 
they may need to take risky courses of action to ensure their survival) and windows of 
opportunity (as weak organizations are less likely to find themselves in situations in which it is 
safe to launch hegemonic bids). This overrepresentation of weak groups does not imply 
amplification or dampening of the effects of my independent variables; it simply affects the 
relative frequency of the two typologies of inter-rebel war and the corresponding causes.  
Rebel group fragmentation and the consequent proliferation of organizations may also be 
a consequence of government counterinsurgency efforts. As Christia suggests, major asymmetric 
battlefield losses among an organization’s constituent subgroups may trigger organizational 
splits.
102
 Relatedly, Staniland argues that effective counterinsurgency measures can promote 
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rebel group fragmentation (in particular leadership decapitation, selective violence and efforts to 
establish pervasive social control on the ground, which tend to be time- and resource-
intensive).
103
 In as much as strong governments are more likely to inflict significant losses to 
their non-state rivals and adopt effective counterinsurgency measures, these kinds of incumbents 
should be prevalent in multi-party civil wars, other things being the same. Again, this should not 
affect the operation of my theory’s independent variables but reduce the frequency of windows 
of opportunity – the stronger the government, the higher the risk that it may be able to take 
advantage of the infighting, which should discourage infighting. 
Organizational merges in early phases of an insurgency may be spurred by the rebels’ 
perception of their extreme military inferiority vis-à-vis the incumbent and the ensuing need to 
pull resources. These merging processes may lead to the exclusion from the universe of multi-
party civil wars of cases characterized by an especially stark imbalance of power between the 
rebels and the government (think, for example, of a case with two weak rebel groups that early 
on in their struggle against the state merge into a single organization, which would be coded as a 
dyadic civil war). Over-representation of cases with especially strong groups may ensue. Take, 
for example, a case with initially four weak rebel groups that then combine to form two 
organizations: the two merges may more than offset the rebels’ initial weakness and thus herald a 
multiparty civil war characterized by a balance of power relatively unfavorable to the incumbent. 
Under-representation of instances of extreme incumbent-rebel imbalance of power should not 
influence the operation of my independent variables, but, again, it may affect the relative 
frequency of the two types of windows. 
By contrast, when organizational splintering occurs due to conflict between a group’s 
constituent factions, the newly emerged groups may be more prone to inter-rebel war, because of 
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the continuation of preexisting tensions, than groups that operate as separate entities from the 
outset. By selecting in cases of groups at high risk of violent conflict, this dynamic would tend to 
amplify the effects of my independent variables; I try to address this concern in my case studies 
by examining the processes leading to inter-rebel war for dyads of rebel groups that splintered 
from the same organization and for dyads of groups that had separate origins.    
Finally, it is important to note one aspect of the selection process generating the universe 
of multi-party civil wars that may plausibly affect the impact of the coethnicity variable. It is 
theoretically plausible that newly-formed rebel organizations are more likely to engage in 
peaceful, consensual merges than well-established groups. Young organizations are likely to be 
especially vulnerable to government attacks and merges promise to reduce that vulnerability; 
moreover, older organizations are likely to have developed bureaucratic structures and 
institutions that stand to lose from merge-related changes in the status quo and can act as veto 
players. 
104
 It seems also plausible that merges would tend to occur between coethnic rebel 
groups (rather than across ethnic lines), given their relatively similar membership profiles and 
political aspirations. If these theoretical speculations are correct, the selection process into the 
universe of multiparty civil wars tends to magnify the war-inducing effect of coethnicity, by 
excluding cases of proto-insurgencies in which coethnicity caused a peaceful merge rather than a 
violent hegemonic bid. Again, this is not a debilitating problem for my argument, as it is scope-
conditioned to cases that have undergone the selection process. But this caveat is worth keeping 
in mind when considering the applicability of the logic of the argument to different contexts.          
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Causal inference strategy and standards of evidence  
I test my theory and alternative explanations with a combination of process tracing and within-
case congruence procedure relying on secondary and primary sources, in particular interviews 
with and memoirs of former rebel leaders but also archival materials.
105
 My ultimate ambition is 
to trace the decision-making processes of rebel leaders and convincingly show the logic of my 
theory (and not that of other theories) at play in their thoughts, deliberations and actions. Thus, 
the strongest possible type of evidence are  “confessions” – explicit statements by those 
responsible for a given inter-rebel fighting-related decision suggesting that they followed 
window of opportunity or vulnerability logic. This type of evidence about rebel decision-making 
is difficult to obtain. Rebel leaders may not keep written records of their decisions or the may be 
unwilling or unable to talk about them with researchers. Moreover, psychological studies find 
that subjects’ self-reported behavioral explanations are often unreliable.
106
 Consistently, based on 
their experience interviewing Washington, D.C. elites, Matthew Beckmann and Richard Hall 
recommend “focusing the interview on elites’ strengths (i.e., knowing what they did in a specific 
instance) rather than their weaknesses (i.e., making empirical generalizations or espousing 
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Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (33), 1977: 231-59; Timothy D. Wilson and Elizabeth W. Dunn, “Self-







 Heeding this advice, I focused my interviews with key rebel 
decision-makers on their perceptions of threat and opportunity vis-à-vis the government and 
other rebel groups in specific historical moments, so as to produce fine-grained accounts of their 
motives and calculus in the relevant episodes. 
A somewhat weaker but still very important type of evidence are what I call “eyewitness 
accounts” – accounts of rebel leaders’ decision-making provided by their close collaborators or 
confidants. Its relative weakness derives from the fact that the recollections of eyewitnesses may 
conflate information on decision-making provided by rebel leaders themselves to (or observed 
by) the informants with their interpretation of relevant events. The practical advantage of this 
kind of evidence is that leaders’ advisors/confidants may sometimes be more accessible to 
researchers than the leaders themselves.  
The next best type of evidence is represented by informed participants’ subjective 
assessments of key features of the situation (e.g., the inter-rebel balance of power or the 
government military posture at a given time) faced by the decision-makers. For example, high-
ranking rebel military commanders may not have been privy to the underlying strategic calculus 
of the organization’s leaders but their assessment of the inter-rebel balance of power is likely to 
be quite accurate. Similarly, rebel commanders are likely to be well informed about 
government’s troop deployments, movements and operations and thus their accounts can allow 
the researcher to code the seriousness and imminence of government threat. Subjects’ 
assessments can be used to confirm the existence of windows of opportunity or vulnerability, 
given the presence of its constitutive elements, even if no direct information on the perceptions 
and thinking of the ultimate decision-makers is available.    
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Finally, researchers can also rely on assessments of key features of the situation advanced 
by third-party observers (e.g., journalists, scholars, analysts and foreign diplomats). The 
disadvantage of this type of evidence is its indirectness: observers’ accurate assessments of the 
situation would be irrelevant to rebel decision-making if rebel leaders had access to different 
information or perceived and interpreted the same information differently. However, in the 
absence of major and systematic gaps between observers’ and participants’ perceptions of key 
features of the situation, third parties’ assessments can be used as rough approximations.
108
   
Even when access to individuals knowledgeable about the decision-making processes of 
interest or to their memoirs is not a problem and when interviews are organized to play to the 
strengths of the interviewees, a number of challenges to reliable process-tracing remain. First, 
individuals’ memories of key events may be defective.
109
 Second, informants’ recollections of 
key events may reflect social and cultural processes shaping collective historical memory. Third, 
interviewees may have incentives to misrepresent their motives and actions. Their statements 
may reflect self-aggrandizing, exculpatory or legitimizing concerns. Fourth, subjects may also 
misrepresent their decisions and actions due to cognitive and motivated biases affecting their 
perception, leading them, for example, to ascribe benign motives to actions they conducted out 
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 I expect the objective features of the situation to affect rebel groups’ behavior indirectly, through the perceptions 
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 For example, psychological research shows that the reliability of eyewitness varies based on a number of factors 
(Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979; Gary L. Wells and 
Elizabeth A. Olson; “Eyewitness Testimony,” Annual Review of Psychology 54: 2003: 277–95). As the reliability of 
memory is likely to be inversely related to the remoteness in time of the relevant events, other things being the same, 
memoirs written shortly after the events are likely to be more accurate than “off the top of your head” recollections 









These problems are not entirely eliminable, but for several reasons they are less of a 
hindrance for this project than for other types of process tracing-based research, and precautions 
can be adopted to further mitigate them. Experimental studies suggest that events that are 
characterized by high intensity (“arousal” in the jargon of this literature) and a high degree of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness (“valence”) tend to be better remembered both in the short- and 
long-run.
111
 Highly consequential political decisions in environments fraught with uncertainty 
and characterized by very high stakes, as civil war settings typically are, would seem to possess 
these attributes and thus are likely to be relatively well remembered (although questions of 
ecological validity of the experimental findings remain).
112
 Moreover, concerns that individual 
accounts may reflect a widely-accepted social narrative are not especially acute for interviews 
focusing on decision-making processes in which the rebel leaders being interviewed took part or 
to which they were directly exposed, rather than on their interpretations of the actions of actors 
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 Elizabeth Wood (2003, pp. 33-4) makes a similar point about violent events witnessed or participated by her 





to whom they did not have access. Beckmann and Hall’s observation about Washington D.C. 




The most serious challenge is associated with informants’ (conscious or unconscious) 
misrepresentation of the decision-making processes of interest.
114
 While no foolproof solution 
exists, assessing the credibility of information based on the incentive structure of those who 
provide it and triangulating it with other sources are useful measures. Statements that go against 
the interests of their source are more credible and should be given more weight.
115
 Thus direct 
evidence of rebel leaders following window of opportunity logic should be rarer but more 
credible than evidence of window of vulnerability thinking: rebel leaders have incentives to 
downplay aggressive actions in their accounts and emphasize self-defense and external 
compulsion (“we had no choice but to defend ourselves”).
116
 Triangulating information across 
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 Researchers conducting interviews with participants often report instances of wrong information provided by 
interviewees. For example, Kevin M. Woods et al. (Saddam’s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2011) report, as inaccurate, an Iraqi general’s denial of the use of 




 Eric Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, “How to Report Interview Research,” in Mosley, ed., 2013, p. 88. See also 
Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 




 Direct evidence of window of opportunity thinking can be considered a “smoking gun”: its presence confirms the 
hypothesis, but its absence does not falsify it, as rebel leaders have incentives not to admit having reasoned along 
those lines. By contrast, direct evidence of window of vulnerability thinking can be considered a “straw-in-the 
wind”: its presence does not confirm the hypothesis but makes it more plausible, while its absence does not falsify it 
but reduces its plausibility, given that rebel leaders should be more willing to admit having followed that logic. See 





subjects and different types of evidence increases our confidence in the findings and reduces the 





I conducted fifty-four semi-structured interviews with forty former senior cadres and political 
and military leaders of insurgent groups active in Iraqi Kurdistan, Tigray and Eritrea (I 
interviewed several subjects more than once).
118
 I also interviewed a handful of former rank-and-
file of a few of the organizations and former government military officials, for a total of 66 
interviews. I conducted all interviews (but one over Skype) in person (with the help of an 
interpreter, when not in English or Italian); they lasted between 45 minutes and three hours. I 
engaged in simultaneous note-taking in all interviews and audio-recorded a dozen of them. All 
subjects were given the option of anonymity but the vast majority declined it. Most interviews 
were conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Ethiopia, but about a dozen took place in Europe (the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway) and the United States.   
 In research on particular policy decisions there is typically a narrow population of 
relevant actors and thus random sampling is not the most appropriate methodology.
119
 I adopted 
the following non-random sampling approach: based on secondary literature on the cases, I 
compiled a list of subjects likely to have access to relevant information and I tried to get in touch 
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 The case studies below report more specific information on the interview samples for each case and on the 




 Tansey 2007; Bleich and Pekkanen 2013, p. 90; Julia F. Lynch “Aligning Sampling Strategies with Analytic 
Goals,” in Mosley, ed., 2013, pp. 40-4. 
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by being introduced to them, thus avoiding cold calls whenever possible; in addition, I asked 
interviewees to suggest other individuals that they thought I should talk to and to introduce me to 
them, if possible. I mitigated the perils of being trapped within a network of interlinked 
respondents with the same world view by starting multiple “snowballs” of interview subjects, 





The two driving concerns in case selection for this dissertation are the sample’s potential 
representativeness of a larger population and the presence of useful within-case variation on 
dimensions of theoretical interest, which enables me to advance causal claims for the cases under 
examination.
121
 I consciously decided not to adopt random case selection, due to potential 
problems of bias and unrepresentativeness associated with a small sample of cases for qualitative 
analysis, in addition to the competing concern of ensuring useful within-case variation.
122
 By 
contrast, I followed a purposive case selection strategy combining several different criteria 
identified in the literature for theory development and theory testing.  
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 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative 




 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 125-6) discuss the potential problem of selection bias 
associated with random selection of a small sample of case studies. Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 295) show that 
randomized case selection with small samples may often lead to substantively unrepresentative samples, even if 
there is no bias. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (“Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods,” in Janet 
M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008) advocate for random selection, but their rationale is countering researchers’ 
confirmation bias rather than achieving representativeness. Random selection would be especially problematic for 
theory building; as Evan Lieberman points out, at this stage of the research project “random selection of cases 
should absolutely be avoided because such an approach would be tantamount to saying, ‘I don’t have a good theory, 
and I don’t have an intuition about why a particular case would be illuminating for constructing a theory,’ which is 
hardly a solid foundation for investigation” (“Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative 
Research,” American Political Science Review 99 (3), 2005: 435-52, p. 447).   
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Theory development case study. My theory development case study explores the Kurdish 
insurgencies against Iraq in the years 1961-88. This case is useful for several reasons: it satisfies 
the theory’s basic scope condition, it meets the deviant and diverse case criteria, and it entailed 
relative easy access to primary sources.  
Iraq’s Kurdish insurgencies fulfill the basic scope condition of a multiparty civil war, as 
more than one rebel group fought against the government for large chunks of the relevant period 
(1961-88).
123
 More crucially, the case fits the criterion of being a deviant or anomalous case for 
Christia’s MWC argument, which I consider the most established and comprehensive alternative 
explanation of the phenomena under study.
124
 As Christia’s own coding in her medium-N 
analysis points out, the case was characterized by overwhelming military superiority by the 
government, a condition under which her theory does not predict inter-insurgent war, but rather 
inter-rebel cooperation.
125
 This is certainly not the only anomalous case for Christia’s theory, so 
why choose this one for theory development? I do not claim that this is an especially deviant 
case; in the absence of a model with a good statistical fit and a nuanced measure over time and 
across cases of key independent variables like the balance of power and threat environment, it is 
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just impossible to assess a given case’s distance from the “regression line”.
126
 A preliminary 
examination did not suggest features of the case that would disqualify it on the ground of being 
especially difficult for Christia’s argument or particularly idiosyncratic.
127
   
Another characteristic that makes the case useful is its diversity, i.e., it displays 
substantial variation on the dependent variable as Iraq’s Kurdish rebels notoriously clashed on 
multiple occasions. Within-case variation enables my causal inference strategy (as it allow me to 
see whether the mechanisms envisioned by my theory are in fact at play in rebel groups’ 
decisions to go to war) and guarantees a minimum of representativeness vis-à-vis the larger 
population (by including both instances of inter-rebel war and peace).
128
 Finally, pragmatic 
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 As Jack Levy points out, there are fewer well-established rules of case selection for the purpose of theory 
development than testing (“Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and 




 Upon selection, the Iraqi Kurdistan case did reveal itself to be an especially useful deviant case, as it allows me to 
circumvent some ambiguity in Christia’s conceptualization and measurement of her independent variable. In her 
case studies, Christia uses territorial control as the key indicator of relative power that belligerents keep in mind in 
their alliance calculations. Due to the challenge of coding this variable for a substantial number of cases, in her 
medium-N analysis Christia relies on a different, rougher, measure of the balance of power: the relative size of 
government and rebel forces. The Iraq case offers the advantage of painting a consistent picture of government 
overwhelming superiority regardless of whether one focuses on territorial control or troop numbers (or other 
potential indicators like fire-power) thus reducing the plausibility of the objection that the case’s anomaly status is a 
function of the specific measure of the independent variable used. An additional ambiguity with Christia’s measure 
of relative power has to do with whether the relevant territorial control concerns the territory under dispute (in this 
case the Kurdish areas of Iraq) or the country as a whole. One would intuitively think that what matters is the 
territorial control of areas being fought over, as this would indicate how close one side is to winning. However, for 
Christia territorial control is also a source of military power (the more territory a belligerent controls, the broader its 
access to resources, including manpower) and thus government control of state’s territory not under dispute (in this 
case the Shia and Sunni populated-areas of the country) could be relevant. The Iraqi Kurdistan case allows me to 





 See Seawright and Gerring’s (2008, pp. 300-1) discussion of the diverse case selection strategy, who observe that 
“[e]ncompassing a full range of variation is likely to enhance the representativeness of the sample of cases chosen 
by the researcher.” The authors argue that the approach at a minimum requires selecting two cases to capture the full 
range of values of a dichotomous variable; however, one case can serve the same purpose if it displays longitudinal 
variation along the relevant dimension. It should be noted that this method does not offer complete 
representativeness because the dependent variable may predominantly take on a given value in the population and so 
the presence of the full range of values in a case may entail overrepresentation of rare values. The method, however, 
ensures that cases in which the values of the independent variables make a given outcome necessary or impossible 
are not selected.    
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considerations reinforced the methodological rationales for case selection discussed above: 
several of the key rebel decision-makers are still alive and fairly accessible (as they are affiliated 
with the main Iraqi Kurdish parties), while the relatively good security situation in Iraq’s 
Kurdistan Region in 2012 made it a safe post-conflict setting for this kind of research.
129
  
The obvious limit of the case is that it presents no variation on the ethnicity dimension 
(all the rebel groups are Kurdish) and therefore does not allow a full assessment of the 
corresponding hypothesis. In fact, in keeping with its designation as theory development case 
study, I developed my argument about the effect of coethnicity on the risk of inter-rebel war 
during my fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the case does allow me to observe an 
implication of the coethnicity argument and thus potentially to falsify it: in the aftermath of 
decisive inter-rebel war, the victor should easily manage to operate and recruit from areas 
previously under the control of its defeated rival(s).   
Theory testing case studies. The insurgencies raging in Ethiopia in the years 1961-1991, 
which I break down in two cases – the rebellions in the provinces of Tigray and Eritrea – are my 
main theory testing case study. My choice was primarily driven by the fact that the case offers a 
rare opportunity to test qualitatively the coethnicity argument. The difficulty involved in testing 
this hypothesis with case studies is that often only coethnic rebel groups find themselves fighting 
the government in close physical proximity to each other and thus only coethnics tend to be 
plausible candidates for inter-rebel fighting – i.e., there rarely is within-case variation on the 
relevant independent variable to exploit for causal inference. Starting from 1975, this case was 
characterized by multiparty rebellions in both the adjacent provinces of Ethiopia and Tigray, 
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pitting, respectively, Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels against Amhara-dominated Ethiopian 
government forces. The case thus allows me to assess whether, controlling for physical 
proximity, rebel groups are more likely to fight across or within ethnic boundaries. Moreover, 
based on preliminary examination of the history of the case before embarking on in-depth study 
and fieldwork, the Ethiopian insurgencies displayed significant variation in inter-rebel fighting. 
Finally, the case provided a mixed picture in terms of ease of access to primary sources. Upon 
consultation with several country experts, due to concerns about my security and that of my local 
informants, I decided not try to conduct field research in Eritrea (which, in any case, would have 
required a research visa, exceedingly difficult to obtain for the country).
130
 However, I managed 
to contact and interview many former high level members of several Eritrean groups who 
currently live in Ethiopia, the United States and several European countries, where I also 
conducted my interviews for the Tigray case study. 
Shadow case studies. I conducted shadow case studies based on secondary literature of 
the civil wars in Lebanon (1975-89), Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and Syria (2011-). These are multi-
party ethnic civil wars with multiple episodes of inter-rebel fighting and thus offer several 
opportunities for within-case controlled comparisons.
131
 Each of them has also distinct benefits: 
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 Ideally, one would want to select cases for external validity tests based on substantial within-case variation on the 
independent variable(s); however, obtaining fine-grained data to measure balance of power and threat environment 
would require a comparable amount of immersion in the weeds of the case as conducting the case study itself, while 
the occurrence of infighting is more easily observable. Given the paucity of available process evidence for the 
shadow case studies, the benefits of substantial within-case variation on the dependent variable for the most part are 
not related to observing the mechanisms envisioned by the theory multiple times but to controlling for case-specific 
features. For this set of cases, I mostly rely on within-case congruence, which allows me to ascertain whether the 
independent and dependent variables covary as the theory suggests, holding constant background features of the 
case. Selecting cases with no variation on the dependent variable would make it extremely difficult to rule out the 
possibility that the outcome is being determined by some constant case-specific factor that makes inter-rebel war 
either highly unlikely or highly likely.     
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Lebanon’s civil war allows me to test the coethnicity hypothesis, as it features both coethnic and 
non-coethnic armed groups operating in close proximity and thus with opportunities to fight each 
other; the Syrian civil war permits me to assess whether window theory is relevant jihadi groups, 
a relatively common presence in civil wars over the past decade; and Sri Lanka’s Tamil 
insurgency offers a chance to explore inter-rebel dynamics beyond the Middle Eastern and 
African scope of all other cases. 
 
Definitions and operationalization 
Inter-rebel war. Consistent with prevailing definitions of civil war, I consider inter-rebel war a 
purposeful, major violent clash between distinct rebel organizations. The large scale of the 
violence helps distinguish inter-rebel war from low-level clashes, which are pervasive in civil 
war settings. Both the participants that I interviewed and case specialists tend to distinguish 
phases in which inter-rebel violence is limited at low levels from phases in which it occurs on a 
large scale (they often use expressions like “skirmishes” to refer the former type of inter-rebel 
interaction, and “war” and “civil war” to refer to the latter).
132
 The purposeful nature of the 
violence and the fact it occurs between rebel groups (rather than individuals or small units 
belonging to those groups) also help differentiate wars from skirmishes: a series of clashes 
involving rank-and-file or low-level commanders would not amount to inter-rebel war unless at 
some point there was an explicit or tacit decision by the group’s leadership to fight. Inter-rebel 
violence does not need to be protracted for it to amount to war, as a group may well be able to 
wipe out a rival very quickly.  
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Operationalizing the proposed definition of inter-rebel war poses some challenges. Civil 
war datasets use numerical thresholds of fatalities to determine whether an event should be 
included. However, rigidly following this approach would not be very helpful for my purposes: if 
the organizations in question are large and there are many opportunities for contact, they may 
engage in a sufficient number of skirmishes to cause a large number of deaths, even if the 
phenomenon under examination does not correspond to the concept of inter-rebel war. Moreover, 
the available data about skirmishes’ death-tolls is typically very poor. Conversely, inter-rebel 
violent interactions that would appear to fit the definition of inter-rebel war may cause a lower 
number of deaths than a large number of isolated skirmishes. For example, a rebel group may 
coerce a much weaker rival to abandon the field with a display of overwhelming military 
superiority, which may only cause a small number of deaths in battle as the losing side concedes 
defeat rather than fighting to the last man. In light of these considerations, I adopt the following 
operationalization criteria for my case studies.
133
 First, there has to be some evidence that the 
episode under examination reflects an explicit or tacit decision by the organization’s leadership, 
i.e., independent actions of individuals or local commanders do not qualify. Second, repeated 
battles between units of different organizations must occur, or a major battle with hundreds of 
fighters must take place, or the main headquarters of one of the rebel groups must be the target of 
a major attack.               
 Rebel group. I define rebel groups as independent organizations taking part in a civil war on 
the opposite side of the government. I consider organizations as independent if there is evidence that they 
make autonomous decisions about alignments and the strategic use of force (i.e., about initiation and 
termination of their anti-government activities as well as their overall military strategy), and that they 
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have exclusive authority over their armed forces.
134
 Independence distinguishes rebel groups from 
subunits (typically referred to as factions) of which rebel organizations are composed.
135
 
 Coethnicity. I consider rebel organizations as coethnic if they are linked to the same 
ethnic group. My theoretical argument about the effects of ethnicity stresses coethnic rebel 
groups’ overlapping ambitions and cumulativity of resources; thus I posit two conditions for 
rebel organizations to be considered as linked to an ethnic group: 1) the rebel organization 
announced political aspirations directly relate to the ethnic group’s fate and 2) the overwhelming 
majority of the rank-and-file or of the leadership of the rebel organization belongs to the ethnic 
group.
136
 In the presence of sub-ethnic differences between rebel groups, I consider rebel groups 
as coethnic if they are engaged in armed combat against a common “ethnic-other” government, 
articulate their struggle in terms of an overarching common ethnic cause and recruit (or are in 
principle willing to recruit) across the sub-ethnic cleavages.    
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 There may be, of course, cases in which in practice it is extremely difficult to distinguish between rebel groups 




 These criteria are similar to those adopted in the ACD2EPR dataset (Julian Wucherpfennig et al., “Ethnicity, the 
State, and the Duration of Civil War,” World Politics 64 (1), 2012: 79-115). However, the second criterion is 
different in some important respects. The ACD2EPR dataset requires that “a significant number of the group 
members actively participate in the organization’s combat operations” (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012, p. 96). My 
criterion is both broader and more specific. On the one hand, given that I am interested in capturing rebel groups’ 
perceptions of the degree to which other organizations can compete for the same pool of resources, it makes sense to 
code as linked to an ethnic group not only organizations with an ethnic-based rank-and-file, but also organizations 
whose leadership is mostly comprised of members of that ethnic group (as that suggests potential ability to recruit 
rank-and-file). On the other hand, my criterion requires a majority of ethnic leadership or membership, rather than 
an unspecified “significant number”. The first criterion (the rebel group’s ethnic political aspirations) does not 
necessarily mean that the “ethnic cause” needs to have priority over other political objectives (e.g., a radical change 
of the entire country’s political system), but simply that the rebel organization consistently states as part of its 
political agenda goals related to the ethnic group’s rights or wellbeing. For a discussion of a series of criteria that 
researchers may utilize to identify ethnic political parties (potentially extendable to rebel groups), see Kanchan 
Chandra, “What Is An Ethnic Party?” Party Politics 17 (2), 2011: 151-69. 
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Windows of opportunity and vulnerability. Window theory of inter-rebel war shares 
similarities with arguments that focus on political opportunity and threat environment as 
explanatory variables for different political phenomena. These arguments have been criticized 
for not clearly conceptualizing and measuring ex ante opportunities and threats, which are 
instead identified by looking back after their purported effects have materialized.
137
 Ensuring the 
falsifiability of my argument requires being able to identify the existence of windows of 
opportunity and vulnerability independently of whether inter-rebel war occurred, so as to detect 
potential instances of rebel groups fighting each other in the absence of windows and of 
windows failing to prompt inter-rebel war.  
Whenever possible, I code the existence of windows (both when inter-rebel war occurs 
and when peace prevails) with a combination of decision-making evidence and rebel leaders’ and 
third-parties’ (scholars, journalists and other observers) assessments of the defining features of 
windows, as the different types of evidence complement each other. As noted, the most powerful 
kind of evidence are rebel decision-makers’ statements that they launched an attack due to their 
perception of an opportunity to get rid of a rival (at an acceptable cost) or the urgency to confront 
a mounting threat posed by it (in spite of the potential steep costs that infighting entailed), and 
that they abstained from attacking in other moments due to the absence of comparable 
opportunities or vulnerabilities. This direct decision-making evidence largely addresses problems 
of authors’ “retroactive” coding of windows; here triangulation with participants’ and third 
parties’ description of the key features of the situation plays the ancillary role of assuaging 
concerns about biases in rebel leaders’ accounts.  
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However, when sufficiently fine-grained process evidence is not available, it is necessary 
to rely on participants’ and observers’ assessments of the constitutive elements of window, 
which puts a premium on transparent and replicable coding criteria.  
As noted, windows of opportunity are characterized by an imbalance of power between 
rebel groups and the absence of a serious and imminent government threat. Whenever possible, I 
measure rebel relative power with information about the perceptions of rebel leaders. In 
particular, I ask them about their perception at a given time of the organization’s overall military 
strength compared to other groups and of specific aspects of the balance of power (e.g., troop 
numbers and armaments) as well as about their assessment at that time of the likely outcome of 
inter-rebel war. I corroborate and supplement leaders’ recollections with other subjects’ and 
third-parties’ reports about the inter-rebel balance of power, focusing on four dimensions of 
power whenever data is available: rebel groups’ troop numbers, weaponry at their disposal, 
organizational cohesion (measured as relative absence of splits and feuds among leaders and 
pervasive indiscipline among the rank-and-file) and tactical-operational skills (often proxied by 
previous battlefield experience).
138
 In the absence of direct evidence of rebel leaders’ perception 
of the balance of power, I code a rebel group as stronger if it starkly outranks another group in a 
net number of dimensions of power for which I have information.
139
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 For example, if information is available on two dimensions of relative power, a group will be coded as stronger if 
starkly superior in at least one dimension and at least roughly equal in the other dimension. 
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Similarly, whenever possible I code the existence of a serious and imminent government 
threat with information about the perceptions of rebel leaders, by asking them what kinds of 
military operations the government forces were conducting at a given time and the extent to 
which they felt that the survival of their organization was under immediate threat. I corroborate 
and complement leaders’ assessments of government threat with information reported by other 
subjects and third-party observers; I code a serious and imminent threat if government forces are 
engaged in a major offensive or if there are indications (for example, troop movements or the 
establishment of more hardline executive) that government’s military pressure could suddenly 
escalate. By contrast, in the context of guerrilla warfare, I consider situations in which the rebels 
initiate most of the engagements and thus can set the pace of their losses as characterized by 
limited government threat. In conventional warfare, a permissive threat environment would 
typically be characterized by static battle lines, which previous interactions have shown that the 
rebels can comfortably defend in the absence of significant escalation of government attacks. 
Government threat is also low when the rebels are making major gains on the battlefield, which I 
operationalize as a trend of pitched battles in which the insurgents get the upper hand and/or the 
fall of government strongholds under insurgent pressure. In this scenario, I do not expect inter-
rebel war due to the high opportunity cost of forgoing major gains (and even ultimate victory) 
against the government.    
Windows of vulnerability are characterized by a sharp deterioration of a group’s power 
position or an imminent and serious threat posed by another rebel group, which can only be 
addressed with a high-risk, low-chance of success military adventure. A sharp decline in relative 
power may take different forms, but it will typically manifest itself as a group’s inability to 
sustain military activities and retain fighters, due to dwindling finances and supplies (in 
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particular, weapons and ammunition, but also food), or to keep up with a rapidly growing rival. I 
code the trend in the balance of power with information about rebel leaders’ perceptions, which I 
triangulate and complement with information from other observers. Similarly, whenever 
available, I rely on direct evidence of rebel leaders’ perceptions of the odds of success and risks 
involved in the gamble for resurrection; this evidence is supplemented with information from 
other sources about the balance of power, from which I infer the ex-ante likelihood of success of 
a given initiative.  
Serious and imminent threats from other groups may emerge in a variety of ways. 
Sometimes threats arise endogenously, so to speak, as a rebel group finds itself surrounded by an 
alliance of hostile organizations. Rebel groups’ threats to each other may also interact with 
threats posed by the government: for example, the existence of an aggressive rival will be 
typically made more threatening by the prospect of a government offensive down the road, as it 
exposes the group to the risk of a two-front war. Other times, threats may emerge exogenously, 
as in cases in which a group loses a safe-haven in a friendly neighboring country and thus 
suddenly becomes more vulnerable to attack. Again, I code the threat posed by other rebel 
groups with evidence of rebel leaders’ perceptions of the situation and information from other 
observers and the secondary literature about developments on the battlefield (in particular about 
the formation of hostile rebel alliances, the loss of safe havens and the prospect of intervention 
by hostile third-parties).         
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented my theoretical argument: wars between rebel groups occur when they 
face windows of opportunity or vulnerability, which are a function of the inter-rebel balance of 
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power, groups’ threat environment and coethnic rebels’ overlapping bases of support. Unraveling 
the puzzle of inter-rebel war requires paying heed to fine-grained measures of belligerents’ 
capabilities and battlefield developments as well as to rebel groups’ mobilization bases. Far from 
being a mere façade for material calculations, rebel groups’ shared ethnic identity amplifies both 
defensive and aggressive motives for inter-rebel war, as it affects groups’ threat perception and 
their ability to expand resources at rivals’ expense. The next two chapters, respectively, present 
my theory-development case study – the Kurdish insurgencies against Iraq – my main theory-



















The Kurdish Insurgencies in Iraq, 1961-1988 
 
 
Excluding Anfal, more Kurds in Iraq have died at the hands of fellow Kurds than of Arabs. 




At various points in the years 1961-1988, Iraq’s Kurdish rebel groups waged war against each 
other to exploit opportunities to launch hegemonic bids or to extricate themselves from positions 
of deep vulnerability, despite the presence of an overwhelmingly powerful common enemy – 
Baghdad – bent on genocidal violence against their people. Rather than promoting solidarity and 
cooperation against the government, coethnicity stoked violent competition between the Kurdish 
groups for control of their overlapping bases of support.  
This chapter presents a case study of the Kurdish insurgencies against Iraq, which served 
as the dissertation’s theory development case. Through detailed processes-tracing of insurgent 
leaders’ decision-making, I show how the opening and closing of windows of opportunity and 
vulnerability cast light on the trajectories of war and cooperation between the groups.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 details the array of 
primary sources (in particular interviews I conducted in Iraq) and secondary literature I rely on to 
get at the underlying logic of intra-Kurdish fighting. Section 3 presents an historical overview of 
the case. Section 4 zeroes in on the instances of inter-rebel war to be explained and assesses my 
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theory’s empirical fit. In section 5, I address alternative explanations and endogeneity concerns. 
Section 6 concludes by summarizing my findings.  
   
2. Sources 
The case study presented in this chapter relies primarily on original interviews with former Iraqi 
Kurdish rebel leaders and their memoirs, interviews with Iraqi government officials conducted 
by other scholars,
140
 documents from the Conflict Records Research Center’s Saddam Hussein 
collection,
141
 and the secondary literature. In the period October-December 2012, I interviewed 
twenty former political leaders and military commanders (seven of them twice) of former 
Kurdish insurgent organizations and two lower–rank members (one of them twice), for a total of 
31 semi-structured interviews.
142
 Since my goal was to trace specific decisions about inter-rebel 
war, the population of relevant subjects consisted of former members of rebel organizations that 
may have participated to the decision-making processes I am interested in or may be reliably 
informed about them.
143
 Thus I focused on individuals that were in positions of political 
leadership or military command in the relevant organizations at the time of the events (the lower-
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 See the discussion of my interview methodology in Chapter 2.  
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ranked former members I interviewed are individuals that I contacted to be introduced to other 
subjects, although their accounts were helpful in providing information on several aspects of the 
activities of their respective organizations).  
Before embarking on my fieldwork, I compiled a list of possible interviewees, based on 
the secondary literature. Upon my arrival to Iraq, I shared the list with my initial local contacts 
(mostly Kurdish journalists), asking for help in getting in touch with the people in question 
(ideally by making introductions or even setting up appointments for me) and for suggestions of 
individuals with a similar profile to be added to my list. This helped me start multiple interview 
“snowballs”, which I kept rolling by asking my interviewees to suggest other individuals that 
could be useful sources for my research.
144
 I conducted all interviews in person (with the help of 
an interpreter for about half of them).
 145
 In addition to the interviews, the case study relies on the 
three-volume memoirs of Nawshirwan Mustafa (de facto deputy leader of the PUK in the period 
under study and head of Gorran party at the moment of this writing), which Dr. Kamal Soleimani 
translated for me from Kurdish Sorani in New York City.  
I certainly cannot claim to have reached saturation of the population of potential 
interviewees. However, by generating multiple snowballs – corresponding to different political 
parties, former rebel organizations and factions thereof – I cautioned against the risk of tapping 
into a single network of individuals with the same views and biases.  
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 My research assistants/interpreters (typically undergraduate students at the University of Kurdistan Hawler (in 




3. Overview of the Kurdish Insurgencies in Iraq (1961-1988)  
The fall of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958 promised to be a key turning point in the history of 
tense relations between Iraq and its Kurdish minority since the country’s birth, following the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
146
 For the first time, the provisional constitution recognized 
the Kurds’ national rights within the Iraqi state; moreover, the new President, General Abdul 
Karim Qassem, forged an alliance with Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani to consolidate 
his regime. However, it was not long before the relationship between the two deteriorated, as 
Qassem became concerned with Barzani’s expanding influence in the Kurdish areas and the 
latter grew frustrated with the absence of progress towards Kurdish autonomy. Clashes between 
Barzani’s forces and the government started in September, as a result of the escalation of a revolt 
launched by Barzani’s tribal allies against Baghdad’s economic reforms. A major government 
offensive against Barzani’s forces ensued.
147
    
In addition to being a powerful tribal leader and a charismatic ethno-national figure, 
Barzani was the honorary president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, the 
party was under the actual control of urban intellectuals, in particular Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal 
Talabani – KDP’s secretary-general and influential politburo member, respectively. For the sake 
of clarity, henceforth I refer to the “Barzani faction” and the “Ahmed-Talabani faction” as the 
two political organizations jostling for control of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq in the 
years 1961-1970.
148
 The two organizations were clearly coethnic, as they both aspired to 
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autonomy for Iraq’s Kurds and had exclusively Kurdish memberships; but they had different 
ideological orientations and partially distinct social bases: the Ahmed-Talabani faction was 
leftist and its strongholds were the major centers in the Sorani-speaking areas (central and 
southern Iraqi Kurdistan); Barzani’s faction held more conservative views and drew most of its 
support from Kurmanji-speaking tribes in the Badinan region (northern Iraqi Kurdistan).
149
  
The Ahmed-Talabani faction was initially reluctant to take part in the rebellion, due to its 
perceived tribal character. But eventually, in early 1962, Ahmed and Talabani rallied on 
Barzani’s side, fearing that his defeat or an agreement between him and Qassem would spell 
their faction’s fate, while also hoping that in due time they would manage to become the 
vanguard of the nationalist struggle, in spite of the faction’s stark military inferiority vis-à-vis 
Barzani’s forces. On his part, Barzani saw the Ahmed-Talabani faction as a potential future 




The first two years of the war were characterized by a seesaw pattern of government 
offensives, which would get bogged down in the mountains, followed by Kurdish counterattacks 
in moments of government military weakness or political turmoil in Baghdad. For most of this 
period, the Kurds controlled a stretch of territory of varying depth along Iraq’s mountainous 
border, extending from Zakho (in the north-west) to Khanakin (in the south-east) (see Figure 3.1 
below), while resorting to hit-and-run attacks elsewhere in the region.  
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In February 1964, in the aftermath of a military coup that significantly weakened the 
Iraqi military, the government and Barzani reached a ceasefire agreement. The Ahmed-Talabani 
faction denounced Barzani as a “sell-out” and argued that the Kurds should press their military 
advantage. In the following months, the long-simmering struggle for control of the Kurdish 
movement escalated and finally came to a head: in July, Barzani sent a military contingent to the 
Ahmed-Talabani’s headquarters, which defeated and expelled the faction to Iran.
151
 This was the 
first episode of inter-rebel war.  
Subsequently, negotiations between Barzani and Baghdad over Kurdish self-
administration stalled and, in April 1965, the government launched a new offensive. Barzani then 
allowed the members of the Ahmed-Talabani faction back into Kurdistan, absorbing the rank-
and-files in his organization while keeping its leaders under close surveillance (Ahmed remained 
in exile).
152
 In a stunning turn of events, however, Talabani and a group of loyal elements left the 




The following three years witnessed similarly indecisive fighting, with an alternation of 
massive, yet unsuccessful, government offensives and phases in which Baghdad “outsourced” 
the bulk of the anti-Barzani operations to the reestablished Ahmed-Talabani faction, which had 
de facto become a pro-government militia.
154
 In 1969, the newly in power Baath government 
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realized that it was not strong enough to deal at the same time with an increasingly more 
assertive Iran across the border and the ongoing Kurdish insurgency in the north (generously 
supported by Tehran). Baghdad thus decided to appease Barzani by granting significant 
autonomy to the Kurds, enshrined in the agreement of 11 March 1970.
155
 Among other important 
concessions, Baghdad ceased its support for the Ahmed-Talabani faction, and its members were 












                                                                                                                                                                                           
154
 O’Ballance 1973, pp. 137 and 151-2; Jawad 1981, pp. 205-14 and 241-251; Van Bruinessen 1986, p. 22, The 
government had also relied since 1961 on Kurdish militias mostly formed from tribes hostile to Barzani, 




 Ghareeb 1981, p. 136; Jawad 1981, pp. 250-2; McDowall 2004, pp. 326-7; Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: 




 O’Ballance 1973, pp. 159-163; Ghareb 1981, pp. 86 and 100. According to Adel Murad, the 6,000 peshmergas 
under Talabani were integrated on an individual basis in separate regional branches of the KDP’s forces (author’s 
interview, 15-16 November 2012, Sulaimania, Iraq; Adel Murad was Barzani’s affiliate at the time of the events and 
later one of PUK’s founders; he was a high-ranking PUK member at the time of the interview, 15-16 November, 
2012, Sulaimania, Iraq). Talabani was readmitted in the KDP but sent to Beirut (and later Damascus) as its 
representative in a soft form of exile, while Ahmed did not return to Kurdistan (Kamran Karadaghi, “The Two Gulf 
Wars: The Kurds on the World Stage, 1979-1992,” in Gérard Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country: The Kurds 
and Kurdistan, London: Zed Press,1993, p. 219; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political 
Analysis, New York: St. Martin's Press 1999, p. 24; McDowall 2004, p. 343).   
80 
 
 Figure 3.1: Map of Iraqi Kurdistan 
 
 
However, disputes over implementation of the agreement and important unresolved 
issues emerged soon afterwards.
157
 Emboldened by promises of US and Iranian support, 
Barzani’s bargaining position stiffened. War re-erupted in the spring of 1974 as Baghdad sent a 
large force to relieve besieged army garrisons in Kurdish-controlled territory. The ensuing 
government offensive made substantial inroads and by the winter the Kurdish forces were 
reduced to a strip of territory near the Iranian border, which they could defend only with Iranian 
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artillery support. Baghdad became convinced that the only solution to its Kurdish problem was to 
placate its foreign sponsor, while Tehran calculated that the time had come to reap the diplomatic 
benefits of the pressure it had imposed on Iraq through its Kurdish proxy.
158
 In March 1975, the 
two governments caught the world and the rebels by surprise with the announcement of the 
Algiers agreement, by which Iran undertook to stop supporting the Kurdish insurgency and 
sealing off the border in exchange for Iraqi concessions in the long-standing Shatt al-Arab border 
dispute. Bereft of vital external support, Barzani ordered his forces to stop fighting and the 
Kurdish rebellion swiftly collapsed.
159
 
New organizations emerged in the power vacuum created by the defeat and dissolution of 
Barzani’s KDP. In the summer of 1975, Talabani announced from Damascus the formation of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which started military operations against Iraq the 
following year. In 1976, Barzani’s sons, Idris and Massoud, in cooperation with other former 
KDP elements, created the KDP-Provisional Leadership (later renamed KDP; henceforth, I refer 
to it as KDP for simplicity’s sake). The group resumed operations in Kurdistan shortly after the 
PUK. In the second half of 1979, the Socialist Party of Kurdistan in Iraq (henceforth, the 
Socialist Party) and the Kurdistan Branch of the Communist Party of Iraq (henceforward, the 
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In the years preceding the Iran-Iraq war, there were skirmishes between the KDP and the 
PUK, as Talabani’s group tried to extend its activities from the Sorani areas to the Badinan 
region – the KDP’s stronghold in northern Iraqi Kurdistan. These low-level clashes culminated 




As the Iran-Iraq war started in the fall of 1980, the various Kurdish groups took 
advantage of the redeployment of the Iraqi army from Kurdistan to the southern front to rapidly 
expand their forces and areas of operations. For a few years after their 1978 fight, the antagonism 
between the KDP and the PUK was largely confined to hostile propaganda and competing 
“diplomatic” initiatives, as the two organizations did not frontally challenge the rival’s control of 
its stronghold.
162
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 Author’s interview with Shoresh Hadji (PUK’s commander during the Iran-Iraq war; he was a Gorran party’s 
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In the spring of 1983, a complex series of alliance maneuvers in the Kurdish camp and 
battlefield developments in the Iran-Iraq war prompted the resumption of large-scale intra-
Kurdish fighting – the third episode of inter-rebel war. The PUK found itself surrounded by 
hostile forces: it was fighting the Iraqi government, but it was also facing an increasingly 
assertive alliance of all other armed organizations active in Kurdistan (the National Democratic 
Front, led by the KDP) and the prospect of an imminent invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan by Iran, 
which was allied with the KDP and hostile to the PUK. The PUK responded by attacking the 
Socialists’ and Communists’ headquarters and expelling their forces (and those of the KDP that 
they were hosting) from the Sorani areas, which became the PUK’s undisputed fiefdom.
163
  
Albeit successful, this attack, on top of six years of anti-government struggle, left the 
PUK in a weakened position. In late 1983, Talabani thus decided to accept Baghdad’s offer to 
negotiate the terms of an extensive Kurdish autonomy and the two sides declared a ceasefire. 




As it had done before, the PUK strove to avoid fighting on multiple fronts and thus made 
reconciliatory gestures towards the other Kurdish organizations and Iran. By now Iran was more 
willing to cooperate with the PUK, as Tehran’s hopes of a rapid military victory against Baghdad 
had been shaken by the emergence of a grinding stalemate in the spring of 1984.
165
 After several 
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extremely costly and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at breakthrough in the south in 1986 and 
1987, in late 1987 Iran refocused its energies on the Kurdish front: it launched major offensives 
there and intensified its support for the Kurdish insurgents, leading to some territorial advances 
by the anti-Baghdad forces in early 1988. However, the tide was soon to turn in Iraq’s favor. In 
the spring, the Iraqi forces were able to retake much of the territory lost in the previous months 
in Kurdistan; more importantly, the thinning of Iranian defenses in the south (due to 
redeployments in Kurdistan) created the conditions for a series of successful Iraqi offensives – 
the first ones since 1981. As Baghdad’s forces were now in a position to threaten Iranian 
territory and military victory by Tehran appeared extremely unlikely, a militarily and 
economically exhausted Iran accepted Iraq’s earlier ceasefire proposal. Following the withdrawal 
of Iranian forces from Kurdistan, in the late summer Iraq crushed the Kurdish resistance with a 
series of attacks against the remaining rebel strongholds, indiscriminately targeting militants and 
civilians on a massive scale in the course of the infamous “Anfal” campaign.
166
 The Kurds would 
not rise again until after the US-led intervention in 1991.
167
       
    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 




 Cordesman and Wagner 1990, pp. 353-403; McDowall 2004, pp. 352-60. The operations in the summer of 1988 
constituted the final phase of the Anfal campaign – a series of major assaults on rebel-controlled areas started by the 




 My analysis ends in 1988 because the subsequent period does not meet my scope condition of multiple rebel 
groups, as only the PUK engaged in sustained anti-government violence after the brief episode of the 1991 uprising. 
Moreover, the fact that my Kurdish subjects were much more reluctant to speak about the 1990s than earlier history 
strengthened my decision to focus my analysis on the 1961-88 period. I nonetheless intend to add a brief section on 
the PUK-KDP war in the 1990s (based on secondary literature) for the forthcoming book project. There are, in fact, 
reasons to believe that my argument should be relevant then too, given that the prospect of Saddam using force to 
take advantage of Kurdish infighting was not a far-fetched possibility. This would work as an out of sample test of 
my argument, using for theory testing a different phase of the case I selected for theory development.  
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4. Can the Theory Explain the Case?      
In this section, I assess the fit of my theoretical argument to the case. Drawing from the previous 
section’s overview of the case, the variation to be explained is: 
- The absence of inter-rebel war in the first two years of the war, 1962-63; 
- The outbreak of inter-rebel war between the Barzani faction and the Ahmed-Talabani faction in 
1964 (heralding Barzani’s hegemony, which would last until 1976); 
- The inter-rebel war between the KDP and the PUK in 1978; 
- The subsequent absence of inter-rebel war until 1983;  
- The inter-rebel war between the PUK and the all the other rebel groups active in Kurdistan 
(forming the National Democratic Front) in 1983; 
- The absence of large-scale violence between the PUK and the National Democratic Front in 
1985-1988, after the PUK resumed its fight against Baghdad. 
    
 Figure 3.2 Timeline of inter-rebel war in Iraqi Kurdistan 
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The analysis focuses on the years of multi-party civil war (i.e., when there are multiple 
rebel groups, which may or may not fight against each other while they are battling the 
government), so the years 1966-1975 are excluded, as in this period the Ahmed-Talabani faction 
sided with the government and then ceased to exist as a separate organization.
168
 I consider the 
Barzani and the Ahmed-Talabani factions as two separate rebel organizations in the years 1962-
1964, in spite of the existence of a loose institutional link between them under the KDP’s 
banner.
169
 In fact, the two factions made independent strategic decisions about their fight against 




With this case study I cannot fully test the part of my theory about the relationship 
between coethnicity and inter-rebel war as all rebel groups are coethnics (i.e., Kurdish).
171
 The 
                                                          
168
 My theory does not try to explain why some armed groups, after having switched to the government side, fight 
groups that remain in the rebel camp while others abstain from such acts. I consider this variation beyond the 




 Barzani received the honorary title of president of the KDP during his Soviet exile and maintained the position 
after his return to Iraq in 1958; Ibrahim Ahmed was the general-secretary of the KDP and the head of its politburo – 




 The Ahmed-Talabani faction meets the criteria of autonomous decision-making about alignments and use of 
force and exclusive authority over its armed forces to be considered a distinct rebel group. The faction entered the 
anti-government military struggle (in which the Barzani faction was already engaged) in early 1962, after a few 
months of agonizing indecision (David Adamson, The Kurdish War, London: Allen & Unwin, 1964, p. 98; 
O’Ballance 1973, pp. 78-9; Jawad 1981, pp. 80-2; McDowall 2004, pp. 310-1; Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi 
Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 70). Primary and 
secondary accounts consistently describe the two factions as having distinct forces under separate commands and 
operating in distinct parts of Iraqi Kurdistan (Barzani in the north and the politburo in the south). For example, Dr. 
Mahmoud Osman, Barzani’s close collaborator, describes the two entities in the following terms: “They operated in 
separate areas, they had separate forces under their command: essentially two separate regions and two separate 
revolutions with only weak connections between the two” (author’s interview). Among the secondary sources, see, 
for example,  O’Ballance 1973, p. 87-8; Jawad 1981, pp. 80-5; Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 65-6; Stansfield 
2003, p. 61). In this phase of the war, the KDP is better thought of as an alliance between two rebel organizations 





case, however, does allow me to observe an implication of the coethnicity argument and thus 
potentially to falsify it: in the aftermath of inter-rebel war, rebel groups should easily manage to 
operate and recruit from areas previously under the control of their defeated rival.   
 
From inter-rebel cooperation to war (1962-1964) 
Window of opportunity logic explains the first episode of inter-rebel war in 1964 and the 
absence of large-scale Kurdish infighting in the previous years. In July 1964 the Barzani faction 
attacked and expelled from Iraq its much weaker rival – the Ahmed-Talabani faction – taking 
advantage of a lull in the fight against the government. The Barzani faction had been 
overwhelmingly stronger throughout the rebellion, but the threat posed by the government did 
not warrant a hegemonic bid until the spring of 1964. Before the February 1964 ceasefire, at 
different moments the rebels confronted major government offensives and an ominous military 
buildup in Kurdistan, or they faced a new government of untested determination and strength. By 
contrast, there is no indication of the constitutive elements of window of vulnerability (a 
mounting threat for a group or obvious trend in the balance of power), which could prompt a 
gamble for resurrection. 
At the onset of the rebellion, Barzani’s fighters numbered 5,000, while the Ahmed-
Talabani faction had little in the way of a military organization. By the summer of 1962, the 
Kurdish ranks had expanded to 15,000 armed men, most of them under Barzani’s control.
172
 The 
stark imbalance of power in favor of Barzani clearly emerges from interviews with peshmerga 
commanders and rebel leaders. For example, Khursheed Shera – a fighter on Barzani’s side from 
1961 and later KDP military commander – after emphatically noting Barzani faction’s military 
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 I selected this case for theory development, before formulating the coethnicity hypothesis.  
172
 Adamson 1964, p. 91; O’Ballance 1973, p. 84-5; Jawad 1981, pp. 80-5. Sa’ad Jawad (1981, p. 84) explicitly 
speaks of the Ahmed-Talabani faction’s “inferior fighting capacity.”    
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superiority reported that in 1964 it consisted of 10,000 troops, while the Ahmed-Talabani faction 
had three units of 1,500 armed men each.
173
    
After being squeezed in the mountains by government advances in 1961, the insurgents 
managed to gradually expand their operations to large swaths of Kurdistan in the spring and 
summer of 1962. However, throughout 1962 government troop strength in the region increased: 
Iraqi forces in Kurdistan doubled in size by the end of the year, from four to eight brigades.
174
 
Even if this buildup did not translate into battlefield trends favorable to the government, it is 




In February 1963, a coup brought to power the Baath party, whose resolve and ability to 
conduct effective military operations were untested. There were, in fact, signs that the new 
government may represent a more relentless foe than its predecessor for the Kurds. The Baath’s 
ideology opposed major concessions to the Kurds, considering any potential cooperation with 
them only as a tactical arrangement to get rid of Qassem.
176
 The Baath shared the widespread 
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 Author’s interview, 10 November, 2012, Erbil, Iraq; at the time of the interview, Khursheed Shera was a KDP 
member of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Parliament. In an interview with the author Dr. Mahmoud 
Osman also pointed out the military superiority of the Barzani’s faction. The secondary literature and interviewees 
tend to focus on troop numbers when discussing the balance of power between the two groups, with no indication 
that the Ahmed-Talabani had an edge in other dimensions of military power (battlefield experience, cohesion and 
weaponry). The only exception is Edgar O’Ballance (1973, p. 104), who claims that the Ahmed-Talabani fighters 
“were better disciplined, organized and controlled” but also reports a much larger numerical imbalance between the 
two factions than other sources (about 15,000 vs. 650 fighters), leaving in any case little doubt about the overall 








 There were in fact indications that the troop buildup had concrete offensive aims: as Schmidt reports (1964, pp. 
82-4), in April 1962 Barzani’s forces managed to disrupt the preparations for a major government offensive due to 




 See, for example, Vanly 1970, pp. 159-60, for a discussion of the ideological position of the Arab nationalist 
forces (and the Baath party in particular) opposed to Qassem. Vanly also reports that in December 1962 (two months 
89 
 
dissatisfaction in the officer corps with Qassem’s conduct of the war against the Kurds, seeing its 
lack of success as a consequence of the limits on the army’s freedom of movement and 
constraints on ammunitions and other supplies imposed by the prime minister.
177
 After the coup, 
the Iraqi military was vocal in arguing that Qassem “did not want to defeat’’ the Kurds but 
wanted to “keep the army away from Baghdad” and in expressing its belief that, provided it was 
granted enough weapons and troops, “the Kurdish rebellion would be eliminated in the space of a 
week.”
178
 Moreover, in 1963 Iraqi troops kept flowing north, so that by May 1963 three quarters 
of the army were deployed against the guerrillas.
179
 Thus the months of negotiations between the 
Kurdish movement and the Baath following the coup (February-June) were probably not seen by 
Barzani as propitious for launching of a hegemonic bid.
180
  
As war resumed in June 1963, the Baath government launched an offensive larger than 
the previous ones, making significant territorial headways in the course of the summer. However, 
in October a substantial number of troops were redeployed from Kurdistan to Baghdad to deal 
with political turmoil there, which enabled rebel territorial gains. Between the November 1963 
coup and the February 1964 ceasefire, the new government was barely able to prevent further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
before the coup), the KDP politburo issued a resolution concluding that Iraq’s nationalist parties (including the 




 O’Ballance 1973, pp. 97-98; Chris Kutschera, Le Mouvement National Kurd (Paris: Frammarion, 1979), p. 226; 
Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), 
2002, pp. 158-9; McDowall 2004, p. 313. In November 1962, a Lebanese newspaper revealed that a group of 
officers of the Iraqi general staff had presented a memorandum to Qassem criticizing his management of the war 












 Jawad (1981, p. 146) points out that “[t]hroughout March and April both sides [the rebels and the government] 
began to reinforce their positions.”  
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rebel advances, as Iraqi forces had been significantly weakened by coup-related infighting and 
post-coup purges as well as by the withdrawal of a supporting Syrian brigade.
181
 The government 
would not be able to launch a serious offensive with an army in such weak conditions. The 
existence of a moment of opportunity for Barzani to liquidate his rivals was further signaled by 
Baghdad’s statements and actions following the ceasefire: Iraqi President Abdul Salam Aref 
threatened force against elements opposed to the peace between him and Barzani – a thinly 
veiled reference to the Ahmed-Talabani faction – and shortly afterwards the government started 
providing weapons and money to Barzani.
182
  
Important military figures on Barzani’s side confirm that the Kurdish leader understood 
that the new government in Baghdad was weak and needed a break from the fight to reorganize 
in the aftermath of the coup. Khursheed Shera observes that “the Iraqi army was tired and needed 
a break, as it was busy killing Baathists. They needed a break to reorganize. They did not 
consider it [the February 1964 ceasefire] a final agreement…Mullah Mustafa [Barzani] 
understood Baghdad’s position on this.”
183
 Sa’id Kaka’s account is consistent:  
Author: Why did Mullah Mustafa Barzani want peace with the government in 1964?  
Sa’id  aka: People were really tired of war. You have to do what people demand and they 
demanded a break.
184
 It was just a tactical pause. 
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 O’Ballance 1973, pp. 107-15. The Baathist Syrian government had contributed a 5,000 strong brigade (and 








 Author’s interview, 10 November, 2012, Erbil, Iraq. Khursheed Shera was a peshmerga on Barzani’s side from 
1961 and later became a KDP’s military commander; at the time of the interview, he was a KDP’s member of the 




 The point that Barzani was deeply concerned by the fact that the Kurdish people were exhausted is reported by 
several observers (e.g., Kutschera 1979, Kindle location 5417-30; Nawshirwan Mustafa 1998, p. 74).  
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Author: Did Barzani fear that Baghdad would take advantage of the conflict with the Ahmed-
Talabani faction?  
Sa’id  aka: Baghdad did not want to fight because it was hurting too and so there was no fear of 




Dr. Mahmoud Osman, Barzani’s close collaborator, offers important insight into the 
calculus of the Kurdish leader, clearly suggesting that he perceived the existence of a moment of 
opportunity to get rid of a potential threat after the 1964 ceasefire: 
“Mullah Mustafa [Barzani] had intended to attack the politburo since 1963, but could not 
do that then because the Kurds were engaged in heavy fighting against the Baath. Mullah 
Mustafa and the politburo [the Ahmed-Talabani faction] had been engaged in a power 
struggle. Barzani wanted to be in control of the party; the politburo wanted to do the 
same and use Mullah Mustafa as a symbol to attract popular support for its cause... Both 
sides were concerned about the other’s plan to take control of the movement. There was a 
lot of mistrust on both sides
186
… Mullah Mustafa signed the February [ceasefire] 
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 Author’s interview, 10 November, 2012, Erbil, Iraq. Sa’id Kaka was a military commander on Barzani’s side at 
the time of the events discussed; he subsequently was a military commander in the PUK (1975-1979) and the 
Socialist Party (from 1979). At the time of the interview, he was a KDP member of the KRG Parliament. 
Importantly, the Ahmed-Talabani faction shared this assessment of the government’s political and military weakness 




 Tensions and distrust between Barzani and Ahmed had existed since before the onset of the war against Baghdad 
(Jawad 1981, pp. 160-3). Several observers report that since 1962 Barzani expressed to visitors contempt and 
distrust towards the Ahmed-Talabani faction; on his part, Ahmed labeled Barzani as repressive, tribal and “a 
Kurdish de Gaulle” (Adamson 1964, passim; Vanly 1970, p. 221; Jawad 1981, p. 184). Reportedly, in 1963 Barzani 
accused the Ahmed-Talabani faction of collusion with the government for not doing anything to ease the pressure on 
his forces during an earlier offensive by Qassem (Jawad 1981, p. 163). Barzani is also said to have ominously hinted 
in 1963 that he “might have to bring to reason the faction of the politburo [the Ahmed-Talabani faction]” (Vanly 
1970, p. 221).   
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agreement with the clear objective of getting rid of the politburo. He took advantage of a 




After the expulsion of the Ahmed-Talabani faction, Barzani consolidated his control of 
the Kurdish region and the rebel movement, without encountering any resistance in areas 
previously under his rivals’ control.
188
  
 In sum, the available evidence strongly supports the interpretation of the 1964 inter-rebel 
war as a hegemonic bid by Barzani. The key elements of window of opportunity logic were 
present in the spring of 1964, but not before. First, all sources agree that the military balance was 
clearly in favor of Barzani’s faction throughout the war. Second, in 1964 Barzani’s threat 
environment vis-à-vis the government was markedly more favorable than in the past, as the Iraq 
armed forces were clearly weakened by the coup and the withdrawal of the supporting Syrian 
unit. As military commanders on Barzani’s side consistently point out in interviews, the Kurdish 
leader understood that the government needed a break from the fight and thus would not be able 
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 Author’s interview. Barzani did not write his memoirs and refused to have his oral recollection of past events to 
be taped (Jonathan Randal, Kurdistan: After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?, London: Bloomsbury, 1998, p. 
177). It is thus necessary to rely on accounts of Barzani’s decision-making provided by individuals in his inner 
circle. Dr. Osman is such an individual as he was a member of the KDP leadership since 1964 and is often referred 
to in the literature as Barzani’s right hand and de facto foreign minister. After 1975 Dr. Osman vehemently 
criticized Barzani for his mismanagement of the struggle in its last phases. However, this does not necessarily 
undermine the credibility of his account of the 1964 events. Dr. Osman would not have an interest in portraying in a 
negative light Barzani in this episode because he himself was indirectly implicated as a new member of the KDP’s 
leadership in the aftermath of the expulsion from Iraq of the Ahmed-Talabani faction. Moreover, Dr. Osman has 
long been an independent figure in Iraqi Kurdistan’s political landscape and is widely respected as a non-partisan, 
balanced observer. Several authors offer a consistent reading of the events of 1964 (e.g., Kutschera 1979, Kindle 
location 5431-5; Jawad 1981, pp. 153-76; John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The 




 O’Ballance 1973, p. 121; Kutschera 1979, pp. 250-3; author’s interview with Khursheed Shera. For a detailed 
description of Barzani’s unchallenged control of the Kurdish movement and the “liberated areas” after the clash, see 
Vanly 1970, pp. 238-252. The Ahmed-Talabani faction would be able to operate in areas around Sulaimania, after 
its 1966 flip, with military back-up from government forces (author’s interview with Salar Aziz, member of the 
Ahmed-Talabani faction and high ranking PUK’s member since the organization’s early days; he was a senior figure 
of Gorran party at the time of the interview, 10-11 December, 2012, Sulaimania, Iraq). 
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to take advantage of Kurdish infighting. Moreover, a close collaborator of Barzani explicitly 
states that the Kurdish leader saw the lull in the fight against the government as an opportunity to 
get rid of a threatening rival for the leadership of the Kurdish movement. Finally, consistent with 
the expectation that coethnic rebel resources are relatively easily cumulable, Barzani was able to 
extend its authority to areas formerly under his rivals’ control without facing any resistance from 
the local population. 
 
Inter-rebel war in 1978   
Window of vulnerability logic explains the second episode of inter-rebel war in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Relations between the PUK and the KDP were tense from the beginning.
189
 Talabani needed to 
mobilize a population that was deeply disillusioned in the aftermath of the 1975 debacle. The 
PUK’s approach to this difficult task was to draw a sharp distinction between the new 
organization and the “feudalist, tribalist and rightist” leadership of the previous rebellion, which 
it accused of being responsible for the defeat.
190
 The KDP responded with propaganda attacks of 
its own.
191
 Both organizations were initially extremely weak, with a few hundred poorly armed 
men facing the formidable Iraqi military machinery.
192
 The KDP concentrated its early activities 
in Badinan, while the PUK was most active in the Sorani areas, the Ahmed-Talabani faction’s 
                                                          
189




 PUK’s Declaration of Formation, issued on 1 June, 1975, Damascus, Syria (provided to the author by Faridoun 
Abd-Al Qader, PUK’s founding member; document translated for the author from Kurdish Sorani by Dr. Kamal 








 Karadaghi 1993, pp. 219-20, Kutschera 1997, p. 40. Buoyed by rapidly expanding oil revenues, Baghdad 





 Despite their profound reciprocal distrust, we should not expect either 
organization to embark on a hegemonic bid, given the rough balance of power (or better, 
weakness) just noted. Moreover, in particular after the government had launched a determined 
counterinsurgency campaign in the spring of 1977, the rebel groups were under significant 




The 1978 clash can, however, be explained as the unintended result of a PUK’s “gamble 
for resurrection” – a risky attempt to deal with the window of vulnerability it was facing. The 
PUK tried to establish a supply route through Badinan to Syria to obtain badly needed weapons 
and ammunition, but the KDP perceived the PUK’s move as an encroachment on its stronghold 
and feared the shift in the balance of power that would ensue. It thus resorted to force to block 
the PUK’s initiative.         
The PUK had faced a window of vulnerability since the beginning of its guerrilla 
campaign. Essential supplies (ranging from sleeping equipment to weapons and ammunition) had 
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 The PUK was an umbrella organization of three groups: Komala (a Marxist-Leninist, Kurdish nationalist 
organization that had operated clandestinely in Sorani areas since 1970), the Social Democratic Movement (led by 
some former prominent KDP members, in particular Ali Askari) and the General Line (a group of influential 
Kurdish personalities that returned from abroad and did not have a large organization on the ground in Kurdistan). 
Positions in the PUK’s leadership organs and local branches were allocated so as to ensure the representation of 
each of its components (Christiane More, Les Kurdes Auhjourd’hui: Mouvement National and Partis Politiques, 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984, pp. 120-2; Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 171-5; Stansfield 2003, pp. 79-84). It is 
nonetheless appropriate to speak of the PUK as a single rebel organization because it had a unified chain of 
command under Jalal Talabani’s leadership; none of the three components had authority over military issues, 
political relations with other groups and the government, and finances nor did they have their own distinct 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 130, 144-7 and 157. In the summer of 1977, Nawshirwan Mustafa, PUK’s 
unofficial deputy commander, briefed Talabani on the dire conditions of the organization’s forces in the field, 
describing the intense pressure brought on them by the government offensive, which had caused a large number of 
defections from the insurgent ranks (Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, p. 166; see also Kutschera 1997, p. 40, for a 
description of the massive forces deployed by Baghdad in Kurdistan in the summer of 1977). The government kept 
up the pressure in 1978 (Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 211-6).     
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to come from Syria, the group’s main external supporter.
195
 However, Iraq’s border with Syria 
was under tight government control: the only way to Syria was through Badinan and then 
southern Turkey, where the KDP and allied tribes held significant sway.
196
 In 1976-1977, two 
small PUK’s contingents operating in areas of Badinan straddling the border with Turkey were 
harassed and eventually wiped out by either government forces and militias or local tribes and 
KDP-affiliates.
197
 The available information on these attacks and the identity of their perpetrators 
is patchy.
198
 It is, however, clear that these episodes do not amount to large-scale fighting 
between the KDP and the PUK (i.e., inter-rebel war), as they are described as skirmishes, 
typically taking the form of ambushes on small PUK’s units on the move. Even if these attacks 
(as it is plausible) were conducted by the KDP as part of the group’s plan to deny the PUK 
access to Badinan and Syria (rather than at the initiative of local commanders), they would be 
better conceptualized as the kind of limited violence that rebel groups often use to gain a 
marginal advantage over their rivals or prevent an unfavorable development without the steep 
costs and risks of all-out war (see my discussion of “salami tactics” in Chapter 2).
199
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 Libya was also providing support to the PUK but for geographical reasons its aid would need to go through Syria 
to reach Kurdistan. Shortage of weapons in Kurdistan was especially acute because, after the end of the rebellion in 
1975, the government had launched a successful weapon buyback program, promising financial rewards for turning 
in guns and threatening capital punishment for illegal possession; the government collected over 150,000 guns 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 95-6; Kutschera 1997, p. 42; Farid Asasard 2010, pp. 125-6. As Nawshirwan 
Mustafa (1997, p. 125) puts it in his memoirs, “Badinan … was the only way to get to the outside world, the only 








 Adel Murad (PUK founding member and senior figure at the time of the interview), for example, strongly 
suspects that the attacks were part of an overarching KDP’s plan to nip in the bud the PUK, but he admits not to 
have seen any direct evidence of such a plan. Moreover, as Chris Kutschera (1997, p. 39) notices, until 1979 the 
KDP political leadership (mostly based outside of Iraq) was not fully in control of the military commanders on the 




The PUK tried several times to find some form of understanding with the KDP that 
would allow it to operate in Badinan, explaining that its only enemy was the government and it 
did not want to have problems with the KDP.
200
 At a meeting in London between the two 
groups’ leaderships, the KDP committed to investigate the events surrounding the disappearance 
of a PUK’s contingent in Badinan in the summer of 1976 (allegedly attacked by KDP 
affiliates).
201
 Eventually in March 1977, with Syrian prodding, the PUK and the KDP agreed to 
facilitate each other’s operations in their respective strongholds and establish mechanisms to 
monitor and ensure the equal distribution of weapons among the groups.
202
 However, shortly 
afterwards the KDP reneged on the agreement, accusing the PUK of having brought 
clandestinely weapons to Kurdistan. The KDP then refused to facilitate PUK’s movements from 
and to Syria through Badinan and another PUK contingent transporting weapons from Syria into 
Kurdistan was allegedly ambushed by KDP affiliates.
203
 
While access to Syria was essential for the PUK to wage its war against the state, it 
would inevitably affect the balance of power between the two rebel organizations, generating a 
classic commitment problem.
204
 The KDP leadership perceived the PUK as aggressive and 
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 Nawshirwan Mustafa (1997, pp. 195-6 and 218-9) reports that there were also skirmishes between PUK and the 
KDP forces in Sorani areas; the PUK either disarmed the local KDP forces, absorbed them in the organization or 
















 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 158-9, 161-2 and 178; author’s interview with Adel Murad; author’s interview 
with Omar Said Ali (high-ranking PUK member at the time of the events; in the leadership of Gorran party at the 




would thus see with apprehension an expansion of PUK’s firepower, as the newly acquired 
weapons could be used against the KDP.
205
 Even if one discounts as self-serving the KDP’s 
accusation that the PUK harbored aggressive intentions, the mere existence of a deep conflict of 
interest between the two (both preferred to have more influence in the Kurdish struggle against 
the state) implied a commitment problem: the PUK could not credibly commit before 
establishing a supply route to Syria not to throw its weight around afterwards; thus the KDP may 
have preferred to use force to forestall the unfavorable shift in the balance of power to living 
with its consequences (i.e., acquiescing to a subordinate position in the rebel camp or fighting 
from a position of weakness). Moreover, even if the KDP leadership were certain (which most 
likely was not) that the PUK did not have aggressive or hegemonic intentions at that time, it 
could not rule out that its rival’s appetite would grow with its power or that new, more ambitious 
leaders would emerge in the future.
206
  
Much debate took place within the PUK leadership following the breakdown of the 1977 
agreement with the KDP, with options being discussed ranging from violent retaliation to 
complete abandonment of Badinan. However, in spite of many meetings and resolutions, no clear 
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 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (2), 1978: 167-214; James D. 





 Khursheed Shera, for example, argues that “Talabani [by creating the PUK] wanted somehow to get back at 
Mullah Mustafa [Barzani]” and that the primary conclusion of one of PUK’s first meetings was that the KDP should 
be considered an enemy (author’s interview). Muhsin Dizai (close advisor to Mullah Mustafa Barzani and senior 
KDP member at the time of the interview) claims that the tensions between the two organizations were due to the 
fact that the PUK wanted to control Badinan (author’s interview, 12 November 2012, Erbil, Iraq). Even if Talabani 
repeatedly tried to cooperate with the KDP, the PUK’s Declaration of Formation (and subsequent communiques) did 
lend itself to an aggressive interpretation: the PUK accused the KDP leadership of having colluded with imperialist 
forces hostile to the Kurdish people and having shamefully abandoned the battlefield in 1975; the PUK also 




 Omar Said Ali (high-ranking PUK member in its early days) indirectly suggests that a change in the group’s 
intentions over time was not a far-fetched possibility, as he notes that within the PUK in those early years two views 
confronted each other – one was in favor of cooperation with the KDP against the common enemy (Baghdad), while 
the other one advocated fighting against Kurdish conservative forces (the KDP) (author’s interview). 
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decision was made about the PUK’s next move and how to address the group’s acute logistical 
needs.
207
 According to PUK’s unofficial deputy leader at that time, Nawshirwan Mustafa, 
Baghdad’s decision to resume its depopulation campaign of the Kurdish border areas eventually 
forced the PUK’s hand. The group’s leadership decided to oppose the government initiative 
(scheduled to start in July 1978) by arming the people in the affected areas, which in turn 
required finding a way to get guns from Syria.
208
 Having assessed the KDP’s strength in border 
areas between Iraq and Turkey, its influence among the local tribes, and the deployments of 
Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish forces along the route, the PUK decided to send an expeditionary force 
of about 1,000 men (half of them unarmed) to pick up a major cache of arms coming from Syria 
and establish a base in Bradost, an area of Badinan where the Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian borders 
meet.
209
 In the hope of avoiding a military confrontation, Talabani sent letters to the KDP’s 
leadership explaining that the expedition was not against the KDP and its sole purpose was 
transporting weapons from Syria to fight the government more effectively.
210
 However, after 
having been harassed by Iraqi and Iranian forces en route, the PUK’s contingent was ambushed 
by a large KDP force and affiliated tribes on Turkish soil. Hundreds of PUK’s members were 
killed (including many leaders) and captured or surrendered to the government, while the 
remaining forces disorderly retreated to Sorani areas.
211
 It would take years for the PUK to fully 
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 McDowall 2004, pp. 344-5; Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 273-7 and 278-89.  
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recover from the blow and the group would not attempt again to establish a supply route to 
Syria.
212
     
All PUK-related subjects I interviewed agree that the KDP was not the expedition’s 
target and that the participation of large number of armed men was just a precaution in case the 
PUK came under attack (by the KDP, Iraq or its neighbors): the PUK had a contingency plan to 
respond to an attack by the KDP, but it preferred not to fight.
213
 However, the most empathic 
PUK-related interviewees readily acknowledge that the KDP would inevitably perceive the 
PUK’s move as threatening, because the growth of PUK’s power following the establishment of 
the supply route could lead to further encroachments in Badinan.
214
  
In sum, the available evidence supports the interpretation that the 1978 clash occurred as 
an unwanted result of the PUK gambling for resurrection to get access to Syrian support. The 
key elements of window of vulnerability logic are present. The PUK was badly in need of 
supplies, weapons and ammunition, but these could only be obtained from Syria, which could 
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 Author’s interview with Mulazin Omar (PUK military commander from its early days; no longer active in 
politics at the time of the interview), 15 November, 2012, Sulaimania, Iraq; author’s interview with Shoresh Hadji; 
author’s interview with Mohammad Tofiq; author’s interview with Salar Aziz; author’s interview with Omar Said 
Ali; author’s interview with Farid Asasard; author’s interview with Mala Baxtiar; author’s interview with Fouad 
Yassin (KDP peshmerga until 1975 and then PUK foot soldier in the years 1976-1978; he was not involved in 
politics at the time of the interview, 13 November, 2012, Sulaimania Iraq). This is not to say that the PUK’s 
leadership did not optimistically miscalculate the risks involved in the expedition and that it could have been 
deterred had it assessed the situation more accurately. In fact, in hindsight, Nawshirwan Mustafa points out that the 
PUK made a number of political and military miscalculations in organizing and conducting the expedition (1997, p. 
277). It is important to note that these PUK-related subjects do not have necessarily the same incentive structure: as 
several of them abandoned the PUK and publicly or privately criticized it, their consistent account of the group’s 




 Author’s interview with Shoresh Hadji; author’s interview with Omar Said Ali. According to the KDP’s narrative 
of the event, the PUK had planned to destroy the KDP’s headquarters on its way to Syria (Van Bruinessen 1986, p. 
24; author’s interview with Mala Mohamed, KDP’s member since before the beginning of the war in 1961 and high 
ranking KDP member at the time of the events and of the interview, 20 December, 2012, Salahadin, Iraq). Some 
renowned scholars implicitly endorse the KDP’s interpretation of the event, but they do not provide any supporting 
evidence (Stansfield 2003, pp. 87-9; McDowall 2004, pp. 344-5).  
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only be reached by crossing KDP-dominated areas. As initial, less provocative attempts at 
establishing a supply route to Syria failed in 1976 and 1977, in 1978 the PUK’s leadership 
reluctantly embarked on a major expedition to transport a large cache of weapons back to 
Kurdistan, knowing that there was a risk of a military clash with the KDP. With no guarantee of 
benign PUK’s intentions in the present and in the future, the KDP ambushed the PUK’s 
contingent and inflicted a major blow to its rival.     
  
Inter-rebel war in 1983 
The fight between the PUK and the other major groups operating in Kurdistan in 1983 can also 
be understood through the lenses of window of vulnerability, as the PUK resorted to force in a 
desperate attempt to break its encirclement by the rival rebel alliance and Iran.  
The negative consequences of the 1978 clash for the PUK were not limited to the loss of 
a large percentage of its fighters.
215
 The military debacle exacerbated preexisting tensions 
between factions within the organization. The leaders of the Social Democratic Movement, 
which had just lost two key figures and a great deal of foot soldiers, criticized Talabani’s 
leadership and eventually decided to breakaway in the spring of 1979, forming a new 
organization – the Socialist Party.
216
 The constellation of rebel groups active in Kurdistan 
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 The estimates of the PUK’s manpower losses range quite widely, from around 25 percent (Van Bruinessen 1986, 
p. 24; Kutschera 1997, p. 42) to almost 60 percent (Salar Aziz, author’s interview; Stansfield 2003, p. 88) (the 
percentages are calculated based on a total figure of 1,200 peshmergas, provided by Fared Asaserd, author’s 




 Kutschera 1997, pp. 42-3; Van Bruinessen 1986, pp. 23-6. The PUK’s breakaway faction merged with Dr. 
Mahmoud Osman’s small group to form the Socialist Party. After the KDP’s debacle in 1975, Dr. Osman openly 
criticized Barzani and created a small organization, the “KDP-Preparatory committee”, later renamed the “United 
Socialist Party of Kurdistan.” Several observers link the PUK’s 1978 defeat to its subsequent fragmentation 
(Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, p. 336; Van Bruinessen 1986, p. 25). For arguments and some evidence that battlefield 
losses may lead to organizational fragmentation, see Michael Woldemariam, “Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel 
Cohesion: Lessons From the Eritrean,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2015 (forthcoming); and Fotini Christia, 
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).     
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became even more complex in late 1979, when the Communist Party established a military 
presence in the Sorani areas after having been expelled by the Baath from the ruling National 
Patriotic Front.
217
 According to Nawshirwan Mustafa, Talabani thought that allying with the 




We should not expect any group to launch a hegemonic bid in the years 1978-1983, as 
none of the organizations had a marked military advantage vis-à-vis the others, even if, starting 
from late 1980, the government threat receded significantly with the beginning and escalation of 
the Iran-Iraq war.
219
 There are no precise figures on the number of troops of the different 
organizations, but it seems that the PUK was only marginally larger than the Socialist Party in 
1979 in terms of number of fighters.
220
 Because of this rough balance of power, my argument 
would predict the PUK and the Socialist Party to abstain from fighting each other. The PUK and 
the KDP were also roughly equal in strength and were increasingly entrenched in their respective 
strongholds in Sorani areas and Badinan.
221
 Thus we would not expect them to fight each other. 
Even if the PUK may have had the strength to rapidly wipe out the Communist Party (which is 
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 Nawshirwan Mustafa, Fingers that Break Each Other: Political Events in Kurdistan from 1979 to 1983 (Iraqi 




 Both Nawshirwan Mustafa (1998, p. 182) and Shoresh Hadji (author’s interview) stress the decreased threat 




 Author’s interview with Adnan Mufti (high-ranking member of the Socialist Party at the time of the events; 
member of the PUK’s politburo at the time of the interview), 18 December 2012, Erbil, Iraq. Van Bruinessen (1986, 




Van Bruinessen (1986, p. 27) reports that in 1981 the KDP and the PUK had, respectively, 2,000 and 3,000 
peshmergas. The typical answer to my question about the KDP’s and PUK’s relative strength in this period offered 
by PUK’s subjects was that each group was strong in its respective stronghold, with the PUK operating in a larger 




far from certain in the aftermath of the 1978 clash with the KDP), the geopolitical calculations 
mentioned above and the existence of the other two comparably strong groups militated against 
such a course of action.
222
  
However, developments in the Kurdish camp and the worsening of relations between the 
PUK and Iran would conspire to bring about large-scale inter-rebel violence. The PUK, the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party formed a common front (the Patriotic National 
Democratic Front), from which the PUK purposefully excluded the KDP. But, two weeks later, 
the Socialist Party and the Communist Party established an analogous alliance (the National 
Democratic Front) with the KDP, thus nullifying the previous agreement and unleashing a series 
of accusations and recriminations between the PUK and its former allies.
223
 Several factors other 
than mere hostility towards the PUK likely underlay the Socialist and Communist parties’ volte-
faces.
224
 The PUK, however, could not help but perceive a worsening of its threat environment, 
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 Based on the definition provided in Chapter 2, the Communist Party should be considered a Kurdish rebel group 
from the beginning of its guerrilla activities in 1980 or 1981. In fact, the Communist Party had openly supported the 
Kurdish cause since the 1950s (in addition to its broader program of radical political and economic change for Iraq 
as a whole) and its fighters (reaching a peak of 2,000 in 1981) were almost exclusively Kurds (with Kurds well 
represented in the leadership too) (Van Bruinessen 1986, pp. 26-7; Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise 
Handbook, Washington: Taylor & Francis, 1992, p. 215; Tareq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist 




 Pasok was also a member of the National Democratic Front. I do not include the organization in the analysis 
because of its low number of supporters and armed elements and the consequent inconsequential role that it played 
in the case (More 1984, p. 136; Kutschera 1997, p. 318, note 27; Nawshirwan Mustafa 1997, pp. 221-222; several 




 The Communist and Socialist Parties’ decisions to ally with the KDP were likely overdetermined. Adnan Mufti 
(high-ranking Socialist Party’s member at that time of the events) suggests that the Socialist Party’s desire to 
establish warmer relations with Iran, which was allied with the KDP, played a role in Party’s decision to ally with 
the latter (author’s interview). Adnan Mufti also adds that the fact that the Socialist and Communist Parties operated 
in Sorani areas, and thus were inevitably involved in a power struggle for control of those areas with the PUK, 
influenced their decision. The fact that the Socialist Party signed agreements with both the PUK and the KDP in the 
span of few weeks was probably due to competition in the socialist leadership, in particular between Dr. Mahmoud 
Osman and Rasul Mamand (Nawshirwan Mustafa 1998, pp. 176-8); Dr. Mahmoud Osman, who signed the 
agreement with the PUK, considers the subsequent signing of the agreement with the KDP a mistake by the Socialist 
leadership, but he claims not to know what the rationale for that decision was (author’s interview). According to 
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as it now faced an alliance led by its arch-rival (the KDP) with superior aggregate military power 
– an inter-rebel security dilemma was at play.
225
 
Relations between the PUK and the National Democratic Front deteriorated in the 
following two years, as they got involved in a spiral of accidents and skirmishes.
226
 Of particular 
concern for the PUK was the fact that the Socialists and the Communists appeared to be acting as 
a sort of Trojan horse for KDP’s penetration of the Sorani region, by inviting KDP’s peshmergas 
to their areas of operations; these troop movements may have been conducted to more effectively 
fight the government forces (as the Front’s members claimed), but inevitably the PUK felt 
threatened.
227
 At the same time, the Socialist and Communist parties resisted proposals by the 
PUK to establish closer ties between the three organizations, voicing fears that this would be the 
first step for the PUK to absorb them, which the PUK considered disingenuous.
228
 In February 
1983, Syria and Libya managed to broker an agreement between all of Iraqi opposition forces 




                                                                                                                                                                                           









 Kutschera 1997, p. 56. As Adnan Mufti notes about the skirmishes between the PUK and the other parties 
operating in Sorani areas, “often the fighting was not preplanned; there were disputes in villages, sometimes about a 
girl, sometimes a local commander would try to show he was especially tough” (author’s interview). Consistently, 
Nawshirwan Mustafa (1998, pp. 188-92 and 207-20) describes a pattern of clashes sparked by local and personal 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1998, p. 222; author’s interviews with Shoresh Hadji, Omar Said Ali and Mala Baxtiar. 









In parallel to the escalation of tensions in the rebel camp, PUK-Iranian relations took a 
turn for the worse. The PUK’s relationship with Tehran had never been as smooth as the KDP’s, 
but it deteriorated significantly when Ayatollah Khomeini ousted Abdulhassan Banisadr, 
revolutionary Iran’s moderate, secular President.
230
 According to Nawshirwan Mustafa, until 
then the PUK had managed the difficult balancing act of getting some support from Iran while 
continuing its cooperation with the Iranian Kurdish rebel groups, in particular, the Iranian KDP 
(KDPI henceforth). However, after Khomeini’s consolidation of power, Teheran became 




The threat posed by Iran to the PUK significantly increased in the course of 1982. Having 
contained Baghdad’s offensive (1980-1982), in the summer Tehran launched its own offensive 
against the Iraqi forces on the southern front while striving to wrestle control of Iran’s Kurdish 
north from the KDPI, which was supported by Baghdad.
232
 The PUK sent 2,000 fighters in a 
desperate attempt to prop up its ethnic brethren’s defenses against the Iranian onslaught, but this 
only served to buy some time for the KDPI’s withdrawal into Iraq.
233
 In March 1983, Iran 
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 Author’s interview with Faridoun Abd-Al Qader (senior PUK’s member involved in diplomatic contacts with 

















launched another operation, clearing residual KDPI forces from its territory.
234
 An Iran 
emboldened by its recent successes against the Iraqi armed forces and further antagonized by 
PUK’s involvement in its fight against the KDPI was now just across the border: PUK’s hostile 
encirclement was complete.  
In this context, after a new series of skirmishes with the Communist and Socialist forces 
following the breakdown of the February 1983 agreement, at the beginning of May the PUK 
launched a major attack against the two groups’ headquarters. The operation inflicted substantial 
losses to the National Democratic Front’s units and forced them to flee to Badinan and 
mountainous areas on the border with Iran.
235
  
Nawshirwan Mustafa claims that the PUK’s attack was preemptive:  
“In February 1983, the KDP’s forces, with the help of Iran, came close to Nauseng 
[where the PUK’s headquarters were located], occupied the high ground and threatened 
to occupy the region… All the indications [in late April] were telling us that the National 
Democratic Front’s forces were about to launch an attack… We had no choice but to 




We should, of course, be wary of Nawshirwan Mustafa’s claims, given his incentive to 
present the PUK’s actions in a positive light. However, the basic features of the PUK’s strategic 
situation in the spring of 1983 are hardly disputable: the PUK had bad relations with all the other 
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armed groups active in Iraqi Kurdistan; its only ally (the KDPI) had been defeated by Tehran; 
and a hostile Iran, allied with the KDP, appeared to be bent on invading Iraqi Kurdistan.
237
 Thus 
even if we dismiss Nawshirwan Mustafa’s preemptive logic as self-serving, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that the PUK’s security situation had dramatically deteriorated compared to the 
previous years and reached an especially critical level in the spring of 1983 – the kind of 
mounting threat that window theory suggests would prompt a gamble for resurrection.  
Nawshirwan Mustafa claims that the people in areas of operations of the Socialist and 
Communist parties greeted the PUK’s forces as liberators after the expulsion of the other groups. 
This is consistent with my theory’s expectation about the cumulativity of resources held by 
coethnic rivals.
238
 However, I could neither corroborate this statement with other sources, which 
therefore should not be given undue weight.     
To summarize, in spite of the absence of incontrovertible evidence of PUK’s decision-
making, the available information is consistent with an explanation of the 1983 inter-rebel clash 
as a gamble for resurrection driven by window of vulnerability logic. Key implications of the 
argument can be observed: as the PUK’s threat environment deteriorated and non-violent 
attempts at establishing better relations with other rebel groups failed, the PUK resorted to a 
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 As Nawshirwan Mustafa (1998, p. 267) implies in his memoirs, the PUK’s leadership was aware that supporting 
the KDPI in its fight against Iran would do little to endear itself to Tehran: “The PUK’s stance was more an 
emotional reaction than a strategic calculation. KDPI was defeated and pushed out of Iran…The PUK’s help could 
not have sufficed to defend the KDPI but it would anger Iran.” We should be careful not to rely unduly on hindsight 
in making sense of PUK’s calculus: the two Iranian offensives in areas of PUK’s operations in 1983 (aimed at both 
weakening the Iraqi forces and finishing off the KDPI) occurred in the summer and fall, i.e., just after this episode of 
inter-rebel war (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, pp. 166-7 and 175-8; Bulloch and Morris 1992, p. 152; Hiltermann 
2007, p. 29-32; Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History , New York: 
Routledge, 2008, p. 142). However, the PUK likely saw with concern the presence of Iranian forces across the 
border, in a context in which Iran was openly hostile towards the group and had launched several cross-border 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1998, p. 296.   
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risky gamble to improve its situation, by expelling from the Sorani areas the Communists and the 
Socialists. 
 
The absence of inter-rebel war in 1985-1988 
The lack of windows of opportunity and vulnerability goes a long way in explaining the absence 
of inter-rebel war in the years 1985-1988. With the attack on the Communists and Socialists, the 
PUK successfully reduced the threat posed by those groups, but its overall threat environment 
did not radically improve. In the summer and fall of 1983, Iran launched two major offensives in 
Iraqi Kurdistan with the support of the KDP.
239
 Faced with the prospect of being crushed 
between the Iraqi and Iranian millstones, the PUK’s leadership reluctantly reached a ceasefire 
with Baghdad and started negotiations over Kurdish autonomy in December 1983.
240
 
Negotiations between the PUK and the Iraqi government made significant progress until late 
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 The military arm of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, a Shiite anti-government group 
supported by Iran) participated in the offensives and established a foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDP-SCIRI is a 
dyad of non-coethnic rebel groups that could have fought each other but did not, as my argument would lead us to 
expect. However, given the paucity of the evidence at my disposal and the fact that Iranian sponsorship of both 
groups is also a plausible explanation for the absence of inter-rebel war, no firm conclusions can be drawn (Hanna 
Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: Ad-Da’wah al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin,” in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. 
Keddie, eds., Shi’ism and Social Protest, New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 197; Dilip Hiro, The 





 PUK’s leaders Mulazin Omar, Faridoun Abd-Al Qader (author’s interviews) and Nawshirwan Mustafa (1998, pp. 
331-2) explicitly say that the decision to negotiate with Baghdad was dictated by the difficult military position of the 
group, in addition to the hope that Saddam may be willing to make real concessions given Iranian successes on the 
battlefield. These accounts are made more credible by the fact that Adel Murad, who opposed the decision to 
negotiate with Baghdad in 1983, responded as follows to the author’s explicit question about whether there were 
realistic alternatives for the organization: “Not really. That was a really dark moment; Iran had a very bad attitude 
towards PUK and had a good relationship with the KDP… The peshmergas needed a break, they had been fighting 
since 1976; plus there was a sense that Saddam was weak (Iran had made some advances in the South), so he would 
make concessions. This was an opportunity for Kurdish rights to be advanced. In fact, Baghdad seemed very willing 
to make those concessions and Baghdad’s attitude was reflected in public statements favorable to Talabani and 
against Barzani.” Several analysts concur in interpreting the PUK’s decision as powerfully influenced by its 
unsustainable military position (see, in particular, Kutschera 1997, pp. 60-1; McDowall 2004, 348-9; and 





1984, when Saddam, under Turkish diplomatic pressure, eventually refused to sign the 
agreement.
241
 The two sides benefited from the ceasefire while it lasted: the PUK got an 
opportunity to recuperate and reorganize its forces, while receiving weapons from Baghdad; the 
government was able to move a large number of troops from Kurdistan to the main front against 
Iran in the south.
242
 In early 1985, PUK returned to the rebel camp and it started a gradual 
reconciliation with the parties of the National Democratic Front and with Iran. Increased 
coordination rather than violent confrontation was the main pattern of interaction between the 
PUK and the Front in the years 1985-1988.
243
  
  Quite clearly, there was no window of opportunity in these years. The PUK may have 
been the strongest group but all sources consistently suggest that it was not markedly more 
powerful than the KDP, which was well entrenched in Badinan.
244
 There was no reason to expect 
an all-out fight between the PUK and the KDP to be short and cheap; in fact in case of a PUK’s 
attack on the KDP, things could have easily turned out as in 1978 – when the KDP inflicted a 
serious blow on the PUK as the latter tried to establish a presence in Badinan.  
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 The importance of Turkey’s veto of the agreement is emphasized in the author’s interviews with Adel Murad and 
Faridoun Abd-Al Qader and in Nawshirwan Mustafa’s memoirs (1999, p. 81) as well as in the secondary literature 
(e.g., Kutschera 1997, pp. 63-5; Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation: How The  urds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping 
Iraq and the Middle East, New York: Walker & Company, 2008, p. 32). Likely a significant improvement in Iraq’s 
position in its war against Iran in 1984 and in early 1985 (Iraq had managed to blunt the Iranian offensive in the 
spring of 1984 and started receiving increased support from the United States) contributed to Baghdad’s decision to 
turn its back to the PUK (Bulloch and Morris 1992, pp. 156-7; Kutschera 1997, p. 64; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq 
War, 1980-1988, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002, p. 47; Hiltermann 2007, pp. 40-56). Talabani offered an 
interpretation of Saddam’s decision along these lines: “Then, however, it became clear that the Iraqi army could 
successfully defend Basra and Saddam Hussein went back on his word” (unpublished interview, Kurdish Library 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1999, p. 83; author’s interview with Faridoun Abd-Al Qader; Stepehn C. Pelletiere, The 









 Van Bruinessen 1986, p. 27; author’s interviews with Mulazin Omar and Shoresh Hadji.    
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Less obviously, the serious threat that the PUK faced in 1983 had receded by 1985. 
Interviews with PUK’s leaders and their memoirs unmistakably point to two major reasons for 
the threat reduction. First, the PUK had significantly weakened the Socialists and the 
Communists parties in 1983. As part of an overall effort to improve its relations with the Front 
and Iran, the PUK now offered the Socialists and the Communists to resume their operations in 
Sorani areas, but the arrangement under which this occurred reflected the major imbalance of 
power between the PUK and the two groups: the Socialists and the Communists were not 
allowed to raise taxes (one of the issues that had caused friction between them and the PUK in 
the past), but would financially depend on transfers provided by the PUK.
245
 The Socialists and 
Communists thus had less of an opportunity to operate as a Trojan horse for KDP’s penetration 
of Sorani areas. Second, the Iranian attitude toward the PUK was now radically different, which 
significantly reduced the threat directly posed by Tehran and may have contributed to the PUK’s 
reconciliation with the KDP.
246
 As Faridoun Abd-Al Qader (a PUK high-ranking member 
involved in diplomatic contacts with Iran) pointed out, Iran became much more forthcoming 
after the PUK resumed its fight against Baghdad: Tehran was now willing to talk to the PUK and 
gradually started providing military support to the group.
247
 PUK-related subjects point to the 
deterioration of Iran’s military position in 1985 compared to 1983 as an explanation for Tehran’s 
change of heart: in 1983 the Iranian forces had successfully been on the offensive for almost two 
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 “We had come to the conclusion that in order to reach intra-Kurdish peace we needed to make peace with Iran” 




 Author’s interview. Tehran’s fears that the PUK may still have been engaged in negotiations with Baghdad 
apparently subsided when a delegation of Iranian intelligence officers visiting Talabani witnessed Iraqi jets bombing 
the group’s headquarters (interview with Sherdel Abdullah Howeizi, PUK’s liaison with the Iranian intelligence at 





years, but in the spring of 1984 they exhausted themselves in an inconclusive, major assault, 
followed by smaller (and similarly unsuccessful) offensives.
248
 Another important factor behind 
Iran’s friendlier attitude was the de facto disappearance of a major bone of contention between 
the PUK and Tehran – the PUK’s refusal to turn against the KDPI. By the time the PUK resumed 
its fight against Baghdad, the KDPI was based in Iraq and was a spent force, thus no longer 
representing a serious threat to Iran.
249
  
In sum, there is evidence that the absence of inter-rebel war in the years 1985-1988 can 
be explained by the closing of the window of vulnerability that the PUK had faced in in previous 
years. By 1985 the Communists and Socialists did not pose a serious military threat and Iran was 







                                                          
248
 “Iran…was in a difficult military position and needed PUK’s help… Iran really needed the PUK now, as in 1985-
86 Iraq was much stronger… Iran was now much more forthcoming because of its need” (author’s interview with 
Faridoun Abd-Al Qader).  Several other PUK-related subjects made similar observations in interviews with the 
author (Adel Murad; Mulazin Omar; Mala Baxtiar; Mam Rostam, PUK military commander at the time of the 
events and member of  Gorran party at the time of the interview, 12 November, 2012, Sulaimania, Iraq) or memoirs 
(Nawshirwan Mustafa 1999, pp. 103-6). For a description of the more difficult situation Iran faced from the spring 
of 1984, see Cordesman and Wagner 1990, pp. 178-213; Karsh 2002, pp. 47 and 74-5. PUK-related subjects also 
argue that Iran’s new disposition was influenced by its perception that the PUK was indeed a powerful organization 
because, when Baghdad and the group reached a ceasefire in 1983, Iraq was able to move a large number of forces 
to the southern front; moreover, after the end of negotiations with Baghdad, Iranian intelligence officers visiting 
PUK areas of operation could see that its peshmergas near Iraqi towns could put serious pressure on the regime 
(author’s interview with Faridoun Abd-Al Qader; see also the interviews with the same person and with Sherdel 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1999, p. 106; author’s interviews with Mulazin Omar and Mohammad Tofiq.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of the findings of Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq 
 
Observed outcome                                                                          Windows theory prediction 
(Inter-rebel war/peaceful coexistence)_______________________________________________  
Barzani & Ahmed-Talabani coexist, 1962-64                                      ✔ (no windows)                 )                                                                        
Barzani vs. Ahmed-Talabani, 1964                                                   ✔(window of opportunity) 
KDP vs. PUK, 1978                                                                           ✔(window of vulnerability)                                                                                                                                                                                        
PUK vs. National Democratic Front, 1983                                          ✔(window of vulnerability) 
PUK & National Democratic Front coexist, 1985-88                          ✔(no windows)                  )                                                                           




5. Alternative Explanations and Endogeneity 
In this section, I discuss alternative explanations for inter-rebel war and address potential 
concerns about endogeneity. Fotini Christia’s minimum winning coalition argument (MWC) 
represents the most well-established general alternative explanation for inter-rebel war, 
emphasizing a different power-driven logic than window theory and downplaying the role of 
ethnicity.
250
 MWC logic would predict rebel infighting when one rebel group (or a rebel 
coalition) is sufficiently strong to take on both the government and other rebels. This argument 
does not fare well in the Iraq case. In the years 1962-1964, both the Barzani and the Ahmed-
Talabani were weaker than the government in terms of territorial control (Christia’s preferred 
measure of the balance of power). At the moment of their maximum expansion in the entire case 
– the spring of 1963 – the “liberated areas” of the Barzani and Ahmed-Talabani factions 
combined amounted to 33 percent of Iraqi Kurdistan (see Figure 3.3 below).
251
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 Figure 3.3 presents geo-referenced information extrapolated from maps reported in Farid Asasard, Political Atlas 
of Kurdistan Region, 1914-2005 (Iraqi Kurdistan, 2010), pp. 65-70 and 81-2 (translated for the author from Kurdish 
Sorani by Dr. Kamal Soleimani in New York City). The darkest area indicates the maximum extent of rebel 
territorial control in the years 1961-1988, which was achieved in the spring of 1963, before the second round of 
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fighting (p. 70). The sum of the two darkened areas in the figure is a rough approximation of Kurdish-claimed 
territory, as reflected in the 1966 Bazaz Plan (named after the Iraqi Prime Minister at the time), which envisioned 
administrative decentralization for the Kurdish provinces, whose boundaries were to be redrawn as depicted in the 
map on page 81 of Farid Asasard’s book; Barzani accepted the plan, which became the basis for negotiations in the 
following years. The Kurdish-claimed areas reported in Figure 3.3 can be considered as a low-estimate of Kurdish 
territorial ambitions, as they do not include areas around Khanakin and Zakho that the Kurds claimed at different 
moments; this implies a bias favorable to Christia’s theory, as a smaller territory under dispute makes it easier for 
rebel-controlled territory to reach the minimum winning coalition threshold. The territory under rebel control 
(“liberated areas”) consists of zones from which the insurgents were able to exclude government forces. The Kurds 
had a clandestine presence even in the major towns and could conduct guerrilla-style attacks in areas outside their 
zones of exclusive control. These areas can be thought of as zones of mixed control. As Stathis Kalyvas pointed out, 
mixed areas are not necessarily areas characterized by a balance of government and rebel control (The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): in some areas one side may enjoy a dominant 
position even if it cannot completely exclude the other. However, no information is available for this more nuanced 
coding of territorial control.        










As the two rebel groups combined controlled less than a third of Kurdish territory, MWC 
would predict a continuation of the rebel alliance rather the inter-rebel war that we observe in 
1964.
252
 The balance was similarly skewed in favor of Baghdad if measured by troop numbers 
and firepower. At the beginning of 1963, the government had at its disposal in Iraqi Kurdistan 
35,000 troops (twelve infantry brigades, supported by armor and airpower) and 5-10,000 
policemen, as well as large numbers of Kurdish and Arab militiamen.
253
 By contrast, the forces 
commanded by the Barzani and the Ahmed-Talabani factions numbered 25,000 overall, 
including both regular fighters and militias, and they possessed only light weapons.
254
 
MWC logic does not shed any light on the second episode of inter-rebel war, in 1978, 
either. In the years 1976-1978, the PUK and the KDP did not control any territory and operated 
in small bands of guerrilla fighters, constantly on the move for fear of government attacks.
255
 
Similarly, the balance of power in terms of troop numbers and weaponry was starkly favorable to 
the government: Baghdad had at its disposal over 150,000 regular troops armed with modern 
heavy weapons, while the combined insurgent forces did not exceed a few thousand lightly 
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 The percentage of rebel territorial control would of course be much lower if one were to consider the entirety of 




 Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964), p. 70; Vanly 1970, 
p. 147; Pollack 2002, pp. 158-61. By the spring of 1963, Baghdad deployed three-quarters of its army in Kurdistan.  
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 Martin Van Bruinessen (1986, p. 27, note 5) reports that in this round of fighting the Kurdish insurgents did not 
have “liberated areas” as they did up until 1975; the government was able to send patrols wherever it wished. The 
insurgents were especially weak in the first years: under constant threat of government attacks, they did not stay in 







 MWC logic would wrongly predict in 1978 a continuation of the existing 
rebel alliance in the face of government’s overwhelming superiority.  
While MWC would correctly predict the absence of inter-rebel war in the years 1979-
1982, it would also lead us to wrongly expect the insurgents to abstain from infighting in 1983. 
Over the years 1979-1983, the military position of the rebel movement as a whole improved, as 
the Iraqi forces were increasingly absorbed in the fight against Iran. However, the government’s 
power still dwarfed the rebels’ in terms of territorial control, troop numbers and weaponry. The 
rebels had more freedom of movement in Kurdistan than in the years 1975-1978, but they did not 
manage to establish “liberated areas” from which they could exclude government forces as 
before 1975.
257
 In this period, the Iraqi military underwent a major expansion, more than 
doubling the size of its regular ground forces (to over 400,000 men) and acquiring large numbers 
of heavy weapons, tanks and aircraft.
258
 There are no precise figures on the number of Iraqi 
troops actually deployed in Kurdistan and rebel fighters in this period, but there is no doubt that 
there were many more government forces than all rebel forces combined (which remained lightly 
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 Nawshirwan Mustafa (1997, p. 278) reports at 200,000 the size of Iraqi armed forces in this period. According to 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Iraqi armed forces grew from 158,000 to 222,000 in the years 
1976-1980 (The Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976-1980). There are no 
precise figures on the size of insurgent groups, but they were almost certainly below 10,000. Farid Asasard estimates 
the number of PUK’s fighters in 1978 at 1,200 (author’s interview); Van Bruinessen (1986, p. 27) reports a rough 
estimate of overall 9,000 fighters in 1981 for all the main groups operating in Kurdistan combined (the PUK, the 
KDP, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party). The figure would be significantly lower for the KDP and the 
PUK in the years 1976-1978, as the two insurgent organizations grew rapidly only after the beginning of the Iran-








 The Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980-1983; Pollack 2002, p. 182. 
This figure does not include the paramilitary forces of the Popular Army, which grew from about 250,000 at the 





 Faced with a starkly more powerful government, according to Christia’s argument, in 
1983 the rebel groups should have remained at peace, as they did in 1978-1982.  
Finally, MWC theory would correctly predict inter-rebel cooperation in the years 1985-
1988, as the insurgent groups were still much weaker than the government, but it cannot explain 
why they fought each other in 1983 under a roughly comparable balance of power.
260
   
A distinct set of alternative explanations would focus on rebel groups’ features (in 
particular, ideology and the degree of centralization) and individual rebel leaders’ characteristics 
(e.g., their temperament, world views and mental health). This set of alternative explanations is 
not empirically convincing either. Whatever ideological differences may have existed between 
the various groups, they do not seem to be driving the overall pattern of inter-rebel war.
261
 The 
conservative Barzani faction, the more leftist post-1975 KDP and the avowedly Marxist PUK, all 
resorted to force against their rivals at some point. Moreover, groups’ relatively stable 
ideological positions cannot explain why they fought in some moments but not others. The 
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 Van Bruinessen (1986, p. 27) estimates at about 9,000 and 13,000 the overall size of the rebel forces in Kurdistan 
in the years 1981 and 1985, respectively; 13,000 can thus be taken as the highest plausible estimate of  rebel 
numerical strength in the years 1979-1983, which were characterized by steady growth in rebel ranks. Consistently, 
Nawshirwan Mustafa (1998, p. 332) reports that the PUK had 4,500 fighters in late 1983. McDowall (2004, p. 351) 
reports that after the PUK and Baghdad reached a ceasefire agreement in late 1983, Iraq could move four-six 
divisions that had been battling the PUK to the southern front (Farid Asasard claims that the PUK was able to pin 
down one fourth of the Iraqi ground forces, author’s interview). Iraqi divisions would often consist of more than 
three brigades and thus their size typically would exceed 10,000 men (Caitilin Talmadge, Authoritarian Armies on 
the Battlefield: Explaining Fighting Power in Non-Democratic Regimes, book manuscript, George Washington 
University, 2013, chapter 4, p. 18). This implies that at least 40,000 Iraqi troops were deployed in areas where the 
PUK operated. Moreover, the government presence in Kurdistan included regular units deployed against the KDP 




 For figures on the rapid growth of the Iraqi ground forces in the years 1980-1987, see Shahram Chubin and 




 The significance of the ideological differences between the KDP and the PUK after 1975 is debated. Several of 
my non-PUK interviewees argued that the PUK’s “aggressive behavior” was driven by its “Marxist fanaticism.” 
However, analysts point out that the actual policy and ideological differences between the two parties are elusive 
(David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, New York: 




ideological argument could take a dyadic form, according to which, for example, Marxist-
leaning rebel groups are not necessarily more belligerent than others but dyads of Marxist and, 
say, conservative groups are especially at risk of fighting each other due to their ideological 
distance.
262
 However, this version of the argument is not supported by the evidence either: at 
different moments, the Marxist PUK fought and cooperated with all Kurdish groups, spanning a 
broad ideological range (including the Communist Party). 
A further variant of the ideological argument would focus on the distinction between 
hardliners and moderates (or “hawks” and “doves”) as the source of tensions that may escalate in 
inter-rebel war.
263
 This too is unconvincing. The fact that a ceasefire between the government 
and the Barzani faction (which the Ahmed-Talabani faction firmly opposed) preceded the 1964 
episode of inter-rebel war would seem consistent with the argument. But a closer examination 
suggests otherwise. As soon as Barzani dealt with his rivals, he started criticizing the government 
for the insufficient guarantees of Kurdish rights inserted in the new constitution and vocally 
demanded autonomy, essentially adopting the more hardline position of the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction.
264
 On its part, the latter was willing to flip to the government’s side in 1966 after the 
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 For a similar argument applied to international alliances, see Mark L. Haas, “Ideology and Alliances: British and 




 This distinction can be conceptualized in terms of the nature and scope of groups’ policy goals (e.g., autonomy 
rather than independence) or of their willingness to pay costs and run risks to achieve their full objectives rather than 
accepting less extensive concessions from the government (Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace 
Processes,” International Security 22 (2), 1997: 5-53; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: 
The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56 (2), 2002: 263-96; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 
“Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence,” International Organization 59 (1), 2005: 145-









Barzani faction had pushed it into Iran.
265
 These two facts (combined with the process evidence 
discussed above) cast serious doubts on the hypothesis that inter-rebel war occurred because of a 
deep divergence of preferences between the two groups about the acceptability of compromise 
with the government. Similarly, there is no indication of any appreciable ex-ante difference 
along the hardline-moderate spectrum between the PUK, the KDP and the other main Kurdish 
rebel groups in the years 1976-1988; in any case, whatever difference may have existed likely 
did not drastically change over time and thus cannot explain why the groups fought each other 
early on but cooperated at later stages of the war.
266
  
Decentralized, incohesive or undisciplined groups may be especially prone to inter-rebel 
war as skirmishes initiated by foot soldiers or low-level commanders might escalate to the point 
of engulfing the entire organization.
267
 All Kurdish armed organizations displayed some 
problems of discipline and limited leadership’s ability to control local units.
268
 However, as with 
ideology, organizational structure cannot explain why some groups fought in some phases but 
not in others, as there is no indication that the phases in which violence erupted were 
characterized by especially high levels of decentralization or indiscipline. In addition, the process 
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 All the main Kurdish rebel groups joined a formal alliance in 1987 – the Iraqi Kurdistan Front – with the 
common objectives of Saddam’s overthrow, the creation of a democratic system and the recognition of Kurdish 




 For examples of studies arguing that organizational structure shape different types of rebel groups’ behavior, see 
Patrick Johnston, “The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from 
Liberia and Sierra Leone,” Security Studies 17 (1), 2008: 107-37; and Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The 




 For one example about the KDP and one about the PUK, see, respectively, Kutschera 1997, p. 39, and 





evidence that I presented above suggests that wars started following explicit decisions of the 
organizations’ leaders, even if it is likely that the occurrence of skirmishes contributed to the 
creation of a climate of fear and distrust, which in turn factored in the rebel leaders’ calculations.  
For similar reasons, individual leaders’ characteristics do not provide a powerful 
explanation for intra-Kurdish: various leaders, with different personalities, backgrounds and 
worldviews, opted for inter-rebel war in some phases but not in others, based on the strategic 
environment in which they operated.
269
 In addition, some important decisions appear to have 
been the outcome of sustained debate within the organization, rather than the manifestation of 
the whims of a single, unchallenged leader. For example, the fateful decision of the PUK’s 
leadership to embark on a major expedition to establish a supply route to Syria in 1978 was the 
result of a long deliberation process, as discussed above. Talabani, the PUK’s leader, initially 
even opposed the idea of opening negotiations with Baghdad in late 1983, later acquiescing to 
the initiative out of respect for the opinion of the majority of the leadership council.
270
          
 Another set of alternative explanations focuses on other actors: the incumbent and third-
party states.
271
 Clearly, one cannot tell the story of Kurdish infighting without bringing Baghdad 
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 Adnan Mufti (author’s interview) made this point eloquently: “They say that some people belong to the cities and 
some people belong to the mountains but after a while on the mountains you start thinking that way” [referring to 
the behavior of “people from the mountains”, i.e., driven by a logic of power rather democratic principles, as 
mentioned before during the interview]. Among my Kurdish informants and scholars of the case (e.g., Ali-Fouat 
Borovali, “Kurdish Insurgencies, the Gulf War, and Turkey’s Changing Role,” Conflict Quarterly, fall 1987: 29-45, 
esp. p. 33), a dyadic version of the individual-level explanation of infighting is especially popular. According to this 
view (which includes elements of the ideological explanation), intra-Kurdish violence in 1964 resulted from of the 
clash between Barzani’s tribal, authoritarian, and religious personality and the intellectual, urban, and secular 
sensibilities of key figures in the Ahmed-Talabani faction (with these tensions persisting between the new 
organizations that emerged after 1975). The same objection presented above applies to this version of the argument: 








 For an argument about how third-party states can affect inter-rebel relations by attenuating commitment 
problems, see Navin A. Bapat and Kanisha D. Bond, “Alliances between Militant Groups,” British Journal of 
Political Science 42 (4), 2012: 793-824. 
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and Tehran into the picture. The key concern, however, is whether their roles in the story point to 
systematic dynamics that the theory does not account for or, worse, that it predicts should not 
occur. As noted, Iran powerfully influenced the PUK’s threat environment. But this is consistent 
with the theory: groups’ threat environment is determined by a host of factors, including in some 
cases the attitudes and behavior of powerful neighbors. This raises a potential question of 
endogeneity as external actors’ policies may well be influenced by the actions (actual or 
anticipated) of the rebel groups. In fact Tehran’s negative attitude towards the PUK was in part a 
function of the group’s refusal to help it crush Iran’s Kurdish rebels. This fact would represent a 
problem for my argument if the reasons behind the PUK’s behavior reflected a general 
alternative explanation (in which case one could say that my theory focuses on intervening 
variables) or indicated some dynamic that my argument expects should not happen. My 
interviews with Faridoun Abd-Al Qader (at that time a key PUK’s official responsible for 
diplomatic relations with Iran) shed important light on the group’s calculus vis-à-vis Iran. 
Pressed as to why the PUK refused to acquiesce to Iranian demands and thus appeared to 
prioritize solidarity with its ethnic brethren across the border over considerations about the 
military advantage of an alliance with a much stronger Iran, the subject responded: 
“We could not trust that Iran would do what it said it would [i.e., provide military support 
to the PUK] once we had put pressure on the KDPI and Komala [another Iranian Kurdish 
rebel group]. We did not know whether Iran would be a good ally; there was a perception 
of Iranians being really smart at deception and manipulation.”  
 
Beyond asserting their desire to survive and make gains in their struggle against the 
incumbent, my argument does not have anything to say about the origins and nature of rebel 
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groups’ preferences (in this case, the PUK’s commitment to its Iranian Kurdish allies) and their 
perceptions of third parties’ preferences (e.g., the fact that the PUK leaders distrusted Tehran as 
they thought that the Mullahs would inevitably think of them as Kurds, unbelievers and 
Marxists).
272
 However, the fact that, in the presence of conflicts of interest, rebel groups appear 
concerned about the enforcement of costly cooperative arrangements with other actors (including 
third-party states) is fully consistent with my argument’s emphasis on commitment problems in 
anarchy. Thus, while relations between rebel groups and third-party states are certainly an 
important topic for further research, Iran’s role in the case does not pose a problem for my 
argument.       
What about the role of the Iraqi government? Inter-rebel wars could occur because 
governments manage to pit groups against each other (for example, by generating fear that the 
other group is cooperating with the incumbent) or because governments somehow induce a 
group to attack another.
273
 Alternatively, a group may attack a rival in the hope or expectation of 
government concessions (as a reward or as an acknowledgment of the group’s strength signaled 
by success in inter-rebel war).  
The fact that groups may mistrust each other because of the possibility (or actual fact) 
that they are in contact with the government (and may at some point even cooperate with it to 
other groups’ detriment) is fully consistent with my theory: fear of defection is one of the 
possible reasons a group would want to attack its rivals. My argument would be falsified only if 
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 The PUK’s ideological and emotional reluctance to abandon the KDPI and Komala clearly emerges from my 
interviews with Faridoun Abd-Al Qader, Mulazin Omar and Shoresh Hadji as well as from Nawshirwan Mustafa’s 
memoirs (1998, p. 267). In interviews, Faridoun Abd-Al Qader and Shoresh Hadji argued that Iran’s leaders 




 For an argument about how government strategies may create fissures within rebel movements, see Patrick 
Johnston, “Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur,” Civil Wars 9 (4), 
2007: 359-77. On “wedge strategies” in international politics, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy 
Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security, 35 (4), 2011: 155-189.   
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the fear that a rebel group is already (or is bent on) cooperating with the government were 
sufficient to cause inter-rebel war regardless of the presence of windows of opportunity or 
vulnerability. However, the empirical evidence presented above suggests this is not the case: 
inter-rebel war did not occur in the absence of windows of vulnerability or opportunity, even if 
rebel groups feared that a rival may defect. This is well illustrated by the first episode of inter-
rebel war. According to several observers, Barzani feared since1963 that the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction might collude with the government during an offensive. But Barzani launched his 
hegemonic bid only when a window of opportunity opened up, following the 1964 ceasefire with 
the government.
274
 The instance of inter-rebel war that lends itself most easily to be interpreted 
as engineered by the government occurred in 1983: the PUK attacked the Socialists and 
Communists in May and a few months later reached a ceasefire agreement with Baghdad.
275
 
According to this interpretation, by attacking its rivals the PUK complied with a government 
request or tried to “impress” Baghdad with a display of military strength.
276
 Conclusively 
disproving this alternative explanation is hard, as individuals that may have access to relevant 
decision-making information (PUK-related subjects) have an incentive to portray the PUK’s 
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 In fact, the immediate motive for Barzani’s hegemonic bid is unlikely to have been fear of defection as the 
Ahmed-Talabani faction opposed the 1964 ceasefire agreement on the grounds that the government was weak and 




 There is no indication that the 1978 episode of inter-rebel war was in any way provoked by the Iraqi government. 
The PUK had meetings with the Iraqi government in 1977 and then in the aftermath of the clash. On both occasions 
the contacts did not make headways as the Iraqi government was not willing to make concessions (besides 
cooptation offers for the PUK’s leaders) given the position of extreme weakness of the rebels; so the group 
continued its guerrilla activities. In 1979 Baghdad had similarly inconclusive contacts with the Socialist Party 




 Dr. Mahmoud Osman said that in 1982 the Iraqi government asked him to prove that the Socialist Party 
controlled the area it claimed, which he interpreted as an exhortation to attack other groups; he interpreted the 1983 





actions in a positive light.
277
 A key piece of evidence, however, casts doubt on the hypothesis 
that the PUK’s attack reflected some form of ongoing cooperation with the government, later 
formalized in the ceasefire agreement: the PUK was engaged in heavy fighting against the 




Finally, it is important to address explicitly concerns about the endogeneity of windows 
of opportunity and vulnerability in the case. The potential problem is not that the purported 
causes of inter-rebel war are themselves caused by some other factor, but rather that windows of 
opportunity and vulnerability could be just the last link in a longer and more complex causal 
chain, which my theory would not capture. I deal with these concerns both theoretically and 
empirically. My theory has a certain amount of “built-in” endogeneity, as windows of 
vulnerability may emerge from the spiral dynamic of the security dilemma, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. This dynamic was most clearly at play in the 1983 episode of inter-rebel war: the 
PUK found itself in a vulnerable position as the other rebel groups coalesced against it, which 
likely occurred as a response to the PUK’ military strength and the perception by the other 
groups that it was throwing its weight around. Whether the apparent spiral dynamic was in fact 
driven by some distinct underlying factor is an empirical question, which I tried address with the 
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 This is the case even for former PUK’s members who are now in Gorran. While this splinter party has been 
critical of the PUK on a range of issues, its members may not have an incentive to be candid about the 1983 episode 




 Nawshirwan Mustafa 1998, p. 332. This battle is also reported by More (1984, p. 125) and Kutschera (1997, p. 
64). This evidence does not allow me to rule out the possibility that the hope of reaching some form of 
understanding with Baghdad in the future may have contributed to shape the PUK’s actions. This, however, does not 
represent a problem for my argument as long as both the attack against the group’s rivals and the desire to cooperate 
with Baghdad were a function of the window of vulnerability that the PUK faced, as discussed above. This is further 
supported by the observation that the KDP, which was in a more favorable situation given its alliance with Iran and 
also had contacts with Baghdad in the period November 1982-May 1983, did not establish any cooperative 





process evidence presented above. Albeit the evidence on the two episodes of inter-rebel war 
driven by window of vulnerability logic is far from perfect, there is no indication of such a 
confounding underlying factor in the historical record.  
Windows of opportunity may also be endogenous, as states may refrain from bringing to 
bear their full offensive power on the insurgents so as to induce inter-rebel war.
279
 However, this 
is not necessarily the case. Governments may not always follow the logic of my argument in 
trying to provoke inter-rebel war: for example, they may sometimes adopt confrontational 
“wedge strategies”, which aim at creating tensions between rebel groups by increasing 
counterinsurgency pressure.
280
 Even when governments do intend to trigger inter-rebel violence 
by reducing the threat that they pose, rebel groups may not take the bait. In fact, we should 
expect rebel groups to make critical decisions based on indicators and signals of government 
capabilities and intentions that are hard to fake (e.g., the state of the armed forces and the 
political climate in the capital). In any case, in the instance of window of opportunity in Iraq, 
endogeneity does not seem a problem: the Iraqi government may well have realized that the 1964 
ceasefire would bring about intra-Kurdish conflict, but its overriding concern appears to have 
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 There is, indeed, some evidence that the Iraqi government was interested in driving wedges between insurgents 
groups. For example, in a document (dated 3 April, 1988) addressed to the General Military Intelligence Directorate, 
an Iraqi intelligence officer recommended to “create division among the insurgency movements in order to reach 
[sic] a state of confusion and disharmony among them” (Conflict Records Research Center, CRRC, Saddam Hussein 
collection, SH-GMID-D-000-859, p. 11). At a much later date (13 August, 2002) and in a different political context, 
the Iraqi intelligence apparatus displayed a similar interest in stoking intra-Kurdish tensions, by carrying out “secret 
plans to increase the severity of conflict between the tribe of al-Jaf and the faction of Jalal Talabani,” issuing a 
forged letter in which the tribe appeared to denounce “the behavior of Jalal Talabani faction toward the tribe of al-




 Crawford 2011. In fact, immediately after the sentence of the April 1988 document quoted in the previous 
footnote, the same intelligence officer recommends sustaining, rather than reducing, the military pressure on the 
rebels: “Continue the military operations to strike at insurgents’ locations wherever they’re at and liquidate them” 





been getting some respite from the fight against the rebels in order to consolidate its power in the 
capital in the aftermath of the November 1963 coup.
281
   
 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented an analysis of inter-rebel war in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1961-1988, 
showing that the ebb and flow of intra-Kurdish fighting was shaped by the opening and closing 
of windows of opportunity and vulnerability. Consistent with one of the observable implications 
of my argument about coethnicity as a cause of inter-rebel war, the Barzani faction was able to 
extend its authority to areas formerly under its rival’s control without facing any resistance. 
However, the absence of variation on the coethnicity dimension in the case (all rebel groups are 
Kurdish) does not allow me to conduct a full test argument. I thus now turn to the cases of the 
insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray, where rebel groups had opportunities for contact and thus 
conflict both across and within ethnic boundaries, for a more thorough and direct empirical 
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 I do not have direct information on government decision-making; this interpretation of Baghdad’s actions as 
driven by an urgent need for a break from the fight is suggested by independent observers (Vanly 1970, pp. 216-7; 
O’Ballance 1973, p. 120; Jawad 1981, p. 154) and Barzani’s affiliates (see the excerpts of my interviews with Sa’id 




Insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray, 1961-1991 
 
 
Even dogs fight each other only after they deal with the hyena. 




We are all nationalists, and we have one thing to do now – win our independence. The rest can 
be worked out later. 




A close friend can become a close enemy 
- Ethiopian proverb 
 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter presents case studies of the insurgencies in the Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea and 
Tigray in the years 1961-1991. Both cases are characterized by substantial variation on the 
dependent variable, thus presenting several opportunities to observe my theory’s causal 
mechanisms at play and to conduct within-case controlled comparisons. More crucially, this 
combination of cases offers a chance to test the coethnicity hypothesis. From 1975 on, multiparty 
rebellions raged in the adjacent provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, pitting, respectively, Eritrean 
and Tigrayan insurgents against Ethiopian government forces (see Figure 4.1 below). Tigray’s 
and Eritrea’s rebels had contacts (and thus opportunities for violent conflict) with both coethnic 
and non-coethnic organizations, which allows me to empirically assess my claim that inter-rebel 
war is more likely to occur within, rather than across, ethnic boundaries. 
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Figure 4.1: Map of Eritrea and Tigray 
 
 
As I detail below, window theory sheds much light on inter-rebel dynamics in Ethiopia. 
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation (TPLF) 
emerged as rebel hegemons in their respective ethno-national camps through a process of violent 
selection, by which they ultimately wiped out weaker coethnic rivals when the Ethiopian 
government posed only a limited threat. Consistent with my argument, the bulk of the inter-rebel 
fighting took place within, rather than across, ethnic lines; crucially, in spite of serious political 
and strategic disagreements, the EPLF and the TPLF refrained from fighting each other and 
eventually jointly defeated Addis Ababa’s forces in 1991.  
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 Before venturing into the intricacies of the cases, it is worth reiterating two key points 
about my conceptualization of ethnic identity (presented in Chapter 2) as they relate to Eritrean 
and Tigrayan identities. First, both identities are socially constructed, as they emerged from 
complex historical dynamics, involving macro-structural processes, discursive practices and 
violence.
282
 This, however, does not make the effects of these identities easy to escape for 
individuals, who face them as “social facts” when they have acquired high salience, in particular 
in the context of large-scale violence across ethnic lines.
283
 Second, the Eritrean and Tigrayan 
identities coexist with other nested and overlapping identities. The Eritrean identity, in particular, 
encompasses “sub-national” religious (Muslims vs. Christians), linguistic (Tigrigna speakers vs. 
the speakers of other eight languages) and regional (highlanders vs. lowlanders) cleavages, while 
many of Eritrea’s and Tigray’s inhabitants share a “supra-national” Tigrigna-speaking 
identity.
284
 As it is often the case in ethnic civil wars, in Ethiopia rebel groups formed on sub-
ethnic social networks (along largely overlapping religious, linguistic and regional lines in 
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 The question of when an Eritrean national identity emerged is hotly debated and its full complexity is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Several scholars identify the experience of Italian colonialism, the subsequent re-
imposition of Ethiopian centralized rule or violent resistance against it as key causes of the emergence and 
consolidation of Eritrean identity; see, for example, Alemseged Abbay, Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity? The 
Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998); 
Richard M. Trivelli, “Divided Histories, Opportunistic Alliances: Background Notes on the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
War,” Africa Spectrum 33 (3), 1998: 257-89; and Gaim Kibreab, “Resistance, Displacement, and Identity: The Case 
of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 34 (2), 2000: 249-96. Analogous debates exist 
about Tigrayan identity (see, e.g., John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political 




 This observation, of course, does not imply that the boundaries, content and meaning of ethnic identities would 
not still be contested. For example, a few Eritrean intellectuals I met during my fieldwork stressed that as Tigrigna-
speaking highlanders they saw themselves as sharing more of a common identity with people from the Tigray 
province of Ethiopia than with west Eritrea’s Muslim lowlanders. This claim is echoed in the analyses of Ethiopian 
nationalists, who opposed Eritrean independence, e.g., Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and 
Revolution in Ethiopia, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989, pp. 14-25; the author was a member of the Derg and 




 Eritrea has a Muslim minority of over one third of the population, nine languages and eleven named ethnic group; 
Gaim Kibreab, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2008), p. 
388, note 3.  
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Eritrea, and a primarily regional divide in Tigray).
285
 In the presence of sub-ethnic differences, I 
consider rebel groups as coethnic if they are engaged in armed combat against a common 
“ethnic-other” government, articulate their struggle in terms of an overarching common ethnic 
cause and recruit (or are in principle willing to recruit) across the sub-ethnic cleavages.    
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 details the array of 
primary and secondary sources that I rely on to test my argument and alternative hypotheses. 
Section 3 briefly introduces each of main rebel groups pitted against the Ethiopian government to 
facilitate the reader’s navigation through the alphabet soup that follows. In section 4, I present an 
overview of the two cases and identify the variation of my dependent variable. In sections 5 and 
6, respectively, I assess the empirical fit of my theory and address alternative explanations for 
inter-rebel war and endogeneity concerns. Section 7 concludes by summarizing my findings.  
 
2. Sources 
The case studies presented in this chapter rely primarily on original interviews with former 
leaders of rebel groups active in Eritrea and Tigray in the years under examination, interviews 
conducted by other scholars,
286
 insurgent groups’ own publications and the secondary literature. I 
interviewed 20 former political leaders, military commanders and senior cadres (a few multiple 
times) of insurgent organizations active in Ethiopia in the years 1961-1991and a handful of 
lower–rank members as well as one official in the Derg-era Ethiopian army, for a total of 35 
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 I am especially indebted to Ethiopia and Eritrea expert Günter Schröder for generously sharing dozens of 
interviews with many key actors, which he conducted over the past three decades.  
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semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1 for a full list).
287
 As discussed for the Kurdish case 
in Chapter 3, the population of relevant subjects consists of former members of rebel 
organizations that may have participated to the decision-making processes I am interested in or 
may have reliable information about them. Thus I focused on individuals that were in positions 
of political leadership or military command in the relevant organizations at the time of the 
events.  
Before embarking on my fieldwork, I compiled a list of possible interviewees, based on 
the secondary literature and the advice of country experts. These individuals also provided me 
with contact information for several subjects, enabling me to start multiple interview snowballs, 
which I kept rolling by asking interviewees to suggest other individuals that could be useful 
sources for my research. I conducted all interviews in person (in English or in Italian) except for 
one interview via Skype.   
The outcomes of the anti-government struggle and inter-rebel wars as well as the vagaries 
of rebel groups’ internecine power struggles inevitably affected my samples for both cases. The 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) crushed its Tigray-based rivals and eventually went on 
to take over the government in Addis Ababa in 1991; as a result, it proved much easier to access 
former and current TPLF’s leaders than former members of rival organizations and pre-1991 era 
government officials. Importantly, the inclusion in my sample of some prominent former TPLF’s 
figures expelled from the organization (and typically living abroad) reduces the risk of exclusive 
reliance on informants with very similar world-views, biases and incentive structures.
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 These individuals are: Aregawi Berhe, founding member of the TPLF, chairman of the organization in the years 
1976-1979, and head of its military committee until his ousting in 1986 (interviewed by the author on August 7, 
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dynamics characterized the Eritrean case but with different implications for access to 
interviewees. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) expelled the rival Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF) to Sudan and, having defeated the Ethiopian army on the battlefield, 
gained a solid grip on power in newly independent Eritrea. Important former ELF’s figures 
(typically involved in Eritrean opposition politics) currently reside outside of Eritrea and are 
more easily accessible than EPLF’s figures in the country, given the prevailing highly 
authoritarian conditions. However, I obtained access to three high-ranking former EPLF’s 
members, who escaped as they were abroad during a purge of the ruling party in 2001.
289
 The 
fact that many of the former ELF’s and EPLF’s members that I interviewed joined various rival 
opposition organizations mitigates the perils of relying on a sample of like-minded individuals 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
2013, in The Hague, Netherlands); Fantahun “Ghidey” Zeratsion, founding member of the TPLF and vice-chairman 
from 1978 until his expulsion from the organization in 1985 (interviewed by the author on August 23, 2013, in 
Oslo); Tesfay Atsbeha, TPLF’s member since 1976, he was a military commander until his expulsion around the 
same time as Aregawi Berhe’s and Ghidey Zeratsion’s ousting (interviewed by the author on August 11, 2013, in 
Cologne, Germany); Gebru Asrat, TPLF’s member from 1975, key figure in the organization during the insurgency, 
politburo member and President of Tigray at the time of his expulsion in 2001 (interviewed by the author on July 30, 
2013, in Addis Ababa); Mokonnen Mokonnen, TPLF member from 1975 until 1988 (interviewed by the author on 




 The three individuals are: Mesfin Hagos, founding member of the EPLF, military commander during the 
liberation struggle and Eritrea’s Minister of Defense after independence (interviewed by the author on July 17-18 
and August 6, 2013, in Frankfurt); Haile Menkerios, EPLF’s member from 1973, Eritrea’s Ambassador to Ethiopia 
and to the Organization of African Unity after independence and United Nations envoy at the African Union at the 
time of the interview (21 July, 2013, Addis Ababa); Adhanom Gebremariam, EPLF’s member from 1972, he held 
senior military command positions during the war as well as executive and diplomatic posts in its aftermath 
(interviewed by the author on April 24 and June 29, 2014, in New York). These three people were part of the so-
called G-15, a group of 15 high-ranking members of Eritrea’s ruling party that issued a public letter criticizing the 
country’s President for his authoritarian tendencies; the other members of the group were arrested and are still held 
incommunicado without charges (except for one, who subsequently repented).    
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3. The Main Rebel Groups 
 
Eritrea 
ELF. The Eritrean Liberation Front was the first group to take up arms against the Ethiopian 
government in 1961.
290
 From the outset, it adopted Eritrean national independence as its goal and 
recruited only Eritreans. I therefore code the ELF as an Eritrean organization.
291
 The group’s 
strongholds were in the Eritrea’s Muslim-populated lowlands, but people from other areas in the 
province and Christians also joined the organization as it expanded the geographic scope of its 
operations. Initially the ELF’s leadership and fighting forces were dominated by Eritrean 
Muslims; however, from1975 on the bulk of the rank-and-file were Christian, Tigrigna speaking 
highlanders, as the government’s indiscriminate violence against civilians in Eritrean urban 
centers drove many thousand men and women in the nationalist camp.
292
  
ELM. The Eritrean Liberation Movement came into existence in 1958, but initially opted 
for a strategy of national liberation via a coup, rather than guerrilla warfare, by infiltrating the 
government security apparatus in the province.
293
 Only after the ELF initiated its guerrilla 
campaign and the Ethiopian government started rounding up the ELM’s underground cells did 
the organization embrace the need for armed struggle. Between 1962 and 1965 several ELM’s 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, I identify two necessary and sufficient conditions for a rebel organization to be 
considered as linked to an ethnic group: 1) the rebel organization announced political aspirations directly related to 
the ethnic group’s fate and 2) the overwhelming majority of the rank-and-file or of the leadership of the rebel 




 Kibreab 2008, p. 415, note1; Dawit Wolde Giorgis 1989, p. 88; Michael Woldemariam, “Battlefield Outcomes 
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 The group is better known by the Arabic for “movement” “Harakat”. 
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attempts to start operations in Eritrea were thwarted by Ethiopian security forces. Eventually the 
ELF sealed the ELM’s fate in 1965 by wiping out its small force in northern Eritrea.
294  
The ELM’s leaders were Eritrean Muslims living in Sudan but the organization, due to its 
secular outlook, attracted both Christians and Muslims in the Sahel and in Keren, Massawa and 
Asmara (see Figure 4.2 below); like the ELF, the ELM professed the goal of Eritrean national 
liberation from Addis Ababa’s rule. Thus I code the organization as Eritrean.   
EPLF. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front was the result of a merging process of 
three ELF’s splinters in 1972-73.
295
 As the ELM and the ELF, the group advocated Eritrean 
independence (but it also explicitly embraced Marxism-Leninism) and had an exclusively 
Eritrean membership (but, unlike in the ELF, Christian highlanders played a dominant role in the 
EPLF’s leadership and rank-and-file from the beginning). Therefore, the group should clearly be 
considered Eritrean.  
ELF-PLF. The Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Front emerged as an EPLF’s 
splinter in 1976; the group had a military presence in Eritrea only until 1978, when it was 
expelled by the ELF. As its “mother” organization, the ELF-PLF is coded as Eritrean, due to its 
Eritrean membership and separatist agenda (but it had a more conservative ideological outlook, 
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 The group is often referred to by the Arabic term “Shaebia”, meaning “people” or “popular”. The group’s 




TPLF. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front started military operations against government 
forces in Tigray province in 1975. The group combined Marxist-Leninism with an unmistakable 
ethno-national agenda, as it advocated Tigrayan “self-determination”; its members were 
exclusively Tigrayans. Thus the TPLF should clearly be considered a Tigrayan organization.  
TLF.  The Tigray Liberation Front initiated armed activities at around the same time as 
the TPLF; it also had an exclusively Tigrayan membership and espoused an ethno-nationalist 
agenda, aiming at Tigrayan independence from the rest Ethiopia. Therefore the TLF too is coded 
as Tigrayan.   
Teranafit. The Tigray People’s Liberation Movement Coordinating Committee – better 
known as “Teranafit”, Tigrigna for “coordinating” or “unifier” – was a loose coalition of 
Tigray’s landlords and bandits at the helm of a peasant army, which took up arms against the 
Ethiopian government in 1976. The organization did not have a clearly articulated ideological 
program, besides wanting to restore traditional Tigrayan authority in the province in the wake of 
the radical change brought about by the Derg revolution in 1974 (see below). In particular, 
Teranafit professed allegiance to Ras Mengesha Seyou, former provincial governor and powerful 
Tigrayan symbol as the heir in Tigray’s royal line.
296
 As prominent Ethiopia scholar John Young 
pointed out, “the Derg’s dismissal of Tigrayan governor Ras Mengesha appeared to herald an era 
of even more harsh Amhara rule. In such a climate, appeals to Tigrayan national sentiments were 
essential for any political group wanting peasant support.”
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 His great-grandfather was Ethiopia’s Tigrayan Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-89), who was succeeded by Amhara 




 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front,   75-1991 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 100.  
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EDU. The Ethiopian Democratic Union was founded by Ras Mengesha himself (together 
with other Ethiopian notables) in Sudan after his escape from Tigray. In 1976 the group crossed 
into Tigray with the bold plan of rolling up rebel groups and government forces alike on its 
triumphal march to Addis Ababa. Many (perhaps most) EDU fighters were from Tigray, but the 
organization recruited also individuals from other northern regions of Ethiopia and other key 
leaders were not Tigrayan.
298
 Unlike Teranafit, the EDU did not simply aim to take over Tigray, 
but was bent on overthrowing the Derg regime. Due to the absence of evidence of an 
overwhelmingly Tigrayan composition and its political agenda not specifically focused on 
Tigray and Tigrayans’ grievances, I do not code the group as Tigrayan. As I discuss below, this 
is an ambiguous case as Ras Mengesha’s prominence in the EDU’s leadership could be 
interpreted as implying a tacit Tigray-focused agenda and the group, like the other rebel 
organizations active in Tigray, did not experience difficulties in recruiting local peasants. I 
nonetheless opted for a strict interpretation of my coding criteria to avoid stacking the deck in 
favor of the coethnicity hypothesis, given that the EDU and the TPLF fought each other in 1976-
78.   
EPRP. The Ethiopian People’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP) was a Marxist-Leninist anti-
Derg group that mostly engaged in urban insurgency throughout Ethiopia, but also had a 
guerrilla presence in eastern Tigray. The literature typically labels the EPRP as pan-Ethiopian, 
but based on my coding criteria of ethnic political goals and ethnic membership/leadership it 
should be considered a Tigrayan rebel group. In fact, the bulk of the EPRP’s leadership was from 
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 and its program explicitly stressed the importance of addressing the oppression of the 




4. Fratricide-ridden Histories: The Insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray 
This section presents an overview of the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray. I first identify the 
outcomes to be explained for the two cases and then provide an historical account of how they 
unfolded.  
 
The insurgency in Eritrea  
The case is characterized by four instances of outbreak of war and two episodes of temporary 
peaceful coexistence between Eritrean rebel groups, which constitute the variation of the 
dependent variable to be explained: 
- The 1965 ELF’s attack against the ELM. 
- The 1972-1974 fight between the ELF and the EPLF. 
- The suspension of the ELF-EPLF war in the years 1974-1979. 
- The cooperation between the ELF and the ELF-PLF in 1976-1977 and their fight in 1978. 
- The 1980-1981 EPLF’s attack against the ELF. 
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 As prominent EPRP’s leader Kiflu Tadesse noted, “resolving the national question had remained one of the major 
issues for the organization” (Generation: The History of the  thiopian People’s  evolutionary Party (Part II), 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998, p. 229).    
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The ELF started military operations against the Ethiopian government in 1961 as Addis 
Ababa was in the process of revoking the province’s federal status (obtained at the time of its 
reunification with Ethiopia after Italian colonial domination and British transitional 
administration). The government’s initial response to ELF’s hit-and-run attacks was clumsy, 
eschewing a clear plan and devoting very limited military resources to deal with what it 
dismissed as mere “bandits.”
301
 As a result, the ELF gradually expanded the geographic scope of 
its operations and attracted more recruits.
302
 In 1965 the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) 
challenged the ELF’s monopoly of the military struggle for Eritrean independence, by trying to 
start military operations in the Sahel. The ELF reacted by wiping out the fledgling rival.
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Following the first, devastating government offensive in 1967, the ELF got engulfed in a 
long and complex cycle of internal contestation. After a reform of the organization’s structure 
and a series of purges, the losers of the internal contest left the ELF in 1970 and by 1971 
coalesced in three organizations, known as the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), the Ala group 
and the Obel group.
304
 The ELF’s leadership tried to lure back the dissidents but also declared 
that it would not accept the existence of competing organizations in the nationalist camp.
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 The three groups are sometimes referred to as PLF I, PLF II and PLF III. For a good summary of the 
fragmentation process, see Michael H. Woldermariam, Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in 
African Insurgencies, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2011, pp. 160-73; for a discussion of the formation of 




 Author’s interview with Ahmed Nasser, 22 August, 2013, Stockholm. The interviewee was a member of the ELF 
from 1963 and in leadership positions from 1971 (including the chairmanship of the organization from 1975 to 
1983); at time of the interview, he was active in Eritrean opposition politics abroad.  
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In late February 1972, two weeks after the leadership of the three splinters announced 
from Beirut their alliance and intention to merge into the EPLF, the ELF launched an attack 
against Obel, whose fighters were rapidly defeated. Shortly afterwards the ELF attacked the PLF, 
which reacted by withdrawing to northern Sahel with a few Obel’s survivors and the Ala group 
(see Map 4.2).
306
 The ELF proved unable to wipe out its opponents in a series of clashes that 
culminated in a week-long pitched battle in February 1973. This episode marked the high tide of 




Figure 4.2 Map of Eritrea 
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The intra-Eritrean fight continued along this moving front until late 1974, when the 
revolution in Ethiopia radically altered the political and military landscape. Amidst a series of 
strikes, student protests and army mutinies, a group of young, left-leaning officials known as the 
Derg (“Committee”) took power in Addis Ababa in the summer of 1974.
308
 The last clash 
between ELF and EPLF occurred in October 1974, a few weeks after the deposition of Ethiopian 
Emperor Haile Selassie. In late 1974 and early 1975, the two groups launched a joint attack 
against Ethiopian forces in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. In the following three years, the ELF 
and the EPLF managed to wrest 90 percent of province’s territory from the government forces, 
weakened as they were by turmoil in Addis Ababa, rebellions throughout the country and the 
Somali invasion of Ogaden, in the south-east of the country
309
  
In 1976 a third Eritrean insurgent group emerged – the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular 
Liberation Front (ELF-PLF) – as the head of the EPLF’s Foreign Mission, Osman Saleh Sabbe, 
had fallout with the organization’s leadership in the field over relations with the ELF. The ELF 
initially allowed the fledgling group to operate in remote areas in western Eritrea, but in the fall 
of 1978 attacked its bases and pushed it into Sudan by the beginning of the following year.
310
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 Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 62-6; Markakis 
1987, pp. 138-42; Pool 2001, pp. 140-2. From the end of their war in late 1974, the ELF and the EPLF engaged in 
negotiations to form a common front. In 1975 Osman Saleh Sabbe signed a unity agreement on terms that the ELF 
had advocated but the EPLF’s leadership in the field had opposed, which led to the denunciation of the agreement 
by the EPLF and the expulsion of Osman Saleh Sabbe from the organization.    
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Cooperation between the ELF and the EPLF continued in the face of a radical reversal of 
military fortunes in 1978. Having consolidated their hold on power in Addis Ababa and 
benefiting from massive military support from the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Yemen, in 
March the Derg regime repelled the Somali invasion and in June launched a major offensive 
against the Eritrean rebels. Unable to contain the government’s onslaught, after initial defeats the 
ELF took refuge in remote areas in northwestern Eritrea, while the EPLF gradually retreated to 
its northern Sahel stronghold. There the two organizations jointly stymied the subsequent 
Ethiopian thrusts. After the last unsuccessful government offensive in 1980, the EPLF, in 
cooperation with the TPLF, attacked the ELF, which was seriously weakened by internal 
problems, and defeated it in 1981.
311
 Having established its hegemony in the Eritrean camp, the 
EPLF fought the government forces to a standstill in cooperation with rebel groups operating in 
other provinces of Ethiopia, in particular the TPLF in Tigray. By the late 1980s, the rebels 
managed to overcome the stalemate and inflicted a decisive defeat on the Derg in 1991.
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 In 
1993, Eritrea achieved statehood following a referendum in which the Eritrean population voted 
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 For an excellent military history, see Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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Figure 4.3: Timeline of inter-rebel war in Eritrea 
 
Absence of inter-rebel war 
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The insurgency in Tigray 
The case is characterized by four instances of outbreak of violence between rebel groups 
operating in Tigray and a spell of peaceful inter-rebel coexistence, which constitute the variation 
on the dependent variable to be explained: 
- The 1975 attack by the TPLF against the TLF. 
- The TPLF’s and the EPRP’s peaceful coexistence in 1975-77. 
- The 1976 attack by the TPLF against Teranafit.  
- The 1976-1978 war between the EDU and the TPLF. 
- The 1978-1979 war between the TPLF and the EPRP.    
As imperial authority collapsed, several insurgent groups started operating in Tigray in 
1975-1976. The first episode of inter-rebel war involved the Tigray Liberation Front (TLF) and 
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cooperation in 1975. Immediately after a preliminary unity agreement was reached, the TPLF 
launched a surprise attack on the TLF, disarming its outnumbered rank-and-file and absorbing 
most of them in the organization.
313
  
 In 1976, frictions erupted between the TPLF and Teranafit, a group led by Tigray’s 
landlords and bandits, which recruited from the local peasants and was equally hostile to the 
Derg regime and the Marxist TPLF. After a series of skirmishes, the TPLF attacked and defeated 
Teranafit. Remnants of the latter joined the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) in Sudan, which 
was planning to take over Tigray and then overthrow the Derg in Addis Ababa. In 1977, with 
overwhelming superiority in weaponry and troops, the EDU launched a major offensive into 
Tigray and forced the TPLF to retreat from its stronghold in the western part of the province. 
After initial setbacks, the TPLF refrained from frontally engaging the EDU and resorted to 
guerrilla tactics. This protracted warfare approach, combined with a government offensive 
against EDU’s forces, proved effective in weakening the organization, which ceased to be a 
significant military player in Tigray by early 1978.
314
      
 While busy fighting the EDU in western Tigray, the TPLF was engaged in negotiations 
with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which had guerrilla forces in eastern 
Tigray. After several failed attempts at establishing a cooperative arrangement, in the spring of 
1978 a series of skirmishes escalated to all-out war. Within a few weeks, the TPLF managed to 
defeat the less experienced EPRP, which took refuge in areas of Eritrea controlled by the ELF. 
Later in the year the ELF helped EPRP’s remnants to reorganize and move to the neighboring 
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Gondar province, where other EPRP units were based. EPRP and ELF forces clashed with the 
TPLF, as the two groups crossed Tigray to reach Wolkait, which was part of Gondar at that time 
but the TPLF wanted to control due to its Tigrigna speaking people and its strategic importance 
as the group’s only direct outlet to Sudan (see Figure 4.4 below). By the end of 1979, the TPLF 
completely expelled the EPRP from the area.
315
 Relations between the ELF and the TPLF kept 
deteriorating, due to both the ELF’s support for the EPRP and disputes over administration of 
Eritreans living in Tigray and the demarcation of the Tigray-Eritrea border, up to the point when 




Having fully consolidated its position in Tigray, the TPLF went on to take over Addis 
Ababa in May 1991, at the head of a multi-ethnic rebel alliance and in cooperation with the 
EPLF.  
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Figure 4.4: Map of Ethiopia
 











Figure 4.5: Timeline of inter-rebel war in Tigray 
 









5. Assessing Window Theory’s Fit 
In this section I assess the fit between the variation of my dependent variable (the occurrence of 
inter-rebel war) presented above and the predictions of window theory.  
 
Inter-rebel wars in Eritrea 
The    5  LF’s attack on the  LM. The historical evidence on the May 1965 attack by the ELF 
on the ELM is consistent with window of opportunity logic: in a moment in which the Ethiopian 
government did not pose a serious and immediate threat, the ELF attacked and defeated a weaker 
coethnic rival trying to start military operations in the region, thus preserving its hegemonic 
position in the Eritrean rebel camp.
317
 The imbalance of power between the two groups was 
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 the ELF had about 1,000 troops at the time, while the ELM’s initial contingent in Eritrea 
consisted of only 50 fighters.
319
  
The government’s initial feeble response to the insurgency created a permissive threat 
environment for the ELF’s attack. As Ethiopia expert John Markakis notes, “[t]he imperial 
regime was characteristically slow to react to the build-up of the ELF. Local insurrections were 
nothing new, and the trouble in Eritrea did not worry officialdom in Addis Ababa unduly… For a 
time the government seemed inclined to believe its own propaganda image of the Eritrean 
nationalists as a few bands of shifta [bandits].”
320
 In 1965, besides the local police, only one 
brigade of the Ethiopian army’s Second Division (about 3,000 troops) was tasked with dealing 
with the Eritrean insurgents; the troops were mostly deployed in static garrison duty in bases in 
Asmara, Keren and smaller stations in other towns, with the rest of the province covered by 
occasional patrols.
321
 The first major government offensive, which put serious pressure on the 
ELF, took place only two years later, in 1967.
322
 The limited available evidence on the pattern of 
fighting between rebels and government forces provides a consistent picture of the absence of a 
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 The ELM represented a more serious potential threat for the ELF than the small size of the contingent would 
suggest, because the former had deeply infiltrated Eritrean society, with many thousand underground cell members 








 An Israeli-trained counterinsurgency force known as the “commandos” or “101”, which would prove highly 
effective in denying rebel access to the Christian-populated Eritrean highlands, was created only in late 1965 




 Erlich 1983, pp. 37-8; Markakis 1987, pp. 121-2.  
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serious and immediate government threat to the insurgents: in 1964 and 1965 the bulk of clashes 
were initiated by the rebels, which suggests their ability to control the pace of their losses and 
thus a low risk of being wiped out by the government.
323
 
The hegemonic intentions of the ELF emerge quite clearly from the ELF’s own accounts 
of the episode. According to Ahmed Nasser (member of the organization since 1961 and 
chairman in the years 1975-1982), “the chief reason for the ELF attacking the ELM was its belief 
that the Field could support only one organization.”
324
 In an interview with the author, Ahmed 
Nasser elaborated on the organization’s calculus: 
“We lost our independence [in the aftermath of World War II] as a consequence of 
internal conflict, Ethiopian ambition and international conspiracy. The obvious lesson of 
this was that the Eritrean revolution should avoid new divisions so as to not to repeat the 
problems of the past… As a result, there must be one leadership, one army, one program. 
If splits occur [we thought at that time], this is going to lead to the polarization of this 
backward society. The attention of the world would come only if we have a strong, united 
political organization on the ground. Unless we achieve this, the revolution would be 
weakened; with many organizations there would be infighting… In 1965 the ELM 
gathered a group of fighters and infiltrated the Sahel. At that time the supreme council 
decided not to give them the opportunity to develop in Eritrea. Some the members of the 
ELM contingent were liquidated and some went back to Sudan.”
325
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 Author’s interview. Mohammed Ibrahim Bahdurai (member of the organization from 1961) offers a consistent 
account: “The unity of the people and their revolution was not in very serious danger in the late 1960s but we were 




ELF’s publications, too, candidly point to the hegemonic logic driving the 1965 attack on 
the ELM:  
“[S]ome members of the ELM joined the ELF, but others who until the end of 
1964 and early 1965 stood against the armed struggle sent a few fighters in the 
field with the intention of starting their own front. The ELF found no reason to 
tolerate a second front vying with the already established organization and took 
steps against it. The first challenge to unity of the armed struggle was easily 
quashed.”
326
    
 
The two groups professed the same goal of liberating Eritrea from Ethiopian rule 
and had exclusively Eritrean leaderships and overlapping (albeit partially distinct, as 
discussed) bases of support among the Eritrean population; thus I consider them coethnic. 
Consistent with the idea of cumulative resources among coethnic rebel groups, before the 
clash, as the ELF expanded its guerrilla operations and the ELM started to crack under 
government’s pressure, a number of ELM’s cells (some of which had been infiltrated by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the ELM was welcomed by all nationalists because everyone knew that the presence of more than one 
organization in the country would invite divisions based not on political lines but on the backward regional and 
confessional sentiments” (“Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Bahdurai,” ELF, Eritrean Newsletter 44, 1 
September, 1981 (available at http://www.nharnet.com/Archives/Arch_2004/Oct_2004/NharnetTeam_Oct01.htm, 




 ELF, Eritrea: The National Democratic Revolution, 1979, p. 32 (quoted in Kibreab 2008, pp. 151-2). A 1976 
ELF document (Eritrean Revolution 1, August-September 1976, p. 12) also explicitly refers to the organization’s 
decision to liquidate with force the ELM when the latter decided to start military operations in Eritrea in 1965 (cited 
in Sherman 1980, p. 42). Consistently, in an interview with the author, Tewolde Gebrselassie (ELF’s member from 
1974) recounts the key features of the episode as it was narrated to him: “we liquidated them. There was no 
toleration for competition in the nationalist camp” (13 July, 2013, Addis Ababa).  
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the ELF) joined the rival organization, taking their recruits with them.
327
 Moreover, after 
the demise of its rival, the ELF reached out to former ELM’s members, often persuading 
them to join the organization.
328
  
The first ELF-EPLF civil war, 1972-1974. Window of opportunity logic also sheds much 
light on the onset inter-rebel war in 1972. The ELF attacked its splinters (which would complete 
their merge into the EPLF by 1973) in a moment of military superiority and absence of serious 
and immediate government threat, with the objective of reasserting its hegemony in the Eritrean 
liberation struggle.  
The new organizations were initially very weak, operating in remote areas of Eritrea, 
with little and inconsistent access to external supplies and harassed by Ethiopian forces.
329
 In 
early 1972, the ELF could marshal about 2,000 fighters, while the splinter groups combined had 
less than 500.
330
 As Mesfin Hagos notes, “it was a one-sided war at the start. The EPLF was at an 
infantile stage as an organization… The first joint [of the three splinters] defensive battle 
occurred in April 1972; many of our units were liquidated. The balance of power was 5 to 1.”
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ELF, Eritrean Newsletter 44, 1 September, 1981, p. 3; Markakis 1987, p. 109; Iyob 1995, pp. 104-5; interview 
with Saleh Ahmed Eyay (ELM’s founder), conducted by Günter Schröder in 2004. One of my interviewees – Gime 












 Markakis1987, p. 133. There are several reasons why the splinters should not be considered below the threshold 
of absolute weakness, in spite of the fact that the ELF had more than a 3-1 numerical advantage. The splinters 
operated in areas far from the ELF’s strongholds and could hope to obtain external support through the well-
connected former ELF’s leader Osman Saleh Sabbe. Moreover, the splinters could have grown significantly (as they 




 Author’s interview. This imbalance of power clearly emerges from several other EPLF fighters’ accounts. For 
instance, in describing the balance of forces during the inter-rebel clash, Adhanom Gebremariam pointed out that 
“[t]he ELF was a much bigger organization” (author’s interview, 24 April, 2014, New York; Adhanom 
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During the inter-rebel fight the Ethiopian government maintained a low profile. Its 
second major offensive had occurred in late 1970-early 1971.
332
 In the year between June 1971 
and June 1972, the insurgents initiated the vast majority of military operations.
333
 Contemporary 
US intelligence assessments of the government-rebels military balance in 1972 and 1973 paint a 
picture of a stalemated battlefield: the rebels appeared unlikely to achieve a decisive victory but 
the government was in no position to overcome the impasse without a major escalation of its 
counterinsurgency efforts.
334
According to an EPLF’s commander, in the years 1972-1974 the 
“Ethiopians barely launched any attacks against the rebels, and were largely content to watch the 
rebels fight amongst themselves.”
335
 In an interview with the author, Gime Ahmed, member of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Gebremariam joined the Ala group in 1972, just before the ELF’s attack). Similarly, speaking about a major inter-
rebel battle across the Sudanese border in 1973, a member of one of the splinters stressed the ELF’s military 
superiority: “It was widely accepted that there was no force able to defeat ELF … [its fighters] being strong and 
many … Gereger was inside Sudanese territory. ELF had chased us all the way there. They were more numerous 
and stronger than us. They could have wiped us out if they had good planning” (quote drawn from Welde Mariam 
Abraham’s memoirs, reported in “The Near Liquidation of the (E)PLF,” a collection of memoirs of splinter groups’ 
fighters and other documents covering the years 1972 and 1973, compiled in 1993 by Aida Kidane (available at 




 Sherman 1980, pp. 80-2 (see also Woldermariam 2011, p. 140, figure 26, which reports the major Ethiopian 
offensives in the years 1960-1982). Richard Sherman notes that in the years 1972-1974 the bulk of the fighting 
occurred between the EPLF and the ELF not between government and rebels. This does not imply that no significant 
government-rebels fighting occurred in that period. “From the Experiences of the ELA” (Part VI) reports three 
clashes between the ELF and the government in 1972, two of which were initiated by an ELF ambush, while no 
information on the onset of the third one is provided. Roy Pateman (Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning, 
Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998, pp. 132-3) and Bowyer J. Bell (“Endemic Insurgency and International 
Order: The Eritrean Experience,” Orbis 18 (20), 1974: 427-50, esp. pp. 442-3) describe a pattern of fighting 
consisting of insurgent-initiated hit-and-run attacks in the years 1972-1974. No sources report major government 




 Annual Report of the Ethiopian Army’s Second Division, June 1971-June 1972, pp. 1-10, as summarized in Awet 
T. Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East Timor Compared (New 




 INR Research Study, A. Palmer, February 24, 1972, RG 59, Central Files, “Ethiopia: Status of Eritrean 
Liberation Front;” INR Research Study, T. Murphy, May 10, 1973, RG 59, Central Files, “Ethiopia: Eritrean 




 Interview reported without quotation marks in Woldemariam 2011, p. 111.     
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the ELF’s counterintelligence office both before and after the 1974 revolution, confirms that the 
organization’s leadership was aware of the limited threat posed by the government during the 
inter-rebel war: 
  
Author: Was there any concern about being attacked by the government in a moment in which 
the ELF was fighting with the EPLF?” 
Gime Ahmed: Not so much. The civil war [between Eritrean organizations] was mostly occurring 
in Dankalia and Sahel, not where the government presence was strong. I was in the office for 
counterintelligence at that time. We intercepted government communications that indicated that 
the government was happy about the civil war. The government would refrain from large-scale 
offensives because it knew the fronts were fighting each other. It would occasionally take 




ELF’s and EPLF’s retrospective accounts of the outbreak of the intra-Eritrean war 
partially diverge. Unsurprisingly, both sides attribute political responsibility for starting the 
violence to the other. According to some EPLF’s sources, the ELF had made plans to liquidate 
the splinters as early as June 1970; by contrast, some ELF’s sources claim that the group’s 
actions in 1972 were a response to violent provocations by the PLF and the Obel group rather 
than part of a pre-existing plan to crush them.
337
 However, important pieces of evidence, 
including statements by leading ELF’s figures, provide a consistent picture of a decision by the 
ELF to nip in the bud the splinters’ challenge to its hegemonic position.  
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 Interviewed on July 22, 2013, in Addis Ababa; Gime Ahmed joined the ELF in 1962 and held several high-level 




 Pool 2001, pp. 70-1 and Kibreab 2008, pp. 174-8.  
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After several failed attempts at persuading them to return to the fold, in October-
November 1971 the ELF’s First National Congress condemned the splinter groups, which had 
refused to attend.
338
 The Congress’s resolution stated that “there can be no more than one 
struggle, one organization and one leadership in our country.”
339
 The Congress put forth an 
ultimatum to PLF’s and Obel’s fighters to rejoin the ELF, declaring that the group’s leadership 
would be “authorized to take military measures against those who fail to return before the expiry 
of the deadline.”
340
 The Congress struck a more conciliatory note towards the Ala group, inviting 
both its leadership and fighters back to the fold without threatening the use force.
341
 Ahmed 
Nasser, who was elected member of the ELF leadership’s military office at the Congress, 
candidly described the ELF’s initiatives to deal with the splinters: 
Ahmed Nasser: The Congress decided to condemn the leadership and reach out to the base of the 
splinters. If these other efforts failed, the ELF leadership should take measures to preserve the 
unity of the revolution. 
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 In an interview with the author, Ahmed Nasser detailed the ELF’s diplomatic attempts to convince the splinters 








 Kibreab 2008 p. 174. Gaim Kibreab (2008) reports an informal translation of the Congress’ resolutions, a copy of 
which is annexed to Al-Amin Mohamed Said, Sowra  ritrea ‘Msuguamn Mnqlqaln’ Mesreh Wishtawi Mfihfahat 
Sowra Eritrea (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994). Al-Amin was a prominent EPLF’s member, so he should 
not be considered an unbiased source. However, Kibreab (p. 186, note 59) points out that in the over ten years 
between his writing and the publication of Al-Amin’s book, no one has questioned the authenticity of the annexed 
document. Moreover, Ibrahim Mohammed Ali, a prominent ELF figure since 1964, reports essentially the same 
language of the resolution in his book The March of the Eritrean Liberation Front: Beginning and End (pp. 137-42, 
excerpts provided to the author by Mesfin Hagos, translated from Arabic by Max Shmookler in New York City). 
The contention of some ELF’s sources that the resolution did not contain an authorization to use of force is also 
belied by a BBC broadcast dispatched by the ELF from Baghdad on December 13, 1971, stating that the 
organization “could resort to violent means to enforce the Congress’ decision … If they [Obel’s and PLF’s fighters] 
refused to comply, the ELF had the right to solve the disunity by military means” (ELF Broadcast from Baghdad in 




 Markakis 1987, p. 129; David Pool, Eritrea: Towards Unity in Diversity (London: Minority Rights Group, 1997), 
p. 11; Kibreab 2008, p. 147 
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Author: Including military measures? 




My argument’s emphasis on coethnicity as a cause of inter-rebel war allows us to make 
sense of the ELF’s decision to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards the Ala group 
compared to Obel and the PLF. All the armed organizations involved in this episode should be 
considered as coethnic, given that they recruited exclusively Eritreans and shared the goal of 
national independence. But the ELF had less of an overlapping popular base with the Ala group 
than with the other two splinters: Ala’s members were Christian and historically the ELF had 
experienced difficulties recruiting Christians and penetrating the Christian-dominated 
highlands.
343
 Both ELF- and EPLF-related subjects point out that the ELF’s leadership thought 
that using force against the Ala group would risk further alienating Eritrea’s Christian 
community and thus its grievances would need to be addressed; by contrast, a purely military 
solution for the Obel group and the PLF was conceivable as their Muslim bases of support 
overlapped more closely with their “mother” organization’s.
344
 However, thinking that “it was 
just a matter of time before PLFII [Ala] would be attacked,” its leaders decided to join the 
elements of the other two groups that had survived the initial ELF’s attacks and sought refuge in 
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 Author’s interview. All the ELF-related subjects with whom I explicitly discussed the episode (with the 
exception of Gime Ahmed) readily admit that in 1971 the ELF decided to “liquidate” the splinters due to the widely 
held belief that “the Eritrean field could support only one organization” (the words between quotation marks recur in 
several interviews). Redie Bereketeab (2007, p. 188) also reports that in an interview he conducted in 1997 with 
Ibrahim Idris Toteel, this top ELF’s figure acknowledged the Congress’ decision to use force against Obel and PLF 








 Author’s interviews with Gime Ahmed; Adhanom Gebremariam; Mesfin Hagos; and Wolde-Yesus Ammar, 5 





 As the ELF ambushed in the Sahel the PLF’s contingent with which the Ala group 
was traveling, the latter found itself fully engaged in the inter-rebel war.
346
    
 The serious and immediate threat posed by the ELF was the glue that kept together the 
splinter groups and prevented them from fighting each other. Reacting to what they perceived as 
a declaration of war by the ELF, the leaders of the splinters met in Beirut in early February 1972 
to conclude a “unity agreement” – an alliance that envisioned their subsequent merge into the 
EPLF (finalized in 1973).
347
 Haile Woldense, a founder of the EPLF, put it clearly: 
“What was the most unifying factor was the declaration of a civil war by the ELF. Then 
many secondary issues have to be overlooked…When the ELF declared the intention to 
liquidate us [in 1972], this created an atmosphere to build some confidence, to 
concentrate on how much we needed each other. And this created an opportune moment 
to strengthen our unity.”
348
  
                                                          
345
 Author’s interviews with Mesfin Hagos. As Adhanom Gebremariam (an Ala’s member) points out, the ELF 
concluded that “the Ala group should be approached and the problem with it should be solved amicably. But the 
resolution [of the Congress] said that the Eritrean field could only accommodate one political organization and one 
army” (author’s interview).  Even ELF-related subjects admit that the option of using force against the Ala group 
was not off the table; for example, Wolde-Yesus Ammar  notes that “[o]bviously there was an understanding that, if 




 Adhanom Gebremariam (who took part in that fight) claims that, although he did not know whether the ELF was 
aware that it was attacking Ala group, the episode represented a clear turning point for the group: “We were 
ambushed. For us that was it with the ELF. It was very sad for us, as we were against the civil war. But we needed to 
defend ourselves. Our decision to join the war was not calculated. We had not intended to join the war and fight the 




 Ruth Iyob 1995, p. 116. The Obel group withdrew from the merging process but then was attacked by the ELF; 




 Dan Connell, Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005), pp. 52 and 58. 
Mesfin Hagos’s account is consistent: “The resolution for liquidation dates to November 1971. I took part to the 
Beirut meeting. The meeting was aimed at reconciling the splinters with each other. There was a clear understanding 
that they would be soon attacked by the ELF” (author’s interview). Explaining the eventual organizational merge of 
the splinter groups (as distinct from the absence of fighting between them) is beyond the scope of my argument; 
however, fear of the ELF seems to have played a central role, as Adhanom Gebremariam’s answer to my question 




Given the documented stark imbalance of power between the ELF and the splinters, it is 
natural to ask the question: how did the ELF fail to wipe out its rivals? In fact, the outcome of 
inter-rebel war is rarely preordained: a group’s superiority in number of fighters and weaponry 
would stack the deck in its favor, but contingency and intangibles such as fighters’ morale, 
effective leadership and smart tactics may sometimes be decisive. Both sets of factors seem to 
have made a difference in the specific case. In 1973, the Sudanese Army interposed itself 
between the ELF and the splinters, which had crossed into Sudan during their fight. While the 
splinters may not have been on the brink of annihilation, as some observers have suggested, 
probably the EPLF benefitted significantly from the contingent Sudanese intervention, as all its 
forces were surrounded by the ELF in Sudanese territory.
349
 The ELF also appears to have 
committed tactical mistakes by failing to concentrate its forces to destroy the splinters once and 
for all and by repeatedly launching frontal assaults against well-prepared defensive positions.
350
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           





 Markakis 1987, pp. 134-5; Pool 2001, p. 134; “The Near Liquidation of the (E)PLF.” In interviews with the 
author, key ELF’s and EPLF’s figures, like Ahmed Nasser, Mesfin Hagos and Adhanom Gebremariam, deny that 
the survival of the splinters was at stake in the battle of Gereger in Sudan in February 1973. However, Mesfin Hagos 
does acknowledge that the all the EPLF’s forces were “fully encircled” by the ELF; this point is confirmed by 
Ahmed Karar, Sudan’s deputy Chief of Security, who met the leaderships of the two groups and intimated them to 




 According to Adhanom Gebremariam, “[t]he ELF was a much bigger organization, but it was not smart. They 
could have gathered all their forces and destroyed us. But instead they would send one force at the time, rather than 
an overwhelming one. That was the wrong strategy. Theirs was kind of a bravado…We had prepared good defenses, 
very good trenches. The ELF force exposed itself in the open field…The ELF lacked intelligence, they did not know 
our tactics; they just thought we were a few hundred people, most of which had been in the ELF before” (author’s 
interview). The fact that Osman Saleh Sabbe, one of the splinters’ leaders, over time managed to provide the 
dissidents with better weapons (through his excellent connections to the Arab world) than those at the ELF’s 
disposal probably also contributed to the outcome (author’s interview with Ahmed Nasser; Tewdros Gebrezghier’s 
memoirs, reported in “The Near Liquidation of the (E)PLF;” Markakis 1987, p. 135).  
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 This suggests another question worth addressing explicitly: is the fact that the ELF 
persevered in its efforts to wipe out the EPLF for two years inconsistent with the argument that 
rebel groups should launch hegemonic bids only when they expect a quick and cheap victory? 
The fact that inter-rebel fighting continued indecisively until the fall of Haile Selassie suggests 
that at some point in the years 1972-1974 one of the key elements of window of opportunity – a 
clear inter-rebel imbalance of power, promising a relatively cheap and quick victory – was not in 
place. However, the continuation of war under these circumstances is not necessarily 
inconsistent with my argument. We should not expect instantaneous updating of beliefs by rebel 
leaders: it will typically take time for sufficient information to emerge for even an unbiased 
observer to conclude that an earlier assessment of the balance of power was wrong or is no 
longer valid. Moreover, cognitive and motivated biases as well as concerns about appearing 
weak to a rival and enhanced threat perception after war onset may contribute to generate inertia 
in inter-rebel fighting. As discussed below, the subsequent emergence of a concrete opportunity 
to liberate Eritrea from the Ethiopian government, combined with the ELF leadership’s gradual 
realization that it would not be easy to wipe out the EPLF, probably contributed to bring the 
inter-rebel war to an end by late 1974.  
 In sum, there is strong evidence suggesting that the ELF launched a hegemonic bid taking 
advantage of a window of opportunity.
351
 Key implications of the argument can be observed. The 
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 Several prominent Eritrea experts offer a consistent interpretation of the outbreak of the inter-rebel war. Haggai 
Elrich (1983, p. 32) observes that “[a]s soon as the EPLF was established in February 1972, the ELF-RC 
[Revolutionary Council, the group’s leadership organ] instigated an open and active war in an effort to enforce 
unity.” According to David Pool (2001, p. 71), “[t]he calculation of the ELF leadership was that it would be a short 
campaign,” made necessary by the “potential military and financial backing for the dissidents that would ensue.” 
Similarly, John Markakis (1987, pp. 133-4) argues that “[t]he merger of the opposition factions narrowed the range 
of options open to the untried leadership of the ELF. The forces at its disposal at this time numbered over 2,000, 
while the combined force of its opponents was less than a quarter of this. The temptation to use force for a swift 
resolution of the problem was strong… In the Spring of 1972, the ELF decided to eliminate this opposition nest and 
sent units to attack it.” Ruth Iyob (1995, p. 116) also notes that “[t]he establishment of an alliance between the 
secessionists and Sabbe [the Beirut agreement] was seen as a threat by the Revolutionary Council, which declared 
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ELF was significantly stronger than the splinters according to key ELF’s and EPLF’s figures. 
The government did not pose a serious and immediate threat for the ELF, as the bulk of intra-
Eritrean fighting occurred in areas with limited Ethiopian military presence and the ELF 
understood that the government was happy to sit back and watch the insurgents bleed each other 
dry.  Moreover, the ELF’s leadership explicitly justified the decision to use force as the 
enforcement of the principle of unity of the nationalist struggle. However, it initially struck a 
more conciliatory note towards the Ala group, as it Christian base was perceived as less easily 
absorbable with force than those of the other splinters. Finally, faced with a serious and 
imminent threat posed by the ELF, the splinters refrained from fighting each other and, in fact, 
engaged in close cooperation. 
 The absence of ELF-EPLF war, 1974-1979. The lack of windows of opportunity and 
vulnerability goes a long way in explaining the absence of inter-rebel war in the years 1974-
1980. By late1974, the ELF’s window of opportunity had closed. Not only had the ELF failed to 
crush the EPLF, but from the spring of 1973 the latter had also been steadily growing and 
moving its forces towards Eritrea’s central plateau.
352
 In October 1974, the EPLF had the upper 
hand against its rival in a major battle in the outskirts of Asmara, the province’s capital.
353
 Thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
war against the Tripartite Unity on February 24, 1972 to eliminate this threat.” Consistently, Gaim Kibreab claims 
that in February 1972 the ELF decided to implement the military solution authorized by the Congress as “the 
formation of a united front engendered serious concerns on the part of the ELF leadership. It was in an attempt to 
nip in the bud the newly formed coalition that the ELF attacked” (2008, pp. 198 and 212-3). Dan Connell makes 
essentially the same claim and points out that the ELF’s leadership in February 1972 made the final decision to use 
force to wipe out the splinters and ensure the unity of the anti-Ethiopian struggle (Against All Odds: A Chronicle of 
the Eritrean Revolution, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1993, pp. 83 and 319, note 21). The one aspect in which my 
interpretation departs from the near consensus of the secondary literature is the timing of the ELF’s decision to 
launch its hegemonic bid: while the authors just cited mention the February 1972 Beirut meeting of the splinter 
groups as the key watershed, all my interviews (both ELF- and EPLF-related) point to November 1971 as the 









these battlefield trends did not provide any reason for the ELF to expect victory against the EPLF 
to be just around the corner.
354
  
More crucially perhaps, in 1974 the opportunity cost of continued inter-rebel war was 
rapidly increasing as government authority was collapsing throughout the country and the 
conditions for liberating the province from Ethiopian presence started materializing. As David 
Pool notes, in the course of the spring and summer of 1974, “[t]he intensity of the conflict 
between the two fronts decreased as a process of protests, rebellions and mutinies evolved into 
the Ethiopian revolution.”
355
 Mutinies in the Second Division of the Ethiopian army and large-
scale defections to the rebel ranks among the Eritrean police and the special counterinsurgency 
unit (“commandos”) led to a significant reduction in Ethiopian military activities in Eritrea. The 
army abandoned the Eritrean countryside, enabling the guerrillas to encircle the province’s 
towns.
356
 After the last inter-rebel clash in October 1974, the rebel groups reached a truce, 
followed by a joint offensive on the Eritrean capital in January 1975. The government forces 
managed to contain the offensive but Asmara remained under siege for many months.
357
 In the 
following two years, the ELF and the EPLF experienced an uninterrupted series of successes, 
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 Author’s interview with Mesfin Hagos.  
 
354
 According to Wolde-Yesus Ammar (member of an ELF’s underground cell since 1965), the years of inconclusive 
fighting had persuaded the ELF that it would not defeat the EPLF, which contributed to the decision to reach a 
ceasefire (author’s interview). Gherezgheher Tewelde, in discussing the factors that brought about the ceasefire 
between the rebel groups, consistently mentioned the fact that both sides had concluded that they could not defeat 













 Markakis 1987, pp. 136-8; Pateman 1998, pp.133-4; Sherman 1980, pp. 84-5.    
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expanding manifold their ranks; by 1977, the groups had extended their control to 90 percent of 
Eritrean territory and all major urban centers (except Asmara, Barentu and Massawa).
358
     
The rebel organizations clearly perceived the radical effects of the Derg revolution on the 
military balance in Eritrea and the opportunities it offered. As an ELF’s source notes:  
“The dramatic events of February-March 1974 ushered in a new era in the region.  
The Eritrean Revolution welcomed the changes in Ethiopia and called the leaders 
of the uprising to start giving priority to the Eritrean question. In the meantime, 
the anarchic situation helped the Eritrean Revolution to openly work inside the 
masses. The Revolution thus could recruit large numbers in the urban centres; 




In October 1974, Osman Saleh Sabbe, one of the EPLF’s leaders, revealed his conviction 
that a clear moment of opportunity for the rebel movement had emerged, declaring that the 
separatist groups, now stronger than ever, were about to launch a new phase of the war, by 
switching from hit-and-run attacks in the countryside to open offensives against army camps and 
operations in the main urban centers.
360
 Osman Saleh Sabbe’s earlier words in 1969 had proven 
prescient: “We are not ready for an offensive to drive the Ethiopians out of the cities. That time 
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 ELF, The Eritrean Newsletter 4, 1 September 1981, pp. 11-3. These statements are echoed in the secondary 
literature.  For example, Markakis (1987, pp. 136-7) notes that the series of mutinies that heralded the collapse of the 
regime, “signaled the start of a protracted period of military disarray…and presented the Eritrean nationalist 
movement with a historic opportunity to reach the ultimate goal … Eritreans in all walks of life now felt 
emboldened to voice their support [for the nationalist movement] … Recruitment now reached a new high.” 
Similarly, Connell (1993, p. 84) observes that “the disorder that accompanied military mutinies in Eritrea, starting in 
February 1974, gave the liberation movements a decided boost as confrontations between them and the government 




 Osman Saleh Sabbe’s interview with Ma’ariv, 21 October, 1974 (reported in Elrich 1983, p. 52).   
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In interviews with the author, important ELF- and EPLF-related figures explicitly 
associated the fall of the Haile Selassie’s regime with the end of the inter-rebel war. For 
example, according to Ahmed Nasser, “developments in Ethiopia, which began in Eritrea, were 
important. Military units there had been deeply affected by the war; there lots of wounded and 
soldiers were unhappy. For a while we had been asking ourselves: ‘What will happen when Haile 
Selassie is gone?’ We concluded that fighting [with the EPLF] must stop to exploit the new 
developments; the regime was weak, this was a moment of opportunity to achieve 
independence.”
362
 On the EPLF’s side, Haile Menkerios makes a similar point: 
“Both fronts were experiencing major inflows [of new recruits]. The situation was very 
different from the past, with the revolution having disrupted the government authority. 
There was a feeling that independence was coming. We saw the possibility of victory. 
Everybody was joining the front [EPLF]. People and new members were saying: ‘there is 
a possibility to gain independence, you have to reconcile.’”
363
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 Osman Saleh Sabbe’s interview with Observer, 22 June, 1969 (reported in Elrich 1983, p. 71). Consistently, Roy 
Pateman (1998, p. 134) observed that the “liberation forces sensed the weakness and lack of commitment of 




 Tesfay Woldemichael “Degiga” (ELF’s member from 1973) also points to the fall of imperial rule and the 





 Author’s interview. Eritrea experts’ interpretations of the effects of the Ethiopian revolution are consistent. 
Sherman (1980, p. 46) argues that “the civil war … came to a halt in October 1974, in large part due to the altered 
political situation in Ethiopia [i.e., the revolution].” Similarly, Bereketeab (2007, p. 189) argues that the fall of the 
Ethiopian regime and the corresponding emergence of a vacuum of power was one the key factors in bringing about 
the end of the inter-rebel war. Pool (2001, 136-7) also seems to imply that the revolution brought about the 
interruption of inter-rebel violence when he writes: “Taking advantage of vacuum in Addis Ababa, a degree of 
cooperation emerged between them as the impact of the events there affected both the army and the administration 
in Eritrea, and in Asmara in particular where the Ethiopian army’s Second Division and the Eritrean police played 




Thus the inconclusiveness of infighting and the risk of forgoing major gains against the 
government in case of continued inter-rebel war contributed to the rebels’ decision to reach a 
ceasefire in late 1974.
364
 Consistent with my argument, as the insurgents achieved major 
successes on the battlefield and greatly expanded their territorial control in the following years, 
inter-rebel cooperation continued. 
The ELF probably witnessed with much apprehension the growth of its rival’s strength 
during the two years of infighting. We should, however, not expect the ELF to respond to the 
unfavorable power trend with a gamble for resurrection, precisely because the group’s leadership 
by 1974 had had ample opportunity to realize the ineffectiveness of the military approach in 
tackling the challenge posed by the EPLF; expansion in the face of the collapse of government 
authority, instead, represented an untested potential avenue to reverse the group’s relative 
decline.     
The radical reversal of military fortunes that occurred in 1978 did not disrupt the ongoing 
inter-rebel cooperation. Having consolidated its grip on power in Addis Ababa and repelled 
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 The end of this episode of inter-rebel war is probably overdetermined, as several factors, besides the closure of 
the ELF’s window of opportunity, appear to have played a role. All my interviewees, other primary sources (e.g., 
Bereket Habte Selassie, The Crown and the Pen: The Memoirs of a Lawyer Turned Rebel, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea 
Press, 2007,  pp. 306-9) and the secondary literature stress the importance of popular pressure on both fronts to stop 
fighting and focus their energies against the common enemy; in addition, the massive inflows of new members in 
both organizations (who did not have any stake in the ongoing inter-rebel fight and vocally called for unity) and 
external pressure (in particular from Sudan) are often mentioned as contributing factors. In itself, overdetermination 
does not undermine my argument as I do not espouse a monocausal view of the world and I do not conceive of my 
independent variables as neither necessary nor sufficient causes of my dependent variable, but rather as having a 
large probabilistic impact, i.e., affecting the chance of the occurrence of the phenomenon of interest (for a nuanced 
discussion of probabilistic causal claims in case study research, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 
“From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research,” International Security 26 (4), 2002: 93-111). The 
evidence presented above about the perceptions and strategic thinking of the rebel groups suggests that the closing 
of the window of opportunity indeed had a probabilistic impact on the end of inter-rebel fighting (i.e., it factored in 
the insurgents’ calculations and thus in its absence they would have been more likely to keep fighting). Moreover, 
there is some evidence suggesting that pressure from below for the rebel groups to reconcile, which had always 
existed, may have been strengthened by the perception that victory against the government was a concrete 
possibility (see the quote above from Haile Menkerios; in interviews with the author, Tewolde Gebrselassie made a 
similar observation about the fact that in their advocacy for end to inter-rebel war the Eritrean people emphasized 
the moment of government weakness and the opportunity of victory.  
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Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden, the Derg launched a major offensive against the Eritrean 
rebels in June. The ELF, which controlled the entire stretch of Eritrea’s southern border, was no 
match for an Ethiopian army reinvigorated by Soviet, Cuban, Libyan and South Yemeni military 
support.
365
 Badly mauled, part of the ELF’s forces withdrew to remote areas in northwestern 
Eritrea (the Barka region), while other units followed the EPLF in its well organized withdrawal 
to the Sahel; there the two groups jointly fended off subsequent massive government 
offensives.
366
 As my theoretical argument would predict, under enormous military strain, the 
rebel groups abstained from fighting each other in the years 1978-1979: inter-rebel war would 
have been suicidal as both Eritrean organizations were stretched thin in their desperate attempt to 
contain the government onslaught.  
In sum, the available empirical evidence provides substantial support to my interpretation 
of the absence of windows of opportunity and vulnerability as a cause of the absence of inter-
rebel war in the years 1974-1979. In 1974, the prospect of a cheap and rapid victory in inter-
rebel war was remote, while the opportunity costs of infighting were high, given the acute 
weakness of the central government. Interviews with important ELF- and EPLF-related subjects 
suggest that the organizations’ leaderships correctly perceived the new situation and this 
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 Odd Arne Westad (The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 276-7) notes that through “an air bridge starting in September 1977 and 
lasting for the following eight months, the Soviets sent more than $1 billion worth of military equipment. In late 
September two South Yemeni armored battalions arrived to take part in the fighting. Fidel Castro sent 11,600 Cuban 
soldiers and more than 6,000 advisers and technical experts, who were crucial in defeating the Somali advance. 
Most spectacularly of all, almost one thousand Soviet military personnel went to Ethiopia in 1977-78 to help 
organize the counter-offensive. By early 1978, when the tide of the war turned in favor of the Mengistu regime, 
General of the Army Vasilii I. Petrov, deputy commander of USSR ground forces, was in charge of Ethiopian 
military planning. Altogether, it was the most important Soviet-led military operation outside the area of the Warsaw 




 For details on the five offensives the government launched between June 1978 and July 1979, see Connell 1993, 
pp. 157-94; Pateman 1998, pp. 135-7; and Awet T. Weldemichael, “The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic 




contributed to their decision to stop fighting. The opportunity cost of inter-rebel war remained 
high for the following three years, as the rebels achieved victory after victory against crumbling 
government forces and wrested control of 90 percent of Eritrean territory; consistent with my 
argument, ELF and EPLF abstained from fighting each other in this period. Then, in 1978 and 
1979 the Ethiopian government launched a series of major offensives, pushing the rebels to the 
Sahel and Barka; consistent with my argument, the beleaguered rebels refrained from fighting 
each other.   
The second ELF-EPLF civil war, 1980-1981. On August 28, 1980, the EPLF launched a 
surprise attack on the ELF.
367
 Over the following months, the ELF’s forces were retreating under 
joint EPLF’s and TPLF’s pressure on all fronts across Eritrea and fleeting into Sudan.
368
 By the 
summer of 1981, the EPLF had completely expelled the ELF from Eritrea and extended 
operations to its rival’s historical strongholds in the lowlands.
369
 The EPLF’s attack on the ELF 
is fully consistent with window of opportunity logic: in a moment characterized by a favorable 
imbalance of power and the absence of a serious and immediate threat posed by the government, 
the EPLF launched a hegemonic bid.  
As Awet Weldemichael eloquently put it, “the ELF was an already collapsing edifice, 
waiting for an Ethiopian onslaught and a push from its domestic rival.”
370
 The imbalance of 
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 Pateman 198, pp. 137-138. By early November up to 100 ELF fighters were crossing the border into Kassala 




 Pool 2001, pp. 146-7; Bereketeab 2007, p. 194; author’s interview with Adhanom Gebremariam, who 
commanded the EPLF’s forces in the last battle against the ELF in Barka. The ELF retained thousands of fighters in 
camps across the border but it was unable to resume large-scale operations in Eritrea as it was partially disarmed by 
Sudanese government forces and further internal squabbling resulted in a three-way splintering of the organization 





power between the rebel groups was primarily a function of the ELF’s problems of internal 
cohesion, as several of my ELF-related interviewees stressed.
371
 For example, according to Gime 
Ahmed, member of the ELF’s military leadership at the time, “there were anarchic divisions 
within the ELF… We had very poor logistical preparation… the EPLF had better 
communications at all levels. In the ELF there was conflict between the military intelligence and 
the civilian intelligence.” Similarly, Tewolde Gebrselassie (a senior cadre at that time) pointed 
out that “there were serious internal divisions [in the ELF]; there had been no congress since 
1975, so lots of unresolved tensions within the organization. This was the most important factor 
[for the quick defeat of the group]. Second, the EPLF was more centralized and disciplined.”
372
  
The EPLF’s leadership was fully aware of the ELF’s weak state. In the words of Mesfin 
Hagos, a top EPLF’s military commander: 
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 Weldemichael 2013a, p. 154. Several secondary sources emphasize the ELF’s position of relative weakness (e.g., 
Dan Connell, “Nationalist Groups Pose Direct Threat to Ethiopia Regime”, The Boston Globe, 6 September, 1980; 




 This is a recurring theme in the secondary literature too (e.g., Iyob 1995, pp. 120-1; Pool 2001, p. 147; Kibreab 
2004, p. 309; Woldemariam 2011, pp. 120-2 and 129-30). In 1977, the organization was significantly destabilized 
by several thousand defections, which not only depleted the ELF’s pool of human resources (most notably, a 
contingent of two thousand militants, disparagingly referred to as “Falool” or “anarchists”, left the organization to 
join the EPLF), but also contributed to a generalized breakdown in the ELF’s military discipline and an erosion of 
its remaining members’ morale. Several authors also argue that the government offensive in 1978 had an 
asymmetric impact on the Eritrean fronts, weakening the ELF much more than the EPLF. The ELF was 
geographically most exposed to advancing government forces as it controlled the entire length of Eritrea’s southern 
border and thus absorbed the brunt of the initial attack; by contrast, the ELF functioned de facto as a buffer between 
the government forces and the EPLF, giving the latter time to organize a strategic withdrawal, which allegedly 
allowed it to preserve much better its units and armor sources (Connell 1993, pp. 165-6; Pateman 1998, p. 82; Pool 
2001, p. 146). Connell (1993, p. 174) claims that EPLF actually managed to increase the amount of armor at its 
disposal during the 1978-1979 government offensives, by capturing over two dozen new Soviet tanks and armored 
cars. However, most of my interviewees (both ELF-and EPLF-related) did not think that the losses inflicted on the 
ELF by the 1978 Ethiopian offensives significantly affected the balance of power between the rebel groups and the 
outcome of their subsequent fight (author’s interviews with Gime Ahmed, Wolde-Yesus Ammar, Ahmed Nasser and 




 Author’s interviews. Several other subjects also pointed to ELF’s logistical and communication problems as well 
as tensions in the leadership and limited organizational cohesion in 1980-1981 (Tesfay Degiga, in the ELF 
leadership from 1975; Wolde-Yesus Ammar, in the ELF’s Foreign Office in Beirut at the time of the events; 
Yohannes Asmelash, ELF’s member from 1974, interviewed on July 11, 2013, in Addis Ababa; Menghesteab 
Asmeron, instructor in the ELF’s cadre school at the time of the events, interviewed on July 15, 2013, in Frankfurt).  
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“The ELF was weak in organization more than in numbers… By the time of the second 
civil war [between the Eritrean rebel groups], the EPLF was slightly bigger numerically. 
But the ELF organizationally was very weak. Their rank-and-file could not even read a 
map. We knew that very well. We had very good daily intelligence on Ethiopian troop 
movements and ELF positions. The ELF did not have a comparable organization; the 
ELF did not have a single tank nor artillery, while we had more than 100 tanks… The 




Adhanom Gebremariam, another EPLF’s commander provides a very similar assessment: 
“The ELF was very divided internally, there were many factions, no unity of command... 
We had several advantages. First, we were able to decode the communications of the 
ELF. Second, we had a formidable mechanized army. This was formed with tanks and 
artillery captured from the Ethiopians. So we were able to use them and modify them, 
making them more flexible and more durable... Barka [the western lowland ELF’s 
stronghold] is an open field and we had formidable conventional army to use in open 




The balance of power was further skewed against the ELF as the TPLF supported 
militarily the EPLF’s attack.
375
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 Kibreab 2008, pp. 180-1; author’s interview with Adhanom Gebremariam. 
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The EPLF faced a fleetingly permissive threat environment vis-à-vis the government. The 
series of five Ethiopian large-scale offensives launched in the summer of 1978 ended in late 
1979, with a counterattack by the EPLF that disrupted government preparations for the sixth 
offensive; Addis Ababa continued to actively plan for a massive attack on the EPLF but would 
not be able to launch operations of comparable intensity in Eritrea until 1982.
376
 Retrospective 
EPLF leaders’ accounts clearly suggest that they understood the constraints faced by the 
government in immediately launching a new all-out offensive. A 1984 interview with Isaias 
Afewerki, currently Eritrea’s President and top EPLF’s leader at that time, is worth quoting at 
length in this regard:  
“The 1979-1980 [EPLF’s] counter-offensive had indicated that the Dergue had 
reached the point where it could not reorganize itself and launch a new offensive 
or even adequately defend its positions if EPLF were to continue its attacks. Thus 
the Dergue set out to recruit a huge army and replace its weapons losses within a 
short time, waged an extensive psychological warfare and conducted an intensive 
propaganda and diplomatic campaign throughout the world with the aim of 
immediately launching its sixth offensive. The scars left over from its past 
offensives and our counteroffensive were conspicuous. In the first place, the 
Dergue was unable to replace its losses in manpower, let alone enlarge its army 
within a short time, because, with the failure of its offensives, the political 
atmosphere on which it had capitalized in 1977-1978 no longer prevailed and its 
attempts to recruit were frustrated… Two basic issues…continued to pose great 
obstacles: shortage of manpower and low morale of its army. Thus the Dergue 
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 Dan Connell, “Eritrea: Guerrilla Offensive,” The Guardian, 19 December, 1979. The much touted sixth 
offensive, known as the “Red Star”, would be launched in February 1982, after two years of preparations (Tareke 
2009, pp. 225-46). 
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was forced to delay and postpone, several times, its sixth offensive, which it 
finally launched after two years of preparations and reinforcing its demoralized 
army with several new divisions…the counteroffensive after the 5
th
 offensive 
had deterred the enemy.”
377
    
 
In interviews with the author, Mesfin Hagos explicitly pointed out that the attack 
on the ELF was carefully timed so that inter-rebel fighting would be over by the time the 
government launched a new offensive under preparation: 
“We were following the preparations of the Ethiopians from July 1979; we needed to 
kick the ELF out before the new offensive. We were following the propaganda, the 
military mobilization, the troop movements. We knew we would not be able to sustain a 
war on two fronts. We knew we had some time. The Ethiopians were saying: ‘the next 
offensive will be decisive.’ So they were trying to organize a massive offensive but their 
capacity had been weakened in the fifth offensive in July 1979. So we knew we had a 
long time to solve our issues with the ELF: we would either reach an agreement or we 
would kick them out. We knew that the Ethiopians, with Soviet support, would launch an 
offensive larger than before. The next offensive would be formidable. This was our last 
chance to defend the revolution.”
378
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 Central Bureau of Foreign Relations of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Adulis 1(4-5), October-November 
1984, p. 10. A 1982 EPLF’s publication made a similar point, noting that “[a]lthough the Ethiopian regime never 
wavered in its intention to launch this last offensive, the political problems, economic crisis and the chronic 
instability in its army delayed it for two years (EPLF, “Ethiopia's sixth offensive and developments in the Eritrean 




 On August 28
th
 1980 (the day of the beginning of the EPLF-ELF war), the Ethiopian government launched 
Operation “Lash” in Ogaden (eastern Ethiopia) against the Somali army and allied local insurgents (Tareke 2009, 
pp. 220-5). Large-scale preparations for the operation had been reported in the press in the previous weeks (e.g., Dan 




Mesfin Hagos’ recollection suggests that security concerns were at the root of the 
EPLF’s hegemonic bid. There is an indisputable element of truth to this interpretation: 
the EPLF was under siege in its Sahel stronghold, the organization’s leaders were fully 
aware that the government was preparing a new all-out offensive and the ELF could 
certainly complicate EPLF’s defensive efforts (by actively cooperating with the 
government offensive, tacitly colluding with it and abandoning joint defensive positions, 
or independently attacking EPLF’s guerrilla units elsewhere in Eritrea);
 379
 EPLF’s 
concerns that the ELF could cause trouble during the next government offensive were not 
abstract speculations, given that the two had repeatedly been involved in low-level 
skirmishes since the end of their fratricidal war in 1974.
380
 This is not to endorse the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1980) and observers at the time noted that the fighting in eastern Ethiopia limited the government’s ability to mount 
a major offensive against the Eritrean rebels (Dan Connell, “Nationalist Groups Pose Direct Threat to Ethiopia 
Regime”, The Boston Globe, 6 September, 1980); in fact, as Nigatu Teferi points out, the Derg government had 
explicitly decided to deal with the insurgency in Ogaden before focusing its full attention on Eritrea for what it 
expected to be a decisive blow (author’s interview, 1 February, 2014, Lancaster, PA; the interviewee was a major in 
the Ethiopian Army until 1991 and took part in Lash and the Red Star offensive). However, in interviews with the 
author former EPLF’s figures did not volunteer references to Lash when discussing their organization’s decision-
making leading to the attack on the ELF and Mesfin Hagos explicitly denied that the operation in Ogaden affected 
the EPLF’s calculus, which instead focused on a more direct assessment of the state of preparations for the sixth 




 In interviews with the author, Mesfin Hagos explicitly stressed fear of having two fight a two-front war during 
the new government offensive as a reason for the EPLF’s attack; Haile Menkerios’ account, by contrast, emphasizes 
the fact that, due to its weakness, the ELF could not provide much help against the government’s onslaught but at 




 Both ELF- and EPLF-related subjects express the belief that at least some of those clashes were part of a broader 
aggressive policy of the other group rather than mere accidents or independent initiatives of foot soldiers and low-
level commanders (e.g., author’s interviews with Tesfay Degiga and Mefin Hagos). Mesfin Hagos points to the fact 
that the two ELF brigades manning a segment of the rebel defensive perimeter in the Sahel abandoned their 
positions overnight in July 1980, thus potentially exposing the EPLF to a government attack there, as the immediate 
trigger of his group’s decision to attack the rival (Adhanom Gebremariam provides a very similar account). ELF-
related sources acknowledge this fact, but offer different explanations of the ELF’s decision. According to Ahmed 
Nasser (ELF’s chairman at that time), the ELF had to withdraw their forces from the Sahel trenches because they 
were needed to defend the group’s base area in Barka; Gime Ahmed (head of the ELF’s military intelligence at the 
time of the events) contends that Adballah Idris (the head of the organization’s military office) ordered the 
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EPLF’s claim that the group had “only one choice: expel them [the ELF] from Eritrea or 
give up the fight,”
381
 nor to deny that the EPLF’s attack may also have been driven by a 
straightforward desire to monopolize the independence struggle, as ELF-related sources 
suggest.
382
 As discussed in Chapter 2, a complex mix of security fears and expansionary 
ambitions may be at the root of hegemonic bids. Disentangling the relative importance of 
different sets of motives (in this episode as in most cases) is extremely difficult, but it is 
not necessary to empirically assess the empirical fit of window of opportunity logic. In 
fact, the key observable implications of the argument (i.e., expectations on the part of the 
initiator that war will be relatively quick and cheap, and that the government will not be 
able to take advantage of the situation) are not related to rebel groups’ deep motives and, 
as the above discussion makes clear, are supported by the available evidence for this 
episode.    
  Finally, as my theory would lead us to expect, the EPLF did not experience any serious 
trouble in operating in areas that had previously been under its coethnic counterpart’s sway, and 
a large number of ELF’s fighters joined the EPLF when their group was defeated.
383
 According 
to Mesfin Hagos, the “ELF’s organizational weakness translated into little popular sympathy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
withdrawal anticipating that the ensuing EPLF’s attack would help him take control of the ELF. Regardless of the 
rationale of the ELF’s action, it is likely that the EPLF perceived it as threatening, although it is impossible to assess 
the extent to which it affected the group’s decision to use force.      
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 One of the three post-1981 ELF splinters (known as “Sagem”) joined the EPLF. Some ELF’s elements continued 
to conduct limited cross-border raids and guerrilla attacks in Eritrea, but this proved no more than a nuisance for the 
EPLF. In the late 1980s the Derg’s project of regional autonomy for Eritrea’s lowlands (known as “Raz Gez”) found 




People flocked to our side [after the expulsion of the ELF from Eritrea] as we opened schools 
and clinics (the Barka area is affected by malaria) and facilitated transportation.”
384
 Similarly, 
Adhanom Gebremariam noted that “the Eritrean people were willing to support any organization 
that would have the upper hand. They thought that the government was the primary enemy and 
the EPLF was a formidable force, which could defeat the enemy… Even people in Barka saw us 
as Eritreans and they thought that we would liberate Eritrea, even if they would still not consider 
us like the ELF, like their sons and daughters.”
385
 The coethnicity of the two rebel groups is 
beyond doubt: they had the same goal of Eritrean national independence and their popular bases 
of support clearly overlapped, although there were well-known differences. In its early days, as 
noted, the ELF had an unofficial pro-Muslim slant and drew most of its fighters and leaders from 
the province’s Muslim-dominated lowlands, in particular Barka – the organization’s birthplace in 
the west. However, from1975 on the bulk of the rank-and-file of both organizations were 
Christian highlanders, as the Derg’s indiscriminate civilian targeting civilians drove many 
thousand men and women in the nationalist camp. At that point, as several observers have 
pointed out, often individuals would join one organization rather than the other for contingent 
reasons, such as the fact that they had a friend in one of the groups or that they happened to cross 
into a group’s area of operation when fleeing their homes.
386
 In fact, during the 1972-1974 inter-
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 Connell (1993, p. 84), Pool (2001, pp. 141-2) and Kibreab (2008, p. 337) report having had many conversations 
along these lines with ELF’s and EPLF’s members. In contrasting his decision to join the ELF in 1973 (motivated 
by his assessment that the ELF’s had a better political program) with that of many other Eritreans, Tesfay Degiga 
made a similar observation: “Encounters with members of the fronts were clandestine; there was a lot of randomness 
determining who you would join: you would join the first group you would bump into” (author’s interview). 
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rebel war, the Eritrean civilian population consistently appealed to both the rebel groups to set 
aside their differences and fight for the common nationalist cause.
387
  
The cooperation between the ELF and the ELF-PLF in 1976-  77 and the   78  LF’s 
attack. The available evidence (admittedly patchy) about the relations between the ELF and the 
ELF-PLF fits with window of opportunity logic: in October 1978 the ELF attacked a weaker but 
rapidly growing rival in a moment of limited government threat.     
 In 1976 the ELF allowed the EPLF’s splinter led by Osman Sabbe Saleh to organize and 
operate in Barka, in areas under ELF’s control. As Tesfay Degiga (in the ELF’s leadership at that 
time) notes, after the split EPLF’s members “in the field but sympathizing with Sabbe had to 
flee, the only place where they would find refuge was ELF’s territory.”
388
 The new organization 
was extremely weak and thus my theory suggests that the ELF could tolerate it as it did not pose 
a meaningful threat.
389
 Moreover, the ELF’s leadership thought the ELF-PLF could offer some 
leverage vis-à-vis the rival EPLF, with which the ELF was engaged in difficult negotiations over 
the formation of a common front. As Wolde-Yesus Ammar (in the ELF’s Foreign Office at that 
time) recalls, the organization “supported Sabbe out of power politics considerations… Some 
elements in the ELF’s leadership wanted to weaken the EPLF by supporting Sabbe. So we gave 
him a base, some support and political recognition as a third force.”
390
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 My interviewees repeatedly made this point, which is also emphasized in the secondary literature (e.g., Kibreab 
2008, p. 336). For example, Menghesteab Asmeron recalls that the civilians that lobbied for inter-rebel cooperation 
in the outskirts of Asmara in 1974 would appeal to the organizations’ common national base with affectionate 








 In the summer of 1977, Osman Sabbe Saleh was reportedly commanding a force of “untrained refugees 
numbering about 1,500 which [had] yet to see combat inside Eritrea” (Dan Connell, “Eritrean Liberation Struggle 
Escalates,” The Guardian, 6 July, 1977); Michael Woldemariam (2011, p. 154) estimates the ELF’s strength at the 




The ELF’s calculus, however, changed as the ELF-PLF grew more powerful and the 
government offensive in the summer of 1978 reversed the previous wave of insurgent battlefield 
successes. In an interview with the author, after having stressed the initial state of disarray of 
Osman Sabbe Saleh’s forces, Tesfay Degiga pointed out that “then their numbers grew and with 
money at his disposal Sabbe [through his well-established connections in the Arab world] started 
creating a bigger military camp, while for ELF it was meant to be a temporary refuge. Also as 
time went by, Sabbe started interfering with our organization, and they started not allowing us to 
go through their territory.”
391
 Skirmishes and frictions between fighters of the two groups 
ensued.
392
 Of particular concern for the ELF’s leadership was the fact that, allegedly thanks to 
his deep pockets, Osman Sabbe Saleh was managing to attract to his organization ELF members 
and supporters.
393
 Concerned by the ELF-PLF’s growing strength, the ELF decided to attack 
when the balance of power was still favorable. As Tewolde Gebrselassie succinctly put it, 
“Sabbe’s group was growing stronger and the attack was meant to prevent that.”
394
 The potential 
threat posed by a growing ELF-PLF was compounded by the ELF’s changed military position 
vis-à-vis the government. The Derg offensive in the summer of 1978 pushed the ELF towards the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
390
 Author’s interview. This explanation of the ELF’s behavior is echoed in Markakis (1987, p. 140) and Pool (2001, 




 By the time the inter-rebel war broke out, the ELF-PLF had grown to 3,000 members (Dan Connell, “Eritrean 
Forces Resume Guerrilla Attacks,” The Guardian, 3 January, 1979); John Duggan, who visited the ELF-PLF in the 
summer of 1978, reports a higher figure of 5,000 fighters (interview conducted by the Eritrean Gruppen Stockholm, 












 Author’s interview. According to Wolde-Yesus Ammar (author’s interview), the immediate trigger of the ELF’s 
attack on the ELF-PLF was Osman Saleh Sabbe’s attempt to extend the operations of his group to the Dankalia in 
eastern Eritrea in October 1978. Markakis (1987, p. 288 note 95) reports this episode, but Kibreab (2008, p. 306) 
suggests that it occurred in 1979, after the ELF attacked the ELF-PLF in the west.    
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ELF-PLF’s areas of operation near the Sudanese border; the presence of Osman Saleh Sabbe’s 
faction in the ELF’s rear raised the specter of the group being “sandwiched” between two hostile 
forces in case the government redirected at some point down the road its attention from its fight 




 At the time of the ELF’s attack the balance of power was still clearly in its favor. The 
ELF-PLF had 3,000-5,000 members while the ELF’s membership was around 18,000. 
Consistently, the ELF’s leadership expected a quick and cheap fight. Wolde-Yesus Ammar notes 
that the “ELF felt it would be easy to liquidate Sabbe. His army was not very organized and his 
members were loyal to him only because he paid them.”
396
 Similarly, Tesfay Degiga recalls that 
“it was easy to push them [the ELF-PLF] out; they were a very small force.”
397
 The other key 
ingredient of window of opportunity – a permissive threat environment vis-à-vis the government 
was also in place. As noted, the fight occurred in remote northwestern areas of Eritrea, far from 
the thrust of the second government offensive, which focused on the EPLF.
398
 To be sure, the 
ELF was not in a position of absolute security vis-à-vis the government, as it had lost territory 
and men in the course of the first government offensive. However, the ELF does not appear to 
have been concerned about an immediate government attack, but rather about the fact that the 
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 Author’s interviews with Tesfay Degiga and Tewolde Gebrselassie. Only the first of the five government 








 Author’s interview.  In interviews with the author, Menghesteab Asmeron and Tewolde Gebrselassie also 




 Dan Connell, “Ethiopia Prepares Eritrea Offensive,” The Guardian, 22 November, 1978. 
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ELF-PLF was growing at its expense and might at some point have represented a security threat, 
in particular in the context of a government offensive in the west down the road.       
In sum, the existing evidence is consistent with window of opportunity logic. The ELF 
tolerated a coethnic rival when it was facing an extremely low threat environment (the Eritrean 
insurgents were rapidly expanding and the government forces were in disarray) and the ELF-PLF 
was in a position of extreme weakness. The ELF, however,  wiped out its rival when it became 
clear that it could become a threat due to its growing strength and the risk of a government 
offensive in the future near the Sudanese border where the two groups were based. 
  
Inter-rebel wars in Tigray 
The 1975 attack by the TPLF against the TLF. The broad outlines of the attack by the TPLF 
against the TLF in late 1975 fit with window of opportunity logic: the TPLF was stronger than 
its coethnic rival (which promised a rapid victory) and the government only posed a limited 
threat.
399
   
The TPLF launched a surprise attack on the TLF when the two organizations were 
camped together for talks aimed at forming a united Tigrayan front: as the TPLF had more than 
three times as many fighters as the TLF, the group’s leadership assigned three to four TPLF 
members to each TLF’s fighter and tasked them with overpowering and disarming him at dawn 
as a secret signal was issued. Many of the members of the TLF joined the TPLF’s ranks after the 
dissolution of their group.
400
 TPLF-related interviewees unanimously point to the relative 
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 As noted above, the members of the two groups were from Tigray and they both had unmistakable ethno-national 
agendas (with the TLF advocating for Tigray’s independence, while the TPLF aimed, more ambiguously, at 




 Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 82-4.  
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weakness of the TLF, which had also recently experienced internal problems and large losses of 
membership.
401
 The government did not pose a serious and immediate threat, because, as 
Aregawi Berhe notes in describing Derg’s activities in the province at that time, “[i]n the vast 
rural areas of Tigrai [sic], there was no meaningful government hold or influence to deter the 
mobility of the TPLF.”
402
   
The 1976 attack by the TPLF against Teranafit. Window theory sheds much light on this 
episode of inter-rebel war too. In 1976 the TPLF faced both a short-term window of opportunity 
and a long-term window of vulnerability: it was marginally stronger than its coethnic rival – 
Teranafit – and the government posed a limited threat, but the EDU was organizing a formidable 
force across the border in Sudan in preparation for an offensive into Tigray. Consistent with my 
argument, the TPLF attacked its rival before reinforcements could arrive from Sudan.
403
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 Author’s interviews with Aregawi Berhe; Gebru Asrat; Mokonnen Mokonnen; and Tedros Hagos (TPLF’s 
member since 1976, he was a cadre until he joined the leadership of the organization in 1983; he was head of the 
TPLF’s politburo at that time of the interview, 31 July, 2013, in Mekele, Ethiopia).  Some TPLF-related sources 
suggest the existence of a plan by the TPLF to get rid of the rival (Kahsay Berhe, Ethiopia: Democratization and 
Unity  The  ole of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, M nster, Germany: Monsenstein und Vannerdat, 2005, p. 
62; the author was a TPLF’s member from 1975; Gebru Asrat, author’s interview; and Tedros Hagos hints at the fact 
that the attack may have been preemptive, as the TPLF suspected that the TLF might have a plan to wipe out the 
TPLF’s leadership, author’s interview). Others stress the genuine interest of the TPLF’s leadership in a merge 
(motivated by concerns about the ineffectiveness of having two separate organizations in Tigray and the desire to 
attract support from both the ELF and the EPLF), which was then overwhelmed by pressure from the TPLF’s rank-
and-file, opposing a merge in light of news that the TLF’s leadership had allegedly committed crimes against the 




 Aregawi Berhe 2009, p. 93, note 48; the author (a founding member of the TPLF) also notes that bands of local 
bandits represented more of a problem for the TPLF in its first two years of existence than the government (p. 95). 
The negligible military presence of the Derg in Tigray until 1978 is reported in the secondary literature too (e.g., 
Young 1997, pp. 93 and 97). My argument cannot explain the peculiar circumstances in which the TLF’s demise 
occurred – i.e., a sudden debilitating blow by the TPLF during ongoing unity negotiations between the two 
organizations rather than more open clashes on the battlefield; a variety of factors beyond those highlighted by my 
theory may play a role in bringing about merges between rebel groups, including pressure from external patrons, 
internal supporters, and rank-and-file for organizations with similar objectives to unite. My argument does suggest 
that rebel leaders should be concerned about the risks of a loss of power within a larger organization and exploitative 
behavior by a rival (for example, the use of force to turn a merge into a take-over, as in this case) and thus  





 As the Derg seized power, it began rounding up high-ranking officials and members of 
the royal family. However, it hesitated to arrest the popular hereditary governor of Tigray, Ras 
Mengesha, for fear of provoking an uprising similar to the one that had rocked the province in 
1942-1943.
404
 Ras Mengesha thus managed to slip into Sudan, where he joined other members of 
the old regime and started setting up the EDU. The new organization, which enjoyed the support 
of Sudan (and allegedly of Saudi Arabia and several western countries), planned on launching a 
sweeping offensive across the border into Tigray and then overthrowing the Derg regime in 
Addis Ababa: supporters of Ras Mengesha in Tigray started coalescing into Teranafit even 
before the formal announcement of the creation of EDU in early 1976.
405
 As TPLF’s founding 
member Ghidey Zeratsion pointed out, the group’s leadership “knew that Teranafit would grow 
stronger as it established relations with the EDU. We knew that the EDU was being organized in 
Sudan and was getting weapons. Its launch base would be Tigray.”
406
 
 While the threat gathered across the border, the TPLF enjoyed a margin of superiority 
over Teranafit. According to most TPLF-related sources, the two organizations had a comparable 
number of fighters, but the TPLF was clearly superior in cohesion and discipline.
407
 As a result, 
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 The first attack occurred in mid-June 1976; the second decisive TPLF’s operation against Teranafit (which 
















 Author’s interviews with Ghidey Zeratsion; Aregawi Berhe; Tesfay Atsbeha; and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot 
(interviewed on July 29, 2014, Addis Ababa; he was a simple soldier at the time of the events and later in the 
TPLF’s leadership until 2001); Aregawi Berhe (2009, p. 170) reports that the size of the TPLF in July 1976 at about 
1,000 fighters. By contrast, according to Gebru Asrat, the TPLF had a smaller number of fighters, but he agrees with 
the other interviewees that the TPLF was a better organized and trained force. TPLF’s historical accounts are replete 
with references to Teranafit’s lack of a coherent organization and the prevalence among its rank-and-file of 
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the TPLF’s leadership expected to crush its rival when it eventually attacked Teranafit.
408
 
Moreover, the TPLF believed that for some time it could grow at Teranafit’s expenses by 
attracting its peasant members with better mobilizing techniques and a political program that 
would deeply resonate with their class and national aspirations. In the words of Ghidey 
Zeratsion, “Teranafit did not have a good political orientation; they were mostly made up of 
peasants and feudal lords. So we thought we could attract their rank-and-file over time”
409
 Faced 
with these two competing dynamics (on the one hand, the creation of the EDU, which would 
eventually strengthen Teranafit and directly intervene in Tigray, and, on the other hand, the 
prospect of outsmarting its rival in recruitment and mobilization), the TPLF’s leadership initially 
opted for tactical cooperation and thus postponed the inevitable violent showdown. Negotiations 
between the two groups led to a cooperative agreement in June 1976, in spite of occasional 
skirmishes between their fighters.
410
  
The TPLF’s calculus, however, was overturned by the killing of Gessesew Ayele “Sihul” 
– one of the group’s leaders – during an altercation with Teranafit’s members. Sihul had served 
as Tigray’s representative in the Ethiopian Parliament and was well-known and popular, with a 
strong reputation as a staunch defender of the province. In his book of the history of the TPLF, 
Aregawi Berhe discusses at length the role played by Sihul:   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
criminals that had opportunistically joined for looting and peasants lured with false economic promises, neither of 
whom was deeply committed to fight for the group. John Young (1997, p. 101) mistakenly reports the strength of 




 In interviews with the author, TPLF’s founding members and leaders Ghidey Zeratsion and Aregawi Berhe 
stated, respectively, that the TPLF expected a rapid victory and that the leadership was very confident the group 




 Author’s interview. Other interviewees made very similar observations (in particular, Aregawi Berhe and 




 Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 127-8. 
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[Shihul’s] background and personality made an immense contribution to the smooth 
development of the TPLF... The people in these villages [in western Tigray, where the 
TPLF started operations] would definitely have been hostile to the unknown students [all 
other TPLF founders were undergraduates] whose activities were centred only in the 
towns… [Their] compliance was granted not because they understood the objectives of 
the emerging front or because of the young revolutionary students, but simply because 
Sihul, whose views they knew well and whom they respected deeply, was in it… Sihul’s 
role in the struggle was irreplaceable. As said above, without him the unknown TPLF 




It appears that Sihul’s sudden death undermined the TPLF’s short-term strategy of 
outgrowing its rival while avoiding open confrontation. In an interview with the author, Aregawi 
Berhe indirectly suggested as much:  
“He [Sihul] was a symbol for the organization; he was well-known and respected by the 
people… For us Sihul was key, because he represented a link between the younger and 
older generations as well as between the rural and urban environments. After his killing 
they [Teranafit’s members] were boasting of being militants and sharpshooters, while we 
were just students.”  
 
Moreover, as Aregawi Berhe notes in his book, the TPLF’s predicament was exasperated 
by appearance of EDU forces in Wolkait region (in the far west) shortly after Sihul’s death.
412
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 The limited threat to the TPLF posed by the government at the time of the inter-rebel 
clash comes across clearly from interviews with the group’s leaders. As Aregawi Berhe recalled:  
“It seemed that the government had chosen to stay away as a tactic... Something like: ‘let 
them weaken each other; the fight between TPLF and Teranafit is to our advantage.’ The 
government forces at that time were in permanent garrisons; they were not moving 
around much in the countryside... We thought that the government feared Teranafit more 





In spite of important ideological and sociological differences, the two groups can clearly 
be considered as coethnic based on my definition – both had Tigrayan membership and 
leadership and professed some form of Tigrayan ethno-nationalism (in the case of Teranafit, 
related to the restoration of Ras Mengesha). Local peasants did see both the TPLF and Teranafit 
as “sons of Tigray” and urged them to cooperate against the “Amhara” Derg.
414
 Consistent with 
my argument, a large number of Teranafit’s rank-and-file joined the TPLF when the latter had 
the upper hand militarily and the TPLF did not experience any organized resistance in areas 
where Teranafit previously held sway (besides the EDU’s offensives discussed below).
415
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 Aregawi Berhe 2009, p. 106. Ghidey Zeratsion also points out that the expectation of EDU’s imminent arrival 




 Author’s interview. Ghidey Zeratsion made a similar observation: “We knew that the government would be 
happy about the infighting, because it would benefit from it. Also the government was very weak at that time, so it 




 Young 1997, pp. 102-3. Efforts by local elders to mediate between the two groups are also reported by Aregawi 




 Author’s interview with Tedros Hagos; Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 107-8. 
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 In sum, key implications of my argument can be observed in this episode of rebel 
infighting: the TPLF attacked a weaker coethnic rival, when its expectations of growing even 
stronger over time were shaken by the killing of a charismatic leader; the TPLF calculated that 
the government would not intervene in the fight and thus did not represent a serious and 
immediate threat at that time; and the TPLF managed to tap into its defeated rival’s pool of 
resources.    
The 1976-1978 EDU-TPLF war. The EDU’s attack against the TPLF presents elements 
of a hegemonic bid – the former enjoyed overwhelming military superiority over the latter and 
the government forces were in disarray – but the two groups should not be considered coethnic; 
thus this instance of inter-rebel war amounts to a failed prediction of my theory. 
Aware of the formidable, looming threat that the EDU posed, the TPLF approached the 
group’s leadership in Sudan and proposed a modus vivendi between the two organizations, but 
Ras Mengesha refused.
416
 In September 1976, the EDU launched an initial limited thrust into 
Tigray, which the TPLF managed to repel at a serious cost in terms of members’ lives.
417
 The 
following March, the new offensive was overwhelming: with around 10,000 well-armed men, 
the EDU rapidly took over the Ethiopian towns of Humera and Metema (just across the border 
with Sudan), which hosted army garrisons, and then moved into the TPLF’s stronghold in 
western Tigray. The TPLF initially decided to hold its ground but its defensive lines were 
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 This account was provided to the author by Ghidey Zeratsion, who led the TPLF’s diplomatic outreach. In 
interviews with the author Gebru Asrat and Sibhat Nega made similar observations (Sibhat Nega has been in the 




 Author’s interviews with Ghidey Zeratsion and Sibhat Nega; Aregawi Berhe (2009, pp. 107-8) reports that the 
EDU’s contingent consisted of 250 men. In the absence of direct evidence of the EDU’s decision-making it is only 
possible to speculate on its motivation for launching this hastened attack, before the organization’s full mobilization. 
It may have been prompted by the group’s perception of the TPLF as a “bunch of students” that would be easily put 
back in their place (as several TPLF-related subjects suggested), the impulse to retaliate against the attack on 
Teranafit (many members of which joined the EDU) and the desire to interfere with TPLF’s popular mobilization 
efforts in western Tigray. 
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eventually swept away by the EDU’s swarms.
418
 All TPLF-related sources stress the enormous 
losses experienced by the organization, which had to switch to a protracted warfare approach to 
survive, launching hit-and-run attacks while relinquishing the defense of fixed positions against 
superior firepower.
419
 However, a major government counteroffensive on EDU’s positions in 
June 1977, combined with gradual attrition of its forces through TPLF’s guerrilla attacks, broke 




 Based on EDU’s propaganda, mobilization efforts and the actual pattern of the offensive 
(as reported in the literature and in TPLF’s accounts), there is little doubt about the broad 
outlines of the group’s plan: the EDU expected to march triumphantly to Mekele (Tigray’s 
capital) and then to Addis Ababa, rolling up on its way the TPLF, which it saw as little more 
than a nuisance.
421
 With hindsight, the EDU optimistically miscalculated the ease of taking over 
the central government, but it correctly assessed its military superiority over the TPLF and the 
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 Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 109-11. Aregawi Berhe points out that the decision to try to openly withstand the 
EDU’s onslaught was motivated by the TPLF’s desire to be seen by Tigray’s peasants as willing to put up a serious 
fight and pay a heavy cost: “Organizing a static defense was militarily wrong, but politically correct” (author’s 




 For example, according to Tedros Hagos, the TPLF lost half of its fighters (author’s interview); Aregawi Berhe 




 The government crushing defeat of the EDU is reported by Clapham (1990, p. 185). According to Nigatu Teferi 
(an officer in the Ethiopian army at that time), the government, alarmed by the fact that the EDU had reached the 
outskirts of Gondar, brought in units armed with heavy artillery from the Ogaden, which inflicted a debilitating blow 
on the rebel group; then the TPLF managed to finish the weakened EDU with guerrilla attacks (author’s interview). 
TPLF-related sources acknowledge that the government attack on the  EDU contributed to its demise but diverge on 
its importance compared to the TPLF’s continuous harassment of EDU’s units (some of my interviewees argue that 
both were important, while others claim that the TPLF’s actions mattered more because by the time of the 
government offensive the TPLF had already weakened the EDU; by contrast, Tesfay Atsbeha points out that the 
TPLF’s eventual success was made possible by the fact that the government offensive caused the fragmentation of 




 Tareke 2009, p. 86. 
181 
 
fact that the government did not pose a serious and immediate threat. TPLF-related sources 
consistently stress that their group was completely outgunned
422
 and that the government had 
very limited ability to project power in Tigray’s countryside.
423
 The EDU’s crucial mistake, as 
Aregawi Berhe suggests, probably was failing to consolidate its hold on Tigray’s countryside 
before heading further south, thus posing an immediate existential threat to the Derg, which 
reacted ferociously: 
“We retreated to central Tigray. Instead of pursuing us they moved south towards the 
government forces. Had they pressed us we could not have posed a challenge. We had 
taken a lot of losses and we had little ammunition. Now the Derg had an opportunity to 




Based on my definition, the EDU and the TPLF should not be considered coethnic, due to 
the former’s pan-Ethiopian agenda and ethnically mixed composition. Unlike Teranafit, the EDU 
did not simply aim to take over Tigray, but was bent on using it as launch-pad for overthrowing 
the Derg in Addis Ababa. A large proportion of EDU’s fighters were from Tigray, but the 
organization recruited also many individuals from other northern regions of Ethiopia and 
important leadership figures were not Tigrayan.
425
 Thus this episode represents a deviation from 
the pattern of inter-rebel war predicted by my theory. But in a sense this is also an exception that 
                                                          
422
 According to Aregawi Berhe (2009, p. 109) and Tedros Hagos (author’s interview), the EDU had a numerical 
superiority of 10 to 1; all other TPLF-related sources confirm a stark imbalance of power in terms of troop numbers 




 As, for example, Gebru Asrat notes, “the Derg was not strong at that time; it had basically lost control of rural 








 Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 108-9.  
182 
 
confirms the rule: the groups do not fit my definition of coethnicity, but they competed over an 
overlapping pool of potential supporters – the dynamic which the abstract concept is supposed to 
capture. This fact is acknowledged by TPLF’s sources. For example, in discussing the reasons 
for the EDU’s ultimate failure, Tesfay Atsbeha observes that the “EDU was going for the towns, 
but this was a mistake: it should have controlled the countryside. The peasants would have 
flocked to their side. Even the TPLF militias had switched sides.”
426
 The EDU’s ability to appeal 
to Tigray’s peasants depended on the absence, in practice, of a sharp distinction between it and 
its “precursor” – Teranafit. As noted, EDU’s founder and prominent (but not sole) leader – Ras 
Mengesha – was the powerful Tigrayan symbol that had inspired the creation of Teranafit. 
Moreover, after its defeat at the TPLF’s hands, a large segment of Teranafit’s forces joined the 
EDU, where they “remained as an autonomous contingent, poised to grab Tigrai.”
427
  
 In sum, although I lack access to EDU’s sources, some elements of window of 
opportunity logic seem to be present in this episode of inter-rebel war. The EDU was stronger 
than the TPLF and the government represented only a limited threat. However, the two groups 
do not meet my definition of coethnicity, even if the available evidence suggests that they had 
largely overlapping bases of support.  
The 1978 attack by the TPLF against the EPRP. The 1978 TPLF’s attack against the 
EPRP represents an additional case of hegemonic bid, as the former attacked its weaker coethnic 
rival in a moment in which the government and the EDU did not pose a serious and immediate 
military threat. 
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 Author’s interview.  Aregawi Berhe (2009, p. 94)  makes a relevant observation too: “Had the TPLF failed to fill 
this gap, likely another local force, for example the TLF or Teranafit/EDU, would have become the leading 
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From the moment in which the two organizations established a military presence in 
eastern Tigray in late 1975 until their fight in the spring of 1978, TPLF-EPRP relations were 
tense, due to ideological disagreements and animated competition for the support of Tigray’s 
peasants. The TPLF and the EPRP engaged in nine rounds of negotiations to establish some form 
of cooperation in their anti-government struggle and prevent the escalation of skirmishes 
involving fighters, militias and supporters of the two groups.
428
  
Until the spring of 1978, no window of opportunity or vulnerability emerged; consistent 
with my argument, no inter-rebel war occurred. Throughout this period, the government had very 
limited ability to project power in rural Tigray, but the TPLF faced the threat of Teranafit and the 
EDU in its base area in the west of the province. However, the picture changed in the spring of 
1978. By then, while the EPRP’s forces in eastern Tigray had languished amidst internal turmoil 
and lack of any significant military engagement with the Derg, the TPLF had defeated its rivals 
in the west, acquiring in the process much valuable battlefield experience and weapons.  
The TPLF took advantage of a clear opportunity to establish a hegemonic position in the 
province by attacking its weaker rival’s base area in eastern Tigray in mid-March 1978.
429
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 Kiflu Tadesse 1998, pp. 88 and 390-9; Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 143-7; author’s interview with Ghidey 
Zeratsion, who took part as a TPLF’s representative to the negotiations. Several possible arrangements were 
discussed, ranging from the merge of the two groups to peaceful coexistence in the context of parallel struggles 
against the Derg. The TPLF and the EPRP created a “Coordinating Committee” to manage localized disputes, such 
as episodes of harassment by fighters of one group of supporters of the other and occasional skirmishes (sometimes 




 The EPRP may have perceived the existence of a mounting threat, as the stronger TPLF would be in a position of 
focusing its full attention on the EPRP as the fight with the EDU drew to a conclusion. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, we should not expect the EPRP to gamble for resurrection as its military weakness was a function of 
limited battlefield experience and problems of internal cohesion. In this kind of scenario, the group’s leadership 
would focus on addressing the sources of the weakness – adopting measures to enhance battlefield experience and/or 
solidify its control over the organization – rather than pick a difficult fight with a stronger group. The leaders of an 
organization rocked by internal dissension typically would have little confidence of being able to execute a coherent 
military plan, which would be necessary to have even a minimum chance of victory against a stronger rival. In 
addition, advocating a dangerous course of action (as a gamble for resurrection is) could weaken the embattled 




Within a few weeks, the decimated EPRP’s forces took refuge in ELF-controlled territory in 
Eritrea.
430
 After six months, the surviving EPRP’s units managed to join the group’s contingent 
in the northwestern province of Gondar; in mid-1979, with the help of the ELF, the group 
established a presence in Wolkait – an area of Gondar that the TPLF intended to control because 
it offered direct access to Sudanese territory and was inhabited by Tigrigna speaking people. In 
late 1979 the TPLF attacked and expelled its rival from the area. From then on, the EPRP was 
relegated to an inconsequential role in the armed struggle and could only operate in areas of 
Gondar and Wello provinces far from Tigray.
431
  
TPLF- and EPRP-related sources agree that the TPLF was militarily stronger when war 
broke out. Aregawi Berhe summarizes well the general perception of the EPRP among the 
TPLF’s leadership: 
“We considered them [the EPRP] militarily ineffective. There was a lot of rhetoric on 
their part, but just that. They had no military experience, unlike us. We had fought 
against Teranafit and EDU for a long time. We had also fought the Derg, even if not in 





The two organizations had roughly comparable numbers of fighters and levels of 
armaments, but the TPLF was clearly superior in terms of internal cohesion, discipline and 
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 Kiflu Tadesse 1998, pp. 402-7; Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 148-9. Kiflu Tadesse reports that the EPRP lost about 








 Author’s interview. Consistently, Kahsay Berhe (2005, p. 58), Ghidey Zeratsion and Mokonnen Mokonnen 





 As former TPLF’s leader Gebru Asrat notes, “[t]he war with EDU was almost 
finished by January [1978]. The TPLF had come out strong. We believed we were much stronger 
than the EPRP. We despised them because they were not engaged in any fighting. They were not 
fighting the Derg as they had a coup strategy… We perceived we could easily win.”
434
 In 
addition to lacking significant battlefield experience, the EPRP was riven by major problems of 
internal cohesion, provoked by the arrival to the group’s base area of large number of activists 
from the cities, who vehemently criticized the authority of the group’s military leadership.
435
 As 
Aregawi Berhe makes clear in answering my question about whether his group had intelligence 
on the EPRP’s internal problems, the TPLF was fully aware of them: “We knew what was going 
on. All organizations have intelligence. We knew about the factions inside EPRP, their military 
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 Kiflu Tadesse (1998, p. 404) reports that in early 1978 the EPRP had about 1,000 fighters in eastern Tigray; in an 
interview with the author, Begasho Ashenafi also estimated the size of the EPRP at about 1,000 men. Aregawi Berhe 
(2009, p. 178) reports that in the late spring of 1978 the TPLF could marshal eight companies for an overall size of 
about 1,000 fighters; Tesfay Atsbeha, a TPLF military commander at that time, notes that the two groups were equal 
in terms of numbers and weapons, but the TPLF was stronger as significantly more experienced (author’s 
interviews). In partial contrast, Tedros Hagos recalls that the TPLF was markedly stronger due to its fighting 




 Author’s interview. The gap in military experience between the two groups clearly emerges in most interviews 
with TPLF-related subjects (e.g., Mokonnen Mokonnen and Tekleweini Assefa). The EPRP’s problems of combat 
readiness and its limited military operations against the government (often a source of discontent among the 
organization’s rank-and-file) is a leitmotiv in EPRP’s leader Kiflu Tadesse’s account (1998, pp. 188, 370, 374 and 
381). In interviews with the author, Begasho Ashenafi and an anonymous EPRP’s foot soldier also stressed the 
group’s almost complete lack of battlefield experience at the moment of the inter-rebel war (the latter was 








 In the course of 1977, the government almost completely eradicated the EPRP’s urban infrastructure; hundreds of 





 As with the other episodes of inter-rebel war in Tigray, the government posed only a 
limited threat. In the words of Aregawi Berhe:  
“Our assessment was that the government was weak in Tigray. They could not penetrate 
rural areas; they had limited forces; they would not dare going to the countryside. 
Tigray’s terrain is very rough and mountainous. It is unsuitable for conventional warfare. 
Tanks, big guns and airplanes can’t do much there. The Derg could not penetrate rural 
areas at will; attempts at penetration would come with a great cost for the Derg. Probably 
also at that point in time the Derg’s attention was mostly focused on the Eritreans. They 
had most of their forces there and in Tigray they were mostly watching the fight between 
TPLF and EPRP, the way they had done with Teranafit. So there was no intervention, not 




My coding of the EPRP and the TPLF as coethnic rebel groups requires explanation, 
given that the former is typically labeled as pan-Ethiopian while the TPLF explicitly espoused 
Tigrayan nationalism. In fact, disagreements about the importance of the Ethiopia’s “national 
question” were at the root of the bitter ideological debates between the two organizations. 
However, these ideological differences are not sufficient to conclude that the EPRP was not a 
Tigrayan organization. As noted above, its program emphasized the need to end the oppression 
of ethnic groups by the Amhara-dominated central government, including Tigrayans. The 
difference from the TPLF’s position was about whether the class contradiction or the 
national/ethnic contradiction had primacy: for the EPRP, the class contradiction was paramount 
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 Author’s interviews. In response to my question about the TPLF’s threat perception vis-à-vis the government at 
the moment in which the fight with the EPRP occurred, Gebru Asrat noted that “the government was engaged in war 
against Somalia, we knew that. The government was busy there.” Tekleweini Assefa reports that after a “holistic 
assessment” of the military situation, the TPLF leadership concluded that the government would not intervene 
during the fight with the EPRP and that it would in fact be happy to see them fight each other (author’s interview).    
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and addressing it would automatically lead to a solution of the national contradiction; for the 
TPLF, which also adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology, under Tigray’s conditions at that time 
the national contradiction had to take priority and solving it would then lead to the solution of the 
class contradiction.
438
 Thus in programmatic terms the EPRP can be coded as Tigrayan because 
it advanced claims about the improvement of Tigrayans’ fate (as well as that of other ethnic 
groups). The EPRP also meets the other element of my definition because the bulk of its 
leadership was from Tigray.
439
 The fact that the two groups had overlapping bases of support is 
clearly illustrated by the dynamics of competition between them, which are reported by TPLF- 
and EPRP-related sources: both groups were able to recruit in eastern Tigray, with some villages 
siding with the TPLF and some with the EPRP and the two organizations trying hard to convince 
supporters of their rivals to switch sides.
440
 Consistent with my argument, after the TPLF got rid 
of its rival, the former managed to expand its influence in areas previously under the EPRP’s 
influence and intensify its mobilization efforts of Tigray’s population.
441
 As Aregawi Berhe 
notes, having established its hegemonic position in Tigray, the TPLF took over “[p]eople’s 
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 I do not have figures on the ethnic background of EPRP’s fighters; those active in Tigray are likely to have been 
predominantly Tigrayan until major inflows of people from the cities in the first half of 1977. The literature and  
EPRP- and TPLF-related subjects report that the group’s leadership was dominated by Tigrayans (Sarah Vaughan 
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In sum, the TPFL’s behavior towards the EPRP is well explained by window of 
opportunity logic. The two coethnic rebel groups intensely competed for the support of Tigray’s 
peasants from the beginning; however, the TPLF turned on its weaker rival only in 1978, after it 
had dealt with the EDU and in a context of continuing limited government threat. As the newly 
established rebel hegemon, the TPLF solidified its grip on the province’s population.  
 
The dog that did not bark (much): the prevalence of inter-ethnic rebel peace 
While both the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgent movements experienced several episodes of 
infighting, relations between rebel groups across the Tigray-Eritrea ethno-national divide were 
characterized by a remarkable absence of large-scale violence, with the important exception of 
the clashes between the ELF and the TPLF.  
Rather than trying to nip in the bud the rebel groups mushrooming in neighboring Tigray 
in 1975-1976, the Eritrean fronts provided vital help. The EPLF trained and armed both the 
TPLF and the EPRP, while the ELF provided similar support to the TLF.
443
 Moreover, in various 
occasions Tigrayan and Eritrean organizations coordinated their forces to fend off government 
offensives.
444
 To be sure, relations between Eritrean and Tigrayan groups were not always 
harmonious; mutual suspicion, fear of exploitation and abandonment, tough bargaining and 
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 Kahsay Berhe 2005, pp. 49-52; Aregawi 2009, pp. 251-5; Weldemichael 2014. John Young (“The Tigray and 
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism,”  The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 34 (1), 1996b: 105-20, in particular  p. 106) and Weldemichael (2014, p. 92) report that the ELF had an 
alliance with the EDU; however, ELF’s chairman Ahmed Nasser claimed that the two groups’ ideological positions 
were too far apart for a systematic relationship but acknowledged they cooperated in a battle against government 
forces in 1977 (author’s interview). The EPLF also provided support to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the 




 John Young 1996b; Gebru Tareke, “From Lash to Red Star: the Pitfalls of Counter-insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980–
82,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (3), 2002: 465–98; Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 141-6 and 216-7.  
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arms-twisting were pervasive, as their interests were far from perfectly aligned.
445
 However, the 
large-scale violence that characterized intra-ethnic relations was a rare occurrence across the 
Tigray-Eritrea divide. This point is well illustrated by TPLF-EPLF relations, to which I now 
turn.  
After consolidation of their hegemonic positions in the respective rebel movements, the 
relationship between the two groups turned sour. The TPLF started objecting to the static, 
conventional defense of the EPLF’s base areas in the Sahel against government offensives after 
1982 (which would require the deployment of TPLF’s supporting units), advocating instead a 
more mobile guerrilla strategy. In addition, the EPLF resisted the TPLF’s pressure to condemn 
the Soviet Union – the main international backer of the Derg regime – as “social imperialist”; 
this was not a purely abstract ideological dispute as the TPLF feared that through Soviet 
mediation the EPLF might reach a separate deal with the government, which would leave the 
TPLF in a vulnerable position. Most crucially, the two groups disagreed on the appropriate 
solution for Ethiopia’s “national question.”
446
 For a long time, the TPLF maintained an 
ambiguous position about whether Tigrayans’ grievances could be addressed within the 
framework of a truly democratic Ethiopia or secession would be necessary, and whether the 
group’s war aims should be limited to the liberation of Tigray or extend to the take-over of 
power in Addis Ababa. By contrast, as Awet Weldemichael notes,  
“[b]ecause Eritrea needed a favorable replacement at the helm in Addis Ababa to help 
legitimize its independence after a battlefield victory, the EPLF opposed Ethiopian 
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 Young 1996b; Weldemichael 2014; author’s interviews with Mesfin Hagos, Ghidey Zeratsion and Aregawi 
Berhe. The TPLF-related subjects point out that fear of an EPLF-Derg rapprochement at the TPLF’s expenses was 
not a crucial factor in the dispute between the two rebel groups, as the TPLF’s leadership calculated that the 
Eritreans’ contacts with the government were unlikely to lead to an agreement given the distance between their 
positions.   
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groups that aspired to secede. Potential secession of its Ethiopian allies threatened to 
deprive Eritrea of a friendly regime in Addis Ababa. Worse still from the Eritrean 
standpoint, its allies’ championing of secession weakened Eritrean claims to separate 
statehood based on a pillar of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] that sanctified 
colonialism’s territorial legacy… [T]he EPLF continued to insist that, without reneging 
on Eritrea’s uniqueness and right to independence, Tigrayan insurgents should take on a 
pan-Ethiopian mandate, seeing themselves as potential rulers of a multiethnic Ethiopia 




In 1985 eventually tensions came to a head, with the two groups engaging in public 
recriminations through radio broadcasts and rebel publications.
448
 The TPLF went as far as 
calling the EPLF “enemy of the revolution,” which prompted the EPLF to sever all contacts with 
its Tigrayan counterpart and even deny it access to Sudan through Eritrean territory to deliver 
relief to victims of the famine ravaging Tigray.
449
 Relations between the groups remained 
strained for the following three years, until a clear opportunity emerged in the spring of 1988 to 
inflict a decisive defeat on the Derg with a coordinated EPLF-TPLF effort. The TPLF then, in a 
nod to the EPLF’s longstanding position, publicly stated that regime change in Addis Ababa was 
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 People’s Voice, March 1985, April-May 1985, Special Issue (“On Our Differences with the EPLF”), 1986 
(published by the TPLF Foreign Relations Bureau, consulted at the archives of the TPLF’s Martyrs Memorial, 




 Weldemichael 2014, pp. 103-4.  
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a prerequisite for peace and for any act of national self-determination to take place, which led to 
the resumption of joint operations and ultimately rebel military victory in 1991.
450
  
Notwithstanding the intense acrimony between the TPLF and the EPLF in 1985-88 and 
the opportunity for military confrontation provided by the physical proximity of their base areas, 
no large-scale fighting ensued. Consistent with my argument, there is no indication that the 
EPLF’s leadership ever thought it could just defeat the TPLF and then mobilize Tigray’s 
population the way it had done with the ELF and the Eritrea’s lowlanders. To the contrary, the 
EPLF continued to believe that the defeat of the regime in Addis Ababa could only be achieved 
with a multi-ethnic alliance of Ethiopia’s rebel groups; as EPLF’s military leader Mesfin Hagos 
noted, “we were aware of our interdependence with the TPLF. We knew that the enemy wanted 
to destroy one at the time and that we would be the next target if it defeated the TPLF.”
451
 
The TPLF followed a similar multi-ethnic coalition approach as the EPLF’s to move 
beyond Tigrayan territory and take over power in Addis Ababa: it “groomed” the Ethiopian 
People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) and the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO), with the objective of mobilizing Amhara and Oromo populations, and then brought 
them together in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989.
452
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 Several factors likely contributed to the groups’ perception of an opportunity of military victory, in particular the 
March 1988 major EPLF’s offensive in the Sahel, which broke the government’s ten year-old siege, the waning 
support for Ethiopia of a retrenching Soviet Union and the Derg regime’s internal weakness (Weldemichael 2014, 
pp. 106-8; Aregawi Berhe 2009, pp. 272-3 and 315; author’s interviews with Aregawi Berhe, Mesfin Hagos and 




 Author’s interview. The absence of fighting between the EPLF and the TPLF in the years of their diplomatic 
breakup may be overdetermined as the balance of power might have been sufficiently close (albeit likely favorable 
to the more experienced and better armed EPLF) not to warrant all-out war, even if during that period the 
government’s ability to project power was clearly more limited than in the past (in interviews with the author, 




 The EPDM was formed by elements of the EPRP that reached out to the TPLF after the defeat of their group to 
continue the struggle against the Derg. Initially, the organization was formally pan-Ethiopian but the TPLF used it to 
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The TPLF also cooperated with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had a strong presence 
in Oromia. Consistent with my argument, notwithstanding the tensions and mistrust that marked 
the relations between TPLF/EPRDF and OLF, no fighting ensued until after the Derg’s defeat, 
when TPLF forces cracked down on the OLF as the latter left the transitional government 




The constraints posed by ethnicity to the TPLF’s anti-government struggle were not 
limited to the fact that the rebel group could not directly appeal to and recruit from non-Tigrayan 
populations. Tigrayan fighters themselves objected to fighting outside Tigray and thus started 
abandoning the battlefield to return home in 1989, arguing that as their goal of liberating Tigray 
had been achieved, it was now up to the other peoples of Ethiopia to free their territories. Only 
after a long internal debate, did the TPLF’s rank-and-file accept the need to completely defeat 
the Derg regime for Tigray to achieve lasting peace and self-determination.
454
  
As noted, the fight between the TPLF and the ELF does not fit my argument. Besides 
occasional skirmishes related to TPLF’s claims on some ELF-held border territories and ELF’s 
attempts to continue to administer the affairs of Eritreans living in TPLF-controlled areas, major 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mobilize the Amhara populations in Gondar and Wollo (Aregawi Berhe 2009, p. 323; author’s interviews with 
Aregawi Berhe, Ghidey Zeratsion, Gebru Asrat and Tekleweini Assefa); it then openly took on an ethnic mantle by 
becoming the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in 1991 (Tareke 2009, p. 109). The EPRDF also 
included the Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement (EDORM); the organization, without a 
specific ethnic profile and composed of officials of the Ethiopian army captured by the TPLF, was disbanded after 




 Marina Ottaway, “The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?” Northeast African 
Studies 2 (3), 1995: 67-87; Young 1997, pp. 107-8; Vaughan 2003, pp. 31, 178-9 and 217; author’s interviews with 
Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and Negasso Gitata (interviewed on July 29, 2013, in Addis Ababa; before he joined the 
OPDM in 1991, Negasso Gitata was an OLF’s member; he was President of Ethiopia from 1995 to 2001 and at the 




 Young 1996b, p. 109-10. Weldemichael (2014, p. 109) reports that 30,000 TPLF’s fighters deserted in this 
episode.   
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clashes between the two groups occurred in 1979-81: in the fall of 1979 and the spring 1980, the 
TPLF fought ELF’s contingents trying to escort EPRP’s elements into Wolkait through TPLF-
held territory, and in 1980-81 the TPLF took part (on the EPLF’s side) in the intra-Eritrean rebel 
war. A closer look at these episodes, however, reveals mechanisms that, albeit not part of my 
argument, are consistent with its “spirit;” the TPLF-ELF fight thus  represents less of a fatal 
falsification blow than if dynamics similar to those that characterize cases of intra-ethnic war, 
which are explicitly ruled out by my theory, were in evidence.  
The TPLF-ELF battles in which the EPRP was also involved occurred in the context of 
the TPLF’s war against the EPRP. Bereft of allies in Tigray (as the TPLF had wiped out its local 
partner – the TLF – and had gotten closer to the EPLF), the ELF tried to prop up the EPRP after 
its first beating at the hands of the TPLF in 1978. The evidence on ELF’s decision-making is 
limited, but it seems that it intended to escort and arm EPRP’s surviving elements to Gondar, 
where they would reunite with group’s units there and then organize activities in Wolkait, to the 
west of the TPLF’s base area, rather than directly attacking the TPLF (at least not 
immediately).
455
 The TPLF was alarmed by the prospect of the strengthening of its rival in 
Tigray and thus, when its forces bumped into the ELF-EPRP contingent in the fall of 1979, a 
battle ensued. Similarly, in the spring of 1980 the TPLF clashed with an ELF’s contingent 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the findings of the insurgencies in Tigray and Eritrea 
 
Observed outcome                                                                             Windows theory prediction 
(inter-rebel war/peaceful coexistence) 
 
Intra-Eritrean 
ELF vs. ELM, 1965                                                                               ✔(window of opportunity)                                    
ELF vs. EPLF, 1972-74                                                                ✔(window of opportunity) 
ELF & EPLF coexist, 1975-79                                                              ✔(no window)________ _   
ELF vs. ELF-PLF, 1978                                                                        ✔(window of opportunity) 
EPLF vs. ELF, 1980-81                                                                         ✔(window of opportunity)                                                                                                 
 
Intra-Tigrayan 
TPLF vs. TLF, 1975                                                                              ✔(window of opportunity) 
TPLF vs. Teranafit, 1976                                                                      ✔(window of opp. & vuln.) 
TPLF & EPRP coexist, 1975-77                                                           ✔(no window)                                                                                     
TPLF vs. EPRP, 1978-79                                                                      ✔(window of opportunity)  
 
Inter-ethnic 
TPLF & EDU, 1976-78*                                                                       ✘(no window)      
ELF & TPLF coexist, 1975-78                                                              ✔(no window)_______    _                
TPLF & EPLF coexist                                                                ✔(no window) 
ELF & Teranafit coexist                                                                        ✔(no window)__________                    
ELF & EDU coexist                                                                              ✔(no window) 
TPLF & EPDM coexist                                                                ✔(no window) ________ _     
TPLF vs. ELF, 1979-81                                                                        ✘(no window)          
Note: The units of analysis are dyadic interactions (coded dichotomously as “war” or “coexistence”) involving rebel 
groups that operated in adjacent areas, i.e., dyads whose members could not have fought each other due to 
geographical distance are excluded.  
* The TPLF-EDU dyad is an ambiguous case. I do not code the EDU as Tigrayan due to its lack of an ethnic agenda 
and its ethnically mixed membership. However, the EDU could recruit Tigray’s peasants (due to the fact that its 
founder was a very popular Tigrayan notable and the absorption in its ranks of the remnants of the Tigrayan 
Teranafit); the TPLF and the EDU thus found themselves competing for the same pool of resources as coethnic rebel 







After these battles, in early 1981 the TPLF eagerly accepted the EPLF’s proposal to join 
it in its ongoing all-out offensive against the ELF.
457
 As Gebru Asrat notes, “there was sort of a 
transmission of the intra-Eritrean conflict in Ethiopia through this system of alliances” – a mirror 
image of the earlier ELF’s entanglement in the TPLF-EPRP feud.
458
 The TPLF wanted to get rid 
of an organization that had threatened its interests in Tigray but there is no indication that it 
expected to take over the resources previously under ELF’s control, as in instances of intra-
ethnic war. In fact, the driving TPLF’s concern in contributing to push the ELF out of Eritrea 
was the survival of the EPLF rather than the absorption of ELF’s resources. Having noted that 
the ELF could hinder EPLF’s defensive efforts against the massive Derg offensive then under 
preparation (the Red Star) and thus bring about a government military victory, Tedros Hagos 
succinctly put the TPLF’s rationale for fighting side by side with its Eritrean ally against the 
ELF: “The collapse of the Eritrean revolution was not going to have a pleasant effect on our [i.e. 
Tigrayan] self-interests.”
459
 The implied counterfactual here is that the TPLF likely would not 
have launched a large-scale attack to expel the ELF from Eritrea had there not been another 
Eritrean organization ready to fill the vacuum. While providing supporting process evidence is 
exceedingly hard, given that rebel decision-makers tend not to indulge in “parallel universes” 
type of thinking, the relations between TPLF and EPLF in the aftermath of the ELF’s defeat 
represents a helpful comparison: notwithstanding the high tensions between the two groups 
discussed above, they refrained from fighting each other. In fact, the TPLF continued to be 
deeply interested in the survival of its Eritrean counterpart, as the alternative would not have 
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 Quoted in Alemseged Abbay 1998, p. 114. 
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been the take-over by the TPLF of the insurgency in Eritrea, but rather an opportunity for the 




6. Alternative explanations and endogeneity 
In this section, I discuss alternative explanations for inter-rebel war in Eritrea and Tigray and 
address potential concerns about endogeneity. Fotini Christia’s theory represents the most well-
established alternative argument, emphasizing a different power-driven logic (minimum winning 
coalition, MWC) and downplaying the role of coethnicity.
461
 MWC logic would expect inter-
rebel war to occur when one rebel group (or a rebel coalition) is sufficiently strong to take on 
both the government and other rebels. The available evidence does not provide much support to 
MWC theory, which wrongly predicts inter-rebel cooperation in all instances of inter-rebel war 
in Eritrea and Tigray (with the possible exception of the episode involving the EDU), as the rebel 
groups were much weaker than the government in terms of troop numbers and armaments and 
had very little territorial control.  
In 1965, when the ELF wiped out the ELM, the insurgents could conduct hit-and-run 
operations in large swaths of Eritrea, but did not control any territory.
462 As noted, Ethiopian 
forces in Eritrea outnumbered the insurgents 3 to 1 (the ratio would be much more favorable to 
the government if the entirety of Ethiopian armed forces – about 40,000 men – were included 
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 As Mokonnen Mokonnen  notes, “we [the TPLF] wanted the EPLF to stay in power otherwise the Derg would 
focus all its forces on us” (author’s interview). In the mid-1980s, the TPLF did provided some support to two ELF’s 
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rather than just the brigade deployed in Eritrea) and were more heavily armed.
463
 When the ELF 
attacked its splinters in 1972, the government-rebel balance of power was roughly comparable to 
the one prevailing in 1965 in terms of territorial control, troop numbers and weaponry.
464
 As 
Michael Woldemariam notes, in summarizing battlefield dynamics in Eritrea in 1972, “the 
position of the Ethiopian military in the province was simply too strong to be challenged. Backed 
by their erstwhile American and Israeli supporters, the chance that the Ethiopian military would 
incur significant losses at the hands of an increasingly bold but outgunned band of rebels was 
remote.”
465
 Similarly, the government controlled the bulk of Eritrean territory and its forces 
outnumbered and outgunned the rebels by even wider margins in 1978 (when the ELF crushed 
the ELF-PLF) and in 1980-1981 (when the EPLF pushed the ELF out of Eritrea).  
By contrast, MWC correctly predicts (as my argument does) the absence of inter-rebel 
war in Eritrea in 1978-79, when a reinvigorated Ethiopian army regained control of the province 
and launched a series of major offensives to crush the insurgents.
466
 Moreover, MWC correctly 
                                                          
463
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 Woldermariam 2011, pp. 104, 111-12 and 137; Weldemichael 2013a, pp. 119-25. The Ethiopian army had still 
about 40,000 troops, while the ELF commanded 2,000 fighters (The Military Balance, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971-1972). I do not have precise information on the number of Ethiopian 
government forces deployed in Eritrea in 1972; in previous offensives two brigades from neighboring provinces had 
reinforced the brigade – the Twelfth – of the Second Division originally deployed in Eritrea, but it is not clear if 
those extra brigades were in Eritrea at the time of the onset of inter-rebel war. If only the Twelfth brigade and the 
battalion of “commandos” are counted, the government forces would have had a 2-1 advantage in terms of troop 








 By 1979 the government controlled well over 70 percent of Eritrean territory and the army had grown to over 
200,000 troops, with 120,000 deployed in Eritrea; both the ELF and the EPLF had 10 brigades, of 1,100-1,300 
fighters each (Weldemichael 2009, pp. 1237-8; Dan Connell reports a higher figure of 40-50,000 Eritrean fighters; 
“Eritrean Struggle Nears Turning Point,” The Guardian, 24 May, 1978). MWC, however, does not necessarily 
explain the absence of inter-rebel war in Eritrea in 1975-77.  Over this period, the ELF and the EPLF were growing 
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predicts the absence of war between the EPLF and the TPLF after the two groups established 
their hegemonic positions in the respective rebel movements, given that they were dwarfed by 
the government forces for a long time.
467
 However, MWC cannot explain why the rebels 
continued to cooperate (rather than turning their guns against each other) past the point where a 
government defeat appeared a forgone conclusion.
468
    
MWC’s explanatory power is comparably limited in Tigray. In 1975, when the TPLF 
wiped out the TLF, the two organizations combined had less than 200 fighters and controlled no 
territory.
469
 Similarly, at the time of their fight in 1976, Teranafit and TPLF were lightly armed, 
controlled no territory and had roughly 1,000 fighters each, compared to overall Derg’s forces 
estimated at 45,000.
470
 A balance of power even more favorable to the government prevailed in 
the spring of 1978, when the EPRP and the TPLF fought each other: the rebels had about 1,000 
fighters each and mostly executed hit-and-run attacks, actually controlling little territory, while 
the Derg’s forces had significantly expanded in numbers and firepower due to massive support 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stronger relative to the government (as suggested by the rapid expansion of territory under exclusive insurgent 
control and the swelling of rebel ranks). MWC would lead us to expect an increased risk of inter-rebel war if the 
MWC threshold was passed (and one group was thus stronger than the government); otherwise, MWC would predict 
(this time correctly) inter-rebel peace. I do not have precise information on territorial control in late 1974 (when the 
rebels reached a ceasefire), but the MWC threshold in terms of territorial control in Eritrea was probably passed only 
in 1977 (when the rebels controlled 90 percent of the province’s territory). By that time, the insurgents also 
outnumbered government forces deployed in Eritrea (Woldemariam 2011, pp. 116, 154 and 220). 
467
 In the course of the 1982 Red Star offensive, the Derg deployed 136,000 heavily armed troops against 20,000 
EPLF’s fighters and about 6,000 TPLF’s troops (Young 1997, p. 125; Tareke 2009, p. 229); the insurgents operated 




 It is hard to tell exactly when the MWC threshold was passed. In terms of territorial control, by early 1989 the 
TPLF had complete control of Tigray and was poised to bring the fight to the Amhara heartlands, while Derg forces 
held out in a handful of urban centers in Eritrea under EPLF’s siege; even then the government probably maintained 
a substantial superiority in terms of troop numbers and weaponry (Gebru Tareke 2009, pp. 46, 284 and 299; 








 Young 1997, p. 98. 
199 
 
from the Soviet bloc. By contrast, when it attacked the TPLF, the EDU likely calculated to be 
stronger than the Derg, as it expected to rapidly march to Addis Ababa; thus this episode of inter-
rebel war would be consistent with MWC, if power is measured in perceptual (or anticipated 
terms) rather in terms of actual territorial control (none, before the group crossed into Tigray 
from Sudan) and troop numbers (only 10,000).     
A distinct set of alternative explanations focuses on rebel groups’ characteristics (such as 
ideology and the degree of centralization) and individual rebel leaders’ attributes (their 
temperament, world views and mental health, for example). These alternative explanations do 
not shed much light on inter-rebel war either. In the Eritrean camp, the EPLF had a more 
straightforward Marxist-Leninist orientation than the ELF, where a communist core (the Labor 
Party) competed with more conservative elements, tied to the Arab world and the Syrian and 
Iraqi Baath parties. These ideological differences cannot explain the pattern of alternation of 
cooperation and violent conflict, given that they were relatively stable features of the 
organizations.
471
 In Tigray, the TPLF fought the conservative Teranafit and EDU as well as 
groups with which it shared a Marxist-Leninist outlook (the EPRP) and nationalist aspirations 
(the TLF).  
Another version of the ideological argument would focus on the distinction between 
hardliners and moderates with regard to rebels’ nationalist goals as the source of tensions that 
may escalate to inter-rebel war. This too is empirically unconvincing. The ELF and the EPLF 
occasionally engaged in separate negotiations with the government; these fostered mutual 
mistrust but did not reflect deep disagreements about nationalist goals, as the two organizations 
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 Interview with Haile Wold’ensae in Connell 2005, pp. 25-65; Awet T. Weldemichael, “African Diplomacy of 
Liberation: The Case of Eritrea’s Search for An ‘African India’,”  Cahiers d'Études africaines 212 (4), 2013b: 867-
94 (in particular p. 876); interviews with Gime Ahmed, conducted by Günter Schröder, 3 October , 1987 and 29 
May, 1988, Rome; author’s interview with Gime Ahmed.   
200 
 
held essentially the same objective of Eritrean independence.
472
 The specter of defection to the 
Derg likely contributed to the groups’ assessment of the threat posed by their rival and thus to 
the decision to use force, but this dynamic is an integral part of my argument. The rebel groups 
operating in Tigray had different aspirations for the province, but this did not result in any of 
them manifesting willingness to find a compromise with the Derg.
473
   
Decentralized or undisciplined groups may be especially likely to take part in infighting 
as the organizations may end up being engulfed in all-out war through a process of inadvertent 
escalation of low-level clashes. However, as with ideology, organizational structure cannot 
explain variation over time in inter-rebel war, as there is no indication that the phases in which 
violence erupted were characterized by especially high levels of decentralization or indiscipline. 
Moreover, both relatively cohesive and disciplined organizations (the EPLF and the TPLF) and 
incohesive and undisciplined groups (the ELF and the EDU) launched attacks against their rivals. 
In addition, the evidence on rebel decision-making presented above shows that inter-rebel war 
tended to occur following explicit and conscious decisions to use force, even if skirmishes may 
have influenced those decisions (by intensifying threat perception) or operated as immediate 
triggers for war.  
Many accounts of the Eritrean independence struggle are dominated by the figure of 
Isaias Afewerki – EPLF’s founder and leader – variously described as authoritarian, power-
hungry, iron-willed, equally ruthless towards internal and external enemies and endowed with a 
remarkable gift for military strategy.
474
 However, his personality and worldviews clearly cannot 
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 As noted, the TPLF’s goals oscillated between Tigrayan independence and self-determination in a context of a 
democratic Ethiopia, while the TLF aimed at creating a separate state. Teranafit/EDU and the EPRP envisaged a 




explain the overall pattern of inter-rebel fighting in Eritrea as the EPLF initiated only one 
episode of intra-Eritrean rebel war; the ELF – whose leadership changed over time and was less 
tightly dominated by a single individual – initiated the other three. Moreover, my EPLF-related 
informants suggest that the 1980 decision to get rid of the ELF’s threat once and for all was 
driven by widely understood “structural imperatives” (i.e., the massive government offensive 
under preparation and the risk that the ELF could hinder the EPLF’s defensive efforts), rather 
than the whims of Isaias. In addition, the same ELF’s leaders that vowed to destroy its splinters 
in 1971 opted for a suspension of hostilities in late 1974; by the same token, the EPLF’s leaders 
that decided to wipe out the ELF in 1980 refrained from this course of action in previous years 
and avoided military confrontation with the TPLF. Some accounts of the TPLF’s military 
struggle analogously stress the role of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, but this 
cannot explain the episodes of inter-rebel war in which the TPLF was involved, as they occurred 
when the organization had a collective leadership (Meles consolidated his hold on power only in 
the mid-1980s).
475
    
Another set of alternative explanations focuses on the role of third-party states and the 
incumbent. Long-time observers of the Eritrean liberation struggle paint the picture of a 
herculean, autarkic effort, which brought about independence despite the world’s neglect or even 
hostility.
476
 While it is true that Eritrea represents an exception to the Cold War pattern of super-
power confrontation by proxy (the Soviet Union provided massive military aid to the Derg but 
the United States did not support the insurgents), this interpretation is overstated. Both the ELF 
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and the EPLF received crucial support from several Arab countries, Somalia and Sudan.
477
 
Although the intensity of Khartoum’s help varied inversely with the warmth of its relationship 
with Addis Ababa, “Sudan provided what any rebellion needs for survival and success: cross-
border sanctuaries, secure and reliable supply routes beyond Ethiopian reach, and shelter to 
waves of Eritrean refugees who, among other things, replenished the guerrillas’ ranks.”
478
 
In any case, foreign powers’ machinations do not provide a convincing explanation for intra-
Eritrean fighting as the available evidence indicates that they tended to push the rebels to 
cooperate rather than fight each other. For example, Osman Sabbe Saleh reported several 
mediation attempts by Sudan in 1975-1977 (one of which with Somali participation) for the 
formation of a joint Eritrean rebel front.
479
 Consistently, Ahmed Nasser noted that in 1974 “[a]ll 
countries with good relations with the Eritreans were exerting pressure on ELF and EPLF to stop 
fighting.”
480
 The TPLF enjoyed similar support from Sudan, in addition to the help provided by 
EPLF in its first years of activities.
481
 Khartoum initially supported TPLF’s rival EDU, but there 
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is no indication that in Tigray Sudan departed from the approach it followed in Eritrea of 
promoting cooperation among opponents of the Ethiopian government.   
What about the role of Addis Ababa? Fears that one group might reach a deal with the 
government at the other’s expense were pervasive in the Eritrean liberation struggle. Addis 
Ababa probably played up those fears in order to drive a wedge between its opponents. For 
example, in 1976 the Derg did not include the EPLF in its list of public enemies to be 
“annihilated” (the list included the ELF, the EPRP and the EDU) and held meetings with 
representatives of the organization.
482
 Similarly, in subsequent years both the ELF and the EPLF 
had separate contacts with the government, through the good offices of East Germany, South 
Yemen and the Italian Communist party.
483
 As noted, the fact that fear of defection to the 
government may affect inter-rebel threat perception and thus contribute to motivate inter-rebel 
war is fully consistent with my argument. Window theory would be falsified only if fear of 
defection (whether arising spontaneously or through government manipulation) were sufficient 
to cause inter-rebel war, regardless of the presence of windows of opportunity or vulnerability. 
The empirical evidence presented above suggests this is not the case: inter-rebel war did not 
occur in the absence of windows of vulnerability or opportunity; both the ELF and the EPLF 
may have be alarmed by news of contacts between their rival and the Derg from 1976 on, but 
infighting occurred only when a fleeting window of opportunity for the EPLF to launch a 
hegemonic bid emerged in 1980. Analogously, there was some fear on the part of the TPLF in 
the mid-1980s that the EPLF might reach a separate agreement with the Derg, but this did not 
lead to inter-rebel war in the absence of a window of opportunity or vulnerability. TPLF-related 
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 Author’s interviews with Tesfay Degiga and Ahmed Nasser.  
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sources do not reveal specific fears of defection driving the group’s actions towards other 
organizations operating in Tigray. In fact, TPLF’s leaders thought that the Derg saw the group as 




This observation points to concerns about the endogeneity of windows of opportunity, to 
which I now turn. At issue is not that the hypothesized causes of inter-rebel war are themselves 
caused by some other factor, but rather that windows of vulnerability could be just the last link in 
a longer and more complex causal chain, not captured by my theory. In particular, governments 
may refrain from bringing to bear their full offensive power on the insurgents so as to induce 
inter-rebel war. If windows of opportunity are systematically engineered by governments, my 
argument could be ignoring a key factor underlying government decision-making, thus missing 
an important part of the explanation of inter-rebel war. A careful examination of the episodes of 
rebel infighting in Eritrea and Tigray, however, reveals that in some cases the limited threat 
posed by the Ethiopian government was a function of circumstances beyond its control 
(essentially exogenous) and that when Addis Ababa had the ability to do so, it would launch all-
out attacks against all the Eritrean insurgents rather than trying to create a wedge between them 
by sitting back. Moreover, it is not clear that, even if the government had wanted to trigger inter-
rebel war by avoiding excessive military pressure on the insurgents, they would have simply 
taken the bait. In fact, we should expect rebel groups to make crucial decisions about inter-rebel 
war based on signals and indicators of government capabilities and intentions that are hard to 
fake, such as the state and commitments of the armed forces as well as the political climate in the 
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capital. The overall empirical pattern that emerges from the following discussion is one in which 
the government opportunistically abstained from intervention in the face of rebel infighting when 
it was weak or when, despite being strong, it was unable to launch a major offensive on a short 
notice, rather than cleverly provoking inter-rebel war by feigning inability to project power.      
During the first ELF-EPLF war (1972-1974), as in the previous year, the government 
maintained a low profile in Eritrea, eschewing large-scale offensives and largely enjoying the 
spectacle of intra-Eritrean fight.
485
 In 1978-79, reinvigorated by massive Soviet aid and 
emboldened by its victory against the Somali invasion in the south, the Derg launched a series of 
all-out offensives against both the ELF and the EPLF, with the goal of ending the insurgent 
threat once and for all, rather than trying to pit one group against the other. The window of 
opportunity exploited by the EPLF in 1980-81 to get rid of its rival was a hiatus (fully 
appreciated by the group’s leadership) between government assaults, which was due to the 
logistical challenges involved in organizing the Red Star offensive, rather than a forward-
thinking government design to ignite inter-rebel war (of which there is no indication). 
Analogously, the limited government’s presence that enabled inter-rebel war in Tigray in 1975-
78 was due to the state of disarray in which the Ethiopian armed forces found themselves in the 
aftermath of the 1974 revolution and the spread of armed rebellions throughout the country. 
TPLF’s leaders were fully aware of the government’s limited ability to launch large-scale 
offensives in the province and in any case thought that the Derg would not want to attack the 
                                                          
485
 ELF’s counterintelligence officer Gime Ahmed, as noted above, recalls intercepting government communications 
expressing satisfaction in the face of inter-rebel fighting (author’s interview). The government had an even more 
limited presence in the province in 1965, when the ELF wiped out the ELM contingent bent on initiating armed 
struggle; in that case the government probably would not have been able to intervene even if it had decided to do so, 





TPLF when busy fighting other rebel groups as Teranafit/EDU and EPRP were considered more 
serious threats for the regime.
486
         
 
7. Conclusions 
The insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray provide strong support to my argument. The vast majority 
of instances of inter-rebel war in the two cases were driven by window of opportunity logic or a 
combination of window of opportunity and vulnerability logics. In Eritrea, the EPLF emerged on 
top by launching a hegemonic bid against the ELF (1980-81), which had previously 
opportunistically wiped out the ELM (1965) and the ELF-PLF (1978) and unsuccessfully tried to 
nip in the bud in the EPLF (1972-74). Similarly “the TPLF saw it as imperative to claim and 
realize a power monopoly in Tigrai [sic],” which it achieved by sequentially crushing the weaker 
TLF (1975), Teranafit (1976) and the EPRP (1978-79).
487
 Window theory generally correctly 
predicts the absence of inter-rebel war in moments in which its costs would be prohibitively high 
(1974-79 in ELF-EPLF relations and 1975-77 in TPLF-EPRP relations) or its benefits too low 
due to the lack of overlapping bases of support (most notably, the peaceful relationship between 
the two ethnic hegemons – the EPLF and the EPLF).  
The fights between the EDU and TPLF and between TPLF and ELF represent exceptions 
to the pattern of rebel groups abstaining from infighting across ethnic lines; however, the 
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available evidence does not reveal causal processes at odds with my argument and thus these two 
failed predictions are not especially damaging for it.         
 In the next two chapters I turn to shadow case studies and statistical analysis to assess the 



























This chapter presents three shadow case studies to assess whether window theory can explain 
inter-rebel war in a variety of geo-political contexts beyond Iraq and Ethiopia. The shadow case 
studies explore the dynamics of civil wars in Lebanon (1975-89), Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and 
Syria (2011-). All three are multi-party ethnic civil wars with multiple episodes of inter-rebel 
fighting, thus offering several opportunities for within-case controlled comparisons.  
Each of the cases also offers peculiar advantages. The Lebanese civil war is especially 
useful as it features both coethnic and non-coethnic armed groups operating in close proximity 
and thus with opportunities to fight each other, which allows me to assess the hypothesis of 
coethnicity as a cause of inter-rebel war. Moreover, prima facie this is not an easy case for my 
theory, as the Lebanon’s civil war is infamously described as an uniquely complex conflict 
devoid of clearly identifiable patterns of fighting between its participants – “a war-of-all-against-
all”, in which “the number of opponents was beyond strategy” and at some point or another all of 
them “had fought one another in a full schedule of round-robin matches.”
488
 Syria’s civil war 
presents the advantage of featuring jihadi groups, which permits me to observe whether these 
increasingly important actors on the world politics scene behave as window theory would 
suggest. In addition, the case is inherently interesting as it has been a major focus of US foreign 
policy since its onset in 2011; this fact, I argue, more than offsets an inevitable drawback of 
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studying an ongoing civil war – the limited quality and patchiness of the available evidence. 
Finally, the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka allows me to explore the validity of my argument 
beyond the context of Africa and the Middle East (broadly defined), where all other cases are 
located.
489
   
  
2. The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) 
Lebanon’s fifteen-year civil war saw a multitude of armed organizations fighting each other in an 
ever-shifting pattern of alliances along multiple crosscutting ideological and ethno-sectarian 
cleavages. The struggle over the distribution of political power among the country’s ethno-
sectarian groups overlapped and interacted with US-Soviet competition for influence in the 
Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict and intra-Arab rivalries, as reflected in Syria’s and Israel’s 
occupations, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) involvement in the fight, and the 
deployment of United Nations and multi-national peacekeeping forces.  
In what follows, I show that window theory explains a substantial part of the variation of 
the case (but by no means all) and performs better than alternative explanations. The case also 
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allows me to further delineate the scope conditions of the theory, identifying features of civil war 
environments in which the dynamics envisioned by my argument are less likely to operate. The 
analysis below suggests that window theory is a less useful guide to understanding inter-rebel 
war in contexts in which belligerents on both sides have virtually no hope of making significant 
military gains against their main enemy and, correspondingly, they face no meaningful 
existential threats – a situation that prevailed in Lebanon in the mid- to late-1980s. When the 
costs and risks involved in inter-rebel war are exceedingly low, as victory or survival are not at 
stake, the structural constraints to inter-rebel war that my theory posits are less stringent; under 
these circumstances, we should be more likely to observe inter-rebel clashes brought about by a 
host of generally less powerful causes, such as groups’ desire for a marginal expansion of the 
territory or resources under their control, ideology, third-party states’ incitement or  individual 
leaders’ psychology and inter-personal antipathy.        
 Before proceeding with the analysis, an important terminological note is in order. 
Throughout this case study, unlike in the rest of the dissertation, I refer to on-side fighting – a 
major violent clash between non-state armed actors that are on the same side of a civil war – as 
my dependent variable, rather than inter-rebel war.
490
 This decision is motivated by the fact that 
for much of the conflict the Lebanese government was not an active belligerent (1977-82, 1987-
88) or only played a secondary role in the fight (1975-76, 1983-1986) compared to the various 
militias and external interveners.
491
 Under these circumstances the rationale for excluding pro-
government militias and their relations from my analysis – the presumption that they have much 
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less leeway for independent strategic decision-making compared to their rebel counterparts – is 
not compelling. This broader conceptualization of the dependent variable offers the benefit of 
substantially increasing its within-case variation, but I acknowledge the drawback of potentially 
raising concerns about the relevance of the findings to other civil wars that do not share with 
Lebanon this peculiar feature.  
 In order to facilitate the reader’s journey through the complexity of the Lebanese civil 
war, I break down the case study in six phases, based on whether the conditions for inter-rebel 
war were present or absent. For each phase, I discuss my argument’s fit with the available 
historical data. I then address alternative explanations and potential endogeneity concerns.    
  
First phase: Lebanese Front vs. National Movement (1975-76) 
The initial phase of the war saw an alliance of Christian Maronite-dominated groups (often 
dubbed as “rightist”, “conservative” or “rightist-Christian”) – the Lebanese Front – pitted against 
a loose coalition of opposition organizations – the National Movement (often referred to as 
“leftist”, “revisionist” or “Muslim”). The National Movement enjoyed the crucial military 
support of PLO’s forces deployed in Lebanon, whose influence in the country’s affairs the 
Lebanese Front was set on curtailing.
492
 The Lebanese Front’s military wing (formally 
established in the summer of 1976) comprised two main militias – the Phalanges and the Tigers – 
and several other smaller ones (most notably the Guardians of the Cedar and the “Tanzim;” the 
Marada Brigade – another smaller Christian militia in the Lebanese Front – was not part of the 
alliance’s joint military command). The National Movement was a collection of ethnically and 
ideologically diverse organizations: the Druze-dominated but secularly oriented Progressive 
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Socialist Party, the Sunni Mourabitoun, the multiethnic Lebanese Communist Party and various 
Arab nationalist formations such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Syrian and Iraqi 
branches of the Baath Socialist Party. The National Movement’s “glue” was a profound 
disaffection with Christian dominance of Lebanon’s power-sharing system, which was perceived 
as especially unfair in light of the decline of the Christian share of the population since its 
establishment in 1943.
493
    
 Two shooting incidents on April 13, 1975 provided the spark for the explosion of long-
simmering tensions between the two camps.
494 Large-scale fighting, characterized by rapidly 
shifting battlefield trends, would soon ensue. The Lebanese Army was initially deployed as a 
buffer between the two camps but it quickly broke along ethno-sectarian lines: several thousand 
heavily armed Muslim troops sided with the National Movement (under the name of Lebanese 
Arab Army), while Christian units fought alongside the Lebanese Front. After initial territorial 
gains by the Christian alliance, in early 1976 the tide turned in favor of the National Movement 
as the PLO got involved more deeply in the fight and Syrian support for the “revisionists” 
intensified.
495
 Then in a surprising development, Syria launched a large-scale intervention in 
support of the Christian side, which was on the verge of military defeat. The newly formed 
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alliance between the Christian forces and Damascus inflicted serious losses on the National 
Movement until Syria imposed a ceasefire and deployed a large force in central and northern 
Lebanon to enforce it.
496
 
My argument correctly predicts that the belligerents would refrain from on-side fighting 
in this phase of the civil war as the two competing alliances were engaged in high-intensity 
conflict. Infighting would have entailed a significant increase in the risk of military defeat for the 
two alliances when they were in dire straits (first the Lebanese Front, then the National 
Movement) and high opportunity costs in terms of forgone military gains when they were having 
the upper hand.
497
 The ethnically homogenous Lebanese Front and the highly diverse National 
Movement displayed comparable levels of alliance cohesion in the face of similar battlefield 
situations.    
 
Second phase: “Pax” Syriana (1977-78) 
As Syria consolidated its control over much of Lebanon in late 1976 and early 1977, fighting 
largely subsided. My argument suggests that the Lebanese Front would be more prone to 
infighting than the National Movement, given the former’s relative ethnic homogeneity. 
However, the conditions for intra-Christian war were not present until 1980, when the Phalanges 
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launched a hegemonic bid. In fact, the Lebanese Front’s threat environment did not substantially 
improve with the end of the first phase of the war, as it soon became evident that the Christians 
had de facto traded the threat of the National Movement for that posed by the Syrian juggernaut.  
The Christian militias only grudgingly accepted the deployment of Syrian forces in much of the 
country (including Christian strongholds in eastern Beirut).
498
 Given the ambiguity of its plans 
for Lebanon and the demonstrated willingness and ability to rapidly bring to bear its military 
might to shape outcomes on the ground, Syria’s threat loomed large in 1977. That Damascus 
could turn its gunsight against the Christian coalition was made apparent by the logistical support 
that the former was providing to the Palestinians and the National Movement in southern 
Lebanon near the border with Israel, where fighting continued throughout 1977 (Syrian forces 
had not deployed there pursuant Tel Aviv’s warning to that effect).
499
 Mutual suspicion between 
the Christian groups and Syria deepened in the course of the year as the former established close 
ties with Israel and the latter reconciled with the Palestinians.
500
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Large-scale fighting between Syrian forces and the Christian coalition eventually erupted 
in April 1978 in Beirut and then raged in the summer and fall in the capital and the north. At last, 
in October 1978 Damascus decided to end its inconclusive bombardment and siege of Christian-
held eastern Beirut in the face of the strenuous resistance of the Maronite militias, turn over its 
peacekeeping activities there to the Lebanese Army and withdraw its forces from the area.
501
 As 
Antoine Abraham notes, in the 1978 fight “Syria had committed most of its forces in the 
northern half of Lebanon into battle, and reinforcements continued to pour into Lebanon, tapping 
Syria’s reserves… It had proven too costly for the Syrian regime. Syrian hospitals were filled to 
capacity with the dying and the wounded. Not since the last Arab-Israeli war had Syria seen its 
forces return home so badly mauled.”
502
 Consistent with window theory, no large-scale fighting 
between Christian militias occurred in this period,
503
 as they watched with apprehension an 
overwhelmingly powerful and potentially hostile Syrian army taking over the country in 1977 
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 Some low-level intra-Christian clashes did occur in this period; most notably, the Phalanges engaged in 
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of Marada’s leader and his wife and daughter. These episodes (albeit politically consequential, as they marked the 
exit of the Marada Brigade from the Lebanese Front) do not appear to amount to the kind of all-out fighting that I 
seek to explain. In fact, they consisted of isolated clashes with the participation of a small number of fighters from 
the two groups (see, for example, O’Ballance 1998, p. 79; Abraham 1996, p. 112; Hanf 1993, pp. 236-7; and 




 As in the previous phase of the civil war, there is no indication of a rapid shift in the intra-Christian balance of 
power or a mounting threat (i.e., a window of vulnerability) that could prompt one of the members of the Lebanese 
Front to attempt a resurrection gamble.  
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Third phase: The emergence of a window of opportunity (1978-80) 
The end of the Syrian offensive in the fall of 1978 marked the beginning of a period of gradually 
receding threat for the Christians, bottoming out in early 1980 with the redeployment of the bulk 
of Damascus’ forces from the entire Beirut area to the Bekaa valley in the east of Lebanon.
505
 As 
Theodor Hanf observes, “[c]ertainly, they [the leaders of the Lebanese Front] were not under any 
illusions about Syria’s military superiority. But the fighting in 1978 had revealed that Syria 
hesitated to pay the price in lives and material needed to break the resistance of the Christian 
militias. Their hopes were strengthened by Assad’s domestic problems.”
506
 In fact, Damascus 
had been dealing since 1978 with a growing insurgency waged by the Muslim Brotherhood 
within the country’s borders. Moreover, the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 left Syria increasingly isolated in the 
region and dangerously exposed to Tel Aviv’s military might.
507
 As Yair Evron points out, the 
“difficulties faced by Asad both in the Arab world and at home would not have been sufficient to 
force a change in the Syrian posture in Lebanon. But combined with Syria’s continued inability 
to impose its will in Lebanon, they obliged Damascus to search for ways to diminish the Syrian 
presence, and so reduce the costs involved in staying there. In January 1980, Syria announced a 
plan for a limited withdrawal from the Beirut area.”
508
 Additional signs of the limited Syrian 
threat were Damascus’ conciliatory feelers to the Phalanges in the spring of 1980.
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 Consistent with my argument, in a moment in which Syria – the main opponent of the 
Christians in this phase of the war – was widely perceived as weak and preoccupied with other 
issues, the Phalanges launched a hegemonic bid.
510
 The balance of power within the Lebanese 
Front was markedly favorable to the Phalanges, with about 8,000 fighters compared to the 4,000-
strong Tigers; the Guardians of the Cedars and the Tanzim were clearly in a different league, 
with fighting forces in the hundreds rather than thousands.
511
 Once Syrian troops had withdrawn 
from Beirut, in July 1980 the Phalanges conducted a series of coordinated attacks against offices, 
barracks and strongpoints of the Tiger militia.
512
 In “a quick, extremely brutal and successful 
operation” the Phalanges defeated their strongest rival.
513
 Faced with no alternatives, the Tigers’ 
leadership surrendered and gave up the group’s weapons and ammunitions, while its fighters 
were absorbed in a unified militia – the Lebanese Forces – under the control of Bashir Gemayel 
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 Evron 1987, p. 90. As Rabinovich (1985, p. 113) points out, the redeployment of Syrian forces to the Bekaa 
valley “was a statement of priorities” for Damascus, as that was considered Syria’s main defense line against a 








 Rabinovich (1985, p. 113) notes out that the “other protagonists in the struggle over Lebanon’s future were fully 
aware of the extent to which the regime’s weakness and preoccupation with other matters limited its ability to 
pursuit its objectives in Lebanon” (see also Rabil 2003, p. 62). Consistently, O’Ballance (1998, p. 93) reports that 
following the announcement of the Syrian withdrawal from Beirut “[i]t was assumed by the West that Assad wanted 
to renounce his role as the ‘policeman of Lebanon’ before he became too involved in the unwinnable, multisided 
civil war in the country, and that as he had shouldered the responsibility for some four years it was now time for 




 Badran 2009, pp. 38-40. All other sources that discuss the balance of power among Christian militias provide a 
consistent picture (see Hanf 1993, pp. 190-1 and 247; Rabinovich 1985, p. 70; Rabil 2003, p. 60; Jonathan C. 
Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon, New York: The 
Viking Press, 1984, p. 117). Apart from Badran (2009, p. 39), who claims that the Tigers were “less organized” than 
the Phalanges, there is no indication of major differences across Christian militias in terms of other dimensions of 








 Hanf 1993, pp. 247-8.  
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– the head of the Phalanges.
514
 As the Guardians of the Cedars and the Tanzim – by far weaker 
groups – acquiesced to their incorporation in Bashir Gemayel’s organization, “[t]he destruction 
of the Tigers and the absorption of their remnants into the Lebanese Forces meant that for the 
first time the Maronites of Central Lebanon were represented by a single organization.”
515
      
 The literature paints a picture of the Phalangist leadership’s calculus consistent with the 
hypothesis that coethnicity prompts rebel groups to consider resorting to force to get rid of direct 
competitors and to grow stronger by absorbing their resources. According to Hanf, Bashir 
Gemayel had come to the conclusion as early as 1976 that the Lebanese Front would be more 
effective as a “tightly disciplined, properly led, unified commando” and thus “resolved to use 
violence” to achieve that objective.
516
 As Itamar Rabinovich observes, “[t]he Phalangist drive 
was more than the pursuit of power and domination; it was rooted in a concept in which the 
unification of the Maronite and Christian communities’ resources was a crucial interim strategic 
goal in the struggle over Lebanon’s future.”
517
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 Snider 1984, p. 9. Two Christian formations in the north and the south remained outside of the Lebanese Forces. 
In the north, the Marada Brigade maintained close ties with Damascus and enjoyed the protection of its army (Hanf 
1993, pp. 236-7; Winslow 1996, p. 227). In the south, Israel’s military and Lebanese army Major Saad Haddad’s 
militia (equipped and trained by Tel Aviv) jointly controlled a buffer zone along the Israeli border (Hanf 1993, pp. 
226-30 and 241-2; Picard 2002, p. 119; Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of 
Lebanon, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987, p. 131). The overwhelming power of the two entities’ allies 








 Rabinovich 1985, p. 114. Similarly, Rabil (2003, p. 59) implies, just before discussing the destruction of the 
Tigers, that the Phalangist leader thought force could be used to get rid of threatening rivals and grow at their 
expense: “Bashir [Gemayel] had a clear cut plan… he perceived power as emanating from the barrel of a gun. He 
believed that political predominance in Lebanon had to be based on military power to be effective. For this reason, 
he strove to unify Christian military power under his command. Inveterate Maronite squabbling was a luxury he 
could not afford.” 
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The Phalanges in fact benefited handsomely from the hegemonic bid. Besides acquiring a 
large number of Tigers’ cadres and weapons, they gained unrivaled access to the recruitment 
pool and tax base of the Christian community of central Lebanon. Under Bashir Gemayel’s 
leadership, the ongoing process of building an embryonic Christian state within Lebanon 
accelerated; the Lebanese Forces introduced conscription and levied direct taxes on businesses 
and homeowners as well as sales taxes and custom duties.
518
 In the absence of coethnic 
competitors, the Christian population docilely complied. As Jonathan Randal observes, after the 
Phalangist victory over the Tigers, “[w]ith rare – almost personal – exceptions, the Marounistan 
[the Maronite-dominated area in central-eastern Lebanon] Christians now fell into line behind 




Fourth phase: From Christian ascendancy to uncontested Syrian suzerainty (1981-1984) 
The years 1981-1983 saw attempts by the Lebanese Forces to expand their territory and to drag 
Israel into the fight as a counterweight to Syria so as to negotiate a settlement of Lebanon’s civil 
war from a position of strength. Damascus and its Lebanese allies violently resisted the Christian 
initiatives and Tel Aviv’s intervention proved not to be decisive. Eventually, in early 1984, 
facing a tightening encirclement of enemy forces and bereft of external support, Lebanon’s 
President Amin Gemayel (the brother of the deceased Bashir) capitulated to most of Syria’s 
demands and formed a national reconciliation cabinet including both the Lebanese Forces and 
Damascus’ allies. Consistent with window theory, this phase of the civil war was characterized 
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 Randal 1983, p. 140. Similarly, Rabil (2003, p. 59) points out that “Bashir [Gemayel] was able to mobilize the 
Christian community and draw support from a large segment of the population who not too long before disapproved 
of and even despised the Phalangists.”  
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by the absence of episodes of large-scale on-side fighting: its prospective costs were high, given 
the intensity of the fight along the main civil war cleavage, and the benefits low, given that the 
pro-Syrian camp (the only side with multiple non-state armed actors) housed a broad array of 
groups with distinct ethnic bases.  
 






Emboldened by the successful unification of the Christian armed groups, Damascus’ 
persistent weakness and Israel’s diplomatic and military support, in late 1980 the Lebanese 
Forces set out to bring their ambitious vision for Lebanon – prominently featuring Christian 
political predominance and the end of Syria’s occupation – to reality. The first move consisted in 
trying to expand their territory by incorporating Zahle in the Maronite heartland (see Map 5.1 
above). The Lebanese Forces had a strong presence in the town but Syria controlled all its access 
points. Damascus saw the Christian attempt to break its chokehold on Zahle by building a new 
road through the Lebanon mountain range as a serious threat, given that this would represent an 
ideal route for a possible Israeli offensive into the Bekaa valley and Syria itself. A sustained 
Syrian siege and shelling of Zahle eventually coerced the Lebanese Forces to desist from their 
effort in June 1981.
520
  
The Lebanese Forces’ disappointment for failing to drag Israel in the fight over Zahle did 
not last long as Tel Aviv soon started preparations for a ground offensive against Palestinian 
forces in Lebanon.
521
 In June 1982 the Israeli forces rapidly swept away PLO’s units in the south 
and Syrian forces encountered on their way to Beirut, where they entered largely unopposed by 
pro-Syrian armed groups. In August the Palestinian camps in west Beirut capitulated to Israel’s 
siege and heavy bombing and PLO’s forces there were evacuated from Lebanon under the 
protection of a multinational contingent of American, French and Italian troops.
522
 The Christian 
leaders saw the deployment of the Israeli army over much of Lebanon as a clear opportunity for 
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 Randal 1983, pp. 245-7. According to Hanf (1993, p. 256) “[f]rom 1981… all sides had been anticipating a 
serious confrontation between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon.” Similarly, Winslow (1996, pp. 228-9) notes that in 
1981 the “preliminaries for the invasion of 1982 were extensive and hardly secret” and “[p]reparations for invasion 









 Thus in late 1982 the Lebanese Forces (with some support 
from the Christian-dominated units of the Lebanese army) launched an attack on the Druze 
stronghold (known as the Chouf) south of Beirut.
524
 At the same time, the Christian-dominated 




However, the Christians’ fortunes were soon to plummet. The Druze Progressive 
Socialist Party, with Syrian support, successfully resisted the Christian thrust in the Chouf and 
pushed the assailants back by the end of 1983.
526
 As Israel, mired in a domestic political storm 
over the occurrence of massacres in Palestinian refugee camps under its forces’ watch, signaled 
its intention to disengage from Lebanese politics and withdraw from the country, Damascus 
regained the initiative.
527
 With generous Syrian military support, the Progressive Socialist Party, 
the Shia Amal movement, the Sunni Mourabitoun militia and other smaller groups took control 
of west Beirut from the Lebanese army in February 1984 after several months of fighting.
528
 An 
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 Robert Rabil (2003, p. 68) reports that at a meeting of Lebanese Forces’ leaders in June 1982 (which he 
attended), Bashir Gemayel spoke of “Israel’s invasion as the single most important event in Lebanon’s civil war” 
and “explained that if the Christians played their cards right, they would emerge as their real victorious party in the 




 Hanf 1993, pp. 275-6. Controlling the Chouf would allow the Lebanese Forces to ensure the safety of the 













 Israel’s gradual withdrawal started in August 1983 (Hanf 1993, p. 275). The killing of a large number of civilians 
in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in west Beirut was perpetrated by elements of the Lebanese Forces; the 
Israeli army, however, was accused of connivance as they controlled the areas surrounding the camps and thus 
presumably had knowledge of the events taking place inside them over the span of several days (Rabil 2003, p. 74; 




internationally isolated President Amin Gemayel succumbed to his adversaries’ joint military 
pressure; days after the “fall” of west Beirut, he visited Damascus and acceded to his opponents’ 
key demands, in particular the abrogation of a de facto peace agreement between Lebanon and 
Israel and the formation a national reconciliation cabinet with the inclusion of opposition 
forces.
529
 In the meantime, Amal had been inflicting heavy losses on Israeli troops in southern 
Lebanon throughout 1984, which prompted Tel Aviv’s decision to withdraw its forces to a 
“security zone” on the border in January 1985.
530
        
 The various groups pitted against the Lebanese Forces and the Christian-dominated army 
did not fight each other in this phase of the civil war.
531
 Window theory correctly predicts this 
outcome, given the intensity of the fighting between the two opposing camps and the ethnic 
heterogeneity Syria’s Lebanese allies.
532
 In 1981-83, the pro-Syrian groups were under 
significant military pressure from Christian forces and faced either an imminent or ongoing 
intervention by Israel, whose ultimate goals were highly uncertain; infighting under these 
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 Amal had initially cooperated with the National Movement but then sided with Syria after its intervention in 
1976. The group did not participate in the Lebanese civil war until 1984, but had clashed with Palestinian forces in 
the south between 1979 and 1982 (Rami Siklawi, “The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90,” 




 Hanf 1993, pp. 282-93; Rabinovich 1985, pp. 174-5 and 179; O’Ballance 1996, pp. 137-8; Abraham 1993, p. 
175; Rabil 2003, p. 73-5. The withdrawal of the French and US peacekeeping contingents from Beirut in early 1984 
in response to a campaign of suicide bombings launched by Shia militants had signaled the end of any residual hope 




 Norton 1987, pp. 112-21; Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, “(In)security Zones in South 




 A possible exception to this pattern is represented by the fight in the northern coastal city of Tripoli between 
Syrian forces and Alawite paramilitary groups, on the one hand, and Palestinian forces and the Sunni militia 
Taweed, on the other. Clashes occurred in early 1982 as Syria’s attempt to consolidate its control of the city was 
resisted by the Palestinians and their allies (Hanf 1993, 253-5). Strictly speaking, however, this is not a case of on-




 The absence of evidence about any emerging threat or rapid change in balance of power within the anti-Christian 
coalition also suggests that we should not see infighting motivated by window of vulnerability logic.  
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circumstances would have entailed a concrete risk of enabling a Christian victory in the civil 
war. In early 1984 the roles were reversed: the Christians were on the defensive, as the 
Progressive Socialist Party and Amal made significant military advances with Syrian support in 
the Chouf and west Beirut and Amal harassed Israeli forces in south Lebanon; under these 
circumstances, infighting among pro-Syrian groups would have entailed substantial costs in 
terms of forgone opportunities to make gains against the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese 
government. Moreover, my argument suggests that the fact that the pro-Syrian coalition was 
composed of non-coethnic organizations would significantly reduce the prospective benefits of 
infighting in terms of threat reduction and resource accumulation. 
 
Phase five: “Deep stalemate” and inter-ethnic rebel wars (1985-1989) 
After the pro-Syrian alliance’s takeover of west Beirut, several episodes of on-side fighting 
occurred. In 1985 the Shia Amal and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party ganged up against the 
Sunni Mourabitoun militia – their erstwhile ally against government forces. Then, after wiping 
out the group, Amal turned on the Progressive Socialist Party, while also battling PLO’s forces 
trying to re-establish a presence in west Beirut in the infamous “war of the camps.” In 1988-90 
Amal and Hezbollah clashed for control over Lebanon’s Shias. Finally, an intra-Christian fight 
occurred in1989 as the segment of the Lebanese army under the control of interim Prime 
Minister General Michel Aoun resorted to force to rein in the Lebanese Forces.  
My argument cannot explain some of these episodes of infighting, as they occurred 
across, rather than within, ethno-sectarian lines. However, an examination of the circumstances 
surrounding these instances of on-side fighting allows me to identify more specific scope 
conditions for my argument. Below I show that this phase of Lebanon’s civil war was 
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characterized by what I call a “deep stalemate” between the main opposing coalitions – i.e., a 
situation in which neither side has a reasonable prospect of making significant gains on the 
battlefield, let alone achieve outright military victory. Under these circumstances, the structural 
forces envisioned by my theory are likely to be relatively weak and thus we should be more 
likely to observe episodes of inter-rebel war caused by other factors.     
 Pattern of on-side fighting. In 1985 the Shia Amal and the Druze Progressive Socialist 
Party engaged in a turf war against Sunni Mourabitoun for control of west Beirut, after the three 
of them jointly expelled the Lebanese army from the area in 1984. Amal appears to have been 
motivated by a desire to forestall the return of PLO’s forces in west Beirut, as Mourabitoun was 
closely associated with the Palestinians; Damascus supported Amal’s and the Progressive 
Socialist Party’s offensive, due to its concern about the prospect of renewed PLO’s influence in 
Lebanon.
533
 After Mourabitoun’s demise in April, Amal attacked the Palestinian camps in 
Beirut, where the PLO had resumed a military presence. Some Palestinian positions fell quickly 
but others withstood ruthless siege tactics until the interposition of Syrian forces in late 1987. 
The Progressive Socialist Party provided support to the Palestinians and thus ended up fighting 
against Amal. After intermittent clashes, Amal took a beating at the hands of the joint forces of 
the Progressive Socialist Party and smaller Sunni-dominated groups and had to be rescued from 
the brink of defeat by Damascus, which redeployed in strength in west Beirut in 1987.
534
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 Tony Badran (2009, pp. 43-4) reports that the Progressive Socialist Party joined the fight on Amal’s side only 
when the latter experienced difficulties in defeating Mourabitoun (see also Norton 1987, p. 134); by contrast, Hanf 
(1993, p. 297) mentions an earlier clash between the Progressive Socialist Party and Mourabitoun in the summer of 
1984. Amal had long held the PLO responsible for the suffering of Lebanon’s Shia population (caught in the 
crossfire between the Palestinian insurgents and Israel) and had repeatedly clashed with it in the south between 1979 
and 1982 (Siklawi 2012; Joe Stork, “The War of the Camps, The War of the Hostages,” MERIP Reports 133, 1985; 
Norton 1987, pp. 85-7). It is less clear why the Progressive Socialist Party decided to side with Amal, but it seems 





Shortly after the end of Amal’s siege of the Palestinian camps, a war erupted between the 
group and its Shia rival Hezbollah in the spring of 1988.
535
 The “Party of God” had emerged as a 
coherent organization in the mid-1980s from the amalgamation of several pro-Iranian Islamist 
groups.
536
 With its efforts to mobilize Lebanon’s Shia community with a combination of a 
radical religious-ideological message, provision of social services and daring attacks against 
Israeli and western forces in the country, Hezbollah had started “gnawing at the support base of 
its main adversary, the Amal movement.”
537
 Several factors contributed to shield the fledgling 
organization from Amal’s wrath until 1988. In 1982 and 1983, Syria and Iran enabled the groups 
that would later form Hezbollah to start organizing undisturbed in the Bekaa valley.
538
 Then, 
from 1983 to 1988, Amal had its plate full fighting the Lebanese army (1983-1984), the Israeli 
occupying force (1983-1985), the Mourabitoun militia (1985), the Progressive Socialist Party 
and the PLO (1985-1987).  
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 Norton 1987, pp. 134-6; Hanf 1993, pp. 302-5 and 314-5; Picard 2002, p. 135; Winslow 1996, pp. 261-2; Siklawi 




 While there had been sporadic clashes from 1985, the “Shi’i civil war proper broke out April 1988” (Hanf 1993, 




 Augustus Richard Norton reports that “[a]lthough its leading members refer to 1982 as the year the group was 
founded, Hezbollah did not exist as a coherent organization until the mid-1980s. From 1982 through the mid-1980s 
it was less an organization than a cabal” (Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007, p. 34). See also Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 









 Azani 2009, pp. 60-1; A. Nisar Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary 
Accommodation,” Third World Quarterly 14 (2), 1993: 321-337 (in particular p. 322). Norton (1987, pp. 100-1) 
reports that, following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Syria allowed the establishment of a 1,000-man contingent of Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa both to fight Israel and to get Hezbollah off the ground; but as Damascus 
regained strength, it became more lukewarm towards the new organizations (see also Jaber 1997, p. 31; William 
Harris, “The View from Zahle: Security and Economic Conditions in the Central Bekaa 1980-1985,” Middle East 
Journal 39 (3), 1985: 270-286, in particular p. 281).  
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As Eitan Azani notes, after the 1984 takeover of west Beirut, “Hezbollah still did not 
constitute a concrete threat for Amal” as the latter was at “the peak of its power.”
539
 However, 
the long fight with the Progressive Socialist Party and the PLO weakened Amal politically and 
militarily vis-à-vis its coethnic rival: many cadres left the group in disgust with the assault on the 
Palestinians camps, while others were enticed by Hezbollah’s deep pockets, which enjoyed 
generous Iranian financial support.
540
 When Amal eventually decided to use force, wiping out 
Hezbollah proved difficult. Amal had the upper hand in the initial battles in the south but its 
forces were defeated by Hezbollah in the southern suburbs of Beirut. After almost two years of 
inconclusive fighting punctuated by several ceasefires, the two groups reached an agreement 
with the mediation of Syria and Iran, permitting Hezbollah to return to the south to continue its 
struggle against Israel, while Amal demobilized in the context of the broader settlement of the 
Lebanese civil war with the Ta’if Accord (see below).
541
   
While the Amal-Hezbollah war was raging, in 1989 the Christian heartland too was 
rocked by intra-ethnic fighting. As the Parliament failed to elect a successor for President Amin 
Gemayel, Lebanon found itself with two governments (and two armies) in late 1988: one was led 
by General Michel Aoun, nominated as interim prime minister by Amin Gemayel on the eve of 
the expiration of his term, and held sway in the Christian stronghold in central Lebanon; the 
other one, headed by Sunni former prime minister Salim al-Hoss, extended its authority over 
                                                          
539
 Azani 2009, pp. 63-4. Timur Goksel, the spokesperson of the UN peacekeeping mission in south Lebanon, 
offered a similar assessment of Amal’s initial view of Hezbollah: “Since 1985, Hizballah started to share Amal's 
domination of the Shi'i community. Initially Amal did not care too much, as it was confident that it was untouchable. 
Amal did not pay a lot of attention to Hizballah as it did not think Hizballah was going to be well organized, active 








 Siklawi 2012, pp. 21-2; Azani 2009, pp. 76-82; Dominique Avon, Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God” 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 36. 
228 
 
areas under Syrian control. In February, Aoun’s forces and the Lebanese Forces clashed over 
control of lucrative custom posts; after heavy fighting, the Lebanese Forces caved in.
542
  
 Window theory sheds only limited light on the foregoing episodes of on-side fighting. 
The clashes pitting Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party against Mourabitoun and the 
Progressive Socialist Party and the PLO against Amal are clearly not predicted by my argument 
as they occurred between non-coethnic armed groups. By contrast, there is tentative evidence 
that the fights between Amal and Hezbollah and between the Lebanese Forces and Aoun’s army 
are consistent with window theory: while there is little doubt that the armed groups in the two 
dyads had largely overlapping ethnic bases (Lebanon’s Shias and Christians, respectively) and 
the other side in the broader civil war did not pose a serious threat (see discussion below about 
the overall battlefield stalemate), the information on the intra-ethnic balance of power and the 
initiators’ decision-making process is very limited. 
Amal’s attack on Hezbollah may have plausibly been driven by a combination of window 
of opportunity and vulnerability logics. On the one hand, the group could marshal a much larger 
force than Hezbollah, but the fact that the former had not performed well on the battlefield in 
west Beirut over the previous years raises the possibility that it was in fact weaker in other 
dimensions of military power, for which I do not have specific information.
543
 On the other hand, 
as noted, Amal had been experiencing a clear deterioration of its power position vis-à-vis its Shia 
rival. Thus hope of a cheap victory and anxiety about decline may have coexisted in the calculus 
of Amal’s leadership. In the Christian camp, Aoun may have taken advantage of a window of 
                                                          
542




 Norton (1987, p. 101) reports that Hezbollah was “numerically inferior to Amal,” which had a 5-1 advantage in 
Beirut (the same author estimates that at the end of the Lebanese civil war, Amal and Hezbollah had 6,500 and 3,500 
fighters, respectively; Augustus Richard Norton, “Lebanon after Ta'if: Is the Civil War over?”, Middle East Journal 
45 (3), 1991: 457-473, p. 468).  
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opportunity, as he controlled more troops (15,000 men) than the Lebanese Forces (10,000), but 
there is little information about other dimensions of the balance of power (besides the fact that 
both sides possessed heavy weapons).
544
         
 efining the argument’s scope conditions  The limited fit of window theory in this phase 
of Lebanon’s civil war raises the question of whether it is possible to identify specific features of 
the situation that could dampen the causal forces envisioned by my argument and could thus be 
considered as additional scope conditions. One such prominent feature was the existence of a 
situation of “deep stalemate” between the two opposing camps in the mid-1980s.  
By 1984 it had become abundantly clear to observes and participants that “the Lebanese 
combatants were unable on their own to overrun each other and no single group was able to 
score a decisive victory;” a violent process of ethno-sectarian un-mixing had created broadly 
homogeneous “cantons” (next to areas dominated by Syria in the north and east and by Israel in 
the south) that could not be taken over by local opponents.
545
 The static nature of the battlefield 
was largely due to its geography: much of the fighting took place either on mountainous terrain 
or in urban settings, which made it difficult to mount large-scale offensives with mechanized 
forces and facilitated defensive efforts.
546
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 Hanf 1993, pp. 572-4; Winslow reports a smaller numerical advantage for Aoun’s forces (15,000 against 12,000 
troops), which was, however, offset by the fact that his units controlled about twice as many heavy weapons (1996, 
pp. 276-7). An additional reason for caution in interpreting the intra-Christian fight as an instance of hegemonic bid 
concerns the ambiguous identity of Aoun’s forces. My argument does not aim to explain the behavior of 
governments vis-à-vis pro-government militias; thus in as much as one accept General Aoun’s claim to be the 
legitimate head of Lebanon’s government (rather than just one of many militia leaders, as suggested by existence of 
another self-proclaimed pro-Syria government led by Salim al-Hoss exerting authority over much of the country’s 
territory), the interaction between his army and the Lebanese forces should be considered beyond my theory’s scope 




 Badran 20009, pp. 36-7. The short-lived takeover of west Beirut by the Christian-dominated Lebanese army in 
1983 represents the exception that confirms the rule as it occurred without active resistance of the Muslim 





The external interveners could have in principle imposed a military solution by tilting the 
balance of power in favor of their local allies, but they were not willing to pay the corresponding 
political and military costs or were simply uninterested in the emergence of an undisputed 
winner of the Lebanese civil war. As Hanf observes, “[t]he cost in casualties of house-to-house 
fighting is always high. Facing cornered, desperate militias, the invading armies were soon made 
to realize that in Lebanon it would be exorbitant.”
547
 Moreover, “the fear of a violent 
confrontation with the respective adversary’s foreign protector – or, as in the case of Israel in 
1982, the political pressure of a superpower [the United States] that feared just such a 
confrontation – cautioned each to stay its hand.”
548
 By 1984 there was little doubt about the fact 
that Syria preferred a negotiated solution of the civil war to an outright Christian defeat. In 1976 
Damascus had saved the Christian militias from defeat at the hands of its erstwhile allies; 
similarly, in 1984, after the Christian President Amin Gemayel accepted its requests, Syria 
extended its support for him and its “anti-Christian” Lebanese allies toed the line by withdrawing 
the request for resignation and joining a national unity cabinet. As Hanf notes, “the Syrian 
government had again demonstrated that after the correction in foreign policy they had little 
interest in the ascendancy of one of the parties to the civil war. For the time being, there was a 
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 Hanf 1993, pp. 336-7. As the author puts it, “[t]he modalities of mountain and city warfare favour the defenders, 
even when they are vastly inferior in numbers and equipment, provided that they are determined to resist even at the 
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military stalemate. Neither the Druze-Shi’a coalition nor the Christians, nor the different parts of 
the army had any prospect of victory.”
549
  
 In this situation of deep stalemate, where neither civil war coalition had any meaningful 
chance of achieving outright victory, the costs and risks involved in on-side fighting were 
relatively minor. When the powerful constraints to inter-rebel fighting represented by the 
possibility of inviting one’s own destruction or forgoing opportunities to make significant strides 
towards victory are lifted, we should not expect on-side fighting to occur only in the presence of 
windows of opportunity and vulnerability – i.e., the prospect of even modest marginal gains (or 
idiosyncratic impulses like personality clashes and ideological disputes) may be sufficient to 
motivate on-side fighting in the context of very low costs.
550
 To put it differently, the emergence 
of a deep stalemate radically reduces the degree of “compulsion” of the environment faced by 
civil war belligerents; the less the situation resembles a “house on fire”, the more variability in 
their behavior we should we should observe.
551
   
 
Phase six: The Damascus-imposed final settlement (1989-90) 
The deep stalemate came to an abrupt end in the spring of 1989. General Aoun’s plan to re-
establish the authority of the Lebanese state went far beyond reining in the Lebanese Forces. 
However, when it announced the closure of all illegal ports – the main source of revenues for the 
country’s militias – the Progressive Socialist Party responded with force. Syria and the forces of 
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the al-Hoss government soon joined the fray. For much of the spring and summer, Beirut and the 
Christian stronghold were rocked by large-scale fighting and bombardment of an intensity not 
seen since the Israeli invasion in 1982.
552
 Faced with the risk of the Christian enclave being 
overrun by the Damascus-led coalition, the Lebanese Forces fought alongside Aoun’s despite 
their earlier clash.
553
 As Hanf puts it, “Aoun’s attempt to restore the Lebanese state had turned 
the demarcation lines into battle-fronts again.”
554
   
 An Arab League-mediated ceasefire in August heralded a meeting of the members of the 
Lebanese Parliament in the Saudi city of Ta’if, where they voted a document of national 
reconciliation, envisioning a constitutional reform rebalancing the distribution of power among 
the country’s ethnic groups and legalizing the Syrian presence (on terms dictated by Damascus). 
The Parliament then elected a new President whose cabinet was hailed as the legitimate 
executive by all parties except General Aoun.
555
 As the Lebanese Forces had explicitly embraced 
the Ta’if peace process, Aoun found himself in complete isolation; instead of accepting offers to 
join the new cabinet, he reacted by attacking the Lebanese Forces in January 1990, engaging in 
an indecisive intra-Christian fight until May. After additional failed overtures to Aoun, in 
October the new Lebanese government authorized an all-out attack by Syria (with the support of 
the Lebanese Forces), which brought the General’s defiance to an end. Thus, the fifteen-year 
civil war came to a conclusion; the national unity government and its foreign protector – Syria – 
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whose forces would remain in Lebanon until 2005, could now focus their attention on the 




 The absence of on-side fighting in this phase is consistent with window theory. As the 
stalemate gave way to a new bout of high-intensity fighting between the two civil war camps, the 
armed groups refrained from potentially costly on-side fighting; the clash between Aoun’s army 
and the Lebanese Forces in early 1990 should not be considered an episode of on-side fighting as 
the latter had accepted the Ta’if agreement and recognized the new government, which squarely 
placed them in the anti-Aoun camp. 
 
Alternative explanations and endogeneity 
The available evidence does not provide much support to alternative explanations of on-side 
fighting in the Lebanese civil war. Fotini Christia’s minimum winning coalition (MWC) theory 
would predict on-side fighting to occur only when one armed group (or a coalition) is 
sufficiently strong to take on both its civil war opponent(s) and (at least some of) its erstwhile 
allies.
557
 However, no organization was that powerful at any point during the war. The 
Phalanges, which launched a hegemonic bid in 1980, may have been the strongest militia at the 
time, but they controlled only a small portion of Lebanon’s territory (see Map 5.2 below). 
Moreover, they were outnumbered by the combined forces of the opposing groups, which were 
comparably well-armed (not to mention the 30,000 heavily armed Syrian troops in Lebanon on 
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the side of National Movement from 1977).
558
 In addition, MWC cannot explain why the intra-
Christian fight occurred in 1980 but not in 1978, given that the balance of power in terms of 
number of fighters, armaments and territorial control was roughly the same throughout the 
period. MWC cannot predict any of the episodes of infighting after 1984 either; for example, 
Amal clearly was not stronger than the combined forces of the opposing Christian coalition and 
its erstwhile allies of the Progressive Socialist Party and Mourabitoun when it fought against 
them.   
Armed groups’ ideologies, organizational cohesion and leaders’ personalities do not offer 
powerful alternative explanation either. The first episode of infighting occurred between 
Christian Maronite organizations with virtually identical political platforms and ideological 
outlooks; on the other hand, the opposing coalition was ideologically heterogeneous (as it 
comprised groups espousing a broad range of Pan-Arab and leftist views), but its members did 
not engage in large-scale infighting until 1985. The fight between Amal and Hezbollah provides 
the strongest case for ideological distance as a cause of on-side fighting, as the two groups 
emphasized their respective secular and Islamist positions when competing for the support of the 
Shia community both before and during their clashes. However, the effect of ideology cannot be 
empirically disentangled in this case from the one of coethnicity envisioned by my argument.  
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  Figure 5.2: Zones of Military Influence in Lebanon, 1976-1982
  
 Source: Hanf 1993, p. 254. 
 
Bashir Gemayel’s widely noted ambition may well have contributed to his decision to use 
force to gain control of the Christian camp and it is impossible to tell whether another leader in a 
similar position would have behaved differently, given the absence of challengers to the 
Lebanese Forces’ hegemony after 1980. However, the fact that Bashir launched his hegemonic 
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bid only when the Syrian threat had clearly receded suggests, at a minimum, that his personal 
impulses were constrained by the threat environment he faced. Similarly, the Phalanges’ 
(apparently high) organizational cohesion cannot explain the timing of attack, given the absence 
of any indication that it changed over time.
559
 
An additional set of alternative explanations concerns the role of external interveners; 
Syria is of particular interest as it had an imposing military presence in Lebanon throughout the 
war. In theory, Damascus could have provoked on-side fighting indirectly, by manipulating 
armed groups’ threat environment and thus creating windows of opportunity, or directly, by 
withholding punishment and promising rewards for infighting. However, the available evidence 
does not provide support for these arguments, as the window of opportunity exploited by the 
Phalangists in 1980 was not the product of Damascus’ clever maneuvers. As noted, Syria had 
been experiencing international isolation and domestic unrest, which convinced it to lower its 
profile in Lebanon and redeploy its forces in the Bekaa valley, where they posed less of a threat 
to the Christian stronghold. It is plausible that Syrian encouragement contributed to Amal’s and 
the Progressive Socialist Party’s attacks on Mourabitoun in August 1984 and then to Amal’s war 
against the PLO. As noted, the events occurred in a phase of deep stalemate, in which we should 
expect factors beyond my theory to have more of an influence on armed groups’ behavior than in 
normal circumstances. However, it is unclear whether Syria in fact played a decisive role in 
shaping Amal’s decisions – the latter had its own motives to fight Mourabitoun and the PLO, as 
it wanted to prevent a Palestinian return to west Beirut (and Mourabitoun was a PLO’s ally).  
Finally, there is no indication that Syria played any role in instigating the fight between Amal 
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and Hezbollah; in fact Damascus and Tehran appeared to be at pains to restrain their respective 





Window theory sheds much light on the complex relationships between the armed groups taking 
part in Lebanon’s civil war. My argument explains the dynamics and timing of the Phalanges’ 
hegemonic bid in 1980: the group attacked its weaker Maronite rival (the Tigers) when Syria did 
not pose an immediate threat, but eschewed such a course of action earlier, when the costs of 
infighting would have been much higher. As window theory would predict, in the same period 
the ethnically heterogeneous opposing coalition – the National Movement – did not experience 
major episodes of infighting. My argument cannot explain some episodes of on-side fighting in 
1985-89, but neither can general alternative arguments. 
 
3. Sri Lanka’s Civil War (1983-2009)  
In 1983, a long-simmering Tamil rebellion in the north and east of Sri Lanka erupted into full-
scale civil war, pitting the Sinhala-dominated government against five major Tamil insurgent 
groups: the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), the Eelam People’s 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOT), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). All groups appealed to Tamil nationalism, with the first three also espousing a 
leftist agenda, while the LTTE and TELO had a more straightforward nationalist focus.
561
 By 
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1990, the LTTE emerged as the undisputed rebel hegemon, having wiped out or expelled from 
Tamil areas any potential challenger.  
Over the years the Tigers gained a reputation as “one the world’s foremost paramilitary 
groups,” establishing exclusive control of large swaths of Sri Lankan territory, holding their own 
against Indian peacekeepers-turned-counterinsurgents deployed in 1987-90 and fighting the 
much larger government forces to a military stalemate until late 2006.
562
 Then a much 
reinvigorated Sri Lankan army launched a major offensive and in the course of three years 
managed to annihilate the LTTE (in addition to massacring thousands of Tamil civilians in the 
process), which had been significantly weakened by an international crackdown of diaspora 
fundraising and a major organizational split.
563
     
  The pattern of inter-rebel war in Sri Lanka closely fits the predictions of window theory. 
“Gradually, the LTTE attempted to eliminate all the other groups as they were competing with 
the LTTE for a common pool of resources.”
564
 The LTTE took advantage of windows of 
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opportunity by attacking and dispensing of coethnic rivals in moments in which they were weak 
and the government posed a limited threat. By contrast, the Tigers refrained from launching a 
hegemonic bid in the early phases of the war, when they did not enjoy a clear military advantage 
over their rivals.    
I break down the years of multi-party civil war in Sri Lanka (1983-90) in three phases, 
based on whether my argument’s conditions for the occurrence of inter-rebel fighting were 
present or absent. In the first phase (1983-85), a roughly balanced distribution of power among 
the rebel groups prevailed, which did not warrant a hegemonic bid, in spite of the limited threat 
posed by the government. Consistent with my theory, there was no inter-rebel war. In the second 
phase (1986), the LTTE took advantage of its newly acquired military superiority and the 
continuation of limited government threat to sequentially wipe out or expel its rivals. In the third 
phase (1987-90), after resisting a large-scale government offensive and then the Indian army’s 
counterinsurgency efforts, the Tigers managed to achieve complete hegemony of the Tamil 
movement by crushing their last remaining rival – the EPRLF – before the resumption of all-out 
war against Colombo.  
 
Phase 1:  Early insurgency and inter-rebel cooperation (1983-85)  
Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war began in earnest in the summer of 1983, after over ten years of low-
level militancy by several Tamil organizations.
565
 The catalyst was an ambush by the LTTE 
against an army convoy in the north of the country in July. The attack sparked anti-Tamil 
pogroms throughout Sri Lanka, which in turn drove thousands of young Tamils into the rebels’ 
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arms and prompted India to provide the militants with training, weapons and safe havens in the 
state of Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait.
566
 At long last, the Tamil rebels had the resources to 
launch a full-blown rebellion. “By the end of 1984, Jaffna [the northern insurgent stronghold] 
had become a war zone. . . at night, life came to a halt and the militants were in control.”
567
 The 
influx of young men and Indian military support had dramatic effects: “training had changed all 
equations in Jaffna. Groups which had been virtually dormant or shown no special caliber for 
military operations were getting bloated.”
568
  
The rebels held the military initiative in the first years of the war. They would launch 
deadly hit-and-run attacks on government forces (while not eschewing violence against Sinhala 
non-combatants) and the government would engage in reprisal killings of Tamil civilians 
pushing more young people in the insurgents’ ranks.
569
 As Narayan Swami observes, the rebels 
“were harassing the Sri Lanka forces almost throughout the length and breadth of the sprawling 
northeast.”
570
 By 1986 Jaffna was essentially a “liberated zone”, where government forces were 
bottled up in fortified bases and could move around only at the cost of provoking a major 
battle.
571
 This pattern of fighting suggests a limited government threat. However, the other 
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In this phase, the LTTE and TELO, with roughly equal strength, towered above all other 
groups. TELO “alone could match the LTTE’s cadres and firepower, mainly due to the head start 
it had enjoyed with New Delhi’s initial generosity.”
573
 The other groups suffered from a lack of 
weapons, poor internal cohesion or limited battlefield experience. As Swamy observes, 
“numerically, the PLOT, TELO, and LTTE had the maximum number of members, although the 
last two were better armed.”
574
 PLOT’s lack of weapons was largely a function of its leadership’s 
inability to establish close relations with India.
575
 Two additional difficulties bedeviled PLOT: 
limited battlefield experience (probably to some extent due to the lack of weaponry at its 
disposal) and serious problems of internal cohesion.
576
 The other two armed groups – EROS and 
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Consistent with my argument, in the context of a rough balance of power between the 
LTTE and TELO, the former responded with uncharacteristic moderation (at least if one relies 
on the hindsight of its subsequent ruthless liquidation of rivals) to low-level clashes and 
accidents in which other Tamil organizations killed Tigers’ cadres, limiting itself to retaliation in 




Phase 2:  The Tigers attack (1986) 
The opportunity for the LTTE’s hegemonic bid came in the spring of 1986. In March, tensions 
within TELO – the only organization that could match the Tigers’ power at that time – exploded 
into open factional violence, bringing about “major upheaval” in the group.
579
 Two factions, led 
by strongmen Das and Bobby, clashed against each other, with the latter’s having the upper 
hand.
580
 “Das was an able military man – and this faction was said to form the military backbone 
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 As Swamy (1994, p. 104) puts it, EROS and EPRLF found themselves “plodding behind in the race for militant 
leadership.” Rohan Gunaratna reports that in early 1986 TELO had more fighters at its disposal than EROS and 
EPRLF combined (1993, pp. 140, 148 and 155). EROS “was largely seen as a group of intellectuals based in 
London” (Swamy 1994, p. 102) and “kept an extremely low profile,” focusing on terrorist attacks in the south rather 
than engaging the government forces in battle (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994, p. 81). The EPRLF too had largely 
been inactive on the battlefield until 1986 and was generally considered “militarily weak” (Swamy 1994, pp. 203 















 The LTTE took advantage of its rival’s moment of weakness by launching 
devastating attacks on TELO’s camps throughout Sri Lanka’s northeast in late April. It took the 
Tigers about one week to liquidate TELO.
582
 “As Swamy points out, “[w]ith the demise of 
TELO, the bulk of the money raised by Sri Lankan Tamils abroad began flowing to the LTTE 
kitty. Recruits rushed to Tiger ranks, attracted by its awesome military operations, its army-like 
discipline and the aura of Prabhakaran [the LTTE’s leader].”
583
 
The Tigers then turned their gun-sight on PLOT. An all-out attack proved unnecessary as 
after the LTTE killed or disarmed several of its members (including the group’s military 
commander in Jaffna) in a show of force, PLOT complied with the Tigers’ ultimatum to leave 
Jaffna in October.
584
 The organization essentially imploded and ceased all military activities.
585
 The EPRLF’s turn came shortly afterwards. The group had conducted a number of 
operations against government forces in 1986 but was clearly outclassed by the Tigers in terms 
of manpower, battlefield experience and internal cohesion.
586
 In December, with a lightening 
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 Swamy 2003, p. 143. We should not expect TELO’s relative decline to have prompted it to gamble for 
resurrection. As discussed in Chapter 2, when a group’s decline is due to problems of internal cohesion, its 
leadership would focus on organizational reforms or efforts to solidify its control of the organization rather than pick 








 As Swamy (1994, p. 223) put it, by the end of the year, “PLOT had ceased to exist for all intents and purposes.” 





attack the LTTE overran all EPRLF’s camps in Jaffna in less than 24 hours; the group, however, 
managed to mount an effective resistance in the east, where it was relatively strong and then 
turned for protection to the Indian peacekeepers after their deployment in the spring of 1987.
587
 
The EPRLF got only temporary respite from the LTTE’s wrath, as the Tigers “finished the job” 
when the Indian forces departed in late 1989-early 1990. As it sidelined its rivals, the “LTTE 
leaders began issuing public statements arrogating to their organisation sole authority to 
represent the Tamil people.”
588
  
In contrast with the treatment reserved to all other groups, the LTTE tolerated EROS – an 
extremely weak organization that quietly accepted the Tigers’ hegemony. In fact EROS “acted 
more like an appendage” to the LTTE than an autonomous organization.
589
 Subsequently, during 
the Indian peacekeeping mission, EROS did not engage in military operations but essentially 
functioned as an unofficial political front for the Tigers, by running for elections and making 
sympathetic public statements. Eventually EROS experienced a major split, with the main 
faction absorbed in the LTTE while the rest left the country.
590
 Consistent with my argument, 
probably EROS’s extreme weakness (it was the smallest group and had very little battlefield 
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experience) explains the LTTE’s tolerance as the former did not represent a meaningful threat to 
the latter’s hegemony.
591
 As Paul Staniland puts it, “[EROS’] lack of large-scale activity or 
presence made its survival more acceptable to the LTTE since it could pose no real challenge.”
592
 
In addition to the emergence of a marked power imbalance in favor of the LTTE, the 
condition of a limited government threat continued to hold in this phase. The pattern of fighting 
described above, in which the “initiative lay with the militants,” prevailed until Colombo 
launched its first major offensive in early 1987.
593
 Moreover, in the course of 1986 the prospect 
of a sudden, radical escalation of the government’s military effort likely appeared remote to the 
LTTE, as Colombo, under increasing diplomatic pressure from India, signaled willingness to 
find some form of negotiated solution addressing Tamil demands short of secession. In 
particular, each of the LTTE’s attacks against its Tamil rivals coincided with Indian diplomatic 
initiatives towards which Colombo appeared pliant but that the Tigers ultimately resisted. The 
LTTE’s attack against TELO occurred during a high-level meeting between Indian envoys and 
the Sri Lankan President on the Tamil issue, which had been announced a few weeks earlier.
594
 
The Tigers expelled PLOT from Jaffna during militant-government negotiations and in a context 
in which the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu was pressuring (ultimately unsuccessfully) the 
LTTE’s leadership to meet Sri Lanka’s President during a South Asian Association for Regional 
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Cooperation summit in November 1986.
595
  Finally, in the period leading to the attack on the 
EPRLF, the “L.T.T.E. and the government gave the impression that a move for a negotiated 
settlement was on” and a set of proposals, drafted with India's help, were announced by the 
government less than ten days after the Tigers’ onslaught.
596
  
In sum, consistent with window of opportunity logic, “the LTTE always struck at the 
other organizations when they were weakened and preoccupied with internal rivalries,” while the 
government did not pose a serious and imminent threat.
597
 The one feature of this phase of Sri 
Lanka’s civil war that does not fit my argument relates to the way in which the Tigers got rid of 
PLOT – a limited show of force, followed by PLOT’s decision to abandon the battlefield. The 
LTTE’s behavior is not surprising, as we should expect strong rebel groups to prefer to achieve 
hegemony without paying the cost of inter-rebel war; however, my argument suggests that rebel 
groups will typically not find a peaceful bargain that both sides prefer to war in the presence of 
windows due to pervasive commitment problems (i.e., the weaker group would generally prefer 
to fight against long odds to accepting complete submission to the hegemon).   
 
Phase 3: From India’s peacekeeping to LTTE’s hegemony (1987-90) 
In the third phase, the Tigers managed to withstand a large-scale government offensive and then 
an intense counterinsurgency campaign by the Indian army after its peacekeeping mission 
floundered in the face of the LTTE’s recalcitrance. Eventually, in the spring of 1990 the Tigers 
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crushed their last remaining rival – the EPRLF – after the departure of its Indian protectors and 
before the resumption of the fight against Colombo, thus fully consolidating their control of Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil movement.  
The circumstances leading to the first major government offensive in 1987 suggest that 
the LTTE may have miscalculated Colombo’s ability or willingness to escalate its hitherto 
limited military effort. In early 1987, as it was still fighting the EPRLF in the east following the 
late 1986 attack, the LTTE declared that it was taking over Jaffna’s civil administration and 
deployed uniformed policemen on the streets. The government responded to what it perceived as 
a blatant challenge to its sovereignty with an embargo on Jaffna and then a massive offensive. 
For the first time since the beginning of the war, the LTTE was under unrelenting government 
military pressure in the north, while continuing to clash with the EPRLF in the east. Loath of 
seeing the Tamil insurgency crushed, New Delhi imposed the India–Sri Lanka Accord on the 
belligerents in the summer of 1987, which envisioned the deployment of an Indian peacekeeping 




The Tigers paid lip service to the agreement but took advantage of the respite in the fight 
against Colombo to reorganize and launch a surprise attack against the EPRLF in September 
1987. As the LTTE kept dragging feet on the implementation of the agreement, New Delhi 
eventually decided to use force to bring the group to heel.
599
 The Indian army’s belief that “the 
LTTE could be driven into a corner in 72 hours,” however, turned out to be ill-founded.
600
 The 
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Tigers had to yield ground in the face of the Indian juggernaut’s advance, but in doing so they 
denied a decisive battle to the counterinsurgent forces while inflicting heavy losses on them with 
skillful use of hit-and-run attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
601
 The EPRLF, 
which had taken refuge in the Indian contingent’s camps after the last LTTE’s September attack, 
served as auxiliary force in New Delhi’s counterinsurgency campaign.
602
 
Eventually, a combination of LTTE’s guerrilla warfare, Colombo’s diplomatic pressure 
(spurred by a rebellion against India’s presence among Sinhala ultra-nationalists in the south) 
and a change of government in New Delhi prompted the withdrawal of the Indian contingent 
from Sri Lanka’s north-east in late 1989. As the Indians started leaving, the Tigers wiped out the 
EPRLF and rapidly consolidated their hold on the Tamil community. “The LTTE was in total 
control of northeastern Sri Lanka within a week of the departure of the Indian forces.”
603
 At that 
time, Colombo did not represent a threat for the Tigers, as it had been engaged in peace talks 
with them since the spring of 1989 and was waging a counterinsurgency campaign against the 
Sinhala nationalist JVP in the south while the Indian forces – which had come to be perceived by 
Sri Lanka’s government as a major threat to its sovereignty – were still present on Sri Lanka’s 
soil; in fact, the government provided military support for the LTTE’s attacks on the Indians and 
the EPRLF. Having subdued all its Tamil competitors, the Tigers resumed their anti-government 
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In sum, the LTTE attacked its weaker coethnic rival EPRLF in moments of limited 
government threat – in September 1987, after the deployment of Indian peacekeeping force 
(before it turned on the Tigers) and in late 1989, as the Indians were withdrawing (the fighting 
between EPRLF and LTTE during the Indian campaign against the Tigers does not amount to 
inter-rebel war as the EPRLF operated as an auxiliary counterinsurgency force rather than a rebel 
group).  
Consistent with my theoretical expectations, the LTTE did not experience any difficulty 
in exerting control on and mobilizing Sri Lanka’s Tamil population after dealing with its 
competitors. As Staniland put it, “[o]nce rival organizations were broken, the civilian population 
faced fewer outside options and the Tigers were able to consolidate their hegemonic hold.”
605
 
The Tigers absorbed some members of the defeated rivals in their rank-and-file but also killed 
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Figure 5.3: Map of Sri Lanka 
 
 
Alternative explanations and endogeneity 
The evidence presented above provides strong support for window theory of inter-rebel war. 
Alternative explanations do not fare as well. Christia’s minimum winning coalition (MWC) logic 
predicts inter-rebel war only when at least one rebel group is stronger than the government. 
However, when it launched its hegemonic bid in 1986, the LTTE was clearly weaker than 
Colombo in terms of territorial control and manpower. The Tamil groups had (almost) complete 
control only over the Jaffna peninsula, which is but a small part of Tamil inhabited areas of Sri 
Lanka (see Figure 5.3 above); moreover, in this phase the Tigers shared de facto sovereignty in 
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Jaffna with the other major rebel outfits.
607
 In 1987 the LTTE had an estimated number of 3,000 
fighters at its disposal, while the Sri Lanka’s armed forces were several times as large.
608
  
Analysts of the LTTE often hint at the personality of its leader – Velupillai Prabhakaran – 
as a key to understanding the group’s behavior. For example, Swamy notes that “Prabhakaran 
orchestrated deadly action with ruthless efficiency,” which the author identifies as “his 
trademark.”
609
 As Prabhakaran’s group was the initiator in all episodes of inter-rebel war in Sri 
Lanka, it is not possible to rule out that his personality or military acumen may have played an 
important causal role. However, the fact that across the cases examined in this dissertation inter-
rebel aggression occurred under a variety of leadership types casts doubts on the general validity 
of this kind of individual-level argument. In any case, leader characteristics may at best provide a 
partial explanation for the LTTE’s behavior, as Prabhakaran’s “ruthlessness” manifested itself 
only when his group was clearly stronger than the rivals. In the same vein, the widely noted high 
cohesion and discipline of the LTTE
610
 may only offer a partial explanation of the pattern of 
inter-rebel war, as those were time-invariant features of the group while fighting occurred only in 
some phases.
611
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 The LTTE’s figure is from Swamy 1994, p. 280. The Military Balance reports the overall size of Colombo’s 
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 A different set of alternative explanations would focus on India’s involvement in Sri 
Lanka’s civil war. New Delhi clearly played a crucial role in getting the Tamil insurgency off the 
ground by providing generous support to several fledgling rebel groups; but India does not 
appear to have instigated inter-rebel war, which in fact occurred in spite of New Delhi’s efforts 
to induce inter-rebel cooperation.
612
 However, Indian intervention may have contributed to inter-
rebel fighting in indirect and unintended ways. Stephen Hopgood (2005), for example, contends 
that Indian support for Tamil insurgents ended up fueling inter-rebel competition for outside aid 
and thus conflict; others suggest that the Tigers attacked TELO because they perceived the latter 
as an Indian stooge.
613
 These arguments about how India’s intervention may have contributed to 
inter-rebel war are prima facie plausible (although I did not come across any concrete evidence) 
but do not constitute distinct alternative explanations. The idea that external support to a coethnic 
rival could affect rebel groups’ threat perception and factor in their decisions to use force is fully 
consistent with window theory. The theory would be contradicted only if external intervention 
tended to spur inter-rebel war in the absence of windows of opportunity and vulnerability or if 
windows of opportunity and vulnerability in the absence of external intervention did not 
typically lead to inter-rebel war. Neither is the case in Sri Lanka. The Tigers targeted TELO in 
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 As Richardson (2005, p. 528) notes, “RAW’s [Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence agency] 
strategy was to maintain control by preventing any one group from becoming dominant.”  As part of this strategy, 
RAW arm-twisted the Tigers into joining the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), an umbrella organization 
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1986, when the latter was engulfed in internecine strife, but abstained from large-scale violence 
against it earlier, when the balance of power was not favorable. After crushing TELO, the LTTE 
expelled PLOT from Jaffna, even if the group had not managed to attract Indian support.
614
        
A final set of alternative explanations concerns the role of the incumbent in provoking 
inter-rebel war. Unlike in the Iraq and Ethiopia cases, there is no evidence that the Tamil 
insurgent groups feared that their rivals may reach a separate deal with Colombo at their expense 
or that the government tried to drive a wedge between its opponents by playing up these kinds of 
fears.
615
 On the other hand, it is plausible that the fact that that EPRLF served as an auxiliary 
force for New Delhi’s counterinsurgency campaign in 1987-1989 factored in the LTTE’s 
decision to wipe out its rival after the departure of the Indian contingent. However, the Tigers 
had attacked the EPRLF in 1986, before India’s deployment in Sri Lanka was a concrete 
possibility, and the EPLRF’s decision to side with India was largely due to its desperate need for 
protection from the LTTE.
616
   
This discussion about the potential impact of counterinsurgency policies on inter-rebel 
war points to questions about the endogeneity of the window of opportunity discussed above, 
given that one of its constitutive elements is the level of threat posed by the government. As 
noted in other chapters, the problem is not the fact that the hypothesized causes of inter-rebel war 
are themselves caused by some other factor (they are not supposed to be “unmoved movers”), 
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but rather that windows of opportunity could be just the last link in a longer and more complex 
causal chain, not captured by my theory. If windows of opportunity are systematically 
engineered by governments (for example, by refraining from bringing to bear their full offensive 
power on the insurgents), my argument could be ignoring a key factor underlying government 
decision-making, thus missing an important part of the explanation of inter-rebel war. However, 
the available evidence does not suggest that Colombo cleverly manipulated the insurgents’ threat 
environment to spur the Tigers to attack their rivals, but rather that it took advantage of ongoing 
infighting. The Sri Lankan government’s initial limited response to the Tamil insurgency was 
largely a function of “severe structural and organizational problems in the military,” which took 
time to overcome.
617
 What the government did do was opportunistically refraining from doing 
anything to stop inter-rebel war, so that the insurgents would continue to bleed each other white, 





Window of opportunity logic offers a powerful explanation for infighting among Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil insurgent groups. The Tigers attacked their coethnic rival organizations when a favorable 
imbalance of power prevailed and neither government forces nor the Indian military contingent 
posed an imminent threat to the group. From its hegemonic position, the LTTE managed to rally 
the Tamil population to its side and pose an even more serious challenge to Colombo’s authority 
than in the previous years.         
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 “All this time [during the LTTE-TELO fight] the Sri Lankan army had remained quiet except for a bit of 





4. Syria’s Civil War (2011-) 
The Syrian civil war started in the summer of 2011, as peaceful protests turned to violent 
resistance in the face of Damascus’ brutal repression. The first groups to take the field were 
mostly formed by local volunteers and army deserters, and operated under the loosely knit 
umbrella of the Free Syria Army (FSA). Jabhat al-Nusra – al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate – and host 
of Islamist organizations followed suit in early 2012.
619
 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) joined the fray in 2013 by crossing into Syria from Iraq.
620
 The conflict has taken on 
ethno-sectarian dimension from the beginning, with an overwhelmingly Sunni insurgency pitted 
against Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime, supported by its Shia allies Hezbollah and the Iraqi 
and Iranian governments.
621
   
The analysis below provides preliminary support for window theory. In the first two 
years of the war, the myriad Sunni insurgent groups intensely competed for resources and 
recruits but refrained from inter-rebel war; this is consistent with window theory as a roughly 
balanced distribution of power among rebel groups would make a hegemonic bid prohibitively 
costly, while the absence of a marked power trend in favor of any organization or a mounting 
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threat to a specific group did not warrant a gamble for resurrection. ISIS’ arrival to Syria 
disturbed this equilibrium: as the group experienced rapid growth, other organizations came to 
see it as a serious threat and decided to attack as window of vulnerability logic would lead us to 
expect. However, ISIS survived the rebel onslaught and, after acquiring significant amounts of 
resources in Iraq, it went on the offensive against the rest of the insurgent movement in 2014-15. 
This subsequent behavior seems consistent with window of opportunity logic, as the group had 
probably gained a marked military edge over rival groups while a weakened Syrian government 
devoted most of its military assets to fighting other insurgents groups.  
The case study is divided in three parts, based on the presence or absence of theoretical 
conditions for inter-rebel war.  
 
Phase 1: Early insurgency and absence of inter-rebel war (2011-13) 
From the rebellion’s onset the anti-government forces have been highly fractionalized, with 
hundreds of groups struggling to coordinate operations and often competing over recruits, 
weapons and external support.
622
 In the course of the first two years of the civil war, a number of 
localized clashes and skirmishes occurred between rebel groups; however, no episode of large-
scale fighting took place.
623
 As the International Crisis Group noted in an October 2012 report, 
“when it comes to fighting the regime, opposition groups of all stripes have been relatively 
successful in putting differences aside. Though some reports of clashes between FSA and jihadi 
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militants have surfaced, for now such incidents appear isolated and do not appear to have 
stymied the broader trend toward collaboration across ideological lines.”
624
 A similar overall 
cooperative trend was evident across Syrian through the summer of 2013.
625
  
 The absence of inter-rebel war in this period is consistent with window theory: Syria’s 
Sunni insurgent groups were coethnic but faced no window of opportunity, due to a balanced 
distribution of power among them and the intensity of the fight against the government; 
similarly, probably there was no window of vulnerability, in the absence of a clear trend in the 
balance of power or a mounting threat posed by some groups to others.  
 The existence of overlapping bases of support among Syria’s Sunni insurgents is well 
illustrated by the fluidity of their memberships. As the International Crisis Group reported, 
“[n]ewly-minted guerrilla fighters tend to flock to whatever group has more guns and bullets, 
irrespective of its ideological leaning; offers superior opportunities for personal enrichment; or, 
in contrast, enjoys the most impeccable reputation. In the countryside, ‘battalions’ often chiefly 
comprise relatives who commute between the front line and their homes. Cousins from a single 
extended family in different parts of Aleppo joined various groups for the simple reason that they 
all needed income and gravitated toward whatever they could find.”
626
  
Inter-rebel war could have thus brought about significant benefits in terms of acquisition 
of resources under the control of rivals and elimination of threatening competitors, but would 
have also entailed prohibitively high costs. In fact, there was no clear hierarchy of power among 
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the myriad rebel groups operating across Syria, which ruled out the prospect of a quick and 
cheap fight for any organization. While several “mainstream” rebel groups affiliated with the 
Free Syrian Army could marshal larger numbers of fighters, Salafi-jihadist groups tended to be 
better armed and display higher levels of battlefield proficiency.
627
 For example, an official of al-
Towhid – the largest group near Aleppo affiliated with the Free Syrian Army – observed: “Al-
Nusra in Aleppo is much smaller than us numerically, but what it lacks in numbers it makes up 
for in the capabilities of its fighters, and the fact that they are willing to do martyrdom attacks 
[suicide bombings]. Given the limited weapons we have, there are instances when we need a 
martyrdom attack, and they provide it. But al-Nusra isn’t big enough to win battles on its own; 
rather groups like us provide the numbers, and they provide what you might call the elite forces.” 
This rough balance of power seems to have induced inter-rebel cooperation, as the International 
Crisis Group’s report cited above notes:  
“Most established rebel formations possess sufficient resources to endure but are not 
strong enough to either fully absorb similar-sized groupings or shun alliances with them. 
At the same time, more radical Islamist factions are powerful enough to carry on, yet 
increasingly feel the need to reach out to mainstream combatants as opposed to 
antagonizing them.”
628
   
 
 The fact that the insurgents were engaged in a high-intensity fight with the government 
throughout this period would also lead us to expect an absence of inter-rebel war. After being 
almost crushed by the government in early 2012, the rebels made rapid gains in the second half 
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of the year and in early 2013; the Assad regime then bounced back from the brink of defeat in 
the spring of 2013 with the infusion of men and material from Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, and 
launched a series of successful offensives.
629
 By engaging in infighting the rebels would have 
exposed themselves to the risk of defeat when under government military pressure or paid a high 
opportunity cost in phases in which they were making significant headways on the battlefield.  
 
Phase 2: ISIS’ rise (2013-14) 
ISIS’entry on the Syrian scene in the spring of 2013 sent shockwaves across the insurgent 
movement, eventually bringing about all-out inter-rebel war. In the summer of 2011, the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI, the “successor” of al-Qaeda in Iraq) dispatched operatives to Syria to create a 
new jihadi organization – al-Nusra – with the support of al-Qaeda Central’s head, Ayman al-
Zawahiri. In April 2013, ISI’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the merge of his group 
and al-Nusra into ISIS. After initial hesitation, Al-Nusra’s leadership, backed up by al-Zawahiri, 
rejected the initiative reasserting its independence.
630
  
 Despite tensions and occasional skirmishes, al-Nusra cooperated with ISIS against the 
government until early 2014, and so did most independent Salafi groups and organizations 
affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.
631
 The one exception to this pattern is the fight between 
ISIS and the Free Syrian Army’s affiliate Northern Storm for control of Azaz, a town on the 
                                                          
629




 Hashim 2014; Terrill 2014; Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global 
Jihadist Movement,” Research Notes, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014; Aymenn Jawad al-
Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 16, Hudson 




 Szybala 2013a; Valerie Szybala “The Islamic Alliance Emerges,” Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 
2013b; Nassief 2014, pp. 26-35; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Special Report: Northern Storm and the Situation in 
Azaz (Syria),” Middle East Review of International Affairs/MERIA Journal 28 (4), 2014b.   
260 
 
border with Turkey, in September 2013.
632
 Salafi and “mainstream” groups continued to 
coordinate their anti-regime operations with ISIS for the remainder of 2013. Then in early 
January a broad array of rebel forces launched all-out surprise attacks against ISIS on multiple 
fronts in northern and eastern Syria.
633
 The group lost large swaths of territory under its control 
in Aleppo and Idlib provinces, but within a few weeks managed (in part thanks to reinforcements 
coming from Iraq) to regroup and established its dominance on Raqqa – soon to become the 
“capital” of the self-proclaimed state (see Figure 5.4). Inter-rebel fighting has caused thousands 
of rebel deaths and continues at the time of this writing (June 2015), with ISIS making 
substantial territorial gains on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border and intensifying the pressure on 
other Syrian insurgents groups around Aleppo, stretched thin in their simultaneous fight against 
government forces.
634
      
 While window theory cannot explain all the twists and turns of these inter-rebel 
dynamics, it offers useful lenses to make sense of some broad patterns. In particular, the early 
2014 rebel attack against ISIS appears like a textbook instance of gamble for resurrection in the 
face of a window of vulnerability. As Rand analyst Brian Jenkins noted, after having discussed 
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other possible causes of the rebel attack on ISIS, “[p]erhaps a bigger factor fueling the conflict 
among Syria’s Islamists has been the growing strength and predominance of ISIL…ISIL’s rapid 
growth threatened the other rebel groups who became increasingly concerned that it would come 
to dominate the rebellion while following its own agenda.”
635
 ISIS had in fact been expanding 
rapidly since its debut on the Syrian battlefield in the spring of 2013, as the International Crisis 
Group pointed out:  
“By the end of 2013, IS had grown to become one of the most powerful factions in rebel-
held areas, evoking respect, fear and animosity among other anti-regime militants. It was 
able to do so due to superior planning, organising, funding and combat capacities in large 




Other insurgent groups heatedly debated (both within and between organizations) the 
trade-off between the long-term risk posed by a growing ISIS and short-term benefits of its 
significant contribution to the fight against the Assad regime.
637
 For example, an Ahrar al-Sham 
fighter observed: “We need to fight them [ISIS] now, because if we don’t, then by the time the 
regime falls they will have taken over;” but he also admitted that his organization continued to 
coordinate with ISIS on the battlefield because of its tactical contributions.
638
 A general 
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agreement about the need to use force to deal with the rise of ISIS emerged only gradually in the 
insurgent movement, allowing the group’s growth to continue unabated until the end of 2013.
639
   
 
Figure 5.4: Map of Syria 
 
 
The insurgents’ reluctant attack on ISIS is consistent with window of vulnerability logic, 
as the strength of the group and the intensity of government military operations in northern Syria 
all but guaranteed that inter-rebel war would be a costly and risky affair. It is unlikely (but it 
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cannot be ruled out, in the absence of direct decision-making evidence) that the anti-ISIS forces 
thought they could quickly and cheaply dispose of their target: the number of ISIS fighters in 
Syria – estimated at between 3,000 and 8,000 – was just a small fraction of the overall insurgent 
movement – around 100,000 fighters; however, ISIS had displayed exceptional battlefield 
effectiveness against government forces in the previous months, was well-armed and had deep 
pockets.
640
 Moreover, the anti-ISIS coalition was bound to experience collective action problems 
and coordination difficulties, which would partially offset its numerical advantage.
641
 In any 
case, even a quick victory against ISIS carried risks given the high level of government threat. 
The Assad regime had launched a massive offensive in Aleppo city and surrounding areas in late 
2013, forcing the insurgents to bring in reinforcements from other provinces; government 
operations were in full-swing as inter-rebel war erupted.
642
 Thus, unsurprisingly, the government 
ended up benefitting from insurgent infighting: “the rebels lost great human and material 
resources and diverted men, weapons and ammunition from the Aleppo front at a time when pro-
Assad forces were pushing to retake the city… the Syrian army and allied militias made 
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 As it turned out, its opponents’ poor coordination and command-and-control may have provided badly needed 
respite for an embattled ISIS, which then managed to regroup in eastern Syria. In particular, Ahrar al-Sham’s 
fighters in eastern Syria offered safe passage to ISIS’s contingents in two momentous circumstances, in spite of the 
fact that the organization as a whole had been an active participant in the fight against ISIS around Aleppo 




 Nassief 2014, pp. 31-6; International Crisis Group 2014a, pp. 7-9.  
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 The fact that ISIS was not the initiator of all-out inter-rebel war is also consistent with 
window theory. ISIS’ power was on an upward trajectory and thus it was in the group’s interest 
to postpone a violent confrontation with the rest of the insurgent movement. These kinds of 
considerations, to be sure, did not dissuade the group from being very assertive in imposing its 
strict interpretation of sharia law in areas where it held sway and using violence (often taking the 
form of individual kidnappings,  executions and isolated skirmishes) to marginalize rival 
organizations and intimidate anti-regime activists.
644
 These actions inflamed other insurgents 
groups and may have contributed to their decision to attack ISIS by affecting their threat 
perception; but they appear more akin to the low-level clashes encountered in all civil war cases 
discussed in this dissertation than inter-rebel war.
645
 Moreover, while much of ISIS’ behavior 
can plausibly be explained by non-strategic ideological zeal, its assertiveness cannot be easily 
separated from its overall growth strategy (envisioning also the provision of key services and 
religious outreach activities), which has proven so successful in out-organizing its competitors in 
Iraq and Syria. In other words, adopting a less assertive approach may have reduced the risk of a 
preventive attack by the rest of the insurgent movement, but at the cost of undermining ISIS’ 
growth, on which presumably its Caliphate dream rested.  
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 As noted, ISIS continued to coordinate with other insurgent forces until January 2014 despite frequent low-level, 
localized clashes; for example, the relationship between al-Nusra and ISIS in Raqqa in late 2013 was described as “a 
cold war” (“Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: a Cold War in Raqqa,” Damascus Bureau, 
December 18, 2013, available at http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=6176, last accessed on June 15, 2015).    
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The clashes between ISIS and Northern Storm near Azaz in the fall of 2013 mentioned 
above are, in a sense, the exception that confirms the rule. The episode amounts to outright inter-
rebel war as it consisted of several days of sustained fighting between the two groups. However, 
it is conspicuous in a context of many negative cases – i.e., situations in which ISIS could have 
fought other rebel groups in physical proximity, but did not. ISIS’ leadership may have 
calculated that the military benefits associated with acquiring control of the border crossing may 
have more than compensated the costs of the fight if it remained limited (as it turned out it did) 
to the weaker Northern Storm rather than dragging into the fray other insurgent groups. If this 
were the case (but I do not have decision-making evidence on this), while not predicted by it 
ISIS’ actions would not be inconsistent with the underlying logic of my argument.   
 
Phase 3: ISIS’ hegemonic bid (2014-15)  
 Window theory also helps us make sense of the continuation of inter-rebel war in Syria 
throughout 2014 and 2015. As noted before, ISIS was largely pushed out of Aleppo and Idlib 
provinces by a coalition of rebel groups, but after a few weeks it managed to regain control of its 
Raqqa stronghold, which allowed it to “fight back from the brink of defeat.”
646
 ISIS’ recovery 
was probably facilitated by the fact the government focused its attention mostly on the rest of the 
opposition forces. As the International Crisis Group observed, “[b]etween January and June 
2014, regime aircraft rarely targeted IS strongholds east of Aleppo; easily identifiable IS 
headquarters remained unscathed; and regime ground forces made no tangible effort to regain 
ground from IS east of Aleppo.”
647
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Then in the summer ISIS went on the offensive on both sides of the Sykes-Picot line. In 
June, the group took over Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, with a lightening attack and 
advanced within 40 miles of Baghdad itself.
648
 In the process, ISIS seized massive amounts of 
military equipment provided by the United States to Iraq: “4 infantry divisions and supporting 
troops fled the battle in June 2014, leaving behind almost all of their weapons, equipment, and 
supplies including artillery, tanks, and a variety of other military vehicles.”
649
 ISIS’ blitzkrieg in 
Iraq also brought about a dramatic expansion of the group’s size and finances.
650
 The group built 
on these gains by defeating its rivals in Syria’s eastern province of Deir al-Zour in July and 
capturing rebel-held territory north of Aleppo.
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 The number of ISIS fighters very likely more than tripled in 2014. Before the fall of Mosul, the group’s size was 
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ISIS has since carried on in its three-front war against Damascus, Baghdad and Syria’s 
insurgents. It is tempting to dismiss the group’s behavior as a mere manifestation of its 
fanaticism, which makes it pick up fights reflexively. But window theory suggests a plausible 
alternative: from the summer of 2014, ISIS has faced a broad window of opportunity to become 
the hegemon of Syria’s Sunni insurgency; in other words, it has had a clear opportunity to crush 
its rivals without significant risk of undermining its prospects of beating the Syrian and Iraqi 
governments and thus reach its (ideological) goal of the Caliphate.  
In fact, a favorable inter-rebel balance of power for ISIS – a key ingredient of window of 
opportunity – has likely been present. Several observers have suggested that with the boost in its 
capabilities after the take-over of Mosul the group has obtained a clear edge vis-à-vis its rivals. 
For example, International Crisis Group analyst Noah Bonsey noted that “the rebels lack the 
capacity and organization, especially compared to the regime and ISIS. They have been effective 
in the past. Rebels in Idlib and Aleppo threw ISIS out of Idlib province, Aleppo city and western 
and northern countryside in January, so they have a proven track record against ISIS. But this 
took place when ISIS was weaker. ISIS has gained a lot of money and manpower since then.”
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After its losses at ISIS’ hands in the summer of 2014, even the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Font 
has reportedly experienced serious problems of internal cohesion and a hemorrhage of fighters to 
its jihadi rival.
653
 Collectively the other insurgent groups could probably marshal more men than 
ISIS, but the group’s leadership may have reasonably concluded that it superior morale, cohesion 
and weaponry could more than compensate for its numerical inferiority, in particular given the 
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highly fragmented nature of the insurgent movement. After all, heavily armed and much larger 
Iraqi forces crumbled in the face of ISIS’ determined push in northern Iraq in June 2014.  
The other key element of window of opportunity – a limited government threat – has also 
be a central characteristic of the Syrian battlefield in 2014-15 from the point of view of ISIS. 
After the fall of Mosul, the Assad regime reversed its initial strategy of largely leaving ISIS 
undisturbed, but fighting the group has remained of secondary importance for the government.
654
 
Assad seems to have adopted a strategy of “defensive protraction”: due to dwindling manpower 
resources, his forces have gone on the offensive on three priority fronts (Aleppo, Damascus and 
central Syria), while relying on a network of isolated defensive positions in the rest of the 
country to nominally assert government presence throughout the country;
655
 unlike other 
insurgent groups, ISIS has not been the main target of those rare government offensive 
maneuvers.
656
 Moreover, it is far from obvious that Damascus would be able to easily dispose of 
ISIS if it decided to focus its attention on the group; the fact that ISIS has been more successful 
than the regime and its allies in making gains against other insurgents in 2014-15 strongly 
suggests otherwise.     
Of course, even if inter-rebel fighting in this context did not pose an existential threat for 
ISIS, it did entail some opportunity costs in terms of foregone gains against the government.
657
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 Kozak 2015. In the words of the author of the report, “Assad is pursuing a strategy to put an ‘army in all corners’ 
by maintaining remote regime outposts throughout Syria which pin the outer bounds of a unified and contiguous 
Syrian state. This strategy enables Assad to assert his presence throughout Syria and preempt any call for the 
partition of the Syrian state… regime forces have therefore postured to maintain the status quo and avoid defeat 




 See Kozak 2015, in particular p. 31, which reports major military operations by geographical front in Syria in 




But these are precisely the kinds of marginal costs that may be warranted by the prospective 
benefits of a hegemonic bid in a context in which the government is not clearly more powerful 
than the would-be hegemon. In fact, inter-rebel war seems to have brought to ISIS the benefits 
that we would expect to arise when coethnic rebel groups with overlapping mobilization bases 
face each other: ISIS has grown to an important extent by absorbing large numbers of defectors 
and extracting resources from civilian populations previously under its rivals’ control.
658
 In the 
summer 2014, ISIS made inroads in eastern Syria by “crushing the Nusra Front’s powerful 
eastern wing and expelling or absorbing most other rebel groups in the region. Hundreds of 
Nusra Front loyalists were killed and others began to defect, sensing that the Islamic State was 
clearly the stronger and more capable jihadi group.”
659
 In Iraq’s and Syria’s incendiary sectarian 
climate brought about by large-scale violence and Sunni political disenfranchisement, ISIS has 
managed to obtain at least passive support from Sunni communities that do not necessarily share 
its ideological zeal where it got rid of rival groups.
660
 In these instances, the organization can 
effectively “present itself as the sole guardian of Sunni interests in a vast territory cutting across 
Iraq and Syria,” while also providing a modicum of stability and order that has largely been 
absent since the civil war onset.
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 Finally, two sets of events that may seem at odds with window theory are worth 
discussing: ISIS’ fight against the Syrian Kurdish forces of the Democratic Union Party (better 
known by its Kurdish acronym PYD) near Kobane and al-Nusra’s attacks on the US-supported 
Hazm Movement and Syrian Revolutionary Front in northern Syria in 2014-2015. Upon closer 
inspection, neither episode contradicts my argument. The PYD never engaged in sustained anti-
government military operations and so its fight against ISIS can hardly be considered an episode 
of inter-rebel war. By contrast, the organizations targeted by al-Nusra were clearly anti-Assad 
rebel groups but they were also receiving military support from the United States, which was 
conducting bombing operations against the al-Qaeda affiliate; this fact makes this episode of 
inter-rebel war inherently less puzzling and unproblematic for my theory.    
 PYD-held Kobane was one of ISIS’ main targets in the second half of 2014; located on 
the Syria-Turkey border and on the edges of the “Caliphate”, the Syrian Kurdish-majority town 
is of strategic value for ISIS as a supply route and for both defense of Raqqa and expansion 
towards Aleppo.
662
 The PYD-ISIS fight occurred across ethnic lines, given that ISIS tends to be 
perceived as a Sunni Arab outfit and typically dubs Kurds as “apostates”, but PYD can hardly be 
considered a rebel group.
663
 In fact, since the summer of 2012, the PYD has been in a “de facto 
alliance with the regime, which handed territories [mostly in the northern Hasaka province] over 
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 ISIS does recruit Sunni Kurds but it has much less appeal among them compared to among Sunni Arabs (Weiss 
and Hassan, 2015 pp. 157-9). 
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to it while continuing to give material support to those territories,” so as to free government 
forces to battle the Sunni insurgency.
664
 
 By contrast, the clashes between al-Nusra, on the hand, and the Hazm Movement and the 
Syrian Revolutionary Front, on the other, can be considered as episodes of inter-rebel war, which 
normally should not occur, given that they were facing the common threat posed by ISIS and 
Assad. But this a very idiosyncratic instance of inter-rebel war: the two Free Syrian Army 
affiliates passed a severe vetting process to receive US military support and thus found 
themselves both on the same side as al-Nusra against the regime and on opposite sides when the 
United States started bombing the al-Qaeda affiliate in September 2014.
665
 In this kind of 
scenario, my argument envisions competing pushes towards inter-rebel cooperation and conflict 
and is thus indeterminate.  
 
Alternative explanations and endogeneity concerns 
Alternative arguments tend to have less explanatory power than window theory in the Syrian 
context. MWC logic would incorrectly predict continued inter-rebel cooperation until at least the 
summer of 2014. When the anti-ISIS rebel operations occurred, in early 2014, the Syrian 
government could count on a larger number of fighters than the opposition as a whole and 
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controlled a comparable amount of territory and a larger share of the population.
666
 Moreover, in 
late 2013-early 2014, there was no indication of a power trend favorable to the rebel movement 
(which would herald the emergence of a minimum winning coalition formed by a subset of rebel 
groups), as the regime was making territorial gains and was poised to launch a major assault on 
Aleppo.
667
 By contrast, MWC logic, like window theory, would correctly predict ISIS’ two-way 
fight against both Assad and the rest of insurgent movement from the summer of 2014, in as 
much it can be argued that the group became was the strongest belligerent in the Syrian 
landscape after the fall of Mosul.
668
   
 I do not have access to good-quality information about the different groups’ leadership to 
advance any solid claims about the effects of individual personalities on inter-rebel war. 
However, the fact that a broad array of rebel groups (presumably with a range of different 
personalities at their helm) decided to attack ISIS in early 2014 points to situational factors as 
more important forces behind their actions.  
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 Notice, however, that based on Fotini Christia’s (2012) preferred measure of the balance of power, ISIS would 
not be stronger than the government as the former controlled only about 30 percent of the country’s territory 
(including vast desert areas), compared to the approximately 50 percent under Assad’s authority (where an estimated 
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By analogous logic, varying degrees of group cohesion cannot explain the pattern of 
inter-rebel war as both relatively incohesive groups affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and the 
highly disciplined al-Nusra participated in the fight against ISIS. Moreover, the decision-making 
evidence discussed above indicates that inter-rebel war did not occur through a process of 
inadvertent escalation of low-level clashes but was in fact the result of conscious, if difficult, 
leaderships’ decisions to confront the growing threat posed by ISIS.   
Similarly, ideology does not seem a convincing explanation for inter-rebel violence as the 
groups that fought ISIS spanned the rebellion’s full ideological spectrum, from secular-
nationalist to jihadi.
669
 In addition, the notion that ISIS’ jihadi ideology makes the group 
inherently more aggressive and threatening to other organizations, thus causing inter-rebel war, 
flies in the face of the fact that al-Nusra, with virtually the same ideology, has largely cooperated 
with other insurgent groups throughout the Syrian conflict. This is not necessarily to deny that 
certain ideological orientations may be associated with a higher risk of inter-rebel war, but the 
pattern of the case suggests that structural factors like the distribution of power powerfully 
constrain and shape rebel group-level impulses.  
A more plausible variant of this kind of argument would emphasize actual group 
behavior, perhaps driven by ideological zeal, rather than abstract ideology, as a cause of inter-
rebel war. Several observers have contrasted the al-Nusra’s and ISIS’ approach and attitude 
toward the rest of the insurgent movement in the second half of 2013, before the outbreak of all-
out inter-rebel war: the former has been described as consensus-seeking, bent on respectful 
cooperation with other groups and prioritizing the fight against the regime, while the latter has 
been accused of being domineering and more interested in controlling territory and imposing its 
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version of sharia than defeating Assad.
670
 The corresponding hypothesis that the early 2014 
attack by a broad array of rebels on ISIS was a consequence of the group’s manifested 
aggressive/expansionist intentions cannot be dismissed as its assertive behavior and growth 
(which would have prompted a gamble for resurrection) went hand in hand; in other words, with 
the available evidence it is not possible to tell whether ISIS’ growth would have provoked a 
similar reaction had it behaved in a less threatening way. However, it should be recalled that 
window theory does not necessarily envision growth differentials between rebel groups that may 
cause windows of vulnerability as emerging exogenously. Rebel groups will often resort to 
salami tactics to acquire marginal advantages vis-à-vis rivals, while also trying to keep the levels 
of hostilities below a certain threshold to avoid all-out war; this is an important mechanism 
through which even rebel groups that are primarily interested in preserving their security 
concretely grasp the imperatives deriving from the anarchic environment in which they operate. 
Some groups (as arguably is the case with ISIS) may be especially effective, thanks to superior 
organizational skills and discipline, at capitalizing on the gains deriving from salami slicing and 
may thus end up inviting a preventive attack.    
I now turn to alternative explanations focused on the actions of external interveners and 
the government. As several observers have suggested, the existence of multiple sources of 
external funding for the rebellion, with foreign sponsors often competing for influence on the 
ground by supporting different groups, may have contributed to the proliferation of rebel 
organizations.
671
 However, I could not find any indication that foreign supporters encouraged 
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their local clients to fight each other rather than cooperate against the regime.
672
 Moreover, there 
are reasons to believe that third-party states’ leverage is limited. Most notably, after the 
designation by the United States of al-Nusra as a foreign terrorist organization in December 
2012, several groups affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and plausible candidates as recipients 
for Western military support refused to distance themselves from the organization and continued 
to conduct joint military operations.
673
  
 What about the role of Assad’s regime? There is no indication that the government tried 
to drive a wedge between rebel groups (let alone succeeded at it) by offering to negotiate with 
some organizations at the expense of others or by providing positive inducements for some 
groups to attack their rivals (for example in the form of weapons, financial support or reduced 
military pressure). By contrast, the evidence presented above suggests that the government 
contributed to create the window of opportunity exploited by ISIS from the summer of 2014 on 
by focusing the bulk of its offensive operations against other insurgent groups, thus generating a 
relatively permissive threat environment for the organization. It is not clear whether the prospect 
of inducing inter-rebel war factored in Assad’s calculus or his military strategy was determined 
only by the perception that other rebel groups represent a more serious threat, because of their 
positioning near strategic points (e.g., Aleppo rather than in the more remote east) and the 
possibility (albeit remote) that some of these groups could serve as ground forces in support of a 
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more forceful US intervention. In any case, as already discussed, the fact that the window of 
opportunity was endogenous to government’s decisions is not in itself problematic for window 
theory. My argument would be weakened only if there were evidence suggesting that the 
government’s decision was driven by some generalizable logic (rather than the ad hoc 
considerations mentioned above), which could suggest that the causal factors envisioned by 
window theory could be mere intervening variables in a more complex causal story.                   
 
Summary 
Window theory helps us make sense of inter-rebel dynamics in Syria. At the beginning, Sunni 
insurgent groups with a variety of ideological perspectives largely cooperated in their intense 
fight against the Assad regime as no organization had a clear edge over its rivals. ISIS’ arrival to 
Syria altered this equilibrium: the group soon started outgrowing its rivals, which came to 
perceive it as a threat; after months of heated debate, a coalition of rebel groups attacked ISIS in 
early 2014, in a pattern consistent with window of vulnerability logic. After initial defeats, ISIS 
managed to regroup and following its expansion in Iraq has been on the offensive against its 
Syrian counterparts from the summer of 2014. ISIS’ behavior seems consistent with window of 
opportunity logic as since the fall of Mosul the group has probably grown to become the 
strongest rebel group in Syria (and perhaps the strongest belligerent), while Damascus seems to 
have decided to focus its dwindling military resources on the rest of the insurgent movement.           
 
5. Conclusions 
The three case studies presented in this chapter provide preliminary evidence of the external 
validity of my argument. Window logics seem to drive armed groups’ behavior in a variety of 
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geo-political settings beyond Iraq and Ethiopia. The Lebanon case study corroborates the 
coethnicity hypothesis as infighting was more common among coethnics than non-coethnics. The 
available evidence of the intra-Maronite fight is fully consistent with window of opportunity 
logic: the Phalanges set to use force to become the hegemon in the Christian camp by attacking 
their weaker coethnic rival when the threat posed by Syria receded; the group then experienced 
no difficulty in rallying the Christian population to its side. By contrast, the ethnically diverse 
opposing coalition – the National Movement – did not experience significant infighting in the 
same period. Window theory cannot explain some episodes of inter-rebel war across ethnic lines 
after 1984 in Lebanon. In my analysis, I pointed to a widely noted feature of the case in the mid-
1980s – a “deep stalemate” – as a plausible explanation for the observed “anomaly” and a scope 
condition for my argument; empirical analysis of other cases will be needed to assess whether 
deep stalemates tend to weaken the causal dynamics envisioned by window theory.          
 The Sri Lanka case represents a poster child of sorts for window of opportunity logic, as 
the LTTE sequentially targeted its weaker Tamil rivals in phases of the civil war in which the 
government did not pose an imminent military threat.  
 Finally, the available – albeit admittedly limited – evidence suggests that window logic 
shaped the behavior the rebel groups pitted against the Assad regime in Syria. Importantly, a 
shared worldview did not prevent the jihadi groups al-Nusra and ISIS from coming to blows 
when the balance of power and threat environment prompted, respectively, to gamble for 
resurrection and launch a hegemonic bid.          
 The obvious limit of these case studies is that they cannot tell us much about how 
window theory travels beyond them. A skeptical reader may not help but wonder whether chance 
(or worse, cherry-picking) can explain the fit between my argument and the evidence. To address 
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these kinds of concerns, in the next chapter I turn to statistical analysis to test on a dataset of all 
rebel dyads in the post-Cold War era an observable implication of window theory: coethnic rebel 
























Assessing External Validity with Statistical Analysis: Are Coethnic Rebel Groups More 




This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of the external validity of window theory using 
an original dataset of dyads of rebel groups that combines three existing datasets. A full test of 
my argument would require fine grained measures of the inter-rebel balance of power and the 
threat environment faced by the insurgents – a far cry from the coarse-grained available data. As 
the case studies in the previous chapters made clear, the threat environment can rapidly change 
as a result of a government’s decision to launch a major offensive, which would not be reflected 
in slow-moving indicators of government strength like GDP and the size of the security forces. 
Similarly, a rebel group’s strength can sharply decline as it experiences problems of internal 
cohesion, but this change in the inter-rebel balance of power would not be necessarily captured 
by existing data on insurgent strength. It is, however, possible to test a key observable 
implication of my argument: other things being the same, dyads of coethnic rebel groups should 
be more likely to experience inter-rebel war than other dyads.  
I do include in the analysis variables measuring government and rebel strength, and the 
degree to which the security forces are stretched thin to deal with the insurgents – a proxy for the 
insurgents’ threat environment; however, due to the data limitations just discussed, I consider 
them more like control variables for my test of the coethnicity hypothesis than proper tests of the 
other components of window theory.  
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To preview my results, I find a robust positive association between rebel groups’ 
coethnicity and their propensity to fight each other. I also conduct a test of minimum winning 
coalition theory – the closest competing argument – with data compiled by Fotini Christia, but 
find no supporting evidence for it.
674
  
It should be noted that I do not have a specific identification strategy and thus the 
analysis below should be interpreted as providing evidence of correlation rather than causation. 
Reverse causality does not seem a major concern here, as it is hard to make a plausible case that 
the coethnicity of a dyad is being caused by it experiencing infighting (in particular given that 
coethnicity is time-invariant within dyads in the dataset). However, potential problems of 
omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out as easily. In particular, it could be the case that groups 
that emerge from the fragmentation of the same organization are likely to be coethnic and are 
also especially prone to fighting each other because of the disagreements that led to the split in 
the first place or recriminations provoked by the splintering itself. However, the qualitative 
evidence presented in the case studies offers grounds to believe that the statistical association I 
identify is not spurious, as I discuss below.     
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of my 
data, the source datasets and the variables included in my models. Section 3 presents the results 
of the statistical analysis. Section 4 concludes by summarizing the main results and discussing 
steps for further research.        
 
2. Data  
Unit of analysis. My units of analysis are dyads of rebel groups pitted against the same 
government in a multi-party civil war in a given year in the period 1989-2011, for a total of 
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 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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1,179 observations and 359 unique rebel dyads. The list of rebel groups and the years in which 
they were engaged in a civil war come from the Non-State Actor Data,
675
 which contains 
information on dyads of governments and rebel groups involved in civil wars and is based on the 
UCDP Dyadic Dataset.
676
   
Dependent variable. My dependent variable – inter-rebel war – is a dummy indicating 
whether the units of a rebel dyad engaged in armed conflict against each other in a given year 
resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths. This information, available for the post-1989 period, 
comes from the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset.
677
 This is not a perfect measure of inter-rebel 
war as defined in Chapter 2 – a purposeful, major violent clash between rebel organizations – as 
it cannot distinguish violence occurring under the direction of rebel leaders from skirmishes 
taking place at the initiative of foot soldiers or low-level commanders. However, the low number 
of episodes of inter-rebel war in the dataset (see below) suggests that that the dependent variable 
is likely not capturing skirmishes, which appear quite pervasive based on academic case studies 
and journalistic reports of specific episodes of multi-party civil wars.       
Unlike the dataset used in the only published study of inter-rebel war (coauthored by 
Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson), mine is dyadic, which is warranted by the dyadic nature of 
the coethnicity hypothesis.
678
 Despite the fact that both datasets rely on the same source data, the 
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two lists of inter-rebel war (the dependent variables in both studies) differ substantially: Fjelde 
and Nilsson report 87 rebel group-years characterized by inter-rebel war out of a total of 752 
observations, while my dataset includes only 19 rebel dyad-years of inter-rebel war out of 1,148 
observations. This discrepancy has several causes. First, as Fjelde and Nilsson’s dataset is 
monadic, any episode of inter-rebel war involving two rebel groups in the Non-state Actor 
Dataset is double-counted (once for each member of the dyad).
679
 Second, in order to maximize 
the number of observations, the authors include armed conflicts that occur between a rebel group 
and a faction of a rebel group, even if the latter has not yet reached the twenty-five battle-death 
threshold in the fight against the government and is thus not reported in the Non-State Actor and 
UCDP Dyadic datasets. Third, Fjelde and Nilsson include rebel groups that have been inactive in 
the anti-government struggle for up to five years (as long as the conflict has not ended with 
either a government or a rebel victory), since such a “rebel group exists and could potentially 
engage in interrebel fighting.”
680
 By contrast, as noted, I follow the Non-state Actor Dataset’s list 
of rebel groups and years in which they are considered as civil war belligerents. This is necessary 
as the information I need to code my control variables is available only for the groups in the 
Non-state Actor Dataset. Moreover, including rebel groups that have been inactive against the 
government for a long time or organizations that have yet to engage in sustained armed conflict 
against it would risk circumventing the theoretical puzzle motivating this dissertation: the 
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occurrence of large-scale fighting between non-state actors despite their common enmity 
(manifested in actual violent behavior, i.e., war) toward the government.         
Key independent variable. My main independent variable – coethnicity – indicates 
whether the organizations in a rebel dyad are “linked” to the same ethnic group. To code 
coethnicity I use the ACD2EPR data, which provides two measures of association between rebel 
organizations and ethnic groups: (1) whether the organization made claims to fight on behalf of 
an ethnic group and (2) whether it recruits from that group; these are similar, but not identical, to 
the conditions presented in Chapter 2 to code rebel groups’ ethnicity and used for the case 
studies.
 681
 The rebel groups in a dyad need to satisfy both of these conditions for the same ethnic 
group to be coded as coethnic. In one specification, I use as independent variable ethnic – a 
dummy indicating whether the civil war between the government and the rebels is fought along 
ethnic or ideological lines.
682
  
I conduct a rough test of the minimum winning coalition hypothesis with hegemonic – a 
dummy variable coded by Fotini Christia taking on 1 when one of the civil war belligerents (as it 
happens, the incumbent in all cases included in my dataset) has fifty-percent-plus-one of the total 
number of fighters in a civil war.
683
 Christia uses the variable to test the observable implication 
of her argument that civil wars in which the balance of power is consistently skewed toward a 
single actor should see relatively few changes in alliances. By extension, rebel dyads in 
hegemonic civil wars should be less likely to experience infighting as minimum winning 
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 Christia 2012, pp. 221-5 and 271-5.   
284 
 
coalition logic suggests that their members should stick together in the face of overwhelmingly 
powerful incumbent; thus hegemonic should enter the models with a negative sign.      
 Control variables. I include a number of control variables. The dummies balance and 
extreme weakness indicate, respectively, whether there is a rough balance of power between the 
members of a rebel dyad and whether one group is below the threshold of extreme weakness 
discussed in Chapter 2; the baseline category is preponderance, which indicates a stark 
imbalance of power between the members of the dyads without extreme weakness. Using 
information from the Non-state Actor Data, I operationalize extreme weakness as a situation in 
which one of the two rebel groups in a dyad has at least three times as many fighters as the other, 
while I code preponderance based on whether one group can marshal between two and three 
times as many fighters as the other.
684
 I expect balance and absolute weakness to enter the 
models with negative sign, as dyads with one of these two features should be less likely to 
experience infighting than dyads with a preponderant member.   
I proxy the extent to which the government poses a threat to rebel groups with 
overstretch, which measures the number of insurgent fighters pitted against a government in a 
given year across all dyads; I use rebel groups – a count of all rebel groups a government is 
facing in a given year – as an alternative measure. I expect these variables to have a positive 
sign. In some specifications I include the proxy for government strength military personnel, 
indicating the size of the armed forces (in thousands of men), which should display a negative 
sign. I also control for regime type with polity (ranging from -10 to 10 on the Polity scale) and 
anocracy (a dummy corresponding to scores between -5 and 5) as Fjelde and Nilsson find that 
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rebels fighting against mixed regimes are more prone to infighting.
685
 Finally, in some 
specifications I include external support and territorial control – dummies indicating, 
respectively, if one of the members of a rebel dyad was openly supported by another country and 
whether it controlled some territory, as Fjelde and Nilsson find a positive association between 




Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable       Mean        Standard Deviation        Min             Max 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Inter-rebel war            0.016              0.124                0               1 
Coethnic                   0.138              0.345                0               1 
       Ethnic civil war           0.926              0.262                0               1 
Extreme weakness           0.471              0.499                0               1 
Balance                    0.326              0.469                0               1 
Overstretch           27,647.17          35,521.84                 0         256,000 
Military personnel       917.182            865.377                3           3,400 
Rebel groups               5.719              2.861                2              11 
External support           0.511              0.500                0               1 
Territorial control        0.449              0.498                0               1 
Polity                     4.605              6.192               -9              10 
       Anocracy                           0.193              0.394                0               1 
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3. Analysis  
Due to the rarity of inter-rebel war in the dataset, I conduct the panel data analysis with rare-
event logit.
687
 I report robust standard errors clustered by civil war country in all specifications. 
Mindful of concerns about atheoretical, “garbage-can” models, I include in the analysis only a 
handful of key variables, which are related to window theory, the main alternative argument – 
minimum winning coalition (MWC) – or have been found to be significant predictor of 
infighting by Fjelde and Nilsson.688 
  Column 1 in Table 6.2 presents a simple bivariate analysis, where the dummy for ethnic 
civil war (between government and rebels, not between rebels) is not a significant predictor of 
inter-rebel war. Column 2 reports a bivariate model with the rebel coethnicity dummy, which is 
significant at the 0.1 level. In Column 3 I introduce two dummies measuring the inter-rebel 
balance of power – extreme weakness and balance – with preponderance as the omitted 
category; both have the expected negative sign but only balance reaches statistical significance. 
Coethnic is significant at the 0.01 level. Model 4 includes overstretch, a proxy for government 
threat, which has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant; the coethnicity 
dummy retains its significance level. Model 5 adds to the previous specification the size of the 
security forces, which has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 0.1 level; coethnic 
retains its significance and so does overstretch but the dummy indicating a roughly balanced 
distribution of power among members of a rebel dyad (balance) is no longer significant.        
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Table 6.2: Testing the coethnicity argument (I) 
 
Model                (1)           (2)              (3)              (4)            (5) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ethnic civil war   -0.980                                                                    
                  (-0.84)                                                                    
 
 
Coethnic                            1.335*          2.140***        2.334***        1.959**  
                                   (1.84)          (2.84)          (3.05)          (2.08)    
 
 
Extreme weakness                                   -0.975          -0.903          -0.307    
                                                  (-1.14)         (-1.08)         (-0.43)    
 
 
Balance                                            -1.366**        -1.383**        -0.673    
                                                  (-2.35)         (-2.29)         (-1.33)    
 
 
Overstretch                                                        0.00001**       0.00002*** 
                                                                  (2.41)          (3.09)    
 
                                                                    
Military personnel                                                                -0.002*   
                                                                                 (-1.67)    
 
                                                                                   
Constant          -3.195***       -4.384***       -3.976***       -4.674***       -4.334*** 
                  (-3.46)         (-5.81)         (-3.83)         (-4.15)         (-5.41)    
 
 
Observations       1,178          1,179  1050           1050          973 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01. 
 
Table 6.3 reports a series of models with additional controls. Coethnic remains 
statistically significant throughout all specifications, ranging from the 0.1 to 0.05 levels; the two 
dummies measuring the inter-rebel balance of power are never significant, while the measure of 
government forces’ overstretch retains significance (ranging from the 0.05 to the 0.01 level) and 
the size of security forces is significant in two specifications out of five at the 0.1 level. In model 
6, I replace overstretch with a count of the rebel groups pitted against the government (rebel 
groups), but the variable is not significant. In models 7 and 8 I introduce, respectively, the 
dummies for rebels’ external support and territorial control, neither of which approaches 
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statistical significance. Models 9 and 10 include polity and anocracy, respectively; only the latter 
is significant (at the 0.1 level), with a positive sign that confirms Fjelde and Nilsson‘s finding.  
   
Table 6.3: Testing the coethnicity argument (II) 
 
Model                  (6)            (7)              (8)             (9)             (10)      
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic              1.600**         1.969**         1.973*          1.912**         2.081**  
                     (2.31)          (1.99)          (1.69)          (2.17)          (2.37)    
 
 
Extreme weakness     -0.772           0.132          -0.340          -0.199           0.054    
                    (-0.69)          (0.18)         (-0.39)         (-0.27)          (0.07)    
 
 
Balance              -0.877          -0.237          -0.702          -0.829          -0.581    
                    (-1.23)         (-0.41)         (-1.10)         (-1.60)         (-1.08)    
 
 
Rebel groups         -0.268                                                                    
                    (-0.90)                                                                    
 
 
Military personnel   -0.001          -0.003          -0.002*         -0.003*         -0.001    
                    (-0.69)         (-0.93)         (-1.73)         (-1.91)         (-0.55)    
 
 
Overstretch                           0.00001**       0.00002***      0.00002***      0.00001**  
                                     (2.23)          (3.12)          (2.84)          (2.44)    
 
 
External support                      1.053                                                    
                                     (0.91)                                                    
 
 
Territorial control                                   0.014                                    
                                                     (0.02) 
                                                                                         
                                                      
Polity                                                               -0.030                   
                             (-0.58) 
  
                                                                                       
Anocracy                                                                              1.404*   
 
  
                                                                                    (1.85)    
Constant            -2.377**         -5.169***       -4.272***       -4.103***       -5.341*** 
                   (-1.96)          (-4.84)         (-3.85)         (-6.01)         (-7.29)   
  
 
Observations         973   969    970     948      970 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 




The magnitude of the effect of coethnicity varies considerably across models (see Table 
6.4).
689
 In models 3 and 4, the probability of inter-rebel war is over 10 percentage points higher 
for a coethnic dyad than for a non-coethnic dyad, with all other variables set at their median; in 
model 5 (which adds as the size of the security forces to the controls included in model 4) 
coethnic dyads face a risk 0.3 percent points higher than their non-coethnic counterparts. Even 
this much smaller effect, however, is not trivial if one considers that the baseline probability of 




For the purpose of comparison, I now turn to a discussion of the magnitude of the other 
effects that reach statistical significance in at least two specifications. Based on the results of 
model 4, dyads characterized by a balanced distribution of power are about 1.3 percentage points 
less likely to experience infighting other things being equal, but, as noted, balance is significant 
only in two specifications. A change in overstretch from the 50
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile (i.e., from 
a situation in which the government faces a combined insurgent force of 18,000 compared to 
26,000 fighters) is associated with an increase in the risk of inter-rebel war of 0.1 percentage 
points. The same percentile shift for the number of security personnel (from to 590,000 to 
1,300,000 troops), other things being equal, is associated with a reduction in the risk of inter-
rebel war of 0.6 percentage points.         
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 The estimated probability of inter-rebel war in model 5 for a coethnic dyad with all other variables set at their 
median is 0.33 percentage points, while the corresponding risk for a non-coethnic dyad is almost an order of 
magnitude smaller (0.04).  
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Table 6.4: Changes in the probability of inter-rebel war using Clarify 
 
Variable                      First difference               95 percent confidence interval 
                               (percentage) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic (model 3)                11.3                            [2.7                28.1] 
Coethnic (model 4)                10.4                            [2.2                27.7] 
   Coethnic (model 5)                 0.3                            [0.003               1.3] 
   Balance (model 4)                                 -1.3                         [-6.5            -0.05] 
   Overstretch (model 4)                          -0.1                            [-0.4             -0.02]  
   Military personnel (model 9)         -0.6                            [-2.1              -0.1] 
 
Note: The marginal effects for the non-dichotomous variables (overstretch and military personnel) are calculated for 
a change from the 50
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the variable. All variables are held at their median value for the 
estimation of the marginal effect of the variable of interest. As the package Clarify does not support the rare event 
logit model, the reported marginal effects are based on ordinary logit models, whose estimates in any case do not 
differ substantially from those obtained with rare event logits. 
 
 
Table 6.5 reports as series of tests of minimum winning coalition theory’s implication for 
inter-rebel war. The hegemonic dummy indicates whether the government is the strongest 
belligerent (i.e., it controls fifty-percent-plus-one of the total manpower of fighters in a civil war) 
and should have negative sign as rebel groups should refrain from infighting when facing a very 
powerful common enemy. The variable, however, has inconsistent sign and is not significant 
either in the bivariate specification or with the inclusion of various controls. By contrast, 
coethnic retains statistical significance in the models including hegemonic. 








Table 6.5: Testing minimum winning coalition theory 
 
Model              (11)              (12)           (13)            (14)             (15)    
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Hegemonic          -0.337           0.606           0.309          -0.263          -0.423 
                  (-0.35)          (0.52)          (0.40)         (-0.30)         (-0.43) 
 
 
Polity                             -0.127* 
                                  (-1.73) 
 
 
Anocracy                                            1.671* 
                                                   (1.94) 
 
 
Coethnic                                                            1.283*          2.277*** 
                                                                   (1.81)          (3.02) 
 
 
Extreme weakness                                                                   -0.976 
                                                                                  (-1.05) 
 
 
Balance                                                                            -1.424** 
                                                                                  (-2.31) 
 
Overstretch                                                                         0.00001* 
            (1.95) 
 
                                                                                    
Constant           -3.756***       -4.243***       -4.671***       -4.094***       -4.187*** 
                  (-5.95)         (-4.54)         (-5.19)         (-5.02)         (-2.88) 
 
 
Observations     1089      979        1089  1089     979 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 




The evidence presented above provides some confidence in the external validity of window 
theory. The fact that the positive sign for the coethnicity dummy is robust across specifications 
suggests that the pattern of coethnic rebel groups’ propensity to infighting observed in the case 
studies is likely to characterize a broader set of civil wars than those analyzed in the previous 
chapters.  
For the book project that will follow this dissertation, I intend to code two new variables, 
indicating, respectively, whether the members of a dyad share the same political ideology and 
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whether they were originally part of the same organization. The co-ideology variable would 
allow me to assess whether there is something specific about ethnicity or similar dynamics apply 
to rebel groups with overlapping bases of support defined in ideological terms. The splinter 
variable would permit me to directly address the omitted variable concern mentioned above:  
groups that emerge from the same “mother” organization are likely to be coethnic and may be 
prone to fighting each other due to the continuation of the conflict that brought about the split or 
tensions generated by the splintering process.  
In any case, the qualitative evidence presented in the case studies provides strong reasons 
to believe that the association between coethnicity and inter-rebel war is not spurious – i.e., a 
mere reflection of the plausible link between splintering processes and inter-rebel fighting. First, 
all of the cases presented in the previous chapters feature dyads of rebel groups that fought each 
other but had not been part of the same organization originally: for example, the PUK and the 
Communist Party in Iraqi Kurdistan, the TPLF and its rivals in Tigray, the Maronite militias in 
Lebanon, the LTTE and the EPRLF in Sri Lanka, and ISIS and the array of groups pitted against 
it (apart from al-Nusra).  
Second, and more crucial, the available evidence does not reveal different dynamics at 
play across dyads of rebel groups that originated from the same organization and those that did 
not: for example, the violent competition between the PUK and the Socialist Party (a PUK’s 
offshoot) mirrored relations between the PUK and the Communist Party; similarly, the ELF 
leadership set out to nip in the bud the fledgling ELM and the EPLF as it saw both as a challenge 
to its hegemonic role in the Eritrean liberation struggle, regardless of the fact that the former 









Inter-rebel war generally entails enormous costs and risks for rebel groups. It diverts scarce 
resources from the fight against the government, which is typically the strongest belligerent; 
moreover, infighting risks to fatally weaken the insurgent movement, thus handing on a silver 
platter opportunities to make military gains and, in the worst case scenario, achieve outright 
victory to the incumbent. However, I argue, there are two scenarios in which the costs and risks 
of inter-rebel war are likely to be more than compensated by the resulting benefits – windows of 
opportunity and vulnerability.  
Windows of opportunity are situations in which a rebel group faces weaker coethnic 
rivals and the government does not pose an immediate and serious threat. The strong group 
would thus be tempted to use force to eliminate its rivals, i.e., launch a hegemonic bid. The 
favorable balance of power and the limited threat posed by the government ensure that the risks 
and costs of infighting would be kept at acceptably low levels. On the other hand, coethnicity 
promises significant benefits: due to coethnic rebel organizations’ overlapping bases of support, 
the group that comes out on top can typically absorb the resources previously under the control 
of the defeated rivals (in particular, their tax bases and recruitment pools); infighting can thus 
strengthen the victor, which would then be in a better position to face the government. Moreover, 
getting rid of coethnic rivals holds the promise of improving the threat environment of the 
would-be hegemon, as the other groups at some point down the road could have been tempted to 
use force.           
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 Windows of vulnerability are situations in which a rebel group faces a mounting threat 
posed by coethnic rivals or a drastic decline of its power relative to those rivals, while the 
government poses an immediate and serious threat and/or the group does not occupy an 
especially favorable position in the inter-rebel balance of power. In this scenario, if no other 
solution appears feasible, the group would be tempted to resort to force or initiate a course of 
action likely to lead to war in a desperate attempt to overcome its predicament – i.e., gamble for 
resurrection. 
 The rest of this concluding chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an 
overview of window theory’s fit with the empirical evidence presented in the dissertation. 
Section 2 discusses window theory’s relation to Realist theories of international politics. Section 
3 draws policy implications for intervention in civil wars and counterinsurgency.  
 
1. Window Theory’s Empirical Record  
Overall, the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 3-6 of this dissertation provides strong, if 
still preliminary, support for window theory of inter-rebel war. In geo-political contexts as 
diverse as those surrounding the civil wars in Iraq, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Syria, rebel 
groups tend to fight each other when windows of opportunity or vulnerability are open, but tend 
to eschew infighting in the absence of windows. The available decision-making evidence (in 
particular for the Iraq and Ethiopia cases, for which I had access to former rebel leaders) 
indicates that rebel groups perceive the incentives provided by the environment in which they 
operate in ways consistent with window theory: they pay close attention to the inter-rebel 
balance of power and its trends as well as to government’s military strength, resolve and 
strategy; they instrumentally use force to eliminate coethnic competitors in the rebel movement; 
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they bide their time when weak but growing; and they diligently search for alternatives to the use 
of force to deal with mounting threats or declines in relative power in situations in which 
infighting would be very costly or risky. Moreover, my statistical analysis of all rebel dyads in 
the post-Cold War era confirms window theory’s observable implication that, other things being 
equal, coethnic rebel groups should be more likely to fight each other. Case study evidence also 
confirms that rebel groups can easily operate in areas previously controlled by coethnic rivals, 
they can recruit and extract resources from the local population and usually attract large 
segments of the defeated coethnic group’s rank-and-file. 
 As Table 7.1 below shows, windows of opportunity seem to constitute the most common 
path to inter-rebel war: 12 instances of infighting out of a total of 24 episodes in my case studies 
are hegemonic bids primarily driven by window of opportunity logic.
691
 I consider three 
additional fights as potential cases of hegemonic bids, as their broad outlines are consistent with 
window theory but I only have limited information or some features of the event in question are 
highly idiosyncratic.
692
 Three episodes of inter-rebel war constitute gambles for resurrection 
prompted by windows of vulnerability.
693
     
                                                          
691




 LTTE vs. PLOT is an ambiguous case of hegemonic bid as the much weaker PLOT complied with the Tigers’ 
ultimatum to leave the Jaffna peninsula after a limited show of force (the LTTE killed or disarmed several PLOT’s 
members, including the group’s military commander in Jaffna) and an earlier decisive defeat inflicted on another 
Tamil rebel group (TELO). The absence of large-scale fighting is puzzling for window theory as I generally do not 
expect rebel groups to just abandon the field when faced by a stronger rival without actually being defeated. 
Consistent with window of opportunity logic, the Amal vs. Hezbollah and Aoun’s forces vs. Lebanese Forces 
episodes pitted coethnic rebel groups against each other in a context of limited government threat; however, the 
evidence suggesting the existence of a marked imbalance of power in favor of the initiator is very limited (also note 
that the Amal vs. Hezbollah case may amount to a combination of windows of opportunity and vulnerability as 
Amal may have been stronger when it attacked Hezbollah but its power advantage was rapidly fading). See Chapter 




 In Table 7.1., I consciously select on the dependent variable for presentation purposes; the case studies, however, 
trace the independent variables both when inter-rebel war occurs and when inter-rebel peace prevails.  
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Table 7. 1: Summary of inter-rebel wars by type and outcome 
 
Hegemonic bids                                                                                             Outcome                     t   
Barzani vs. Ahmed-Talabani, 1964                                                               Success 
ELF vs. ELM, 1965                                                                                       Success                                             
ELF vs. EPLF, 1972                                                                                      Failure 
ELF vs. ELF-PLF, 1978                                                                                Success 
EPLF vs. ELF, 1980                                                      Success 
TPLF vs. TLF, 1975                               Success  
TPLF vs. Teranafit, 1976*                                                                             Success 
TPLF vs. EPRP, 1978                                                                                    Success 
Phalanges vs. Tigers, 1980                                                                            Success 
LTTE vs. TELO, 1986                                                                                   Success 
LTTE vs. EPRLF, 1986                                                                                 Success 
ISIS vs. anti-ISIS coalition, 2014                                                                   Partial success  
 
Resurrection gambles                                                                                     Outcome                    t    
PUK vs. KDP, 1978                                                                                        Failure  
PUK vs. National Democratic Front, 1983                                                    Partial success 
Anti-ISIS rebel coalition vs. ISIS, 2014                                                         Failure 
 
Potential hegemonic bids                                                                                Outcome                   e                     
LTTE vs. PLOT, 1986                                                                                    Success  
Amal vs. Hezbollah, 1988*                                    Failure                                  
Aoun’s forces vs. Lebanese Forces, 1989                                                       Partial success 
 
Failed predictions                                                                                            Outcome                  e                     
EDU vs. TPLF, 1976                                                                                       Attacker’s defeat 
TPLF vs. ELF, 1979                                                                                        Attacker’s victory                                                                                                   
Amal & Progressive Socialist Party vs. Mourabitoun, 1985     Attackers’ victory 
Amal vs. Progressive Socialist Party & PLO, 1985                                        Attacker’s failure 
ISIS vs. Northern Storm, 2013                                                                        Attacker’s success 
 
Indeterminate prediction                                                                                  Outcome                  e 
Al-Nusra vs. Hazm Movement and Syrian Revolutionary Front, 2014          Attacker’s success 
 
Note: This table reports all 24 instances of inter-rebel war encountered in the case studies in Chapters 3-5, divided 
by typology (hegemonic bids and resurrection gambles) or the extent to which window theory can explain them. 
“Outcome” refers to the observed results of inter-rebel war. For hegemonic bids, “success” means the attacker 
crushed its target(s), while “partial success” indicates that the initiator made significant battlefield gains but did not 
completely obliterate its rival(s); “failure” denotes cases in which the attacker did not apparently manage to even 
weaken its target(s). For resurrection gambles, “failure” indicates cases in which the initiator did not achieve any 
improvement in its position and was in fact weakened in the process; “partial success” is a situation in which the 
gamble for resurrection only addressed some of the sources of the initiator’s vulnerability. For failed and 
indeterminate predictions, “attacker’s defeat” and “attacker’s victory” indicate, respectively, instances in which the 
target of the attack militarily defeated the initiator and vice versa; “attacker’s failure” is a situation in which the 
attacker did not even achieve the objective of weakening the target(s), which would constitute “attacker’s success.”           
* denotes cases where both windows of opportunity and vulnerability were likely present.  
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The relative prevalence of hegemonic bids is unsurprising: rebel groups tend to eagerly 
exploit temporary advantages in the balance of power or improvements in the threat environment 
to expand the resources at their disposal and get rid of threatening rivals on the cheap. By 
contrast, rebel groups embark on gambles for resurrection reluctantly, only after making sure that 
no alternative solution to their relative decline or the mounting threat they face exists – after all, 
to paraphrase, Otto von Bismarck, insurgents don’t commit suicide for fear of death.  
Also unsurprisingly, hegemonic bids tend to be successful. Out of the 12 clear-cut instances of 
hegemon bid, the initiator of the attack achieved the goal of getting rid of its weaker rivals in 10 
cases, while only one episode represents an outright failure, as the initiator did not even manage 
to weaken its rival (ELF vs. EPLF, 1972); the episode involving ISIS and a broad coalition of 
Syrian insurgent groups from the summer of 2014 amounts to a mixed success, as ISIS managed 
to wrest substantial amount of territory from its rivals but did not crush them. By contrast, two 
out of three gambles for resurrection resulted in failure: in 1978, the KDP dealt a serious blow to 
the PUK when the latter tried to establish a supply route to Syria near the KDP’s stronghold; and 
the anti-ISIS coalition failed to defeat ISIS, which then managed to recuperate and become much 
stronger. The PUK’s attack on the groups of the National Democratic Front (the KDP, the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party) in 1983 represents a partial success, as the PUK 
expelled its rivals from the group’s stronghold but continued to be in such a vulnerable position 
that shortly afterwards it had to seek an accommodation with the Iraqi government.      
 
Unexplained cases of inter-rebel war 
The case studies identity five instances of inter-rebel war that window theory predicts should not 
have taken place and one instance in which the theory does not make a specific prediction. Four 
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of the failed predictions occurred across ethnic lines (rather than within, as the coethnicity 
hypothesis suggests), while the fifth one saw ISIS attack the Free Syrian Army-affiliated 
Northern Brigade in a context in which the former was growing stronger but did not have enough 
power vis-à-vis the overall rebel movement to launch a hegemonic bid.  
These failed predictions are important reminders of both the probabilistic nature of my 
claims and of the need for future work aimed at identifying additional hypotheses and refining 
scope conditions. But it is also important to point out that the features of these episodes of inter-
rebel war significantly mitigate their impact as falsification blows for window theory.  
Before turning to a discussion of each of the five failed predictions, the instance of inter-
rebel war that is not predicted by window theory but also does not contradict it (hence its label as 
“indeterminate prediction” in Table 7.1) should be mentioned – the al-Nusra’s attack on the 
Hazm Movement and the Syrian Revolutionary Front in late 2014-early 2015. We would not 
expect Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate to engage in inter-rebel aggression at that time, given that it was 
already involved in a difficult two-front war against ISIS and the Syrian government. However, 
the two groups were also receiving significant military support from the United States, which 
was conducting bombing operations against al-Nusra. This fact implies that al-Nusra and its two 
targets were simultaneously on the same side of a war (against Assad’s regime and ISIS) and on 
opposite sides (in the US campaign against the al-Qaeda affiliate); in this kind of intricate 
situation, window theory would not make a specific prediction about al-Nusra’s behavior 
towards the two groups.   
 EDU vs. TPLF. The fight between EDU and TPLF is anomalous as it involved two 
groups coded as non-coethnic, due to the EDU’s ethnically mixed membership and its political 
agenda not explicitly focused on Tigray (unlike the TPLF’s). However, both groups successfully 
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recruited Tigrayan peasants in their ranks and thus effectively competed over a common pool of 
resources. It thus seems plausible that, in the specific political context of Tigray in the wake of 
the collapse of imperial authority, the EDU had enough of a Tigrayan character (due its 
connection to the symbolic Tigrayan leader Ras Mengesha) to trigger the kinds of competitive 
dynamics with the TPLF that I expect to characterize relations between coethnic groups. 
Generating some “false negatives” may well be an inevitable drawback of adopting sufficiently 
abstract and general coding criteria to sooth concerns about “retroactive” coding and 
falsifiability.       
TPLF vs. ELF. The other episode of inter-rebel war between non-coethnics in Ethiopia 
pitted the TPLF against the ELF. The two groups clashed first in Tigray, when the TPLF 
intercepted an ELF’s contingent escorting EPRP’s survivors from an earlier encounter with the 
TPLF, and then in Eritrea, when the TPLF helped its Eritrean ally – the EPLF – in the latter’s 
hegemonic bid against the ELF. Without a doubt, this is an instance of inter-rebel taking place 
across ethnic lines. However, the dynamics of the case suggests the existence of a mechanism 
that, while not envisioned by window theory, does not contradict it – the transmission of intra-
ethnic disputes to non-coethnic dyads through a system of inter-ethic alliances (a variant of the 
logic of “the friend of my enemy is my enemy”). Both the TPLF and the ELF forged relations 
with rebel groups across the Tigray-Eritrea ethnic divide: the TPLF cooperated with the EPLF 
for a long period of time, while the ELF, bereft of other allies in Tigray, eventually provided help 
to the EPRP. As tensions between coethnic rebel groups (expected by window theory) escalated, 
the ELF and the TPLF found themselves dragged into a fight across ethnic lines on the side of 
their allies.   
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Amal & Progressive Socialist Party vs. Mourabitoun; Amal vs. Progressive Socialist 
Party & PLO. In 1985, Lebanon’s Shia group Amal was involved in two episodes of infighting 
that unambiguously occurred across ethnic lines. First, it ganged up with the Druze Progressive 
Socialist Party against the Sunni Mourabitoun militia; then it fought against the joint forces of 
the Progressive Socialist Party and the PLO. As I have argued at some length in Chapter 5, these 
episodes took place in the context of a deep stalemate – a situation in which neither side in the 
broader civil war had a reasonable prospect of making significant gains on the battlefield, let 
alone achieve outright military victory. Under these circumstances, the structural constraints to 
inter-rebel war across ethnic lines (namely, prohibitively high costs and serious risks) envisioned 
by my theory are likely to be relatively weak and thus we should expect to observe episodes of 
inter-rebel war caused by other factors, such as the prospect of even modest marginal gains, 
third-parties’ incitement and idiosyncratic impulses like personality clashes and ideological 
differences. Future empirical research will need to assess whether deep stalemates are in fact a 
valid scope condition of window theory by examining a wider range of cases.   
 ISIS vs. Northern Storm. When ISIS attacked the Free Syrian Army’s affiliate Northern 
Storm in September 2013, the former’s power was on the rise, but the group was probably not 
strong enough to launch a hegemonic bid against the entire rebel movement, i.e., ISIS was not 
facing a window of opportunity. Circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that ISIS may have 
intended to fight a limited war with the weaker Northern Storm for control of Azaz, a town on 
the border with Turkey that the rebel movement used as a gateway to the outside word, without 
provoking a broader war with other groups. If this interpretation is correct, the ISIS’ attack 
would constitute a variant of the salami tactics discussed several times in this dissertation: a 
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limited use of force to gain a marginal advantage over rivals without initiating all-out war, 
which, however, does carry some risk of inadvertent escalation.
694
    
 
3. Which Realism? 
Window theory clearly belongs to the Realist paradigm, given its depiction of inter-rebel 
relations as a competition for power and security in anarchic environment.
695
 It is nonetheless 
helpful to discuss similarities and differences between my argument and various theories in the 
realist family.  
Window theory is a structural or systemic argument (like Waltz’ and Mearsheimer’s), as 
it explains the behavior of rebel groups as a function of the incentives provided by the 
environment (the “system”) to “units” that, at a minimum, are interested in their survival and in 
advancing their political-military struggle against the government. The structure in which rebel 
groups are immersed, however, is not made up of material factors only, but also ideational ones – 
namely, a set of inter-subjective identities possessed by the various civil war belligerents. 
Identities are typically multi-dimensional and they are socially constructed, but these facts do not 
make their effects less real. Complex political processes (and violence across ethnic lines, in 
particular) make certain identities highly salient, so that they become very “sticky” during civil 
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wars and powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and rebel groups – “they confront actors 
as objective social facts with real, objective ‘material’ effects.”
696
 
 Shared ethno-national identity (coethnicity) both whets rebel groups’ expansionary 
appetites and fuels their security concerns. The existence of overlapping bases of support means 
that inter-rebel aggression can succeed on the cheap and enable the victor’s acquisition of more 
resources. In this context, even groups that would in principle prefer to not get involved in 
infighting may opt for the use of force when an opportunity emerges, lest they are victimized 
down the road under changed circumstances. Disentangling predatory and security-seeking 
motives is made even more complicated by the presence of the other civil war side – the 
government. Inter-rebel aggression motivated by a group’s desire to expand (rather than 
preventive self-defense from a rival) may be deeply rooted in the fear induced by the 
incumbent’s overwhelming power and the ensuing realization that more resources are needed to 
deal with it. 
The fact that window theory envisions rebel groups as harboring mixed motives does not 
place it in either camp in the debate between offensive and defensive realists. Jack Snyder made 
this point convincingly:  
“Both offensive and defensive realists believe that states are motivated by both 
expansionist and security goals. To some extent it is a debate about the incentives that 
international anarchy creates for states. Offensive realists tend to believe that offensive 
action is more necessary for self-defense than defensive realists believe it is, but the two 
schools’ divergence on this point should not be exaggerated… This is a dispute not about 
theoretical principles but about empirical probabilities. It is as if defensive realists think 
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In this sense, when coethnic rebel groups are in physical proximity, window theory 
depicts a world that more closely resembles the one envisioned by offensive realists, in which 
security is scarce, calculated aggression often pays off and thus even insurgents that are mostly 
motivated by fear and security concerns tend to behave as expansionists. The conflict of interest 
between coethnics is real and typically does not merely result from interactions fraught with 
misperceptions: the combination of anarchy and cumulable resources provides rebel groups with 
strong incentives to undertake offensive initiatives. Negative interactions (like the skirmishes 
that so often characterize relations between coethnic rebel groups not engaged in al-out war 
against each other) can certainly make things worse by enhancing threat perception; but to an 
important extent they represent the mechanisms through which rebel groups concretely grasp 
structural imperatives (i.e., they understand the logic of the situation) and reveal, rather than 
cause, underlying conflict.  
Some situations encountered in the case studies do more closely resemble defensive 
realists’ spiral dynamics. In particular, when weak rebel groups form a defensive alliance to 
balance against a stronger organization, the latter may not help but perceive a deterioration of its 
threat environment. This sort of hostile encirclement can contribute to the emergence of windows 
of vulnerability and inter-rebel war, as in the case of the 1983 PUK’s attack on the National 
Democratic Front. It should be noted, however, that this is a “deep” security dilemma, a situation 
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in which hardly any attempt at showing good will can really convince the other without exposing 




4. Policy Implications 
Understanding the causes of inter-rebel war is clearly important for policy. Civilian and military 
decision-makers will typically want to be informed about the likelihood of infighting and 
available options to induce cooperation or conflict between rebels when contemplating 
intervention in ongoing civil wars or choosing counterinsurgency strategies. Window theory and 
the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation offer several important insights for 
policymakers dealing with challenges associated with civil war termination, counterinsurgency 
and external interventions.  
First, and perhaps most obvious, window theory identifies a set of specific factors that 
affect the risk of inter-rebel war and that, therefore, policy-makers should pay close attention to. 
The argument and supporting evidence do more than simply reminding policymakers that both 
power and identity matter: they point to a particular power-driven logic of inter-rebel war and 
correspondingly cast doubt on alternative arguments (e.g., minimum winning coalition logic). 
Policymakers are probably more receptive than most political scientists to the notion that ethno-
national identities, far from being epiphenomenal, powerfully affect civil war dynamics. But this 
dissertation cautions them against inferring from the power of ethnic identity that coethnic rebel 
groups will tend to cooperate. In fact, the forces that push individuals to favor coethnics and 
cooperate at higher rates with them (i.e., to display ethnic parochialism) spur rebel groups with 
overlapping bases of support into fighting each other. The point that ethno-national rebel 
movements should not be treated as monoliths is perhaps not particularly surprising in the wake 
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of the fight between ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria in 2014-15 – two groups appealing to the same 
Sunni Arab constituency. This dissertation, however, advises against explaining away this 
episode as a mere reflection of the fanaticism of ISIS – a “group too extreme even for Al-
Qaida”:
699
 coethnic groups tend to fight each other in a broad range of cases and the ideological 
outlooks of the two organizations are hardly distinguishable (which is not surprising given that 
the Islamic State of Iraq – ISIS’ predecessor – created al-Nusra in 2011).     
Second, policymakers should not be too sanguine about easily influencing inter-rebel 
relations, as their leverage is limited and there are serious risks of unintended results. Interveners 
and local governments could in principle persuade rebel groups to fight each other or cooperate 
by promising rewards or threatening punishment. However, there is little evidence consistent 
with the implied conception of rebel groups as pawns in the hands of experienced government 
chess masters. In fact, the case studies suggest that rebel groups do not tend to do governments’ 
bidding if that entails a significant deviation from their preferred course of action. For example, 
the Sudanese government’s efforts to make the Eritrean fronts reconcile went nowhere; New 
Delhi did not manage to prevent fighting between the Sri Lankan Tamil; and the United States 
largely failed to convince much of Syria’s Sunni rebel movement to distance itself from al-
Nusra.    
Third, the dynamics postulated by window theory pose major constraints to governments’ 
ability to foster the growth of favorite rebel groups and weaken especially unpalatable ones. 
Leaving aside operational difficulties involved in ensuring limited spill-over of aid to other 
organizations, selectively providing support to a subset of rebel groups – i.e., “picking winners” 
– risks creating windows of vulnerability for other groups, which could then respond by 
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 Similarly, the prospect of direct external military intervention 
(with airpower or ground forces) in support of a subset of rebel groups may be perceived by 
other groups as a mounting threat, which can warrant the use of force to weaken the local allies 
of the intervener. For example, Tehran’s support for the KDP and direct intervention in Iraqi 
Kurdistan prompted the PUK’s gamble for resurrection in 1983; a similar dynamic may have 
been at play in al-Nusra’s attack on the main recipients of US military aid among Syrian 
insurgents – the Hazm Movement and the Syrian Revolutionary Front – when the United States 
started bombing the al-Qaeda’s affiliate in 2014. This is not to say that picking winners is 
doomed to failure, but that the would-be interveners should incorporate in their plans measures 
to counter the unintended effects suggested by windows theory (e.g., avoid slow and gradual 
interventions in support of local allies, so as to reduce the risk that local opponents would have 
enough time to crush them).                
Given that rebel groups are highly responsive to the opening and closing of windows of 
opportunity and vulnerability, one may reasonably wonder whether governments could indirectly 
influence the behavior of rebel groups in desired directions, by manipulating the factors that give 
rise to windows. However, several considerations suggest limited leeway here too. Local 
governments could create windows of opportunity by providing weapons or money to some 
groups and reducing military pressure on them, thus creating a permissive threat environment for 
infighting. However, whether rebel groups would take the bait remains an open question, as they 
may fear an opportunistic government attack when the insurgent movement is the throes of 
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infighting; in the case studies presented in this dissertation, the limited government threat 
associated with hegemonic bids tended to be a function of hard-to-fake government’s political or 
military constraints to power-projection, rather than clever maneuvers. Creating a window of 
vulnerability by providing support to a subset of rebel groups (i.e., something observationally 
similar to picking a winner) may be the most effective way to provoke infighting, but when this 
strategy is adopted by a local government it runs into the problem of limited willingness on the 
part of rebel groups to be seen as colluding with the enemy
701
 and may also entail significant 
political costs for the incumbent in the form of outbidding efforts by hardliners on the 
government’s side. External interveners may be in a better position to trigger and sustain inter-
rebel war by appearing to be picking winners and then adjusting the level and direction of 
support to ensure that no group comes out on top. This strategy, however, would be sensible only 
if the third-parties’ goal is in fact simply promoting infighting rather than propping up a local 
ally or weakening an enemy. Moreover, there is no guarantee that inter-rebel war would continue 
if the rebel groups realize they are stuck in a costly stalemate that is only serving someone else’s 
interests.    
In sum, window theory does not provide policymakers with ready-made blueprints for 
action. It does, however, provide them with a framework to think about the specific policy 
challenge they may be facing, it distills key causal factors, it identifies corresponding potential 




                                                          
701
 Paul Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-






Abbay, Alemseged, Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity? The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean 
and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998). 
 
 
Abraham, Antoine J., The Lebanon War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). 
 
 
Achen, Christopher H., “Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Probits Where They Belong,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Research 22 (4), 2005: 327–39. 
 
 
Adamson, David, The Kurdish War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964). 
 
 
Akcinaroglu, Seden, “Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56 (5), 2012: 879-903. 
 
 
“Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: a Cold War in Raqqa,” Damascus 
Bureau, December 18, 2013 (available at http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=6176, last 
accessed on June 15, 2015).    
 
 
Alam, Asadollah, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s  oyal Court,     -1977 
(New York: Tauris, 1991).  
 
 
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (New 
York: Routledge, 2008).  
 
 
Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” Current 
Trends in Islamist Ideology 16, Hudson Institute, 2014a. 
 
 
Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “Special Report: Northern Storm and the Situation in Azaz 
(Syria),” Middle  ast  eview of International Affairs/MERIA Journal 28 (4), 2014b.   
 
 
Aregawi, Berhe, A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front:  evolt, Ideology, 





Arriola, Leonardo R., “Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic 
Societies,” World Politics 65 (2), 2013: 233–72. 
 
 
Ashim, Ahmed S., When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tiger 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
 
 
Avon, Dominique, Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
 
 




Badran, Tony, “Lebanon’s Militia Wars,” in Barry Rubin, ed., Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and 
Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2009).  
 
 
Bakke, Kristin M., Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Lee J. M. Seymour. “A Plague of 




Balanche, Fabrice, “L’Inflexible Progression del’Etat Islamique,” Libération, 3 October, 2014a.   
 
 
Balanche, Fabrice “Insurrection, Contre-insurrection et Communautés,” Geostrategic Maritime 
Review 4, 2014b. 
 
 
Balanche, Fabrice, “L’Insurrection Syrienne et la Guerre des Cartes,” OrientXXI, 24 October 
2013 (available at http://orientxxi.info/magazine/l-insurrection-syrienne-et-la,0397, last accessed 
on June 20, 2015).  
 
 
Balcells, Laia and Patricia Justino, “Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and 
Political Violence: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 
(8), 2014: 1343-59. 
 
 
Balcells, Laia and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter?, Severity, Duration, and Outcomes 





Bapat, Navin A. and Kanisha D. Bond, “Alliances between Militant Groups,” British Journal of 
Political Science 42 (4), 2012: 793-824.    
 
 
Barnard, Anne and Tim Arango, “Using Violence and Persuasion, ISIS Makes Political Gains,” 
New York Times, 3 June, 2015.  
 
 




Barnard, Anne, “Dual Threat Has Mainstream Syrian Rebels Fearing Demise: Facing Both ISIS 
Militants and Bashar al-Assad’s Forces in Syria,” New York Times, 15 August, 2014. 
 
 
Basil, Yousuf, Mohammed Tawfeeq and Ray Sanchez, “Al Qaeda Boss Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Calls for Halt to Jihadist Infighting,” CNN, 3 May, 2014, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/03/world/meast/ayman-al-zawahiri-message-syria/, last accessed 
on June 21, 2015). 
 
 
Batatu, Hanna,“Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: Ad-Da’wah al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin,” in Juan 
R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Shi’ism and Social Protest (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1986). 
 
 
Bates, Robert H., “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa,” 
Comparative Political Studies 6 (4), 1974: 457-84.  
 
 
Beckmann, Matthew N. and Richard L. Hall, “Elite Interviewing in Washington DC,” in Layna 




Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2006), p. 167.   
 
 
Bell, Bowyer J., “The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence: An Overview,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 17 (2), 1994: 115-50. 
 
 
Bell, Bowyer J., “Endemic Insurgency and International Order: The Eritrean Experience,” Orbis 





Bengio, Ofra, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2012).  
 
 
Bennett, Andrew, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 
eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2010).  
 
 
Bereket, Habte Selassie, The Crown and the Pen: The Memoirs of a Lawyer Turned Rebel 
(Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2007).  
 
Bereketeab, Redie, Eritrea: Making of a Nation (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2007). 
 
 
Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why did 
Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37 (1), 2012: 1-34. 
 
 
Biddle, Stephen, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and 
Iraq,” International Security 30 (3), 2005/06: 161-76.    
 
 
Biddle, Stephen, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 
 
Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007).  
 
 
Blainey, Geoffrey, Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).   
 
 
Blank, Hartmut, Jochen Musch and R diger F. Pohl, “Hindsight Bias: On Being Wise After the 
Event,” Social Cognition 25 (1), 2007: 1-9.  
 
 
Bleich, Eric and Robert Pekkanen, “How to Report Interview Research,” in Layna Mosley, ed., 
Interview Research in Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
 
  
Bornstein, Gary, “Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective Interests,” Personality 





Borovali, Ali-Fouat, “Kurdish Insurgencies, the Gulf War, and Turkey’s Changing Role,” 
Conflict Quarterly, fall 1987: 29-45. 
 
 
Boserup, Rasmus Alenius, “Collective Violence and Counter-state Building”, in Bruce Kapferer 
and Bjorn Enge Bertelsen, eds., Crisis of the State: War and Social Upheaval (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009). 
 
 
Bowles, Samuel, “Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of 
Human Social Behaviors?”, Science 324, 2009: 1293-8. 
 
 
Bradley, Margaret M., “Emotional Memory: A Dimensional Analysis,” in Stephanie H. M. van 
Goozen, Nanne E. Van de Poll and Joseph A. Sergeant, eds., Emotions: Essays on Emotion 
Theory (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994). 
 
 
Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth, “From Old Thinking to New Thinking in 
Qualitative Research,” International Security 26 (4), 2002: 93-111.  
 
 








Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence,” 
International Organization 59 (1), 2005: 145-76. 
 
 
Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the 
Kurds (London: Viking, 1992). 
 
 
Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ethic Conflict and 
International Intervention (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 
 
 
Byman, Daniel and Taylor Seybolt, “Humanitarian Intervention in Communal Civil War,” 





Byman, Daniel, Understanding Proto-Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007). 
 
 
Calamur, Krishnadev, “ISIS: An Islamist Group Too Extreme Even For Al-Qaida,” NPR, 13 
June, 2004 (available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/06/13/321665375/isis-an-
islamist-group-too-extreme-even-for-al-qaida, last accessed on June 25, 2015). 
 
 
Caris, Charles C. and Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Middle East Security 
Report 22, Institute for the Study of War, 2014. 
 
 




Chakravarti, Sudeep, Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008). 
 
 
Chandra, Kanchan, ed., Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).   
 
 
Chandra, Kanchan, “What Is An Ethnic Party?” Party Politics 17 (2), 2011: 151-69. 
 
 
Chandra, Kanchan, “What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?” Annual Review of Political 
Science 9, 2006: 397-424 
 
 
Chandra, Kanchan, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
 




Choi, Jung-Kyoo and Samuel Bowles, “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War,” 
Science 318, 2007: 636-40. 
 
 
Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack L. Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting 









Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988). 
 
 
Clapham, Christopher, “The International Politics of African Guerrilla Movements,” South 
African Journal of International Affairs 3 (1), 1995: 81-91.  
 
 
Clapham, Christopher S., Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
 
Clarance, William, Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 
 
 
Clark, Janine A., “Field Research Methods in the Middle East,” PS:  Political Science and 
Politics 39 (3), 2006: 417-22.  
 
 
Cockburn, Patrick, “ISIS Consolidates,” London Review of Books 36 (16), 2014: 3-5. 
 
 




Conflict Records Research Center, CRRC, Saddam Hussein collection. 
 
 
Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 2010).    
 
 










Connell, Dan, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea 
Press, 1993).  
 
 




Connell, Dan, “Ethiopian Army Poised for New Ogaden Guerrilla Assault,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, 29 July, 1980. 
 
 
Connell, Dan, “Eritrea: Guerrilla Offensive,” The Guardian, 19 December, 1979.  
 
 
Connell, Dan, “Eritrean Forces Resume Guerrilla Attacks,” The Guardian, 3 January, 1979. 
 
 
Connell, Dan, “Ethiopia Prepares Eritrea Offensive,” The Guardian, 22 November, 1978. 
 
 
Connell, Dan, “Eritrean Struggle Nears Turning Point,” The Guardian, 24 May, 1978. 
 
 
Connell, Dan, “Eritrean Liberation Struggle Escalates,” The Guardian, 6 July, 1977. 
 
 
Copeland, Dale C., The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
 
 
Copeland, Dale C., “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic 
Realist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies 5 (3), 1996: 29-89. 
 
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The 
Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).  
 
 
Corstange, Daniel, The Price of a Vote: Ethnicity and Clientelism in the Middle East, 2013, book 
manuscript, Columbia University. 
 
 





Crawford, Timothy W., “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power 
Politics,” International Security, 35 (4), 2011: 155-189. 
 
 
Cunningham, David, Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis 
of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (4), 2009: 570-97. 
 
 
Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, Kristin M. Bakke and Lee J. M. Seymour, “Shirts Today, 
Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination 
Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1), 2012: 67-93. 
 
 
Dagher, Sam and Maria Abi-Habib, “Fighting Among Rebels Boosts Syrian Regime,” Wall 
Street Journal, 13 January, 2014.   
 
 
Darden, Keith, Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National 
Loyalties (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
 
 
Davies, H. J., “Spies as Informants: Triangulation and Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in 
the Study of Intelligence and Security Services,” Politics 21 (1), 2001: 73-80.  
 
 
Dawit, Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, NJ: Red 
Sea Press, 1989). 
 
  
De Figueiredo, Rui and Barry R. Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and 
Ethnic Conflict,” in Barbara F. Walter and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and 
Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
 
 
Dougherty, Beth K. and Edmund A. Ghareb, Historical Dictionary of Iraq (Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, 2013).      
 
 
Dovidio, John F. and Samuel L. Gaertner, “Ingroup Bias,” in Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert 
and Gardner Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010).  
 
 
Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and 





Eck, Kristine, “Fighting Our Friends Instead of Our Enemies,” working paper, 2010.  
 
 
ELF, Eritrean Newsletter 44, 1 September, 1981. 
 
 




Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens, GA: University 
of Georgia Press, 1980). 
 
 
Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Politics in the Middle (East Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).  
 
 
EPLF, “Ethiopia's sixth offensive and developments in the Eritrean struggle,” 25 August, 1982. 
 
 
Evron, Yair, War and Intervention in Lebanon: the Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).  
 
 
Farid, Asasard, Political Atlas of Kurdistan Region, 1914-2005 (Iraqi Kurdistan, 2010).  
 
 




Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods,” in 
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Oxford Handbook of 
Political Methodology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)  
 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 97 (1), 2003: 75-90 
 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 





Fearon, James D., “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go Together,” presented at a 
MacArthur Foundation-sponsored conference on Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability, 
Chicago, May 1999. 
 
 








Fischhoff, Baruch, “Hindsight≠Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment 
Under Uncertainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 
1 (3), 1975: 288–99.  
 
 




Fjelde, Hanne and Desirée Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel 
Groups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (4), 2012: 604-28.  
 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1976, volume XXVII, Iran, Iraq, 1973-1976, 
Documents 275-6, 279. 
 
 
Fortna, Virginia Page, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 
 
Fraiman, Keren and Austin Long, “When Failed States Succeed: Assessing Weak State Capacity 
and Choice to Confront Violent Non-state Actors,” working paper, 2014.  
 
 
Franck, Raphael and Ilia Rainer, “Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter?  Ethnic Favoritism, 
Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa,” American Political Science Review 106 (2), 
2012: 294-325.  
 
 
Frieden, Jeffry, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” in David A. Lake and 
Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 





“From the Experiences of the Eritrean Liberation Army” (available at 
http://www.nharnet.com/Editorials/TodayinEriHistory/NharnetTeam_Jan13.htm, accessed on 18 
June, 2014).  
 
 




Galula, David, Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
 
 
Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in Doug McAdam,  
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
 
 
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, “How Many Fighters does the Islamic State Really Have?” War on 
the Rock, February 9, 2015, available at http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/how-many-fighters-
does-the-islamic-state-really-have/, last accessed on June 18, 2015).   
 
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theories Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).  
 
 
Gerring, John and Rose McDermott, “An Experimental Template for Case Study Research,” 
American Journal of Political Science 51(3), 2007: 688-701.  
 
 
Ghareeb, Edmund, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1981).  
 
 
Gilmour, David, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). 
 
 
Gilpin, Robert G., “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International 
Organization 38 (2), 1984: 287-304.  
 
 
Ginges, Jeremy and Scott Atran, “What Motivates Participation in Violent Political Action: 






Gleditsch, Nils Petter, et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace 
Research 39 (5), 2002: 615–37. 
 
 
Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A 
Data Set of Political Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research 46 (2), 2009: 269–83. 
 
 
Gordon, Michael R. and Anne Barnard, “U.S. Places Militant Syrian Rebel Group on List of 
Terrorist Organizations,” New York Times, 10 December, 2012. 
 
 
Gould, Roger V., “Collective Violence and Group Solidarity: Evidence from Feuding Society,” 
American Sociological Review 64 (3), 1999: 356-80.  
 
 
Gunaratna, Rohan, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The  ole of India’s Intelligence Agencies  
(Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993).  
 
 
Gunter, Michael M., Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011). 
 
 
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (New York: St. 
Martin's Press 1999).   
 
 
Haas, Mark L., “Ideology and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 
1930s,” Security Studies 12 (4), 2003: 34–79. 
 
 
Habyariamana, James, et al., Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action (New  
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009).  
 
 
Habyariamana, James, et al., “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” 
American Political Science Review 101 (4), 2007: 709–25. 
 
 
Haddad, Wadi, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York: Praeger, 1985). 
 
 
Hamzeh, A. Nisar, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary 





Hanf, Theodor, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation 
(London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993).  
 
 
Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander and Peter Wallensteen, “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 
1946–2007,” Journal of Peace Research 45 (5), 2008: 697–710. 
 
 
Harris, William, “The View from Zahle: Security and Economic Conditions in the Central Bekaa 
1980-1985,” Middle East Journal 39 (3), 1985: 270-286.  
 
 
Hashim, Ahmed S., “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East 
Policy 21(4), 2014: 69-83. 
 
 
Hazarika, Sanjow, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New 
Delhi: Penguin India, 1994). 
 
 
H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Reviews 6 (2), 2013. 
 
 
Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart, 
Germany: F. Steiner, 1994). 
 
 
Hiltermann, Joost R., A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
 
Hiro, Dilip, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991).    
 
 
Holliday, Joseph, “Syria’s Maturing Insurgency,” Middle East Security Report 5, 2012.  
 
 
Hopgood, Stephen, Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002, in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
 









Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
 
 
Horowitz, Michael C., “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide 
Terrorism,” International Organization 64 (1), 2010: 33-64.  
 
 
International Crisis Group, “Rigged Cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian 
War,” Middle East Report 55, 2014a. 
 
 
International Crisis Group, “Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria,” Middle East 
Report 151, 2014b. 
 
 
International Crisis Group, “Syria’s Metastasising Conflicts,” Middle East Report 143, 2013a.  
 
 




International Crisis Group, “Anything But Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition,” 
Middle East Report 146, 2013c. 
 
 
International Crisis Group, “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition,” Middle East 
Report 131, 2012.  
 
 
“Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Bahdurai,” ELF, Eritrean Newsletter 44, 1 September, 
1981 (available at 
http://www.nharnet.com/Archives/Arch_2004/Oct_2004/NharnetTeam_Oct01.htm, accessed on 
12 July, 2014).  
 
 
Iqbal, Jawaid, The Lebanese Civil War: Issues, Actors and Outcome (Aligarh, India: Centre for 
West Asian Studies, 1998).  
 
 
Ismael, Tareq Y., The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (New York: Cambridge 





“ISIL Says It Faces War with Nusra in Syria,” Al Jazeera, 8 March, 2014 (available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/isil-says-it-faces-war-with-nusra-syria-
20143719484991740.html, last accessed on June 14, 2015) 
  
 




Iyob, Ruth, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 
1941-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
 
 
Izady, Mehrdad R., The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington: Taylor & Francis, 1992). 
 
 
Jaber, Hala, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
 
 
Jawad, Sa’ad, Iraq & the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970 (London: Ithaca Press, 1981). 
 
 
Jayatilleka, Dayan, The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, 1987-1990: The North-east Provincial 




Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Brothers Killing Brothers: The Current Infighting Will Test al Qaeda's 
Brand,” Perspective, RAND Corporation, 2014 (available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE123, last accessed on June 15, 2015). 
 
 
Jentzsch, Corinna, Stathis N. Kalyvas and Livia Isabella Schubiger, “Militias in Civil War,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015 (forthcoming). 
 
 
Jervis, Robert, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (5), 2006: 641-63.  
 
 






Jervis, Robert, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997).  
 
 
Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (2), 1978: 167-214 
 
 
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
University Press, 1976). 
 
 
Johnston, Patrick B., “Countering ISIL’s Financing,” Testimony presented before the House 
Financial Services Committee on November 13, 2014.  
 
 
Johnston, Patrick B., “The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil 
Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone,” Security Studies 17 (1), 2008: 107-37. 
 
 
Johnston, Patrick B., “Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence 
from Darfur,” Civil Wars 9 (4), 2007: 359-77.  
 
 
Kagan, Kimbery, Frederik W. Kagan and Jessica D. Lewis, “A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic 
State,” Middle East Security Report 23, Institute for the Study of War, 2014.  
 
 
Kahsay, Berhe,  thiopia: Democratization and Unity  The  ole of the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (M nster, Germany: Monsenstein und Vannerdat, 2005).  
 
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Matthew Kocher, “How ‘Free’ is Free-Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, 
Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics 59 (2), 2007: 177-216.  
 
 








Kaplan, Morgan L., “How Civilian Perceptions Affect Patterns of Violence and Competition in 





Karadaghi, Kamran, “The Two Gulf Wars: The Kurds on the World Stage, 1979-1992,” in 




Karam, Zeina and Bassem Mroue, “Al-Qaida Militants Capture Town in Northern Syria,” 
Associated Press, 19 September, 2013 (available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/jihadis-capture-
northern-syrian-town-near-turkey, last accessed on June 13, 2015). 
 
 
Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002).  
 
 
Kasara, Kimuli, “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of 
Agriculture in Africa,” American Political Science Review 101 (1), 2007: 159- 72.  
 
 
Kaufmann, Chaim D., “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International 
Security 20 (4), 1996: 136-75; 
 
 
Keller, Edmond J., Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
 
 
Kenny, Paul D., “Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from 
Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma,” International Studies Review 12 (4), 2010: 533-55. 
 
 
Khalidi, Walid, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: A Confrontation in the Middle East 
(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979). 
 
 
Kibreab, Gaim, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence (Trenton, NJ: The Red 
Sea Press, 2008).  
 
 
Kibreab, Gaim, “Resistance, Displacement, and Identity: The Case of Eritrean Refugees in 
Sudan,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 34 (2), 2000: 249-96.  
 
 
Kiflu, Tadesse, Generation: The History of the  thiopian People’s  evolutionary Party (Part II) 





Kilcullen, David, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2006: 103-8.  
 
 
King, Gary and Langche Zeng, “Explaining Rare Events in International Relations,” 
International Organization 55 (3), 2001: 693–715. 
 
 
King, Gary, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 




King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
 
 
Klarke, Kevin A., “The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Research 22 (4), 2005: 341-52. 
 
 
Kozak, Christopher, “An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria,” Middle 
East Security Report 26, Institute for the Study of War, 2015.  
 
 
Kozak, Christopher, “The Assad Regime Under Stress: Conscription and Protest among Alawite 
and Minority Populations in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, 15 December, 2014  
(available at http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-assad-regime-under-stress.html, last 
accessed on June 20, 2015).  
 
 
Kramon, Eric and Daniel N. Posner, “Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the 




Krause, Peter, “The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed 




Krause, Peter, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to 









Kutschera, Chris, Le Mouvement National Kurd (Paris: Frammarion, 1979).  
 
 
Kydd, Andrew H. and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist 
Violence,” International Organization 56 (2), 2002: 263-96. 
 
 
Lawrence, Adria, “Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings 
against Colonial Rule,” International Security 35 (2), 2010: 88–122. 
 
 
Lawrence, Quil, Invisible Nation: How The  urds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the 
Middle East (New York: Walker & Company, 2008).  
 
 
“Lebanon,” UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (available at 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=92&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, last 
accessed on April 25, 2015).   
 
 
Le Fort, René, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution? (London: Zed Press, 1983).  
 
 
Lefebvre, Jeffrey Alan, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-
1991 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).  
 
 
Levy Jack, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 25 (1), 2008: 1-18.  
 
 
Lewis, Janet I., “Initiating Insurgency: Rebel Group Formation and Viability in Uganda,” 
manuscript, Harvard University, 2012.   
 
 
Liberman, Evan, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” 
American Political Science Review 99 (3), 2005: 435-52. 
 
 
Liberman, Nira, Michael D. Sagristano and Yaacov Trope, “The Effect of Temporal Distance on 





Liberman, Peter, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
 
 
Lilja, Jannie and Lisa Hultman, “Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against 
CoEthnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War,” Security Studies 20 (2), 2011: 171–97.  
 
 
Lindsay, Jon and Austin Long, “Counterinsurgency Theory and Stabilization of Iraq’s Anbar,” 
working paper, 2009. 
 
 
Loewenstein, George, Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, “Projection Bias In Predicting 
Future Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4), 2003: 1209-48 
 
 
Loftus, Elizabeth F., Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
 
 
Loganathan, Ketheshwaran, Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic 
Conflict (Colombo: Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, 1996).  
 
 
Lowenthal, Richard World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964).  
 
 
Lowery, David and Virginia Gray, “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural 
Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States,” American Journal of Political 
Science 39 (1), 1995: 1-29. 
 
 
Lund, Aron, “Syria’s al-Qaeda Wing Searches for a Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 18 September 2014 (available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=56673, last accessed on June 19, 2015).   
 
 
Lund, Aron, “The Political Geography of Syria’s War: An Interview With Fabrice Balanche,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 January 2015 (available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=5887, last accessed on June 20, 2015).  
 
 
Lyall, Jason, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second 





Lyall, Jason, Kosuke Imai and Yuki Shiraito, “Dropping a Dime: Coethnic Bias and Wartime 
Informing,” working paper, 2013. 
 
 
Lynch, Julia F., “Aligning Sampling Strategies with Analytic Goals,” in Mosley, in Layna 




Mackey, Sandra, A Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict (New York: Norton, 2008). 
 
 
Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During 
War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).  
 
 
Marcum, John H., The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978). 
 
 
Markakis, John, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987).  
 
 
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).     
 
 
McDoom, Omar Shahbudin, “The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict:  Emotions, 




McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, 3rd ed.). 
 
 
McDowall, David, The Kurds: A Nation Denied (London: Minority Rights Group, 1992).  
 
 
McLauchlin, Theodore and Wendy Pearlman, “Out-Group Conflict, In-Group Unity? Exploring 






McLauchlin, Theodore, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative 
Politics 42 (3), 2010: 333-50.  
 
 
Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).  
 
 
Mehta, Ashok “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: How Eelam War IV was Won,” Manekshaw Paper 
22, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, CLAWS, 2010, New Delhi). 
 
 
Metelits, Claire, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior 
(New York: New York University Press, 2010).  
 
 
The Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (various years). 
 
 




Mosley, Layna, “Introduction. ‘Just Talk to People?’ Interviews in Contemporary Political 
Science,” in Layna Mosley, ed., Interview Research in Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2013). 
 
 
Mullen, Brian and Rupert Brown and Colleen Smith, “Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, 




Muni, S. D., Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s  thnic Crisis (Oslo: PRIO, 1993).  




Nassief, Isabel, “The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo,” Middle East Security Report 17, 2014. 
 
 






Nawshirwan, Mustafa, Going Around in Circles: The Inside Story of Events in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
1984-1988 (Iraqi Kurdistan, 1999). 
 
 
Nawshirwan, Mustafa, Fingers that Break Each Other: Political Events in Kurdistan from 1979 
to 1983 (Iraqi Kurdistan, 1998).  
 
 
Nawshirwan, Mustafa, From the Danube Shores to the Nawzang Valley: Political Events in Iraqi 
Kurdistan from 1975 to 1978 (Iraqi Kurdistan, 1997) 
 
 
Nemeth, Stephen, “The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 58 (2): 336-62.  
 
 
Nisbett, Richard and Timothy D. Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on 
Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (33), 1977: 231-59. 
 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, “(In)security Zones in South Lebanon,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies  23 (1), 1993: 61-79. 
 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).  
 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard, “Lebanon after Ta'if: Is the Civil War over?”, Middle East Journal 45 
(3), 1991: 457-473.  
 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1987.  
 
 
Nygard, Havard Mokleiv and Michael Weintraub, “Bargaining between Rebel Groups and the 
Outside Option of Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2015 (forthcoming). 
 
 
O’Bagy, Elizabeth, “The Free Syrian Army,” Middle East Security Report 9, Institute for the 
Study of War, 2013. 
 
 





O’Ballance, Edgar, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973).  
 
 
O’Duffy, Brendan, “LTTE: Majoritarianism, Self-Determination, and Military-to-Political 
Transition in Sri Lanka,” in Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary and John Tirman, eds., 
Terrorism, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflict (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007).  
 
 
Ostovar, Afshon and Will McCants, “The Rebel Alliance: Why Syria’s Armed Opposition Has 
Failed to Unify,” CNA Research Memorandum, CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2013 (available at 
https://www.cna.org/research/2013/rebel-alliance, last accessed on June 10, 2015).  
 
 
Ottaway, Marina, “The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?” 
Northeast African Studies 2 (3), 1995: 67-87. 
 
 
Parkinson, Sarah Elizabeth, “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and 
Social Networks in War,” American Political Science Review 107 (3), 2013: 418-32.  
 
 
Pateman, Roy, Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998). 
 
 




Petersen, Roger, Understanding Ethnic Violence, Western Intervention in the Balkans: The 
Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
 
Petersen, Roger D., Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
 
Picard, Elizabeth, Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 2002).  
 
 






Pollack, Kenneth M., Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2002).  
 
 
Pool, David, From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean Liberation Front (Oxford: James 
Currey, 2001).  
 
 
Pool, David, Eritrea: Towards Unity in Diversity (London: Minority Rights Group, 1997).  
 
 
Popkin, Samuel, The Rational Peasant (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).  
 
 
Posen, Barry R., “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 31 (1), 1993: 27-37. 
 
 
Posen, Barry R., Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
 
 








Quinlivan, James T., “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” 
International Security 24 (2), 1999: 131-65.  
 
 
Rabil, Robert G., Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003).  
 
 








Randal, Jonathan C., Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War 





Ray, James Lee, “Constructing Multivariate Analyses (of Dangerous Dyads),” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 22 (4), 2005: 277-92. 
 
 
Reno, William, Warfare in Independent Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
 
Richardson, John, Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism and Development 
from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 2005). 
 
 
Riek, Blake M., et al., “Does a Common Ingroup Identity Reduce Intergroup Threat?,” Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations 13 (4), 2010: 403-23.    
 
 
Roessler, Philip, “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,” World 
Politics 63 (2), 2011: 300-46. 
 
 
Roggio, Bill and Lisa Lundquist, “Analysis: Shifting Dynamics of Rebel Infighting in Syria,” 
Long War Journal, 17 January, 2014 (available at 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/analysis_shifting_dy.php, last accessed on June 
24, 2015).   
 
 
Roggio, Bill, “Chief of Syrian Revolutionaries Front Says al Qaeda Is ‘Not Our Problem’,” Long 
War Journal, 3 April, 2014 (available at 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/chief_of_syrian_revolutionary.php, last 
accessed on June 21, 2015).  
 
 
Romano, David, “Conducting Research in the Middle East’s Conflict Zones,” PS:  Political 
Science and Politics 39 (3), 2006: 439-42.  
 
 
Romano, David, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
 




Rosecrance, Richard, Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986).  
335 
 
Rosen, Stephen Peter, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).  
 
 
Rouleau, Eric, Le Monde, 12 March, 1963.  
 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an 
Operational Definition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6), 2004: 814-58. 
 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Moses Shayo, “Parochialism as a Central 
Challenge in Counterinsurgency,” Science 336, 2012: 805-8. 
 
 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid Sarkees and Phil Schafer, “The Correlates of War Data On War: an 
Update To 1997,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 18 (1), 2000: 123-44. 
 
 
Scacco, Alexandra, Anatomy of a Riot: Participation in Ethnic Violence in Nigeria, 2012, book 
manuscript, New York University.  
 
 
Scheepers, Daan, et al., “The Social Functions of Ingroup Bias: Creating, Confirming, or 
Changing Social Reality,” European Review of Social Psychology 17 (1), 2006: 359-96. 
 
 
Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).  
 
 
Schmidt, Dana Adams, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964).  
 
 
Schroeder, Paul, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security 19 (1), 
1994: 108-48.       
 
 
Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonah, “Fighting Between Allies and the Civil War in Syria,” in The Political 
Science of Syria’s War, POMEPS Briefings 22, 2013.   
 
 
Schweller, Randall, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, 





Seawright, Jason and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A 




“Setback for U.S.-backed rebels in Syria,” CBS News, 4 November 2014 (available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-linked-nusra-front-fights-rebels-syria-turkey-border/, 
last accessed on June 20, 2015). 
 
 
Seymour, Lee, “Alignment in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage and Side Switching in Sudan,” 
International Security 39 (2), 2014: 92-131.     
 
 
Shayo, Moses and Asaf Zussman, “Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 2011: 1447–84. 
 
 
Sherman, Richard, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980). 
 
 
Shils, Edward A. and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World 
War II,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (2), 1948: 280-31. 
 
 
Shinn, David H. and Thomas P. Ofcansky, Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia (Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, 2013). 
 
 
Siklawi, Rami, “The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 34 (1), 2012: 4-26. 
 
 
Simmel, Georg, Conflict: The Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, ILL.: Free Press, 1955 
 
 
Sivarajah, Ambalavanar, Politics of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers, 1996).  
 
 
Sly, Liz “On Third Anniversary of Syrian Rebellion, Assad Is Steadily Winning the War, 
Washington Post, 14 March, 2014.  
 
 
Smith, Niel A., “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 





Snider, Lewis W., “The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics,” Middle 
East Journal 38 (1), 1984: 1-33.  
 
 
Snyder, Glenn H., Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).  
 
 
Snyder, Jack L. and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Barbara F. Walter 




Snyder, Jack L. and Keir A. Lieber, “Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History 
of World War I,” International Security 33 (1), 2008: 174-94. 
 
 




Solomon, Erika, “Isis Uses Humility as Tactic for Conquest,” Financial Times, 27 July, 2014.  
 
 




Staniland, Paul, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).  
 
 
Staniland, Paul, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and 
the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1), 2012a: 16-40. 
 
 
Staniland, Paul, “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia,” 
International Security 37 (1), 2012b. 
 
 
Staniland, Paul, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” Perspectives on Politics 10 





Stansfield, Gareth R. V., Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).  
 
 




Stein, Arthur A., “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 20 (1), 1976: 143–72. 
 
 
Stork, Joe, “The War of the Camps, The War of the Hostages,” MERIP Reports 133, 1985. 
 
 
Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck and Joakim Kreutz, “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, 49 (2), 2012: 351-62.  
 
 
Swamy, M.R., Inside an Elusive Mind, Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World's Most 
Ruthless Guerrilla Leader (Delhi: Konark Publishers 2003).  
 
 




 “Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political opposition,” BBC News, 13 December, 2013, 




“Syria: Nearly Half Rebel Fighters are Jihadists or Hardline Islamists, Says IHS Jane's Report,” 
The Daily Telegraph, 15 September, 2013.  
 
 
“Syrian Rebel Factions Tell Al Qaeda Groups to Withdraw,” France24, 3 October, 2013 
(available at http://www.france24.com/en/20131003-syrian-rebels-tell-qaeda-groups-withdraw-
homs-isil-azaz/, last accessed on June 13, 2015).   
 
 
Szybala, Valerie, “Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colors in Syria,” Backgrounder, Institute for the 













Talmadge, Caitilin, Authoritarian Armies on the Battlefield: Explaining Fighting Power in Non-
Democratic Regimes, book manuscript, George Washington University, 2013.  
 
 
Tambiah, Stanley, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
 
 
Tansey, Oisin, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” 
PS: Political Science and Politics 40 (4), 2007: 765-772. 
 
 
Tareke, Gebru, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2009). 
 
 
Tareke, Gebru,“From Lash to Red Star: the Pitfalls of Counter-insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980–
82,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (3), 2002: 465–98 
 
 
Terrill, Andrew W., “Confronting the ‘Islamic State’: Understanding the Strengths and 
Vulnerabilities of ISIS,” Parameters 44 (3), 2014:13-23.  
 
 
Tetlock, Philip E., “Social Psychology and World Politics,” in Daniel Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and 
Gardner Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). 
 
 
“The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: Two Arab Countries Fall Apart,” The Economist, 
14 June, 2014.  
 
 
“The Near Liquidation of the (E)PLF,” a collection of memoirs of splinter groups’ fighters and 
other documents covering the years 1972 and 1973, compiled in 1993 by Aida Kidane (available 





Tiruneh, Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1987: A Transformation from an 
Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).   
 
 
Tooby, John and Leda Cosmides, “The Evolution of War and its Cognitive Foundations,” 
Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Report 88 (1), 1988.  
 
 
TPLF Foreign Relations Bureau, People’s Voice, March 1985, April-May 1985, Special Issue 
(“On Our Differences with the EPLF”), 1986. 
 
  
Trachtenberg, Marc, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).  
 
 
Traud, James, “Everyone Is Scared of ISIS,” Foreign Policy, 4 October, 2013 (available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/04/everyone-is-scared-of-isis/, last accessed on June 24, 2015). 
 
 
Trivelli, Richard M., “Divided Histories, Opportunistic Alliances: Background Notes on the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean War,” Africa Spectrum 33 (3), 1998: 257-89. 
  
 
University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), The Broken Palmyra (Sri Lanka, 1990) 
(available at http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume1/Chapter5.htm, last accessed on January 19, 2015; 
UTHR(J) is a human rights organization that originated among professors in Jaffna). 
 
 
Unpublished interview with Jalal Talabani, Kurdish Library Museum, Brooklyn, New York.   
 
 
“U.S.-backed Syria Rebels Crumble Under al Qaeda Fire,” CBS News, 3 March, 2015 (available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-backed-syria-rebel-group-hazm-defeated-al-qaeda-nusra-
front/, last accessed on June 20, 2015). 
 
 
Vagts, Alfred, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New 
York: King’s Crown Press, 1956). 
 
 






Van de Walle, Nicolas, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (2), 2003: 297–321.  
 
 
Van Evera, Stephen, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
 
 
Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). 
 
 
Van Oyen Witvliet, Charlotte, “Traumatic Intrusive Imagery as an Emotional Memory 
Phenomenon: A Review of Research and Explanatory Information Processing Theories,” 
Clinical Psychology Review 17 (5), 1997: 509-36.  
 
 
Vanly, Ismet Chériff,  urdistan Irakien  ntit  Nationale   tude de la   volution de      
(Neuch tel:  ditions de la Baconni re, 1970).  
 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” Perspectives on Politics 1 
(1), 2003: 85–99. 
 
 




Vijayasiri, Raj, “A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan Government’s Counterinsurgency 
Campaign,” Master Thesis, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999. 
 
 
Walt, Stephen, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
 
 
Walter, Barbara F., “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 
51 (3), 1997: 335–64 
 
 
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
 
 
Ward, Steven R., Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: 





Weinstein, Jeremy M., Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
 
Weiss, Caleb, “Islamic State Advances Near Kobane,” Long War Journal, 1 October 2014 
(available at 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/islamic_state_advances_near_ko.php, last 
accessed on June 20, 2015). 
 
 
Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan, “Why Some Secular Sunnis Support ISIS,” Business 
Insider, 14 March, 2015 (available at http://www.businessinsider.com/why-some-secular-sunnis-
support-isis-2015-3, last accessed on June 19, 2015).  
 
 
Weiss, Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan 
Arts, 2015).  
 
 
Weitsman, Patricia A., “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and 
Triple Entente,” Security Studies 12 (3), 2003: 79-113.     
 
Weldemichael, Awet T., “Formative Alliances of Northeast African Insurgents: Eritrean 
Liberation Strategy and Ethiopian Armed Opposition, 1970s–1990s,” Northeast African Studies 
14 (1), 2014: 83-122. 
 
 
Weldemichael, Awet T., Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East 
Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013a). 
 
 
Weldemichael, Awet T., “African Diplomacy of Liberation: The Case of Eritrea’s Search for An 
‘African India’,” Cahiers d'Études africaines 212 (4), 2013b: 867-94 
 
 
Weldemichael, Awet T., “The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean 




Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University 





Wells, Gary L. and Elizabeth A. Olson; “Eyewitness Testimony,” Annual Review of Psychology 
54: 2003: 277–95.  
 
 
Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
 
“What ISIS, an al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria, Really Wants,” The Economist Explains (blog), 
January 20, 2014 (available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/01/economist-explains-12, last 
accessed on June 14, 2015). 
 
 
Whetten, Laurence L., “The Military Dimension,” in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, 




Whitaker, Mark P., Learning Politics from Sivaram: The Life and Death of a Revolutionary 
Tamil Journalist in Sri Lanka (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 
 
 
White, Jeffrey and Oula Abdulhamid Alrifai, “Growing Rebel Capabilities Press the Syrian 
Regime,” Policywatch 2414, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2015. 
 
 
White, Jeffrey, “ISIS, Iraq, and the War in Syria: Military Outlook,” Policywatch 2273, 2014.  
 
 
White, Jeffery, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” in  Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler 
and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Syria’s Military Opposition: How Effective, United, or Extremist?,” Policy 
Focus 128, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013. 
 
 
White, Jeffrey, Andrew J. Tabler and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Syria’s Military Opposition: How 




“Why ISIS Is Gaining Ground – and So Hard to Beat” (interview with Noah Bonsey), Syria 
Deeply (available at http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/10/6227/isis-gaining-ground-hard-





Wickham-Crowley, Timothy, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study 
of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
 
 
Wilson, Michael L., Marc D. Hauser and Richard W. Wrangham, “Does Participation in 
Intergroup Conflict Depend on Numerical Assessment, Range Location, or Rank for Wild 
Chimpanzees?” Animal Behaviour 61 (6), 2001: 1203–16. 
 
 
Wilson, Timothy D. and Elizabeth W. Dunn, “Self-knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential 
for Improvement,” Annual Review of Psychology 55, 2004: 493-518. 
 
 
Windrem, Robert, “ISIS By the Numbers: Foreign Fighter Total Keeps Growing,” NBC News, 
28 February, 2015 (available at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-numbers-
foreign-fighter-total-keeps-growing-n314731, last accessed on June 17, 2015).  
 
 




Woldemariam, Michael, “Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons From the 
Eritrean,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2015 (forthcoming). 
 
 
Woldermariam, Michael H., Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African 
Insurgencies, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2011. 
 
 
Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962). 
 
 
Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter and Clifford J. Carrubba, “Information, Commitment, and War,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (4), 2011: 556-79. 
 
 
Wood, Elisabeth J., Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
 
 
Woods, Kevin M., David D. Palkki and Mark E. Stout, eds., The Saddam Tapes: The Inner 





Woods, Kevin M, et al., Saddam’s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2011). 
 
 
Woods, Kevin M., Williamson Murray and Thomas Holaday, “Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military 
Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War,” McNair Paper 70, National Defense University, 2009. 
 
 
Wucherpfennig Julian, et al., “Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War,” World 
Politics 64 (1), 2012: 79-115.  
 
 
Yamagishi, Toshio, Nobuhito Jin and Toko Kiyonari, “Bounded Generalized Reciprocity: 
Ingroup Boasting and Ingroup Favoritism,” Advances in Group Processes 17, 1999: 161-97. 
 
 




Young, John, Peasant  evolution in  thiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front,   75-1991 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
 
 
Young, John, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy 23 (70), 
1996a: 531-42.  
 
 
Young, John, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and 
Pragmatism,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1), 1996b: 105-20.  
 
 
Zahriyeh, Ehab, “How ISIL Became a Major Force with Only a Few Thousand Fighters,” Al 
Jazeera, 19 June, 2014, available at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/isil-
thousands-fighters.html, last accessed on June 17, 2015). 
 
 
Zelin, Aaron Y., “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist 








Appendix 1: Interviewee List  
 
 
Iraqi Kurdistan (22 subjects, 31 interviews total)  
 
- Abdulrazaq Aziz – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was member of the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction from 1960, then PUK’s high-ranking member.  
 
 
- Adil Murad – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a member of Barzani’s faction during 
the first Kurdish insurgency and then a founding member of the PUK.  
 
 
- Adnan Mufti – 1 interview in Erbil, Iraq. He was a senior member of the Socialist Party at the 
time of its insurgency against Iraq.  
 
 
- Azoz Hardi – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a member of Pasok from 1981, for which 
he fought as a peshmerga from 1987 to 1991.  
 
 
- Farid Assasard – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was responsible for PUK’s 
communications from 1978. 
 
 
- Faridoun Abd-Al Qader – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK’s founding member. 
 
 
- Fouad Yassin – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a KDP’s peshmerga until 1975 and 
then a PUK’s foot soldier in the years 1976-1978. 
 
 
- Kurshid Shera – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a peshmerga in Barzani’s faction from 1961 
and then a KDP’s military commander. 
 
 
- Mahmoud Osman (Dr.) – 1 interview in Erbil, Iraq. He was Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s close 
collaborator from the early 1960s.   
 
 
- Mala Baxtiar – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early PUK’s military commander. 
 
 
- Mala Mohamed – 2 interviews in Salahadin, Iraq. He has been a KDP’s member since before 
the beginning of the war in 1961. 
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- Mam Rostam – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK’s military commander.   
 
 
- Mohammad “Hama” Tofiq – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early high-ranking 
member of the PUK.   
 
 
- Mulazin Omar – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early PUK’s military commander. 
 
 
- Mushin Dizai – 1 meeting in Erbil, Iraq. He was a close advisor to Mullah Mustafa Barzani and 
then a senior KDP’s figure.  
 
 




- Mustafa Seydcadre – 1 meeting in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a senior PUK’s member. 
 
 
- Omar Said Ali – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a senior PUK’s member.   
 
 
- Salar Aziz – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a member of the Ahmed-Talabani faction 
and then high-ranking PUK’s member.  
 
 
- Shoresh Hadji – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK’s commander during the Iran-
Iraq war.  
 
 
- Seyd Kaka – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a military commander in Barzani’s faction, 
then in the PUK and the Socialist Party. 
 
 
- Shaik Jafar – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a PUK’s military commander and KRG’s 











Eritrea (12 subjects, 17 interviews total)  
 
- Adhanom Gebremariam – 2 interviews in New York City. He was an EPLF’s member from 
1972, held senior military command positions during the war as well as executive and diplomatic 
posts in its aftermath. 
 
 
- Ahmed Nasser – 1 interview in Stockholm. He was member of the ELF from 1963, held in 
leadership positions from 1971, including the chairmanship of the organization from 1975 to 1983. 
 
 








- Gime Ahmed – 2 interviews Addis Ababa. He was an early ELM’s member, in the ELF from 
1962, held several leadership and military positions, including in the counterintelligence office. 
 
 
- Haile Menkerios – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was EPLF’s member from 1973, Eritrea’s 
Ambassador to Ethiopia and to the Organization of African Unity and United Nations 
Ambassador at the African Union after Eritrea’s independence.  
 
 
- Mesfin Hagos – 3 interviews in Frankfurt. He was a founding member of the EPLF, military 
commander during the liberation struggle and Eritrea’s Minister of Defense after independence. 
 
 
- Tesfay Woldemichael “Degiga” – 1 interview in Frankfurt. He was an ELF’s member from 
1973 and in the group’s leadership from 1975.  
 
 
- Tewolde Gebrselassie – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He was an ELF’s member from 1974, 
senior cadre subsequently.  
 
 
- Wolde-Yesus Ammar – 1 interview in Frankfurt. He was a member of an ELF’s underground 
cell from 1965, subsequently became the head of the ELF’s Foreign Office. 
 
 






- anonymous interviewee, 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an ELF’s member from 1974, 
senior cadre subsequently. 
 
 
Tigray (16 subjects, 18 interviews total)  
 
- Aregawi Berhe – 1 interview in The Hague. He was a founding member of the TPLF, then 
chairman of the organization in the years 1976-1979 and head of its military committee until his 
ousting in 1986. 
 
 
- Begasho Gurmo “Ashenafi” – 1 interview in Frankfurt, Germany. He was an EPRP’s foot 
soldier in Tigray from 1977.  
 
 
- Berhanu Berhe – 1 interview in Mekele, Ethiopia. He was a TPLF’s rank-and-file from 1977.  
 
 
- Fantahun “Ghidey” Zeratsion – 1 interview in Oslo. He was a founding member of the TPLF, 
then vice-chairman from 1978 until his expulsion from the organization in 1985 
 
 




- Gebru Asrat – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was a TPLF’s member from 1975 and a key 
figure in the organization during the insurgency, then politburo member and President of Tigray 
at the time of his expulsion in 2001. 
 
 
- Mokonnen Mokonnen – 1 interview in Silver Spring, MD.  He was a TPLF’s member from 
1975, then a senior figure in the organization until 1988.  
 
 
- Mulugeta Gebrehiwot – 1 in Addis Ababa. He was an early TPLF’s member, a simple rank-and-




- Negasso Gidada – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was originally affiliated with the OLF, then 





-Nigatu Teferi – 1 interview in Lancaster, PA. He was a major in the Ethiopian Army until 1991 
and took part in the Lash and the Red Star offensives. 
 
 
- Sibhat Nega – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He has been in the TPLF’s leadership since 1975.  
 
 
- Tedros Hagos – 1 interview in Mekele, Ethiopia. He was a TPLF’s member from 1976, then 
member of the group’s leadership committee from 1983. 
 
 
- Tekleweini Assefa – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an early TPLF’s member, then senior 








- Yosef Tesfai – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an EPRP’s member based in the United 
States during the war.  
 
 
- anonymous interviewee – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He was an EPRP’s rank-and-file in 























Appendix 2: Robustness Checks for Statistical Analysis  
 
 
In this appendix, I present a series of additional robustness checks of the statistical findings 
presented in Chapter 6 on the coethnicity hypothesis. As a preview, coethnic appears robust to 
the inclusion of several alternative measures of my control variables and different specifications.   
 
Robustness checks with alternative measures of government threat and strength 
In Table A2.1, I run the models presented in Table 6.2 in Chapter 6 with gdp replacing military 
personnel as a measure of government strength. The new variable is drawn from the dataset 
compiled by Seden Akcinaroglu and indicates a civil war country’s GDP per capita (in 2005 
constant prices, divided by 1000).
702
 I also run models with two alternative measures of the 
degree of overstretch of government forces. In addition to estimates of rebel groups’ numerical 
strength (whose annual sum across all dyads facing the same government I use to create 
overstretch), the Non-state Actor Data reports a qualitative assessment of organizations’ 
“fighting capacity” and “summary strength” relative to the government. Fighting capacity is an 
ordinal variable indicating “the ability of the rebels to effectively engage the army militarily and 
win major battles, posing a credible challenge to the state,” rather than limiting themselves to hit-
and-run attacks; it ranges from “low” to “moderate” and “high”.
703
 The measure of summary 
strength is an ordinal variable indicating whether an insurgent group is “much weaker,” 
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 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of 
Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4), 2009: 570-97, in particular pp. 580-1. 
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“weaker,” “stronger,” “much stronger” than the government or “at parity” with it.
704
 I construct 
overstretch3 and overstretch2 by transforming both of these nominal variables into numerical 
ones (with respective ranges of 1-3 and 1-5) and summing them across all rebel groups facing the 
same government in a given year. 
   
Table A2.1: Robustness to alternative measures of government strength and threat 
Model               (A1)            (A2)             (A3)             (A4)           (A5)            (A6)                  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic            2.304***        2.444**          1.997***        1.724***        2.267***        1.958**  
                   (2.70)          (2.34)           (2.79)          (2.62)          (2.62)          (2.48)    
 
 
Gdp                 0.013           0.043                                            0.010           0.006    
                   (0.41)          (1.25)                                           (0.32)          (0.21)    
 
 
Abs. weakness      -0.471           0.052           -1.012          -1.219          -0.476          -0.652    
                  (-0.45)          (0.07)          (-1.26)         (-1.51)         (-0.51)         (-0.70)    
 
 
Balance            -0.818          -0.485           -1.342**        -1.466**        -0.817          -0.863    
                  (-1.27)         (-1.02)          (-2.29)         (-2.33)         (-1.27)         (-1.43)    
 
 
Overstretch                         0.00002***                                                                 
                                   (3.71)                                                                    
 
 
Overstretch2                                        -0.076                          -0.013                    
                                                   (-0.34)                         (-0.05)                    
 
 
Overstretch3                                                        -0.229                          -0.179   
                                                                   (-1.15)                         (-0.90)    
 
 
Constant           -4.530***       -6.039***        -3.389**        -2.478**        -4.367***       -3.272*** 
                  (-3.34)         (-5.89)          (-2.46)         (-2.21)         (-3.00)         (-2.83)   
 
Observations     973    973     1050  1050         973          973 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01. 
 
The inclusion of these new variables does not affect my main findings, with coethnic’s 
significance ranging between the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Gdp and the two alternative measures of 
government overstretch are not significant.   
                                                          
704
 Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) collapse these two variables in, respectively, a dichotomous and 
trichotomous variable in their paper, but I use the original variables in the Non-state Actor Data to create the two 
alternative measures of government forces’ overstretch 
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In table A2.2 I introduce the variable counting the number of rebel groups a government 
is facing in a given year (rebel groups) in models with different specifications (in Chapter 6, I 
had included this variable in model 6 in Table 6.3 and then dropped it for lack of statistical 
significance). Rebel groups is significant in 3 out of 5 models, but has an unexpected negative 
sign, which suggests that the variable is probably not capturing the degree of overstretch of the 
security forces; my favorite measure – overstretch – retains statistical significance and its 
positive sign in the models in which it is included. The coethnicity effect is robust to these 
checks.      
 
Table A2.2: Robustness checks with number of rebel groups  
Model                  (A7)               (A8)                (A9)            (A10)             (A11) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic              1.662***           1.770***            1.586**          1.987**            2.101** 
                     (2.71)             (2.60)              (2.29)           (2.29)             (2.49) 
 
 
Rebel groups         -0.574**           -0.473**            -0.266           -0.654*            -0.579 
                    (-2.25)            (-2.23)             (-0.89)          (-1.66)            (-1.29) 
 
 
Absolute weakness    -1.245             -0.711              -0.763           -0.128             -0.145 
                    (-1.42)            (-0.67)             (-0.68)          (-0.18)            (-0.19) 
 
 
Balance              -1.441**           -0.793              -0.867           -0.466             -0.583 
                    (-2.10)            (-1.10)             (-1.21)          (-0.90)            (-1.06) 
 
 
Gdp                                      0.013                                0.05*  
                                        (0.44)                               (1.85) 
 
 
Military personnel                                          -0.001                               -0.001 
                                                           (-0.71)                              (-0.82) 
 
 
Overstretch                    0.00002***          0.00002*** 
                           (3.89)              (3.63) 
 
 
Constant             -1.314              -2.169*             -2.376**        -3.18**             -2.874* 
                    (-1.11)             (-1.66)             (-1.96)         (-2.08)             (-1.78) 
 
Observations          1050                973                   970            973                 970 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses).  







Robustness checks with alternative measures of the inter-rebel balance of power 
In tables A2.3 and A2.4 I run a series of models with alternative measures of the distribution of 
power among members of rebel dyads; coethnic retains statistical significance in all 
specifications, ranging from the 0.1 to the 0.05 level. In model A12, I include preponderance, a 
dummy indicating a 2-1 numerical advantage for one of the groups in the dyads, instead of the 
balance and absolute weakness dummies included in the main models. In model A13, I replace 
the new variable with preponderance2, indicating a 1.5-1 numerical advantage. Neither variable 
approaches statistical significance. Models A14 and A15 are identical to the previous two, with 
the exception that gdp replaces military personnel as a measure of government strength; the 
measures of preponderance are still not significant.  
In models A16-18, I include the dummies absolute weakness and balance2, which is 
created based on the threshold of intra-dyad numerical advantage (1.5-1) used for 












Table A2.3: Robustness to alternative measures of the inter-rebel balance of power (I) 
Model          (A12)          (A13)         (A14)        (A15)       (A16)         (A17)         (A18) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic        1.4*          1.4*          2.3**        2.2**       1.4**         2.1**         2.2*** 
               (1.83)        (1.80)        (2.48)       (2.41)      (2.02)        (2.55)        (2.86) 
    
 
Mil. Per.      -0.002*       -0.002*                                -0.002*                                  
              (-1.83)       (-1.85)                                (-1.88)                                
 
 
Preponderance   0.2                         0.4                                                                
               (0.37)                      (0.77)                                                                
 
 
Preponderance2               -0.1                       -0.001                                                
                            (-0.30)                    (-0.00)                                                
 
 
Gdp                                         0.01         0.02                       0.02                
                                           (0.39)       (0.57)                     (0.56)                
      
 
Absol. weak.                                                         -0.3           0.1            -0.3 
                                                                    (-0.26)        (0.09)         (-0.41) 
 
Balance2                                                             -0.1           0.02           -0.5   
                                                                    (-0.20)        (0.03)         (-0.89) 
 
   
Overstretch2                                                                                        0.00001**              
                                                                                                   (2.20)    
 
 
Constant      -3.9***       -3.6***       -5.3***       -5.1***     -3.5***       -5.0***          -5.2*** 
             (-4.78)       (-4.38)       (-4.74)       (-4.33)     (-2.93)       (-3.65)          (-4.46)    
 
Observations    970     970           973        973   970         973           1050 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01. 
 
Models A19-21 in Table A2.4 report robustness checks using asymmetric central control 
as an additional alternative measure of the inter-rebel balance of power. The Non-State Actor 
Data contains information about the strength of rebel groups’ central leadership, which is coded 
as either “high”, “moderate” or “low”. The newly created variable asymmetric central control is 
a dummy indicating whether the members of a dyad have the same level of central leadership’s 
strength. The variable does not approach statistical significance, while coethnic remains 





Table A2.4: Robustness to alternative measures of the inter-rebel balance of power (II) 
 
Model                      (A19)                  (A20)                (A21)       
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Coethnic                    1.143*                1.589**              1.834**  
                                 (1.84)                (2.15)               (2.36)    
 
 
Overstretch                       0.00001***            0.00002***           0.00002*** 
                                 (2.65)                (3.43)               (3.79)    
 
 
Asymmetric central control       0.022                  0.543                0.160    
                                (0.04)                 (0.76)               (0.23)    
 
 
Military personnel              -0.004***                 
                               (-2.80)                    
 
 
Gdp                                                     0.023    
                                                       (0.87)    
 
 
Constant                        -4.575***              -4.362***             -5.464*** 
                               (-5.97)                (-4.48)               (-5.23)    
                 
 
Observations                      902                    823                    824 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01. 
 
 
Robustness checks with alternative measures of external support.  
In table A2.5 I report a series of robustness checks with four alternative measures of external 
support. External support2 is a dummy variable taking on 1 if both members of a rebel dyad are 
coded as receiving explicit external support from a foreign state in the Non-State Actor Data 
(external support, which I use in the main models, is equals 1 if at least one of the two groups 
received explicit external support). External support3 is a dummy indicating whether both 
members of a dyad received support, regardless of whether is coded as “explicit” or “alleged” in 
the Non-State Actor Data. External support4 is a dummy indicating whether at least one of the 
rebel groups in a dyad received external support, regardless of whether it was explicit or alleged. 
Finally, the military support dummy takes on 1 if the Non-state Actor Data codes the external 
support to at least one member of the dyad as either military aid or foreign troop presence.  
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The coethnicity variable remains significant in all specifications. Among the alternative 
measures of foreign involvement on the rebel side, external support3 and external support4 enter 
the models with positive sign and are significant at the 0.1 level. The measure of the overstretch 
of security forces is not very robust to the inclusion of the alternative measures of external 
support, reaching statistical significance (at the 0.1 level) only in two out of four models.   
 
Table A2.5: Robustness to alternative measures of external support 
 
 
Model                   (A22)            (A23)               (A24)        (A25)    
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic                2.122***            2.394**             2.228***           2.508*** 
                       (2.63)              (2.27)              (2.60)             (3.55)    
 
 
Overstretch             0.00001*           -0.000               0.000              0.00001*   
                       (1.76)             (-0.38)              (1.61)             (1.82)    
 
 
Absolute weakness      -0.700              -0.553              -0.556             -0.578    
                      (-0.78)             (-0.44)             (-0.61)            (-0.63)    
 
 
Balance                -1.286              -1.406              -1.055             -1.138    
                      (-1.63)             (-1.09)             (-1.32)            (-1.54)    
 
 
External support2       0.902                                                    
                       (1.05)                                                    
 
 
External support3                           1.379*                                   
                                           (1.72)                                    
 
 
External support4                                               1.563*                   
                                                               (1.89)                    
 
 
Military support                                                                    0.526    
                                                                                   (0.68)    
 
 
Constant             -4.849***            -4.878***            -5.653***           -5.214*** 
                    (-4.42)              (-3.08)              (-4.57)             (-4.15)    
 
Observations          1046          1002       1046       1046 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 









Robustness checks with alternative measures of territorial control and hegemonic civil war 
Table A2.6 reports two additional sets of robustness checks. Models A26 and A27 introduce two 
alternative measures of rebel territorial control. Territorial control2 is a dummy indicating 
whether both groups in a dyad control territory (territorial control, which I used in my main 
analysis in Chapter 6, measures whether at least one member of a dyad controls territory); 
territorial control3 measures asymmetry in territorial control, i.e., it takes on 1 only if one group 
controls territory and the other one does not. Neither variable is statistically significant while 
coethnic retains its significance. 
 Models A28-31 include an alternative measure of the dummy for hegemonic civil war – 
hegemonic2 – with various specifications. The new variable differs from hegemonic just for three 
observations involving Russia/Soviet Union, which Fotini Christia does not include in her list of 
multiparty civil wars and thus are coded as missing; for these observations hegemonic2 takes the 
value of 1 as the overwhelming numerical superiority of Russian/Soviet forces makes the cases 
hegemonic by Christia’s operationalization criteria.
705
 The new variable does not approach 
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 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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Table A2.6: Robustness to alternative measures of territorial control and hegemonic war 
 
Model                (A26)            (A27)           (A28)           (A29)          (A30)            (A31)    
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coethnic             2.360***         2.448***                                        1.285*          2.279*** 
                    (3.01)           (3.10)                                          (1.82)          (3.03)    
 
 
Overstretch          0.00001**        0.00001**                                                       0.00001*   
                    (2.37)           (2.37)                                                          (1.95)    
 
 
Absolute weakness   -0.905           -1.059                                                          -0.978    
                   (-1.07)          (-1.12)                                                         (-1.06)    
 
 
Balance             -1.313**         -1.379**                                                        -1.425**  
                   (-2.18)          (-2.45)                                                         (-2.31)    
 
 
Territorial         -0.399                                                                                    
control2           (-0.39)                                                                                    
 
 
Territorial                           0.886                                                                    
control3                             (1.20)                                                                    
 
 
Hegemonic2                                           -0.341           0.280          -0.265          -0.424    
                                                    (-0.36)          (0.37)         (-0.31)         (-0.43)    
 
 
Anocracy                                                              1.639*                                   
                                                                     (1.92)                                    
 
 
Constant            -4.649***        -4.974***       -3.756***       -4.647***       -4.095***       -4.187*** 
                   (-4.09)          (-4.49)         (-5.96)         (-5.22)         (-5.03)         (-2.88)    
 
Observations         1050     1050    1092   1092  1092  981 
Note: Rare-event logit with robust standard errors (Z values in parentheses) 
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
